HC Deb 10 December 1958 vol 597 cc383-8

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.

5.29 p.m.

Mr. Thomas Steele (Dunbartonshire, West)

We have the advantage this afternoon of the presence of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. It might be advisable at this stage, in view of what was said during the Second Reading of the Bill, if we could have some information from him about naval reserves. It is true that in his winding-up speech on Second Reading the Parliamentary Secretary mentioned that the naval reserves were rather low. I have read the speeches which were made and looked at the figures and I am wondering whether we could have an assurance by the Parliamentary Secretary that he is satisfied that those reserves are, in fact, sufficient.

The only other question I want to put is in connection with the discussion which took place on Second Reading in reference to this Clause. It seemed that there was some doubt in the minds of hon. Members about the reserves actually covered by the Bill. There was some discussion on that and there seemed to be some misconception about it. I was hoping that today the Parliamentary Secretary might tell us exactly what the position is so that the Committee and the country may know what reserves will be available after the Bill comes into effect. If the hon. Gentleman can set out the number of reserves which the country will have, taking into account those who have done their National Service, and so on, and the new reserves available under this Measure, that would be useful. If the Parliamentary Secretary is ready to reply to my question I will give way to him.

5.30 p.m.

The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Robert Allan)

I was present during the Second Reading debate when the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, West (Mr. Steele) spoke for the Opposition. It is not that the naval reserves as a whole are low. What my hon. Friend meant was that the number of naval reserves involved in the Bill was relatively small. In other words, the group which we are taking in now, which is the equivalent of the Army Group N, consists of about 17,000 men in the Royal Navy, but we have over and above that in our own Regular reserves.

The Royal Fleet Reserve is the first line; then we have the retired officers and pensioners; then the R.N.R., which is the amalgamation of the old R.N.R. and the old R.N.V.R., now forming one volunteer reserve; then we have the R.N.S.R.—the Royal Naval Supplementary Reserve—and, finally, the R.N.S.R. (Special), into which group the 17,000 reservists will go.

With regard to the wider question, all the Services have their own Regular reserves. I have just given the titles of the naval reserves. The Army has its own regular reserve organisation, and so has the Royal Air Force. Therefore, none of the Regular reserves is in any way affected by the provisions of the Bill. All that we have been doing is to relieve from membership of the Reserve those who have served in the forces from the outbreak of the war to the end of 1948.

Those people are now released from all liability, but the Bill also extends membership of the Reserve until 1964 for those who have entered the service of the colours from 1949 onwards. The point is that it excludes those up to 1948 and includes those from 1949 onwards, but there is no effect on the main Regular reserve of any of the three Services.

Mr. Steele

I am glad that the Parliamentary Secretary has said what he has, but perhaps he will recall that my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) mentioned during the Second Reading that it would be useful if we could have a White Paper setting out the various categories of reserves. I thought there was a great deal of misunderstanding during the Second Reading debate and that hon. Members did not properly understand the categories of reserves in each of the Services and the numbers in those reserves. If my hon. Friend's suggestion has not been considered since Second Reading, perhaps further consideration might be given to it so that on Third Reading we might have an answer.

Mr. Allan

The Services are notable for the speed at which they act, but I doubt whether that information can be made available for the Third Reading of this Bill. However, I shall be very glad to mention it to the Secretary of State for War, who is, unfortunately, unable to be here tonight, and has apologised for his absence. If it is possible, I am sure that we shall be glad to meet the wishes which have been expressed. I doubt very much, however, whether it would be in the public interest to publish the figures. I am not sure about that. There would have to be consultation, but we will try to meet the 'wishes which have been expressed.

Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

I sought same sort of general idea as to what the Navy wanted reserves for and for what it might in certain conceivable circumstances use them for. We tried on Second Reading to get some information on those lines from the Secretary of State for War, but we were almost entirely unsuccessful.

I see that the Under-Secretary of State is now in his place. Is he in a position to give us a little information? The Army is asking that a reserve liability should be taken off certain people but added to others. In other words, it is asking for a block of reserves. What does it want them for? Does it contemplate that these additional reserves should, in the event of catastrophe, be mobilised locally for Civil Defence, rescue and salvage? Does it contemplate that they should be formed into units for transport abroad, which seems, in modern circumstances, a somewhat improbable operation? How is it fitting this reserve conception into the new professional Army which is being created? These are questions on which we did not succeed in getting an answer from the Secretary of Stare for War, and I very much hope that we may have a reply now.

