REGULAR ARMY RECRUITING (Hansard, 22 January 1958)

§ Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

I am very sorry indeed that I am the cause of the Secretary of State for War having to take an Adjournment debate at this late hour, but at least it gives me the opportunity of wishing the right hon. Gentleman the best of luck in the very difficult task he has to handle. I am sure that from time to time I shall have critical things to say, but we have it in common that we both want to do the best we can for the Army.

In my good fortune in having this Adjournment debate, I do not want to weary the House. It is my purpose to bring to the notice of the House, and perhaps even to those outside the House who are interested, the fact that the November recruiting figures, published in the early days of January, now give us a firm basis upon which to make a projection, a short and long-term projection, which enables one to say that if these recruiting figures continue, certain results will follow.

Of course, I readily agree that one month is a short time in which to form an opinion, but it is equally clear that neither the Government nor the Opposition have all that amount of time for their defence manpower policies to work out. My right hon. and hon. Friends are committed to a four-year plan. The Government are committed to a policy which will have to be confirmed or abandoned before the existing National Service legislation expires at the end of the year.

It therefore becomes a matter of great interest to both sides of the House, to all the young men who may be called up, to industry, to those responsible for technical education and to the universities and the like. One is helped by the fact that one has almost the complete 1957 recruiting figures under all heads. For example, we know that in 1957, making an estimate for the December figures which are yet to come, 21,000 men enlisted on a three-year engagement. Those men will be serving in 1960. If one takes the 251 men recruited on a three-year engagement in November as a basis for a projection, that is 3,000 a year, 27,000 men will be serving on a three-year engagement on 1214 1st January, 1960. On 1st January, 1961, there will be 9,000, because the 21,000 who enlisted in 1957 will have left the Colours and will have been replaced by men enlisting at the rate of 3,000 a year which, for three years, makes 9,000 men.

We have also got as a guide the policy announced by the then Secretary of State for War on the Second Reading of the Army (Conditions of Enlistment) Bill, that it was the Government's intention eventually to put a ceiling on the three-year engagement of 1,000 a year in order to get sufficient men for the Brigade of Guards, the Army Catering Corps, the Intelligence Corps, R.E.M.E. and the Corps of Military Police. So we can again carry on with our projections. On 1st January, 1960, there will be 27,000; on 1st January, 1961, there will be 9,000; on 1st January, 1962, there will he 7,000, and on 1st January, there will be 5,000. Finally, with the Government's announced ending of National Service, we run down to their figure of 3,000 on 1st January, 1964.

Now let us turn from the three-year engagement to the new nine-year engagement. In November, 830 men enlisted on the six-year engagement and 190 on the nine-year engagement. We have the exact figures for the rest of 1957, so that we know that in that year there enlisted 3,024 men on the six-year engagement and 1,865 on the nine-year engagement, making an assumption of the figures for the month of December. The figures I have taken are 750 on the six-year engagement and 170 on the nine-year engagement. I think that they are rather high figures.

There is another category about which, if one is making a projection into the future, one must take into account. I refer to that valuable recruiting source—boys. So far the number has remained constant. The figure for 1956—the last year for which we have the complete yearly figure—was 2,608. For my purpose I have taken a figure of 2,600, and I have assumed no casualties, deaths, invalidings, discharges by purchase—no non-effectives at all. For the purpose of doing my sums I have conceded that each ex-boy will give at least eight years' men's service, which is higher than the pre-war figure.

Taking those figures together, one can make a projection that by 1st January, 1215 1963, 5,000 men will be serving the three-year engagement; 52,884 the six-year engagement; 13,265 the nine-year engagement, and 20,880 ex-boys. Although I always work on the basis of male Regulars, I am allowing a figure of 18,000 for officers.

The answer, as on 1st January, 1963, is a total of 109,949, as compared with the Government's ceiling of 165,000. But one has to remember that we did not suddenly start the Army from scratch in October or November. There is a considerable number of men serving long-term engagements—ten years and twelve years, and there are even some on the three-year engagement who may continue to serve. One does not know what that figure is. I do not know; I do not believe that the Government know; I do not believe that anybody can know, because in thousands of cases the men have not yet taken the decision either to leave or to stay in the Army. My estimate—again on the high side—is 25,000. If the Secretary of State says that that is low I would not deny that that is possibly so, but that would make a total of 134,000.

Turning to 1st January, 1964, the comparable figures are 3,000 on the three-year engagement; 59,832 on the six-year engagement; 15,545 on the nine-year engagement; 20,800 ex-boys and 18,000 officers, giving a total of 117,177. If I make the allowance of 25,000, that gives a figure, which is on the high side, of 142,000. The same limitations apply in this case. I have made the allowance of 25,000 for those who are serving at present and who will stay in the Army. I admit that that figure is more a guess than an estimate.

