HC Deb 04 July 1958 vol 590 cc1810-24

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Sir G. Wills.]

3.32 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas (Lincoln)

The question I have to ask the Government today is their policy on routine air trooping and the air transport of troops in an emergency. Today, just when we have the greatest need of a clear policy and firm decisions, we appear to have nothing but Ministerial indecision and there is direct evidence of confusion.

The debate arises directly out of answers given by the Minister of Defence on 11th June which showed confusion in his mind between two completely separate matters—first, routine air trooping; and second, the strategic movement of troops. Any hon. Member who was present on 11th June and had followed the subject at all was surprised by the Minister's statement in reply to a supplementary question which I put to him and which appears in column 194 of HANSARD of that day. The debate arises directly from his answer. But it flows indirectly from pronouncements by members of the Government in different Departments on transport aircraft and their operation which have brought despondency to the management and workers in the aircraft industry and to all those concerned with defence.

In considering this subject, we must recognise that there is bound to be a great deal of uncertainty about air trooping requirements. This uncertainty is an important factor in working out the policy, but it is not a reason for not having a policy which can be clearly stated, and still less is it a reason for there being confusion in the minds of Ministers.

First, let us consider the routine day-to-day air trooping of men and materials. How much of the load is to fall on the Royal Air Force Transport Command? How much of the load is to fall on the nationalised Corporations? How much is to fall on the independent operators? I should like evidence that the Government have accepted the fact that air transport, for both men and material, is cheaper than sea transport, by any test. I should like to see evidence that stockholding by the Services overseas has been ruthlessly cut and that stores and spares are delivered as required by air freight. In short, I should like to see evidence that the Government are alive to the enormous possibilities of air transport. So much at this stage for the routine, day-to-day air transport of men and material.

Second, when we come to the policy for an emergency, the same three questions arise, the rôle of Transport Command, the rôle of the Corporations—obviously, particularly B.O.A.C.—and the rôle of the independent operators. To give the Under-Secretary a chance to state the Government's policy and to clear the air in this respect, I shall put some of the questions which are being asked everywhere in the aviation world.

We were told that there was a serious emergency in Cyprus, yet it took five days to move just over 2,500 men. I could quote the criticisms of the national daily newspapers, but I shall quote only the two aviation weekly papers. Flight attributed the time taken to move these troops to the woeful lack of suitable military transport aircraft. Aeroplane referred to the scarcity of the proper weight-lifting long-range aircraft and said It is scarcely encouraging to those who know what is involved in moving not only troops but their heavy equipment about in double quick time. I said that I would ask a series of questions so that we might have an opportunity of hearing the Government's policy.

Is it true that the Air Council is fighting not only against the Maginot policy of the Minister of Defence, but also against the Army Council? Is it true that while the Air Council fights for the Short Bristol Britannic for Transport Command, the Army Council fights for the Blackburn B 107 and that some other Department wants the Armstrong-Whitworth 660 freighter coach and yet another Department the Handley Page development of the Victor? Those are questions which are being asked in the aviation world and by those who are concerned with defence. Further, is there any truth in the report that the Government are about to order American transport aircraft?

I must refer too to the rumours of a deal to strip the Royal Air Force of Coastal Command and to hand it over to the Navy. This rumour and discussion on it have cropped up in every year since the war. I shall not raise the wider implications, because that is not the subject of the debate, but I want for a moment to consider how it would affect air transport.

In the Cyprus emergency the Shackle-tons of Coastal Command were used, and I understand that they made about 50 trips and carried about 30 men each time. If that is anything like accurate, it represents a very large proportion of the men who were moved.

In an emergency, Transport Command must call upon other commands. That is understandable. We cannot expect Transport Command to have enough capacity to meet an emergency. It must be able to call on other commands. But it is difficult enough to meet the complications of having to rely upon another command; if that other command is transferred to another Service the additional complications are enormous. I very much hope that the Under-Secretary can kill once and for all the rumour of the transfer of Coastal Command to the Royal Navy. I am not asking him to go into the wide strategic and political matters which are involved; that would be inappropriate in a small Adjournment debate such as this. But it is directly relevant to the control of the reserve of transport aircraft which is at present available within the R.A.F. Transport Command.

