CYPRUS (Hansard, 12 November 1958)

§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan)
With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement on Cyprus.
On 30th October, my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary explained to the House the position with regard to the discussions on Cyprus in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and, on 31st October, Her Majesty's Government issued a White Paper publishing the relevant documents. This makes abundantly clear the sincere and continuous efforts which we made to make possible a conference on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation discussions. The Greek Government have subsequently issued a statement commenting on the White Paper.
Although Her Majesty's Government cannot altogether accept this Greek version of events, I do not think it would be helpful for me now to engage in further controversy over these past exchanges. It is important to note that there has been general agreement that, whatever might be the appropriate final settlement, such a solution was unlikely to be reached immediately, and it was, therefore, necessary to find an interim arrangement. It would, however, he necessary to ensure that such an interim arrangement did not prejudice any final solution. It was made clear that, as well as a general discussion on a possible final long-term solution, particular attention should be given by the conference to this point.
We still hope that the Greek Government will, in due course, find it possible to come to the conference table on the basis which was virtually agreed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation discussions. We ourselves are still willing to attend on that basis.
As the House knows, the Greek Government have tabled on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations an item entitled, "The Question of Cyprus". Before long, we may expect a debate on this item. We are quite ready to make clear our position to other members of the United Nations. We would explain, in particular, our own policy, which we believe to be the fairest 388 compromise attainable in present circumstances. We would also make clear that we have tried, and still desire, to arrange a conference which would discuss not only our policy and amendments to it, but also any ideas for a long-term solution. Nevertheless, it would be our endeavour that the debate in the United Nations should not make agreement more difficult and should, in fact, facilitate the convening of the conference which once seemed so near.
I now turn to the position in the island. Terrorism continues and has recently taken new forms. In addition to attacks on the security services, on patrols and on military installations, there has been an increase in murderous violence against civilians. I regret to say that nine have been murdered in the last five weeks. In countering these measures, the Governor is acting throughout with the full support of his military advisers; and I would like to make it clear from the start that we have complete confidence in the Governor and his advisers, both civil and military. I must add with equal force that there is the fullest co-operation and confidence between the civil and military sides.
Various new precautions are being taken and new measures introduced. In certain respects, these have been successful. The number of ambushes is steadily falling. It is, indeed, because of these successes that the terrorists are turning towards attack upon unarmed civilians. In this situation, the Governor is being given, and will be given, every help and support that he requires in the administrative and legislative field. At the same time, every requirement of personnel or material that the Director of Operations needs will be made available to him.
We are convinced that by far the greatest proportion of Cypriots are tired of the whole terrorist situation, but the House will appreciate that they live in an atmosphere of fear. Until we can make further progress in attacking the evil at its root, we shall not command their co-operation.
Many suggestions—some very helpful —have been put to me and to my right hon. and learned Friend, and have been passed on to the Governor. We must, however, bear in mind that, while we are obliged to take security measures such as the dismissal of Cypriots employed 389 in military installations and camps, we have no desire to resort to punitive retaliatory measures against the population as a whole, although such measures may be justified in special cases.
I must now say a word about the British civilians. I would like to pay tribute to their courage. It is what we have learned to expect, and it is reinforced by the enthusiastic readiness of people in this country to volunteer for work in Cyprus. This must have impressed the House.
Some criticism has been made as to the recent decision of the Governor to arm civilians. Here, I am content to rest upon, and support, the Governor's judgment. The legal position has, of course, been fully safeguarded.
To sum up, I think that the House arid the country can have full confidence in the men on the spot, and that we can best help them by giving them our full moral and practical support.
There are thus two aspects of our Cyprus policy today. We are going forward, on the one hand, with a constructive policy for political progress in Cyprus, and we shall proceed quietly and unprovocatively with the arrangements contemplated under that policy. We shall also continue the search for a policy agreed by all parties concerned, inside and outside the island. But, on the other hand, we shall not be deterred by violence or the threat of violence, and we shall impose whatever measures are necessary to maintain security and good order and to prevent further loss of life. There is no contradiction between these two aspects of our policy.
Peace and security are the only sure foundations for political progress. We shall combat terrorism with all possible vigour; at the same time, we shall continue our efforts to reach a political agreement. It would be a great help to us in this double task if the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriot leaders would dissociate themselves from the campaign of horror and violence in the island.

