HC Deb 07 March 1958 vol 583 cc1667-76

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Hughes-Young.]

4.3 p.m.

Mr. Philip Goodhart (Beckenham)

I shall not readily forget the last occasion when my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation and I debated the affairs of British Railways on the Adjournment. It was the night of 4th December, the night of the Lewisham rail disaster. Many of my constituents were killed in that crash.

I do not intend this afternoon to suggest that the general safety record of British Railways is bad. Our railways are safe railways. In 1954 and 1956 no passengers were killed at all, and compared with our bloodstained roads the record of passenger miles per casualty is quite outstanding. Train accidents, even comparatively minor ones, make headlines because they are rare events.

On the whole, the story of safety is a good one, but one chapter makes rather curious reading. I refer to the chapter on automatic train control. By this time, the whole House and most of the country knows something about automatic train control. There are several systems but, generally speaking, they are a device which warns the driver of a train by buzzer, siren or bell that he is passing a signal that shows there is danger ahead. The majority of these systems can bring a train automatically to a halt if the driver ignores their warning.

Soon after the turn of the century a number of bright young men developed A.T.C. on the Great Western Railway. It was a tremendous success. In 1920 there was set up a high powered committee to investigate A.T.C., and it recommended the general adoption of A.T.C. on all British railway lines. Five years later another committee recommended the general introduction of A.T.C. and specifically praised the Great Western system. I refer to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of that Report.

From the moment of the report of the first committee all Ministers of Transport have made obeisance to the general idea of automatic train control, but not very much has happened. Before the Second World War there were one or two experiments, but in general it is true to say that the Great Western Railway had automatic train control and the rest did not have automatic train control. A number of senior officials of the old Great Western Railway system believed that the refusal to instal the Western system of automatic train control generally throughout the country was largely based on jealousy; because that system was known as the Great Western system.

Mr. David Jones (The Hartlepools)

Let us get the record right. Even after 1922 there were many scores of miles of the Great Western Railway which did not have automatic train control. Only the principal routes had it.

Mr. Goodhart

Yes, I believe about 65 per cent. of the Great Western line was protected by A.T.C.

Then came nationalisation, and a great many people thought that with nationalisation jealousy would be swept away and that the introduction of A.T.C. would be general. Indeed, there was a great scheme put forward and pronounced upon by British railways, that they were going to spend some £6 million on the quick installation of A.T.C. on the chief lines throughout the country.

Sir Alan Mount, Chief Inspecting Officer of Railways at the time of nationalisation, said that it was time to do away with all this fiddle-faddle and to get on with the installation of this valuable system, but the years from 1948 to 1952 turned out to be the years that the locusts ate. There were experiments. hut as the Chief Inspecting Officer of Railways stated: Four years were taken to bring the prototype equipment to its present advanced state. The Western system had been rejected. It so happened that the development of this prototype to an advanced stage coincided with the Harrow train disaster. Then there was a surge of interest in automatic train control, which could have prevented that disaster. In his report on the Harrow crash the Chief inspecting Officer said: Thus, after all these years, there are now firm prospects that work will be started on the extension of Warning Control to all the important routes of the country within a measurable time. In those four years the prototype had reached an advanced stage of development.

