§ 47. Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Prime Minister if he is aware that the American Atomic Energy Commission, which had stated that an underground nuclear test had not been detected beyond 250 miles distance, now admits test shock recordings 2,320 miles away; and if, in the light of this new evidence that tests cannot be hidden, he will accept the Russian proposal to stop all further tests.
§ The Prime MinisterThe reply which I gave on 3rd April remains correct. As regards the Russian proposals, I have nothing to add to what I said on Tuesday last.
§ Mr. AllaunAre we to understand that there is a conflict between the British and American evidence, particularly in view of the statement made by President Eisenhower on 26th March that any sizeable explosion could be detected? Secondly, have not the Russians agreed in any case to the setting up of monitoring stations on their own territory?
§ The Prime MinisterI do not think there is any conflict of evidence. As we stated at Bermuda, our scientists believe that if a deliberate attempt were made to run these explosions in such a way as to avoid detection, it would almost certainly be successful. That is the scientific advice given to me. I still feel, therefore, that some form of surveillance or control is necessary to any effective measure of disarmament in this sphere.
§ Mr. GaitskellIs not it the case that on more than one occasion the Soviet Government have agreed to have control in order to ensure that the tests would be detected?
§ The Prime MinisterThe solution to the problem of how to deal with tests will, I hope, make a considerable advance if the Russians, as I hope they will, accept the last proposal we made to them regarding a Summit Conference.
§ Mr. BevanIn view of the existing confusion of testimony as to whether tests can in fact be detected, would not it be desirable to invite the leading physicists of the world to an open symposium on the matter; otherwise, the evidence we are given now is fragmentary and cannot itself be tested?
§ The Prime MinisterI think there is general agreement that if we could reach agreement regarding the suspension of tests, it should be accompanied by at least some measure of international control.
§ 51. Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the recording in the United States of the recent Soviet underground test explosion in the Urals, it remains the policy of Her Majesty's Government that the cessation of nuclear tests must be accompanied by the establishment of an international control organ.
§ The Prime MinisterYes, Sir.
§ Mr. HendersonIs the Prime Minister aware of the recent statement of Mr. Khrushchev, that the Soviet Government would be willing to collaborate in such an inspection system, and, further, that he did not think that it would be difficult to establish it? In the light of that statement, will not Her Majesty's Government make another proposal to the Soviet Government that they should appoint their technical experts and enable discussions to take place with the Western experts, as proposed in August last year by the Western Governments?
§ The Prime MinisterYes, Sir. We have repeatedly made that suggestion. It would be a very good thing if we could get an expert committee to start to study this problem so that when we came—as I hope we will—to the summit meeting, that work would have been done instead of having to be done afterwards. It would be of great advantage and I hope that this committee of experts can be appointed.
§ Mr. GaitskellWas not the proposal that there should be a committee of experts put forward by the Western Powers at a time when we were also insisting that suspension of tests must be accompanied by other measures of disarmament? Will the Prime Minister consider making a fresh start on this particular point? Would it be possible, for instance, for the ambassadors, who, we hope, are now talking in Moscow, to consider as one of the subjects for discussion the possibility of establishing effective controls over the suspension of tests, or could it be considered at the Foreign Ministers' conference?
§ The Prime MinisterYes, Sir, but all that shows how important it is that the ambassadors should discuss, at least to some degree, questions of substance and not merely the time, place and date of the meeting.
§ Mr. GaitskellObviously, if we can get anywhere with questions of substance, so much the better. Is the Prime Minister aware that we have never opposed that? What we have said is that they should not make the Summit Conference dependent upon the success of these talks.
§ The Prime MinisterYes, Sir, but I think that the request which the right hon. Gentleman has made to me confirms our view that it would be a good thing if we could make these preliminary discussions a little larger than merely fixing the time and place of the meeting.
§ 53. Mr. Beswickasked the Prime Minister what inquiries he has made, or caused to be made, of Mr. Khrushchev or the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics about the period for which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics propose to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons and the type of inspection and enforcement machinery they are prepared to accept.
§ The Prime MinisterI do not wish to anticipate my reply to Mr. Khrushchev's last communication.
§ Mr. BeswickDoes that mean that the Prime Minister has belittled the Russian offer, has been at pains to say that tests can go undetected, without making any inquiry of the Soviet Union about whether they are prepared to set up a comprehensive system of international inspection to detect these tests?
§ The Prime MinisterNo, Sir. None of those deductions needs to be drawn.
§ Mr. BeswickCan the Prime Minister say how any reasonable person could fail to draw those deductions, if he is denying that tests may be detected and he has not made any inquiries about what kind of system of detection the Soviet Government would agree to? How can he persist in this sort of attitude?
§ The Prime MinisterThe conditions in which the Soviet Government made the offer to suspend tests, after having completed one of the largest series of tests 352 that have ever been made, are very well known to the House and have been discussed on several occasions. What we say and stand by is that any question of suspension of tests, whether as part of a disarmament agreement, or on its own, is a matter best handled by the Summit Conference, or conference of all the countries concerned, so that a watertight agreement may be reached.
§ 54. Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Prime Minister if it is proposed to invite observers from the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to witness the next atomic tests to take place at Christmas Island.
§ The Prime MinisterIn the past it has been our policy to invite United States observers to our Christmas Island tests, and in return we have received invitations to certain United States tests. We shall follow the same policy in the future. We have not invited the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to send observers to our tests, nor have we received invitations to their tests. But I would remind the House that last year Her Majesty's Government put forward proposals in the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations, the first stage of which included the advance registration of tests and limited international observation. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet representative.
§ Mr. HughesWould not it be a good idea to have the summit talks at Christmas Island?