May I turn to the long-term projection. If hon. Members are in doubt about these figures I ask them to take a minute to do this simple sum. Let them start in October, 1957, and imagine that two men join the Army every month after that, one on a six-year engagement and one on a nine-year engagement. This is the crux of the man-year calculation which I have had difficulty to persuade many hon. Members on both sides of the House to accept. This is the crux of the matter, whether we are talking in terms of commitments or in any other terms. What we get out of these men in terms of man-years is what matters.

1216 The two men start equal but one is on a six-year engagement and the other is on a nine-year engagement. After six years the Army will be 144 strong. After nine years it will have risen to 180. But there is a further factor to take into account. In order to keep the bias against myself, I am making no allowance for non-effectives at all—no deaths, no discharges, no invaliding out, no desertions. I am allowing an average of eight years' man's service for every man, which, again, is higher than the pre-war figure. The Army which we shall eventually get on that basis is 192. That figure will be attained only after 22 years, because it takes into account that some men enlisting for six and nine years will extend their service to 20 years and in some cases longer.

Let us do a projection based upon the November recruiting figures, taking every available factor into account and leaving no margin at all for non-effectives. The assumption which I make is that in the case of three-year engagements the Army will gain at least ten per cent. by extension of service. As I have said, in the case of the man on six years and nine years, we shall get an average of eight years out of each man. From boys we shall get eight years' man's service each. The figures are then 3,300 men on three-year engagements; 96,000 on six-year and nine-year engagements; 20,800 ex-boys and 18,000 officers. The total figure is 138,100.

We thus reach an extraordinary situation. I ask right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House to see the logic of the position in which they have landed themselves by playing politics with this problem. Suppose that as a result of the Government's pay increases and the improvement of conditions, or suppose that as a result of my right hon. Friend's four-year plan, we succeed in doubling the rate of recruitment at once. Suppose that the thousand a month recruiting now on six and nine-year engagements becomes 2,000. I warn the Government that that is the figure which they will have to attain; they will have to double the recruiting figure if they are to close the gap on the basis of this long-term projection. That is what they must do to reach the figure of 165,000.

If they doubled the rate of recruiting they would reach the figure of 165,000, 1217 but four years later they would have about 40,000 or 50,000 too many. One now sees the rhythm of the Government's proposals. In July they introduced a compensation White Paper in which they announced proposals costing £50 million by which men would leave the Army.

In January they have a Treasury crisis. The Chancellor and his colleagues resigned because they do not want to give any more money to the Forces, but the Defence Minister must save the situation, and the Government will now spend £35 million to £40 million to get more recruits. If the policy succeeds and the Defence Minister has his way, and we double recruiting, then, in another four or five years another Chancellor of the Exchequer will resign, because another Defence Minister will come to the House and offer £50 million to the 40,000 or 50,000 surplus men to leave the Army.

That is the wonderful position into which we have got ourselves. I am not suggesting for a moment that tonight the Secretary of State can refute my figures. I know that he cannot. I know the answer that I would give myself were I in his position: the argument that we have not all the data, that it has not yet finished, and that this is only one month. But in a few months' time we shall have the December figures, and if I am lucky enough to get the Adjournment debate so soon I will do my sums again, because the country should know the truth at the earliest possible moment. The one thing we cannot afford to do is to go on doling out £50 million every half year to induce men to leave the Army and, in the other half, to offer £50 million to get them into the Army. Someone must make up his mind.

I am quite used to being told that my information is incomplete. On 29th January, 1953, I said that the three-year engagement was not the answer, and I was howled down for saying so. I went on saying it, and later, when we were given the figures of re-engagement, I again expressed my doubts. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will accept that I sincerely hope that I am wrong, and that by some magic he will get the recruits he wants, but I tell him quite honestly, even though I may rouse the ire of the Minister of Defence, that I do not think that it is possible. I say that because the problem is not primarily one 1218 of recruitment. What has gone wrong as a result of the introduction of the three-year engagement, and as a result of its absurd retention long after its usefulness had ended, is that the structure of the Army has been so distorted that it, will take several years to put it right. My guess is 12 or 13 years.

On the whole, the long-term recruitment figures for November are good, and better than the Government had a right to expect. If the Government were wise, they would abandon the absurd proposals they have put forward in the last White Paper and adopt a slow-but-sure policy—better accommodation, better married' quarters; better pay, if they think it necessary—better conditions all round. As was said in another place earlier, let the Army be a good employer. A good employer does not give good pay and good conditions only when it suits him, but does it as an act of justice to those serving him. If the Secretary of State for War will do that, he will lay the foundations of what will, one day, be a successful recruiting policy.

