HC Deb 04 July 1957 vol 572 cc1338-72

(1) If as the result of an Injury caused after the passing of this Act by the happening of subsidence damage any person dies or is seriously and permanently disabled, and apart from this section no action to recover damages is maintainable in respect of the death or disablement, then, subject to the next following subsection, the Board shall be liable—

  1. (a) in the case of a death, to pay to or for the benefit of any dependant of the deceased the like damages, recoverable in the like manner and within the like time, as would have been payable to or for the benefit of that dependant if the death had been attributable to the negligence of the Board and—
    1. (i) where the death resulted from an injury caused in England or Wales, if the persons for whose benefit an action may be brought under the Fatal Accidents Acts, 1846 to 1908, included any dependent of the deceased;
    2. (ii) where the death resulted from an injury caused in Scotland, if the persons entitled to bring an action against the Board for damages in respect of a death attributable to the negligence of the Board included any dependant of the deceased;
      3. 1339
    3. (b) in a case of disablement, to pay the like damages, recoverable in the like manner and within the like time, as if the disablement had been attributable to the negligence of the Board.
  2. (2) No liability shall attach to the Board under the foregoing subsection in respect of the death or disablement of any person as a result of an injury if—
    1. (a) at the time when that person incurred the injury he was a trespasser; or
    2. (b) the injury was incurred underground in a mine of coal within the meaning of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954; or
    3. (c) the injury was wholly attributable to the negligence of that person; and if the injury was partly atributable to the negligence of that person the liability of the Board under the foregoing subsection shall be reduced proportionately.
  3. (3) For the purposes of this section—
    1. (a) the expression "dependant" in relation to a deceased person means any person who at the time of the death was, or but for the injury would have been, wholly or mainly maintained by the deceased;
    2. (b) a person shall be treated as seriously and permanently disabled if, and only if, he is suffering from loss of physical or mental faculty which is likely to be permanent and is such that the resulting disablement assessed, by reference to the disabilities incurred by that person as a result of that loss of faculty, in such manner as may be prescribed is not less than twenty per cent.;
  4. and any question arising under this section in any particular case shall be determined by a court having jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings for the recovery of damages in that case.—[Mr. Maudling.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Maudling

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

When the question of compensation in the event of death or disablement was discussed in Committee, I said that it seemed to raise rather difficult problems. Under existing law—indeed, under the law on these matters as it always has been—the peculiar situation is that if subsidence occurs and the roof of a man's house breaks and part of it falls on his head and injures him, he can get compensation for the damage to the roof, but not for the damage to his skull. This has always seemed to me to be a position which it is hard to sustain in logic.

Fortunately, so far as the records go, there have been very few cases of injury or death arising from subsidence and we all hope that that will continue to be the case. It is, however, right that provisions should be made for compensation when people are killed or seriously injured as a direct result of mining subsidence.

As I said in Committee, one of the difficulties is the introduction of a new principle. Normally, when a person is killed by the action of somebody else, damages cannot be claimed unless negligence can be proved. Now, it is proposed that absolute liability be placed upon the Coal Board in the case of damage caused by mining subsidence. It was, however, pointed out by the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. J. T. Price) when discussing the matter at an earlier stage that we are placing upon the Coal Board an absolute liability in the absence of negligence concerning damage to property and, therefore, it is reasonable to extend this principle to personal injury. The new Clause achieves that effect. In addition, it adds certain provisions which are necessary to round off the proposal.

The effect of the new Clause is to say that when anyone is killed or seriously injured—and serious injury is defined quite generously in subsection (3, b), on the basis of existing legislation—as the direct result of subsidence damage, the actual phrase in the Clause being by the happening of subsidence damage the compensation will be payable on the lines on which it would have had to be paid had the damage been caused by negligence. In other words, the person injured or the dependants of a person who is killed can get the kind of damages to which they would have been entitled had the occurrence resulted from the negligence of the Coal Board.