As to the reserves of transport aircraft, I wonder whether the Air Council has given enough attention to the possibility of using ordinary production line civil aircraft, such as the Viscount, for the training of aircrew other than pilots. I realise that different considerations arise in the case of pilots, but I wonder whether enough consideration has been given to the question as it affects the training of other aircrew. I mention this not only because it is cheaper, since the aircraft come off the ordinary production line, but because these ordinary civil aircraft would also form a valuable transport reserve.

There is a widespread feeling among people concerned with aviation and defence that the Government are not showing enough understanding of the importance of aviation in our defence and in our traditional rôle of a manufacturing and trading nation. I have asked questions which I believe reflect a dismay in the world of aviation and among those concerned with defence. I do not envy the Ministers at the Air Ministry, but they are the spokesmen of the Government and we have to look to them for answers.

I see that the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. P. Williams) is in his place. He knows something about air transport matters, and I hope that he will catch the eye of Mr. Deputy-Speaker so that he can intervene. It is important that we should realise that this is not an occasion for any narrow party criticism; we are concerned with the genuine worry which is felt about the circumstances to which I have referred.

If, as is felt, the Government are guilty of a lack of decision and policy, that is not a matter which affects only our defence and aviation industry of today. It is something which will affect them in five, ten, or fifteen years' time—because aircraft development and production is not like a tap which can be turned off and on; it is one long, continuous belt, and if it is broken now the mistakes made today will be felt in years to come.

The Minister of Defence must recognise that rockets are not the answer to every problem. They are the answer to many defence problems, but it is obvious that men and material will not for a long time, if ever, be transported by rocket. Our defence strategy is based upon air transport. I wish that I could be convinced that the Government have a policy which recognises that we must have adequate modern manned transport aircraft.

3.45 p.m.

Mr. Paul Williams (Sunderland, South)

The whole House is profoundly grateful to the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) for raising this subject on a particular Adjournment Motion as opposed to losing it in a plethora of words in a Defence or Civil Estimates debate. It is of interest that at this moment when there is so much in doubt about aircraft manufacture, design, research and about trooping itself that we should have an opportunity of hearing from the Government exactly what is the present intention for aircraft production and for the policy itself.

I apologise for not hearing the first few words of the speech of the hon. Member for Lincoln, but I rather imagine that this debate has been provoked by what I believe was a slip of the tongue by the Minister of Defence two or three weeks ago.

Mr. de Freitas

The hon. Gentleman is quite right. I do not know whether it was a slip of the tongue or not, but it was provoked, as I indicated, by what the Minister said on 11th June.

Mr. Williams

My understanding of what was said then was that Transport Command would be doing the trooping. It may well be that that was a slip of the tongue or a misunderstanding of what the hon. Member for Lincoln was saying in his supplementaries, because that particular moment was in advance of the movement of troops to Cyprus. It may be that the Minister was thinking of that forthcoming move and that there was a quite natural misunderstanding of what the hon. Gentleman was driving at on that occasion.

I should declare that I have an interest in the civil aviation industry, and I hope that the House will not wish me to dwell on that point too long. The hon. Member for Lincoln said that there is considerable uncertainty in the aviation world over the Government's policy on research, on aircraft production, both for civil and for military use, and, as a result of what I believe to be a slip of the tongue on the part of the Minister, a misunderstanding on air trooping policy.

I only want to ask one question. How can we as a nation get the most efficient and the safest method of moving troops and material for the Services? I think that these are the two things one must try to combine and then to examine, without the prejudice of past experience or even past knowledge, how to do it.

We must surely combine safety, reliability and efficiency of aircraft and airworthiness of airlines with economy of operation. I am not convinced that there has been a sufficiently close scrutiny of the comparative merits of conducting an operation of this nature, air trooping and air freight, by the civil operators. I include in that phrase both the independent companies and the Corporations—the civil operators, on the one side, and Transport Command on the other.

