§ 2.1 p.m.
§ Mr. F. V. Corfield (Gloucestershire, South)In initiating a debate on this very important matter of the future of the aircraft industry, I think it will be probably apparent to the House in the course of my remarks that I have no expert knowledge on the subject. I have, however, over the last few years, largely because of the great interest of my constituents in this matter, endeavoured to familiarise myself with the widest possible knowledge of expert opinion. In trying to assess that opinion, which in the nature of things is very conflicting, I think that perhaps the freedom of bias which I have and which is almost inseparable from expert opinion may not altogether be the disadvantage that it may first appear to be.
I think that there are certain broad matters on which there is a reasonable degree of agreement in the aircraft industry, and, indeed, among all those who take an interest in it and in airline operation. First, I do not think any of us would deny for a moment the enormous value of this industry both to our defence and our economy.
I do not wish to take up the time of the House by reiterating figures with which hon. Members are already familiar. I will content myself by reminding the House that in the current year the export value of aircraft, equipment and spares looks like reaching a record well in excess of £150 million. That is a very considerable achievement, and it is certainly not one which we can afford to imperil, any more than we can afford to ignore the welfare of hundreds of thousands of men and women who depend on this industry, either directly or indirectly, for their livelihood.
Secondly, I think we all recognise that, confronted with the very fierce competition of American aircraft producers, our industry inevitably has a very considerable handicap in the smallness of the home market provided in this country. It is a market which, at best, can absorb only a fraction of the numbers of any particular type of aircraft that it is essential to sell if the line of production is to be economic or competitive.
1357 Thirdly, we are also aware of the immense sums involved in the development and production of a modern civil aircraft, and also of the very long delay between the decision being taken to go ahead with a certain aircraft from the drawing board stage and the time when it can possibly be in production. That means that there can be no quick return arid, indeed, no certainty that the market potential when the aircraft is eventually produced has not substantially altered from that envisaged at the time when the decision to go ahead was taken.
In the past the cost and risk have to a very large extent been underwritten by Government subvention in the form of orders for military aircraft. The rapid reduction in this form of subvention is bound to present the industry with very great difficulties. Whatever the possibilities of reorganisation and so on may be in the future, that short-term difficulty will remain. Not many of us would quarrel with the general proposition that the development of the long-range ballistic missiles must affect very seriously the demand for aircraft, though there is hound to be a good deal of controversy with regard to the timing as to when we should cease making a further generation of manned military aircraft.
On the general proposition, I think that most people would be in agreement. Equally, I think it is quite impossible to see, with the sudden cutting away of military subvention, how the aircraft industry can possibly survive such a drastic change without very considerable Government assistance.
When considering some of the aspects of this small home market, it consists, as we all know, of Transport Command of the Royal Air Force, for which the Government are directly responsible. Secondly, there are two nationalised Airways Corporations providing a somewhat different market—B.O.A.C. on the whole, for long-range aircraft, and B.E.A. for medium-range aircraft. Again this is a market over which the Government have a very considerable degree of control; at any rate they always have the right to have the last word. Thirdly, there is the much smaller market provided by independent airline operators, who again are dependent for their future on Government policy.
1358 I think that in this connection the House, and no doubt the aircraft industry, faces a considerable dilemma because my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation is responsible for both the nationalised airlines and independent airline policy. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence is responsible for laying down the strategic considerations which condition the requirement of Transport Command and of military aircraft. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air and my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty are responsible for the specifications of military and naval aircraft. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply is responsible for the placing of orders, the issuing of requirements and the allocation of funds in support of research. My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade is responsible for export credits, and my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible for finding the money.
It seems to me that it is virtually impossible in this House to have a comprehensive debate on the aircraft industry while we have responsibility spread around so many Departments. I hope that the Government would give serious consideration to the possibility of a Ministerlal committee or some organisation of that kind under the chairmanship of a single Minister, who would be responsible to this House and, indeed, to the aircraft industry itself for these matters.