In answer to a Parliamentary Question on 26th January, 1953, the then Minister of Transport took a hopeful but slightly cautious line. He said: I am anxious that people should realise that there must be experiments. I do not mean experiments running into years, but with these production types there will probably have to be some six months or so of hard investigation as to how far they are proving effective. I am very hopeful that after that we shall be in the realm of definite achievement"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th January, 1953; Vol. 510, c. 659.] That was on 22nd January, 1953. Those words proved, to put it mildly, to be a little bit optimistic. Exactly three years later, on 25th January, 1956, a Question about automatic train control was asked in the House. The Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation was asked— to make a statement as to the reason for the delay in adopting throughout British Railways the system of automatic train control which has been working satisfactorily on the Great Western section for so many years. The Minister of Transport replied: The system of automatic train control used on the former Great Western Railway has certain technical disadvantages which precludes its universal adoption on British Railways, especially on electrified lines, though it has been very successful under steam operation. The British Transport Commission has been developing an improved system which has been under trial on the east coast main line between New Barnet and Huntingdon for some time. The development of this new equipment has reached an advanced stage and the trial stretch is being extended to cover the 210 track miles of both the lines between King's Cross and Grantham. The ground equipment has already been installed on the down line between King's Cross and Peterborough. Then came the following supplementary question: Is the Minister aware that there has never been any adequate explanation why this system has not been adopted on comparable stretches of railway either before or after nationalisation; to which the Minister replied: The explanation is that unfortunately the system used on the Great Western is not suitable for electrified lines. We are about to undertake a pilot scheme with the new system on a really workable length of main line." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th January, 1956; Vol. 548, c. 199–200.] On 1st March, 1956, the technical advisers of the British Transport Commission wrote a letter to the Chief of General Duties, British Transport Commission, and I have a copy of the letter here and will read the relevant paragraphs to the House: In reply to your letter of the 28th February, the purpose of Mr. Fraser's request is, as I understand it, summed up in paragraph 5, in which he asks that the Chief Inspecting Officer of the Ministry of Transport should now be asked to give his approval to the system on the grounds that the failure record is now thought to be sufficiently good to allow us to anticipate a favourable result. On this aspect, I have no comments other than to say that the sooner the system is approved the better, from every point of view, as the performance rate is now as good as that on the Western Region system. In other words, after eight years of nationalisation, we have now reached the point where we are proposing to ask approval of a system as good as that on the Western Region. I repeat, as good as that on the Western Region. I consider that that is an incredible performance—literally incredible.

There are one or two other points I should like to make. That letter was dated 1st March, 1956; in fact, approval for that system was not given until 1st November. The Minister of Transport, in his reply in January, 1956, said that the main objection to the Western Region system was that it could not be applied to electrified lines, but we find from the report of the Chief Inspecting Officer that A.T.C. has not been thoroughly tested on electrified lines. Approval of the apparatus as adapted for use with the Westinghouse air brake on multiple unit electric trains must await the result of trials which are soon to be put in hand. That was sixteen or seventeen months ago.

Now, I am happy to say, those trials have recently been put in hand on an electrified line and, perhaps, they will work out well. I very much hope so, because it is just on these multiple-unit electric trains that so many of my own constituents travel every day. But, as far as I know, there is not at the moment any plan to bring any protection to these trains by A.T.C. in the foreseeable future.

A long time has elapsed. This is a sad story. Either there has been massive inefficiency on the part of the British Transport Commission or there has been a decision by responsible men that the installing of A.T.C. was not really as urgent as many people thought, and they have been fobbing off Ministers with a lot of soft soap. I rather imagine that both considerations apply.

Now I understand that there is a shortage of staff on British Railways on the installation side for automatic train control.

Will the Transport Commission consider approaching the area electricity boards? At least one senior executive of one area board has seen the new A.T.C. system in operation. He has studied the installation and he has reported that his area board could very easily handle the widespread installation of this system. I should also like to know whether there is any chance of the new accelerated plan for automatic train control system, which has been announced, being extended to the mid-Kent area in which my constituency lies and which was so disastrously affected by the Lewisham crash.

I have said that there has been a disparity in the past between performance and statement. This record does not inspire confidence, but will the Minister agree to make a statement quarterly, giving details of new railway safety devices, and not merely A.T.C., installed, delivered or ordered during the preceding three months? It would be improper for me to comment upon any case which is now before the courts, but at the moment one man does stand in the dock. On the moral issue, perhaps he should not stand alone.