§ Mr. Gaitskell
May I say, on behalf of Her Majesty's Opposition, that however much from time to time we may have differed from the Government in their 390 handling of this situation, and in the proposals that they put forward, all of us deeply deplore the cowardly and brutal murders committed recently, particularly against civilians, in Cyprus by the terrorists. Let there be no misunderstanding in Cyprus that Her Majesty's Opposition also give full support to the British security forces in the difficult, dangerous and distasteful task which they have to carry out.
May I add, however, that we do not believe that a solution to this problem can ever be found simply on the basis of repression. I therefore prefer to address my questions—and they will not be many —to the Prime Minister on the possibilities of further progress towards an agreed solution.
The Prime Minister said that he did not wish to go over the grounds of disagreement with the Greek Government which led to their withdrawal from the proposed N.A.T.O. conference. Nevertheless, since we are all anxious that there should be such a conference, I think that it is relevant to follow up one or two points which are still not clear. I should like to ask the Prime Minister three questions.
First, did M. Spaak propose, during the negotiations, that for the time being the implementing of the British plan in Cyprus should be suspended? If so, did Her Majesty's Government oppose this suggestion and, if so, why? Was it so essential that we should proceed at once with this plan, which is obviously extremely difficult to implement in the present situation in Cyprus?
Secondly, was not one of the reasons why the Greek Government withdrew from the proposed conference their desire that not only the United States and one other N.A.T.O. country—I believe Norway—should be present at the conference, but also Italy and France? If so, what was the attitude of Her Majesty's Government to that particular proposal? Was there any objection to the other two Mediterranean Powers being represented there?
Thirdly, did the Greek Government propose that both Enosis and partition should be discarded, should be put on one side? Did Her Majesty's Government accept this proposal and, if they refused it, why?

§ The Prime Minister
I will try to answer those three questions. The first was raised yesterday.
In the first place, the history of recent years has shown that there are moments when, after all the process of negotiation, and so forth, action of some kind becomes necessary. I therefore felt that the time had arrived when, after the various negotiations had already taken place and we had introduced amendments to the plan as a result of those negotiations, there was no alternative but to proceed.
But I must add—and this is the point of importance to the future as well as to the past—that the decision to do so had no effect upon the possibility of a conference, for there was, in fact, agreement on the substance of what was to be discussed at the conference and, to all intents and purposes, upon the membership and procedure.
It is clear, therefore, that it was not the refusal to postpone the plan which broke down the conference; otherwise, we would not have got so far towards it. It was not until three weeks later that the final breakdown, or, I hope, only temporary breakdown, took place. I think, therefore, that that is of importance in considering the story in its proper relation.
With regard to composition, all sorts of points were raised by all kinds of people, by different countries, at N.A.T.O. Some thought that nobody else ought to attend. Some thought that there should be three and some thought that there should be five. We thought that we had reached a compromise on the United States and Norway being asked to come as observers. The question of composition was not—and I think that the Greek Government would say so, too—the real reason why it broke down. That question could easily have been settled.
We had also made another step which, I think, was not without some generosity. I think that it was right. We proposed that we should convene the conference as the sovereign Power. We were prepared to have the conference at any place that might have been thought most convenient. We had already got down to practical discussions with all concerned about the place, and we also proposed that after the preliminary 392 session the British representative should ask Mr. Spaak to take the chair and carry on the work of the conference. From the point of view of procedure and the Power primarily concerned, that was not an ungenerous act.
I come now to the last question was it proposed by the Greek Government that questions of Enosis and partition should be washed out? Of course, they are out of that part of the agenda of the conference altogether which has to do with the present British policy and with possible amendment to it, but the Greek Government were equally anxious, as were the Turkish Government, and, perhaps, ourselves, that no kind of final solution should be ruled out of order for discussion.
Indeed, it was agreed that one of the items of the agenda should be a discussion of the final solution, and that was for two purposes. First, one must always hope for a miracle, that it might be possible that a final solution against all our expectations would emerge, but, much more important, as I have explained, that there should be full discussion of all possible solutions to ensure that what was proposed for the interim period should not be altogether contrary to, or make impossible, any final solution.

§ Mr. Bevan
Why did not the Prime Minister state in the White Paper which was issued the other day that Mr. Spaak had suggested the postponement of the application of the British plan? Why has the right hon. Gentleman omitted that? The White Paper says that M. Spaak also proposed that an early conference should be held between the three Governments, with the participation of representatives of the two major Cypriot communities. Why has a reference been made to one sugggestion of M. Spaak and the other omitted?

§ The Prime Minister
rose—

§ Mr. Bevan
I have not yet finished.

§ The Prime Minister
The answer is very simple. This suggestion of M. Spaak was never formally placed before the conference. The White Paper contains the formal document finally put forward by M. Spaak.

§ Mr. Bevan
Is it not obvious that in the psychology then existing one of the 393 chief obstacles to Greek participation was, in fact, the intention of the British Government to proceed with implementation of the plan, which had aroused such opposition in Greece?