In the debate on the Air Estimates earlier this year, I raised the question of how many flying hours an aircraft of Transport Command does per year, what are the costs per flying hour, and what is the experience of pilots? Again, in asking this question once more, I do not wish in any way to cast a shadow of doubt on the worthiness of the pilots or of Transport Command itself. It is quite obviously not possible for a pilot flying oldish aircraft for only 300 hours a year to be as effective, as efficient and as safe as a civil airline pilot operating aircraft which may be flying 1,000 or 2,000 hours a year and himself, perhaps, flying 800 or 1,000 hours a year in every possible type of weather.

It is always possible to prove that Transport Command has a very good safety record, and we are grateful for that. But one is not so likely to have accidents due to weather if one is always flying in good weather. Again, I do not wish to raise any doubts about the safety of Transport Command, but I think that unfortunate comparisons are sometimes made when comparing fair weather flying with flying in all conditions.

This is the simple and sole question I wish to ask the Government. I do not know whether, at short notice, I can even reasonably expect an answer. Has a comparison been made at any stage of safety, reliability, efficiency and cost in conducting transport operations, between the two sides, civil and military? If not, it would be reasonable to ask the Government to make some inquiry and comparison of this nature. If it were to be found, as I believe it would, that civil operators could provide a service safer, as reliable and certainly more economical than the military, then there would be a very firm case indeed for re-examining completely the rôle of Transport Command.

I hate the word "civilianisation", but I think hon. Members would know what I meant if I were to use it. It may be that more of the burden of moving freight and men, and of providing strategic reserve movements as well, could be carried through by civil operators than is being done at the moment. Let me take the case of the twenty Britannias. Surely it is patently obvious that if Transport Command is to have twenty Britannias within its control there will be precious little chance of their being used effectively and efficiently or maintained in good order If they are maintained in good order, the economics of the Command will be extremely expensive I therefore suggest to the House and to the Government that the making of a comparison between the civil and military sides is a matter of prime and urgent necessity.

3.52 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing)

I am glad to have the chance of clarifying any uncertainty which may exist on this Adjournment debate initiated by the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas). If there is uncertainty we cannot restate the case too much. I am afraid it will not be possible for me to answer all the questions put to me by my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. P. Williams). There were from 15 to 20 of them. I can re-explain the policy and how it is working, and so answer at least some of the questions which have been put to me.

Let me first make it clear that these policies are founded on the need for Transport Command to provide air mobility at short notice and in emergency for all three Services. In order to do that, Transport Command must be freed from its routine tasks. To answer one point put by my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, South, while the defence forces must, particularly in the present climate, look for the economic issues, we cannot always measure in the field of defence the value we get from reserve equipment in pounds, shillings and pence, whether in arms or aircraft.

There has been no change in air trooping policy, which was stated by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air on 9th May, 1957, in the debate on the Air Estimates. Perhaps I might repeat what he said, which was: Apart from a small number of ad hoc movements which have been undertaken either by Transport Command or by the Corporations, and apart from the carriage of individual passengers on scheduled civil air lines, the policy of the Government has been to invite the independent civil operators to carry out the air movement task"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th May, 1957; Vol. 569, c. 1192.] When my right hon. Friend said "air movement task" he clearly meant in this context the routine air movement to which the hon. Member for Lincoln referred in his opening speech. Oversea garrisons are somewhat smaller because we are running down the total of our Forces, but at the same time there are fewer troopships in the Service.

The fact is that in each of the last four years more Servicemen have been moved by air than by sea. That shows the importance the Government attach to the present air transport position. Air transport is vital to the task of our troops in carrying out their jobs in all parts of the world.