Mr. Allan

I think that the Secretary of State for War and the Under-Secretary did their best to answer the questions. The Group N Reserve, as it is called in the Army, will be required only in global war. It is not part of the pattern of the normal Regular forces of the country. It is available only if there is a global war in which we have to have a general call-up. I do not think that I can add to that.

The hon. and learned Gentleman has asked about the mobilisation plan. The Secretary of State said there was a general mobilisation plan into which the Group N reservists would be fitted.

Mr. Paget

I had understood that the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser) had been appointed to the War Office. Am I mistaken in that? Was it to the Whip's department?

Mr. Allan

I am speaking for the Government on this occasion, and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War is here to support me and give me any advice that he can.

Mr. Paget

Is not the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone allowed to open his mouth when simple questions are asked about the Army? Much as I admire my own Service, I find its answering for the Army eminently unsatisfactory.

We are now told that the Reserve is for global war. I am profoundly interested about the conception of the Reserve in global war. Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, who, I understand, is speaking for all three Services, can tell us whether he imagines that he can transport and land reserves in global war and when subject to atomic attack.

I had thought that the idea that we could mobilise, train, organise and transport reserves in global war had been written off in the strategic conception before last, if not the last but two. I thought that it was regarded as obsolete. Has it now been brought back to life? If that is not the conception, and I do not think that it is, can the War Office—and it is from the War Office that I want an answer tell us what its conception for this sort of Reserve is, when it is to be available only in total war?

Although I have not discovered it in any White Paper, I believe that there is a function for reserve forces, provided that they have their arms right beside them and provided they have an automatic mobilisation plan, which means moving people no further than their local village. In the event of an atomic attack, civil government will cease to exist, the survival of the country will depend on a military organisation, and the only effective means of carrying on any war being a purely local defence.

Does this sort of Reserve arise from that sort of conception? Has the Army thought of some method whereby it can mobilise these reserves in circumstances in which all centres of communication will have ceased to exist and in which those reserves can be taken to their arms only if that does not involve their passing any communication centre? Has the War Office thought of an organisation which, of its nature, will have to be local? Does it contemplate some form of defence on those lines? If the answers to those questions are, "Yes", then I can see a purpose for this total war Reserve. If the answers are not "Yes", I can see no point in the reserves.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Hugh Fraser)

I thank the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) for his interesting speech. Especially when one is new to an office, it is very interesting to get the views of so distinguished a strategist and Parliamentarian.

It is perfectly true that at this stage the mobilisation plans and the general concept of what a global war would mean for this country are in the process of being developed and worked out. I am certain that the hon. and learned Gentleman's remarks will be of great interest. With many of them, I personally agree.

Whatever conception one has, there is bound to be a need for a large body of controlled and disciplined men in the event of a total emergency. I think, however, that the hon. and learned Gentleman will agree that at this stage it is impossible to work out the full details of deployment.

The hon. and learned Gentleman's main contention, that a large body of men would be necessary, is accepted by Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. Paget

I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman and comforted by what he has said. However, is it not rather a peculiar horse-before-the-cart method, which is not untypical of the Government, that they should ask the House to impose a large obligation on a large number of men before they have made up their mind about what they intend to do with them? Would not a more normal process have been to decide the mobilisation plan which was wanted and the number of men needed to accomplish it, and then to come to the House to ask for that number of men to be made available? After seven years of Government, right hon. Gentlemen opposite should have thought out what they intend to do with reserves in the event of atomic war and how they intend to mobilise such a reserve.

5.45 p.m.

It is only right that one should observe and draw attention to something which is all of a piece with the appalling muddle into which defence has fallen during the last seven years, a muddle which, after the expenditure of about £5,000 million, has left us as defenceless as we were at Suez and more defenceless than we have ever been in our history.

Mr. Fraser

The hon. and learned Gentleman is, again, almost obliquely right. He is right by implication, but he is wrong in his invective. What we are proposing to do is simply to reduce the number of people on whom the obligation falls from 3½ million to 650,000. His first point is thus met.

The hon. and learned Gentleman then said that there was a demand for these men without there being a detailed and published plan. I point out that we are now taking these powers because our present powers lapse next year and that the new obligation will not become effective until June of next year. There would thus be plenty of time between now and June to make a plan, supposing that there were not a plan, for the much smaller number of men who will be involved.

Mr. Paget

In that case, would not June have been the time to bring in the Bill? The Government have known perfectly well that their powers would lapse. Why have they not thought out what they would do when that happened? Clearly, they have not done so.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 2 and 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule agreed to.

Bill reported, without Amendment; read the Third time and passed.

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