Certain further provisions are necessary. For example, it is fair that the Coal Board should not be liable if the injured person was, at the time a trespasser nor if the damage was his own fault. If it is a question of contributory negligence, compensation will be assessed in the normal way with which the law deals with contributory negligence.

We thought it right also—and I am sure the House will agree—to make it quite clear that the new Clause does not apply to men employed underground, whose position, clearly, is different from that of a bystander. The compensation payable to mineworkers is regulated by other schemes and enactments. Accordingly, these various provisions appear in subsection (2). Subsection (3) defines "dependant" and defines the degree of disability which qualifies for compensation under the Clause.

The only outstanding point, which will be raised subsequently on the Amendments to the Clause, is the class of person who should be entitled to claim the compensation in the case of death. Our proposal is that the people who should be able to claim compensation when a man dies are those who are wholly or mainly dependent upon him financially. The Clause is designed largely to deal with cases of hardship, and it is right to ensure that those who suffer hardship because they have been dependent upon the deceased should be the people who receive the compensation. We are, therefore, proposing a rather different principle from that which is likely to be advocated later by hon. Members opposite. It might be for the convenience of the House if I leave that point to be dealt with when the Amendments are called.

To sum up, the general purpose of the Clause is to ensure that when somebody is killed or seriously injured as a result of subsidence damage, compensation shall be payable as if the damage had arisen from negligence, so long as the person concerned was, in effect, an innocent bystander and not a trespasser or a person who, by his own negligence, contributed in any degree to the damage that occurred or to the injury he suffered. I hope that the House will be prepared to accept the new Clause.

Mr. R. Williams

I suggest, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that because the Amendments which immediately follow the new Clause go to the very roots of the Clause, it might save the time of the House if I deal with them in passing, so that when we come to them later we will be faced simply with the formal question of whether to divide. This would enable us to have the one debate rather than a debate on the merits of the Clause, in which I should have my reservations concerning the Amendments, and then a debate on the Amendments themselves. May I suggest that we take the Amendments with the Clause?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Gordon Touche)

The procedure is first to read the Clause a Second time. Not until then can the Amendments be called. I am not sure which procedure the hon. Member wants to follow.

Mr. Williams

If at this stage I incorporated my objections in my observations on the Clause, I should cover the whole ground in the one debate. It is not as if the Amendments relate to trifling matters.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

If it is for the convenience of the House, that course would be agreeable.

Mr. Ellis Smith

Before you reply finally, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, let us see where we are going. This is an important Clause, and it has not been on the Order Paper very long, although I do not complain of that. The Minister has made an important statement and explanation, which I appreciate, but in view of what is at stake, it should be subject to searching interrogation. In my view, this is the best stage at which hon. Members can conduct that searching interrogation. We are all trying to be helpful, because it is necessary to have a complete understanding so that when people outside read the debate tomorrow they also will understand it.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

I assure the hon. Member that nothing is now proposed that would prevent him from having his searching interrogation.

Mr. Ellis Smith

I have made a number of notes, because I am uneasy about the legal application of the Clause. I would prefer that we indulge in our constitutional right of interrogation now. Later, when the Amendments have been moved, if we are not satisfied with the Minister's reply we will have safeguarded our rights.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

I think we can proceed on the Question. "That the Clause be read a Second time."

Mr. Kenneth Piekthorn (Carlton)

All the Amendments down to line 29? Is that the intention?

Mr. R. Williams

Yes, all the Amendments down to the one in line 29, to leave out paragraph (a), that is, all the Amendments on page 2400 and the two at the top of page 2401.

It will, of course, give everyone the opportunity of asking any questions they like and of probing as far as they like. I am most indebted to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.

Mr. Ellis Smith

We are in the House of Commons now, and we all have rights. Will you be good enough to consider, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, before agreeing to this suggestion, that the Minister's statement is now fresh in our minds and that we have the right to indulge in interrogation now in order to get a clear understanding. Then, later on, if the Amendments are moved, we shall be able to speak again, because we shall not have lost our right to do so by speaking on the Question, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

There will be a new Motion before the House when the Amendments are moved.