This general emphasis will continue. Several other troopships may be withdrawn and, as the Britannia 252s are brought into use, there will be extra capacity for air trooping, but I wish to emphasise that it is not intended that Transport Command should do more than occasional ad hoc trooping. Not only will that leave the command free for emergencies, but, by giving this work to civil operators we provide a most essential and valuable pool of air transport which supplements the resources of the command. The air trooping policy is designed to free Transport Command of routine tasks from which it could not be easily disengaged, either so that it can stand by for emergency or carry out the tasks of an emergency. It must be there to train its air and ground crews to the highest standards and to take part in inter-Service exercises.

I wish to assure my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, South that this continuation training goes on by day and by night over all distances and in all kinds of weather. If he were in my seat he would know the number of complaints I have from certain hon. Members who have Transport Command airfields close to centres of population in their constituencies. I never cease to get complaints about the amount of training which Transport Command undertakes.

Transport Command must also be free to take part in the inter-Service exercises and, in particular, the movement of units of the Army and the Royal Air Force. This does not impair the capacity of the command to undertake a number of other tasks of very great importance. First, there is logistic support for the R.A.F. and other Services overseas; secondly, logistic support for nuclear weapons and guided missile trials; thirdly, aero-medical evacuation flights; and, fourthly, miscellaneous flights of various kinds

Emphatically, it is not our object to get the maximum flying hours out of Transport Command aircraft or to run it as an airline deeply committed to scheduled services. I cannot give the actual number of hours, but, as I said in the Air Estimates debate, if we tried to make an airline out of the command it would be impossible for it to fulfil its emergency rôle. Naturally, as the capacity of Transport Command increases we shall welcome the opportunity to increase the number of inter-Service exercises and the amount of effort which the command devotes to the other tasks I have described.

Exercises are particularly important. A start was made earlier this year, in February, with "Exercise Quickstep." We chose a month notorious for its unpleasant weather. The exercise was carried out with 500 troops and 10 vehicles and trailers. Ten tons of equipment were moved a distance of 1,400 miles in 34 hours, using four Hastings, four Beverleys and one Comet. In future, we shall go to a variety of destinations and use different combinations of men, materials, and aircraft.

Nor are we concerned only with troop movements, but it is equally necessary to produce reinforcement moves by R.A.F. units to overseas commands if we are to get the flexibility which is essential. Troops and airmen cannot have too much experience of rapid movement by air into different climates and different surroundings. Staffs need practice in organising and executing airlifts of this kind and overseas commands need practice in the reception of reinforcements.

Having spoken of the policy and of the way in which it works, I should like to turn for a moment to the Cyprus airlift.

It being Four o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]

Mr. Orr-Ewing

The recent airlift to Cyprus is a good illustration of the success of our air transport policy in coping with an emergency and, in particular, of the excellent understanding between the Services about air transport problems. The hon. Member has quoted various informed papers which suggested that the pace of the operation was slow. These papers suggested that this was the best that Transport Command could do. This is a wholly mistaken outlook. The pace of any move is, naturally, always related to the reasons for it. Emergencies fall into different categories. There are emergencies of the utmost importance, where time is vital, and there are other emergencies where time is less vital.

The first thing, of course, was the decision to send these reinforcements to Cyprus. It entailed a total of 6,000 men and more than 200,000 lb. of freight. This was authorised not at one time, but progressively over a period of several days.

Moreover, in this operation only a part of Transport Command's aircraft was allocated to the airlift for, after we had considered the priorities most carefully, about half our Hastings force, which is our largest force, continued to do the tasks previously assigned to it. More aircraft could have been made available for the airlift and the time of the move shortened in consequence, but this was not considered necessary.

I think that the House will agree that there are three stages in a move of this kind. First, there is bringing the troops from their normal bases to the point of departure; secondly, there is the airlift itself; and, thirdly, there is the reception of the troops at the other end and their deployment in the field to their operational objectives.

We should not over-rate the importance of supreme speed in the airlift part of this movement. It seems futile to save half-an-hour or an hour in the airlift if we spend 48 hours in moving the troops to the point of departure and 24 hours in deploying them at the other end. I think that the papers have perhaps emphasised the importance of the speed at which the aircraft travel.