§ The Prime Minister
No, Sir. I could well imagine that that was very much in their minds, but I do not think that it can have been an important factor, because if that had been the case they would not have continued for another three weeks discussing the conference and practically reaching agreement upon the substance of the discussion rather than still be discussing the question of composition.

§ Mr. Bevan
I have not quite finished asking my questions. We wish to be clear on this matter, because some confusion still exists. In demanding that a final solution should not be excluded from the conference, do we understand the Prime Minister to mean that the Greeks still wish Enosis to be one of the solutions considered and the Turks partition?

§ The Prime Minister
Our original idea of the conference was to discuss the interim plan and that is what I hoped it would first be. We did what we could, through our representatives in N.A.T.O., to get that. It was the Greek Government who, I think properly, said that they could not come to a conference so limited; there must be general discussion of a final solution so that they could put forward their view. We then accepted that and the Turkish Government accepted it.
If one accepts as an item for the agenda a discussion of a final solution, I do not think that it is possible to get all the members of the conference to rule out all except the particular final solution which they happen for the moment to have chosen.

§ Mr. Clement Davies
May I, first, associate myself and my colleagues with all that has been said today about the horror with which we all view the murders and atrocities that are taking place in Cyprus, and, secondly, the fact that we all have complete confidence in Her Majesty's forces.
I wish to ask the Prime Minister a question. As it is the desire of everyone to arrive at a peaceful settlement, and 394 the Government's proposals have now been before all parties for over three months and no progress has been made towards arriving at a final solution, would not the Prime Minister consider withdrawing his proposals altogether and attending a conference with a completely clean sheet, either with all the bodies that matter or with the assistance of N.A.T.O., so that they come there without anything whatsoever having been decided upon and with nothing in the minds of anybody but the desire to get even a provisional solution?

§ The Prime Minister
First, I should like to express my appreciation of the words with which the right hon. and learned Gentleman prefaced his question. I hope he will allow me to add that we have complete confidence not only in the troops, but in the Governor and the civil departments, in whom, I feel, we have equal confidence.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman's suggestion is that we should call a conference without an agenda; that is what it comes to. That, of course, we did in the summer of 1956. What we have obtained—after all, it is not something to be lightly given up—is an agreement that the conference will discuss a certain number of documents which have been circulated and agreed. That is a great advance. It means that we have agreed item I of the agenda—that is, various documents regarding the interim plan. We and the Turkish Government have agreed that amendments can be proposed and made, so we are getting very near to what the right hon. and learned Gentleman wants. We can agree to put forward different interim plans and all that can be discussed on item I.
We have agreed that a final solution is also to be discussed, for two purposes: either with the hope—as I have said, perhaps a rather extravagant hope—that it might suddenly emerge or, more particularly, to ensure that any temporary solution should not conflict with any possible final solution. Having obtained all that advance, I would be very much averse to sweeping all that away and starting again, because we would lose the really great benefit—do not let us underestimate it—of the work of M. Spaak, to whom I pay tribute.
395 We have got a great deal of progress and I am not without hope that after the United Nations discussion and at a later date, as things move, we shall be able to revive the idea of a conference without abandoning all the tremendous effort that M. Spaak and his colleagues have put in and the substantial progress which they have made.

§ Mr. Speir
So that there should not be any misunderstanding, and while agreeing with the Leader of the Opposition that it is unlikely that a final solution will he found by methods of suppression and repression, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether it would be a fair summary of the Government's policy to say that while seeking a long-term political solution they will from now on do their utmost to restore law and order? May I ask for an assurance that where an attitude of "business as usual" conflicts with the restoration of law and order, priority will be given to law and order?

§ The Prime Minister
If there were a conflict—which I do not agree there is—that, of course, is the first task of government. I would, however, like to insist, what, I believe, the Governor, the people there and the troops themselves feel, that there must be a double purpose. We must be seeking all the time a political solution and we must, at the same time, do our duty to restore law and order. It is the sense of purpose, the sense of having something to work for, which helps those who are under this great strain to carry on their task.

§ Mr. Shinwell
May I ask a question about the position of British civilians in the island, first, about those civilians who have agreed to be provided with arms and, I understand, have been formed into a special constabulary? In the event of casualties being suffered by any of those persons, does any question of compensation arise?
Secondly, does the right hon. Gentleman regard it as in the military interest to retain wives and families in Cyprus? Would it not be better to relieve the anxieties, at least to some extent, of the forces by permitting those wives, with their children, to return home if they so desire?