4.19 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. G. R. H. Nugent)

I must congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) upon securing the Adjournment today to raise this very interesting topic. Whilst I congratulate him upon his interest in and enthusiasm for this topic, I have to explain that I cannot agree with all his conclusions, though I should like to welcome the comments with which he started on the good safety record of the railways.

I find that in the past forty-six years, during which time 698 formal inquiries took place into rail accidents, 1,599 people were killed. That number, serious though it is, is equivalent only to an average of four months' fatalities on the roads.

It is of interest to note that in the judgment of experts about 11 per cent. of these accidents could probably have been avoided if A.T.C. of the warning type had been fitted. It is also of interest to note that if that 11 per cent. of accidents had been saved, about 31 per cent. of the fatalities would have been avoided, because A.T.C., especially since it reduces the danger of an accident happening at high speed, tends to save the accident with very heavy casualties.

The figure of 11 per cent. helps to put into perspective the rest of the picture, in which the House may be interested, of what A.T.C. does. It is an important safety factor but, as we use it, it is a warning control system which operates when a distant signal is indicating caution, and a signal at stop lies ahead. The operation results in a siren sounding in the engine cabin and an automatic, moderate application of the brake.

To fill in the picture I should add that there is a stop control system which applies the brake fully where it is fitted, if and when a stop signal is passed at danger. This system is used by London Transport on underground trains, where the speed and the brakes of the trains are uniform, but it would not be suitable for main line work, where speed and braking capacity of trains is widely variable.

Thus the effect of A.T.C., as we know it, is to give the driver of the train a strong additional warning, including some application of the brake, that he is approaching a signal ahead set at danger. It still remains for the driver to bring his train to a halt if the signal is still at stop when he reaches it.

The other features of special safety that go with A.T.C. are, first, track circuiting. This is a further safety device and it works by dividing the track into sections insulated from each other, each section having a low voltage current passed continually round it, so that when a train comes into the section it has the effect of short-circuiting the current which goes through the wheels and axles instead of round the circuit of the whole section. This short-circuiting of the current operates a switch gear called a track relay. Thus, track circuiting serves primarily to record that a train is in a particular section of the track and this shows, of course, in the signal box and thus provides a basis for many safety signalling functions. To give an obvious example, it automatically holds at danger signals covering the track behind the train to protect it from another train coming up behind it into the same section.

Colour light signals, of which we have spoken more than once here, consist of the conventional system: green for go, yellow for warning, and red for stop, which we are familiar with on the roads, with the refinement in some cases of the double yellow. The advantages of the colour light signal are, first, that it is much easier to see, especially at night and in fog. Unlike the old-fashioned semaphoring signal, which is high up in the air and lit only by an oil lamp, the colour light is on a level with the driver and can be seen even in bad weather conditions.

Secondly, being electrically controlled, it can be linked with A.T.C. and track circuits and the control board in the signal box. Thirdly, combined with power-operated boxes, it makes a large-scale and valuable economy in signalling manpower where, up to now, we have been very short-handed. Fourthly, it allows a most valuable increase in line occupation.

Especially for the interest of my hon. Friend, I should record that, despite the shock of the Lewisham accident with its heavy toll of fatalities, the colour light system which has been operating on that area of line, which carries the densest traffic in the world, has had an accident-free record for nearly thirty years. That underlines what a very valuable safety device the modern colour light system of signalling is.

It will thus be seen that the A.T.C., track circuiting and colour light signals, while each is a valuable safety device in itself, can eventually link up and combine to give the maximum traffic safety. But although they greatly help drivers and reduce strain, especially in bad weather conditions, they do not eliminate the final human element. It still remains for drivers to pay strict attention to signals, visual and A.T.C., to have an expert knowledge of the road on which they are travelling, and to use their judgment in an emergency if there is to be safety on the line. The same applies to signalmen in employing skill, taking care and applying full accuracy.