It is pointless to make elaborate and costly arrangements to accelerate the speed of the airlift to an extent which puts it out of gear with the general pro- cedure in all stages. However many aircraft Transport Command uses on an airlift of this sort, the speed of the move depends on the speed with which forces can be made ready in the United Kingdom and how readily they can be received at the other end.

In time of great emergency troops can no doubt be ready in a matter of hours, but in this case it was not necessary. It was thought right to give the troops reasonable warning to make their private arrangements before they left. In any event, it can sometimes be a case of too much haste, less speed. A short period of warning is often helpful in planning for a steady flow of aircraft along the route and to arrange for the handling capacity of airfields outside the United Kingdom to be in keeping with the rate at which we want to pass aircraft through those bases.

The short answer to any criticism, therefore, is that the time of the move could have been shortened if the Government had considered it necessary. Obviously, in any move of this kind there are a number of factors to be taken into account, and that is what we did on this occasion; we made our plans accordingly. The great thing, I think, was that the plans were efficiently carried out.

I should like to say a word on cooperation. I saw something of the airlift myself. The most noticeable feature was the excellent co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the Army and also between the various commands concerned. Army and Royal Air Force staffs worked together at command level and planned the move jointly and then carried it out together at the bases. Army staff were on duty alongside the R.A.F. operations officers in the Operations Room at Headquarters, Transport Command.

The airlift as a whole was controlled by Transport Command, but Coastal Command was closely associated with working out the detailed planning. Coastal Command officers, too, were on duty throughout in the R.A.F. Transport Command operations room. Coastal Command aircraft operated from transport airfields so as to make the best use of the movements and loading organisation there. The whole airlift was a striking example of close teamwork between the Services, with each Service doing the job at which it is expert and for which it is specially trained.

The hon. Member for Lincoln raised the question of the future of Coastal Command. As he rightly said, the future of Coastal Command has arisen fairly consistently year after year. At this juncture, I cannot do more than reiterate what was said by my noble Friend the First Lord, in another place, when he remarked that any suggestions in the papers about the future of Coastal Command were "purely speculative."

Mr. de Freitas

Apart from the strategic and other implications of any possible transfer of Coastal Command to the Royal Navy, can the hon. Gentleman give the assurance that the point I raised about the reserve of transport aircraft being in the Royal Air Force, although in a different command, will also be considered if the possibility of transfer is discussed?

Mr. Orr-Ewing

I am sure that if the question arises, all these factors will be taken into consideration.

From time to time, we use Shackletons of Coastal Command to carry our troops in emergency. I have seen it suggested that we ought not to use these aircraft for this rôle. This point was not made by the hon. Member for Lincoln—in fact, he is in favour of their use for this purpose. There has, however, been some criticism. The primary rôle of Coastal Command, as my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence said on Wednesday, is maritime operations, but its capacity for such operations is in no way impaired by this occasional contribution to the air transport rôle. We would be open to a charge of bad and extravagant management if we did not use the Shackletons in this rôle when the need arose.

It is true that the Shackleton is not as comfortable or as fast as other Transport Command aircraft. This is all that can be said against it. From what I know, there is no doubt that the Army morale seems high whatever aircraft is used. Army personnel seem quite ready to take the rough with the smooth, the Shackletons with the Comets. Not only does the use of Shackletons give us a bigger airlift. It may on occasions enable Transport Command to carry on with its other important tasks and the Shackleton gives us a valuable extra degree of flexibility.

The figures quoted by the hon. Member are approximately correct. Coastal Command carried 2,000 of the total of 6,000 men transferred to Cyprus, although not the 200,000 lb. of freight. That was a worthy contribution to the task.

The hon. Member for Lincoln asked about future aircraft. The Government are deeply conscious of the importance of ordering new aircraft to do the job properly and of ordering them at the right time. The hon. Member mentioned certain British designs and asked whether we had made up our minds about the Beverley replacement and what our plans were for the longer-range transport aircraft.