Mr. Ellis Smith

Then we shall have lost our right to speak on the Minister's statement.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

The hon. Member can speak on the Question, "That the Clause be read a Second time", and then on the Amendments. I can assure him that he is not being prejudiced.

Mr. Williams

Let me say at once that, in bringing in for the first time the provision for payments in respect of death and disablement, we very much welcome that step and are delighted that the Minister has considered the observations which we on this side of the House pressed in Committee. However, I wish to make it clear at the outset that we cannot consider the Clause without dividing very sharply in our minds the distinction between fatal and non-fatal cases. It might, perhaps, help the House if I say right away that, so far as the non-fatal cases are concerned, I think that this is a good Clause. The Minister has accepted the phrase, "serious and permanent disablement", which we on this side proposed in Committee, and he is following, I assume, legislation passed when we were in power in considering what the meaning of "serious" should be. He has suggested that it should be a loss of faculty being not less than 20 per cent. With all that I am in complete agreement.

I am in complete agreement, too, with the Government approaching the matter along the lines of, shall I call it, a presumed or constructive negligence. The cases shall be treated in exactly the same way as cases of a similar nature which would arise if the injury were caused by negligence. Up to that point, I am in entire agreement with the Minister. It is when we come to the fatal cases that I must say quite frankly that I differ from him, because fatal cases, however small their numbers, are in one sense the very type of cases which command our sympathy even more than the non-fatal cases.

If a man is killed as the result of mining subsidence we should draw upon our legal experience and provide whatever we can for the dependants and the estate of that man. We should be generous in our approach. I do not think that the Government have been generous. Perhaps it is because they have mixed up two things. When the Minister refers in the Clause to non-fatal cases he applies the test of pecuniary loss. When he deals with fatal cases he applies the test of need, and in applying the test of need he restricts that principle even further by saying that it is only those who are wholly or mainly dependent upon the deceased who can claim.

That being so, the extraordinary situation would arise under the Clause that the person who was seriously and permanently disabled might succeed in getting a substantial sum by way of damages—and with that we heartily agree—but that the dependants of a person who was killed in precisely the same conditions might get little or nothing at all because the test would be not the question of pecuniary loss, but the test of whether the dependants were, in fact, wholly or mainly dependent.

I think the Minister will see that we could get into very troubled waters here, and it would be wrong, I think, for the House to pass a Clause which contained two such dissimilar principles in relation to injuries arising from the same cause. I ask the House to forgive me if I quote from Charlesworth on negligence to indicate what the principle is in relation to fatal cases and how it was set out in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1946. That is over 100 years ago, and if we had then reached the stage where our minds were clear on the matter we should certainly not go back on that principle and give less to the equally deserving cases which we are considering under the Bill. Charlesworth says: The measure of damages is the pecuniary loss suffered by the dependants as the result of the death. No damages can be given for the mental sufferings they have undergone or by way of solatium for their wounded feelings or the pain and suffering of the deceased. The pecuniary loss in question means the actual financial benefit of which the dependants have, in fact, been deprived whether the benefit was a result of a legal obligation or of what may reasonably have been expected to take place in the future. Those are firmly established principles which should apply in this case, but which do not because the only persons who can ask that those principles shall apply to them are people wholly or mainly dependent. Under the Fatal Accidents Act such a stringent test is very properly not applied since there the concern is not the question of need, but the question of pecuniary loss.

Mr. Maudling

I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I am interested in his quotation from Charlesworth. Am I right in thinking that on that principle the people who can claim are confined to dependants? Though we are providing in the Bill for a wider category of dependants, it is still confined to dependants.

Mr. Williams

That is a paint fairly taken, but the leading point which I want to leave in the Minister's mind is that the basis of it is pecuniary loss. It is not something based on the need of a particular dependant, or whether that particular dependant is wholly or mainly being maintained by the deceased. Perhaps the position will become even clearer in the Minister's mind if I remind him that where such cases occur in England and Wales the position is that one is not restricted to fatal accidents in making the claim, but that one can also proceed under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, and one can there rightly make a claim in respect of loss of expectation of life.