I think that serves to put in perspective what A.T.C. does. It is extremely valuable, but it is by no means the only essential safety measure. Briefly, the history of A.T.C. was that it started with the enterprise and initiative of the Great Western Railway in 1905, but it was not until 1930 that the Great Western completed the equipment of the main lines, and many of the early years were spent in working out the system. The warmest congratulations are due to the Great Western Railway; it was a great achievement.

During the 'thirties the Hudd system was also evolved. That was a non-contact magnetic system. It was tried out experimentally on the London Midland and Scottish Railway. It was not until 1947 that the Hudd system was finally approved by the Minister of Transport.

As my hon. Friend said, the British Transport Commission made a policy decision in 1948 that in the interests of rail safety it would make a wide extension of A.T.C., colour light signals and track circuits. The A.T.C. design, it decided, was to be one which would combine the best of both the Great Western Railway system and the Hudd system. My hon. Friend feels that the Great Western system was not given all the attention that it should have been and that there was failure there. That is not so. The Great Western system, admirable though it is for a steam line, is not entirely suitable for an electric line. There is a risk with an electric line of stray currents giving a false signal in the cab by energising the alarm, which is worked magnetically.

Mr. D. Jones

It is not only the line on which the train is travelling which must not be electrified. If there are parallel lines which are electrified there is a danger with the Great Western system of the current seeping through and causing a wrong signal.

Mr. Nugent

My hon. Friend can certainly accept my assurance without any doubt that, technically admirable though the Great Western system was, it was not suitable for electric lines. Furthermore, electric trains do not have sufficient clearance between the A.T.C. ramps and the undercarriage. Finally, the heavy mechanical parts of the G.W.R. contact system were by no means ideal to be made permanent and universal throughout the country.

The Commission was convinced that it could find a non-contact magnetic system better than the Hudd system which would finally be better all round. It is true that it has taken some time to develop it. In 1949 the initial trials were carried out, and from 1950 onwards full-scale trials were carried out on the East Coast line. Many difficulties were encountered, but these are only to be expected.

The Hudd system took ten years to establish. There is no record how long the Great Western system took. I am reliably assured that seven-and-a-half years is by no means an excessive time to—as the engineers put it—"get the bugs" out of a new system of this sort. It has to operate in all weathers under heavy vibration and it has to operate infallibly—I repeat, infallibly—otherwise it is no use at all. I assure my hon. Friend that seven-and-a-half years is by no means an unreasonable time. It was certainly tried out on the four-rail electric line and it will very shortly be fully convened to the third-rail system, too. It certainly will not be held up in any way on that account.

My hon. Friend's suggestion that the Electricity Board could take over part of the work of installation conflicts with the general policy of the railways that their rail signal engineers never allow outside contractors to do work on existing systems where the lines are in operation. They bring in contractors to do new work, a complete new installation, but the danger of an outside contractor inadvertently doing something which interferes with the existing safety system is so great that it cannot be risked. For very sound policy reasons, therefore, it would not be possible to accept the help of outside contractors.

Turning to priorities, the routes which will receive the earliest attention will be those carrying the greatest train frequency and with the greatest train speed. My hon. Friend's neighbourhood, with its very good system of colour light signalling, will obviously not be among the earliest.

I am afraid that quarterly reports would require a great deal of extra work and would not be justified. My right hon. Friend will receive very full reports in the Annual Report of the British Transport Commission and from our own inspecting officers of railways, and I am sure that that will keep him fully in the picture, but the Commission has made it plain that the capital restrictions are in no way slowing up the programme of A.T.C. installation. In fact, the Commission hopes to accelerate it. It realises that this is a very valuable safety measure and it has every intention to push ahead with it as fast as it can, in conjunction with colour light signals and track circuiting, which are both equally important in their way. When we get all three together we can say that we have taken such steps as we can, but at the end of the day we depend on the driver's skill, attention and responsibility to see that the train gets safely home.

I will conclude by a word of congratulation on the wonderful record which our drivers and our railways have provided of safe travelling in very heavily used conditions in this country over many years.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-seven minutes to Five o'clock.