The Beverley is only just in service. Although we know a good deal about the time which it takes to get a new type of aircraft into service, we still think that we are right in considering with the greatest care the precise type of aircraft at which we should aim. There are a number of divergent requirements to be reconciled. This is not a question of battle between the Air Council and the Army Council, as the hon. Member suggested. It is a question of consultation and of finding a compromise which is as near ideal as possible. Ideally, we want an aircraft with a hold large enough to take all the cargoes which the Army needs to carry, and yet the aircraft must not be so large, expensive, and vulnerable as to be too precious to risk on tactical operations.

The long-range freighter raises a separate problem. Militarily, of course, range is invaluable, and a really long-range freighter would provide a solution to many staff problems. Whether it would necessarily be the best or most economical solution is a different matter, bearing in mind the possibility of stockpiling heavy equipment overseas and the heavy cost of providing expensive aircraft whose full potential can be realised only occasionally.

Meanwhile, for the carriage of troops and ordinary freight over long ranges we are getting excellent aircraft in the shape of 20 Britannias for Transport Command. They are expected to have a very long and useful life indeed, and for a number of years will be supplemented for the carrying of passengers and light freight by the Comets which are already in the Air Force.

For our long-term transport requirements our aim is to introduce aircraft which have a civil as well as a military future, if we cannot adopt aircraft under development for the civil market for military use. It is two ways round. Let me repeat it. We want to introduce aircraft which have a civil as well as a military value, if we find that no civil aircraft under development are suitable for military use. The research and development costs incurred in producing a new type are so high that this country cannot lightly undertake to develop specialised military aircraft if no civil market is in sight at all.

The Americans have developed some excellent freighter aircraft which are used for military purposes, but I think it is significant that to date, as far as I know, not a single civil order has been placed for those long-range military freighter aircraft like the Globemaster and the Lockheed C.130A.

We are not closing our eyes to the value of aircraft of this class. All I am saying is that it would be difficult for the United Kingdom in present circumstances to justify the development of similar aircraft if they had only—I repeat only—a military application.

On top of all this is the problem of numbers. The more ambitious our specification the fewer aircraft we shall be able to afford, and by striving to provide for all contingencies we could arrive at a force too small to be effective for the task. All these conflicting factors have to be most carefully weighed in deciding what aircraft we are to invest our money in. I cannot apologise for the fact that our problems are taking us time to solve, but I can assure the House that we are well aware of the timetable to which we must work.

Finally, I wish to stress that this question is not a problem for the Royal Air Force alone. When it comes to air transport there must be the closest co-operation between all three Services and, of course, especially between the Army and the Royal Air Force, particularly since decisions made now, as the hon. Gentleman underlined, affect the future for many years to come.

Working well together on transport operations themselves is equally vital. I wish to pay tribute to the co-operation which in fact exists today. As I said earlier, I have witnessed something of this myself. On Monday, 16th June, I went to Lyneham. At that time some 1,500 troops had passed through the base on their way to Cyprus. I was tremendously impressed with the smooth way in which this task had been undertaken while not cancelling all the other tasks which Transport Command was doing. The Royal Air Force had a job to do; the Army had a job to do; both clearly understood what those jobs were, and did them together in a very fine spirit of very close co-operation.

Mr. de Freitas

With the leave of the House, may I add this? I entirely agree with what the Under-Secretary has said as to how very well run was the Cyprus operation and commended the work of the R.A.F. Transport Command and Coastal Command. What puzzles me, and puzzles so many people who are concerned in these matters, is that the two aviation weekly papers which study this problem both appeared to be disappointed. They are papers working in this particular field and they thought that the airlift job was a failure and they pointed to the shortages which I outlined.

Mr. Orr-Ewing

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising this matter, because I think that I have been able to show that, in fact, we were employing only a small portion of the transport aircraft on this airlift. If the emergency had been so extreme, we could have employed more aircraft and have done the task much more quickly. However, I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman and to my hon. Friend for this debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at a quarter past Four o'clock.