To return to the problem of the home market, a further difficulty arises from the fact that the type of aircraft suitable for one of these markets, either Transport Command, B.E.A. or B.O.A.C., is not necessarily suitable for either of the other two. I think that makes it absolutely essential that any requirements issued by the Ministry of Supply for any civil aircraft should bear in mind very much its export potentialities, otherwise we shall have a small order which cannot possibly develop into an economic line of production.
We all remember in this House the controversy which raged over the new aircraft for B.E.A., which was eventually alloted the D.H.121. I have no doubt that that aircraft was considered by the best possible experts in the country to be eminently suited to B.E.A., but it seems to be forgotten that there is no airline 1359 in any country in the world which has an exactly similar route pattern to B.E.A. I would have thought that it would have been much more sensible to design an aircraft primary for other European airlines and American airlines with similar types of route to those used by B.E.A. rather than tailor-make the aircraft especially to B.E.A. and thereby diminish its export potential.
The same applies, I think, to an even greater extent to Transport Command. It has long been obvious to people who take an interest in defence planning that the Beverley freighter is hopelessly out of date and that the new generation of freighter will have to have a very much longer range and a very much higher speed. It may indeed be necessary to have two freighters, a tactical freighter of limited range capable of carrying relatively light equipment, and a strategic freighter capable of much longer range capable of carrying anything up to a tank. If that is so, the number of orders for each aircraft will be even more limited than if there were only one aircraft capable of fulfilling both functions.
It does, therefore, seem essential that this type, when it is designed, should be designed with an eye to the export market for civil operation in Europe or America, otherwise the costs of production will be quite exorbitant and will be entirely wasted from the point of view of setting up an economical production line from which aircraft can go to export. I know full well that the Minister of Supply cannot possibly give any indications of the requirements of these aircraft until the military authorities have made up their minds as to what type of aircraft they require, but I think that the Government, who, after all, control the military experts, are under an obligation to make an early decision in the present state of the aircraft industry so that that industry has a reasonable chance of planning production.
We have in the last few months, in the Press and elsewhere, been almost inundated with rumours that the matter is so urgent that there is now no suitable British aircraft available, and that it is contemplated that we may resort to purchasing American aircraft. If that is so, it seems to me that the fault lies entirely with those responsible for foreseeing the requirements of Transport Command. It does not seem to me that those require- 1360 ments are very different today from what could have been foreseen five or six years ago, when it was already clear that many of our oveseas bases on which we had to rely were becoming dangerously insecure, which must have meant that we must look to a longer range and a bigger capacity aircraft. Had an order been given then, there would have been no question at all that a British aircraft suitably designed for the purpose could have been available today. I hope that my hon. Friend will be in a position to give us a categorical denial that there will be any purchase of American aircraft for Transport Command.
It has always seemed to me that Transport Command is something of an unwanted child to the Air Ministry. It is perfectly natural in Service Departments that air marshals, like generals or admirals, should look first to their first-line equipment. I think that as a result Transport Command does tend to get what is left over and no more. Yet the importance of Transport Command is probably even greater to the other Services, and certainly to the Army, than it is to the Air Ministry, which, in this respect, is really only the operator, and I hope that we shall see the Estimates for Transport Command taken out of the hands of the Air Ministry altogether and regarded in the House as a separate item to be considered under the Ministry of Defence Estimate.
Now to say one word about the independent airline operators without going into any of the controversies as to policy. It seems to me that one of their difficulties arises from the fact that much of their most profitable work is seasonal, but there are other airline companies in other parts of the world who also have these seasonal requirements, and those seasons do not coincide with the seasonal peaks in this country. It seems to me that there is scope for a holding company—I mean, a company holding aircraft— to hire out aircraft for relatively short times to those airline companies. It would be able to ensure full utilisation of existing aeroplanes. If Britain were first in the field with an idea of that sort it might well introduce British planes to other airlines in other parts of the world where hitherto they have been unknown. I hope that that suggestion can be considered with a view to increasing the home market, on which so much depends.
1361 To look for a moment at the immediate future, apart from the freighter for Transport Command which I have already mentioned, we must remember that the current successful British airliners, the Comet, the Britannia and the Viscount, do stem originally from a good deal of work financed and supported by the Government, and it is difficult indeed to visualise how the next generation of aircraft can possibly be developed without some similar assistance.