§ The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Christopher Soames)

I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) for the kind words he addressed to me. One of the agreeable features of this particular post is that one has frequent opportunities of debating these matters with him.

I would first of all like to deal with his point that the Government are paying a large sum of money one year to encourage people to leave the Army and then in the next year paying a large sum of money in order to try to attract more people into it. He knows, of course, that the two payments are not in any way comparable. If one is running down the Army one can run down the number of other ranks very quickly, but one cannot do that with the corps of officers. The compensation payments are, of course for officers and senior N.C.O.s, whereas the other payment to which the hon. Member referred would be made try) attract a large number of recruits.

About two things we would all agree. First, we would agree as to the great knowledge the hon. Gentleman has of defence in general, and particularly of the Army, and, secondly, we would agree as to the assiduity with which he gains 1219 his facts, checking them and rechecking them before he airs them in public. As a result, those who are responsible for matters of defence on this side of the House do not often find themselves differing from the hon. Gentleman over facts, but where we frequently have to differ from him is over the conclusions which he draws from those facts. That is the position in which I find myself this evening. I am grateful to him for having given me a sight of the figures which he has quoted, which enables me to give him a considered reply.

There are two main reasons why I differ from his conclusions. To one of them he referred himself. It is that his conclusions are not based on adequate statistical information. The three-year engagement only came to an end at the end of September; in fact, there was a hang-over into October. And, of course, the three-year engagement does distort the picture of the six and nine-year engagement; so that November was the first month when we could get some idea of the numbers coming in on six and nine year Regular engagements.

November, on the other hand, is the only month on which the hon. Gentleman drew up his figures. I cannot blame him for that, because they were the only figures available to hip. But what I am saying is that the conclusion which he tried to draw was, what was going to be the size of the Army in 1963; and he based that upon one month's recruiting in 1957. If he were running a cricket team, he would not drop a batsman who did not score a century the first time; and he certainly would not do so if it was on a sticky wicket. November is a sticky wicket, notoriously so. November and December are bad months for recruiting. Just before Christmas, if a young man is contemplating going into the Army he is inclined to remain at home over Christmas and join the Army soon afterwards, in January or February. The variations in recruiting figures for different seasons of the year are really very considerable. Here again, what the hon. Gentleman has done is to take the figures for one month only in the year and project those forward. If one does that, surely one falls into the oldest statistical trap of all, which is to multiply error by starting from a false premise. 1220 If one's premise is wrong, the further one has to take it and the more one multiplies it, the greater becomes the error. So my first reason for disagreeing with his conclusions—although I fully see his point, that they are the only figures open to him—is that he has tried to draw conclusions too hastily and base them on insufficient information.

Secondly, even if we were to accept that the hon. Member's conclusions were soundly based, all that they would show us would be the numbers of men who would be likely to join the Army as Regular soldiers under existing conditions. But conditions will change; they must change. He referred to the good employer policy. A good employer must be flexible in both thought and action, and he must change with the times. Conditions will be changing for the better. Financial improvements are to be announced shortly. A large building programme has been got under way, which will make living conditions very much better.

I know that the hon. Member would not under-estimate the effect of the added incentive to recruitment, for a man who wishes to go into the Army as a vocation, of spending a goodly part of his life in the Armed Forces as a volunteer. How much more agreeable is it for a true volunteer to spend his time with other volunteers. While not in any way denigrating the National Service man—we all pay tribute to the good they have done in the past years—the fact remains that in almost every barrack room every week there is one National Service man going. I think the barrack room terminology is "release happy"—he sticks up a calender behind his bed, ticks off the days, and gets more and more excited as the day gets nearer. That has an effect on morale and on those who are contemplating signing on; and if one wants to be a regular career soldier, it is more agreeable to be so in an all-Regular Army than in a mixed Regular and National Service Army.

I shall not try to forecast tonight what effect these considerations will have on the level of recruiting, but I am sure they will have a considerable effect and should not be ignored. But of necessity the hon. Gentleman, only wanting to start from definite, established figures, has ignored them; and they will, I am sure, make a considerable difference.

1221 To sum up, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that if the figures for November, 1957, are not improved upon we shall not get an Army of the strength we require. But I do not believe the shortfall will be as serious as he has suggested. I do not agree either that there is enough statistical evidence yet available from which to draw conclusions for the years ahead, or, more important, that the present recruiting figures for November will not be improved. I do not regard 1222 the task we have set ourselves as being impossible of attainment; but neither am I complacent about it. We are going fiat out to close the gap. I know his concern for the Army is such that he will be as pleased as any of us, if in the event the figures confound his pessimism.