§ The Prime Minister
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. Both are 396 important points and I am glad of the opportunity to clear them up. The legal position of the armed civilians is a matter of Cyprus law and will have to be regulated by ordinances made by the Governor. The authorities will take the necessary precautions and make the necessary arrangements. I do not think that the question of compensation would differ from the present situation, but I would be grateful of an opportunity to look further into that.
With regard to the Service families, we have again made it known that any family that wishes to go home can do so at public expense. At present, I am informed, only one family has expressed a wish to do so. There is also the question whether further families should be allowed to go out. The right hon. Gentleman knows the normal rules about the period of service entitling families to go, and those rules are applied.
For the present, we have decided temporarily not to send out any more families. I am, however, bound to say that I do not believe that we shall long be able to resist the absolute, almost universal, view in the island of the troops themselves of wanting to have their families out there and the wish of their families to go, and of the view that that would increase rather than diminish the morale of the troops.

§ Mr. Shinwell
It is extremely important to have these points elucidated. Would the Prime Minister say that it is safe to retain the families in Cyprus taking into account the military interest? Does he regard it as safe?

§ The Prime Minister
No, Sir, nothing is absolutely safe; and they know the risk. I was asked whether I would allow them to come home. I say once again that we have repeatedly made it well known to all that those who wish to come home can do so at the public expense. I am not really surprised, because British people are very family-minded, that the response has been that only one family, and that for a rather special reason, has so far wished to do so. That offer, however, is before them. We have checked further families going out for the time being, but I do not believe that we shall be able to resist the pressure for very long.

§ Major Legge-Bourke
In warmly welcoming the statement made today by my right hon Friend and, in particular, his linking of the restoration of law and order with the long-term political solution, may I ask whether he would not agree that if we are to restore law and order it is essential that Her Majesty's forces who are carrying out the work must know that policy is not to be changed again?
Would he not agree that one of the most disconcerting things of all for troops conducting that kind of action, especially in the sort of circumstances in which our troops are at the moment, is uncertainty as to whether or not they will be allowed to go through with the job which they have to do? Will he give an assurance that our troops will be allowed to finish the job properly?

§ The Prime Minister
Yes, Sir, although, as I said before, when the Governor discussed these plans with us, when we launched them, I am sure that he and his military advisers felt that if we could have a policy which we ourselves thought to be fair, being willing to discuss every possible way of amending it and contriving it so that it would be fair, and if we could stick to that and work for that, with any change being subject to a general agreement such as we might get out of a conference, we would then get what is the basis of all morale, that the troops would not only be allowed to do their duty but would know what it was they were being asked to work for.

§ Mrs. L. Jeger
Is not the heart of the matter the urgent need to come to terms with the people of Cyprus themselves, and is not the difficulty that the majority of them believe that the Government's interim plan is a direct step towards partition? Would the right hon. Gentleman not help by making a statement on this point? Would he consider using the good offices of the United Nations, on the occasion of the United Nations debate, to make a fresh start in allaying those fears?

§ The Prime Minister
Of course, we shall use the United Nations debate to do all we can to explain this and get general understanding of it. In regard to the views of the people of the island, I feel, for reasons which it is not necessary now to go into, that they have not yet begun to realise—they have not been allowed 398 to realise—the really substantial advantages which the plan offers in the way of self-government for the Greek Cypriot people. We offer them full government of their own purely Greek affairs and a permanent majority—for that is what it comes to—on the Governor's Council responsible for all-island affairs.

§ Mr. M. Lindsay
Last week a young officer was killed in an ambush in Cyprus, and there was no reference whatever to this in the British Press, which was particularly surprising since he happened to be the son of a British general. Would my right hon. Friend have this incident inquired into, and ensure that there is no mistaken policy on the part of the military authorities in Cyprus to conceal such incidents, tragic though they are?

§ The Prime Minister
I will, of course, look into the incident, but there is really no censorship of that kind, as my hon. Friend suggests. I think that we have only to read the newspapers to realise how freely the news comes out.

§ Mr. Wigg
The Prime Minister told the House that the Governor would have all the forces that he required. Would he be good enough to square that statement with the fact that on 19th June the Minister of Defence announced that the 1st Guards Brigade was being sent to Cyprus for the purpose of carrying out town security duties, and that it was specifically stated in The Times that it had been sent there for an internal security role. Why is it that it has now been withdrawn, plus the fact that the 19th Brigade has also been withdrawn?

§ The Prime Minister
This is a matter on which the Governor from time to time takes advice from his own military authorities and the present Director of Operations was, of course, consulted before the Guards Brigade was sent home. He is at the moment satisfied with the number of troops under his command.

§ Mr. Speaker
The Prime Minister.

§ Mr. Wigg
On a point of order. I have already written to you, Mr. Speaker, making a formal request that, in the possible event of the hon. Member for Hexham (Mr. Speir) not proceeding with his subject for the Adjournment debate tonight, I might have your permission to do so.

§ Mr. Speaker
I understand that the hon. Member for Hexham (Mr. Speir) is to pursue another topic tonight, so, as he was successful in the Ballot, I shall give him the preference.