I would ask the Paymaster-General to consider in this connection the words of Lord Wright. He was giving his judgment in the case of Roach v. Yates, decided in 1938, and he said this, speaking of the deceased: I think he has a legal interest entitling him to complain if the integrity of his life is impaired by tortious acts not only in regard to pain, suffering and disability but in regard to the continuance of life for its normal expectancy. A man has a legal right that his life should not be shortened by the tortious act of another. His normal expectancy of life is a thing of temporal value, so that its impairment is something for which damages should be given. So here, in relation to negligence, we have clearly defined rights under the law in these matters, first, rights which come under the Fatal Accidents Acts, and secondly, the rights which come under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, the loss of expectation of life.

In this new Clause there is nothing for loss of expectation of life at all. I submit that if a Clause is drafted as this is on the basis that it is to be treated as if it were an action for damages for negligence, it is highly necessary that there should be consistency in the application of that principle. That is to say, once we take the line to treat these cases as if they were negligence cases, we must proceed from that to what the natural consequences are of taking that line. What we must not do is attempt to make a distinction, and in the same Clause, between those who are seriously and permanently disabled and get the full benefits of Common Law rights and those who are even worse affected in that they are killed and have lost rights. In their cases we deprive their dependants of the full rights. We deprive their estates of the full rights which are applicable.

I am quite sure that the Paymaster-General does not warn to do that. I feel that once he is seized of this point he will say we must surely treat this consistently and give what would apply in negligence cases without distinction between the two categories as we have made them in this new Clause.

It will have this advantage, too, that when cases are being contested, as, regrettably, cases may be, before the courts, there will be great difficulty in a court's deciding the question posed by the words "wholly or mainly" in this new Clause, when everywhere else the legal principles are quite clear and are in accordance with the stream of precedents going back for over a hundred years.

There is this advantage which I put before the Paymaster-General, that the National Coal Board will know where it is if this distinction is not made, because it will consider the fatal claims under mining subsidence in exactly the same way as it would treat a fatal claim which arose as the result of negligence in a pit. The Board has its competent staffs dealing with these cases every day of the week, and its mind is quite clear about this question of assessing damages and what amount should be paid.

What would be very confusing and, I think, quite wrong would be for the Board at one and the same time in otherwise identical circumstances to pay under the Fatal Accidents Act amounts in respect of loss of expectation of life to the estate of one person who has been killed, and in relation to the estate of another, because it is a case arising out of mining subsidence, to say, "We will pay nothing more."

That may easily arise. It may be that the wife of a person who is killed has also been working and may have had an income equal to that of her husband. Does the Paymaster-General seriously say that even though that man was killed and substantial damages would have been claimed had he been killed by negligence his widow is to get nothing whatsoever because she cannot show she was wholly or mainly maintained by him? Has the Paymaster-General thought about this, that if two persons were killed the dependant of one would be in that category, and the dependant of the other in an entirely different category, because the degree of the dependence at home was different?

5.15 p.m.

Why should we be concerned with these questions which fall into another part of the law altogether? This has more to do with the administrative side. When we are thinking in terms of benefits payable in cases where contributions have been made and where we have to have our categories worked out for the sake of administration, there is a strong case; but here there is no case at all, because here all the arguments are in favour of the vast experience we have in the courts and of the Acts, which exist, and which have been existing, many of them, as I have said, for over a century. Are we going to throw all those aside in regard to fatal cases but allow them all, in effect, in regard to non-fatal cases? That is what the Paymaster-General has done in his new Clause.

I think that he will clearly understand, from the way I am putting my case, that I am not being carping and critical. He has made a great effort in bringing in these categories at all, and I thank him with all my heart for having done so. For the first time there will be claims in cases where now people can get nothing. However, I beg him, as he has done this job so far, to do a really good job, because now he can do it with all the force of legal authority and apply throughout the new Clause one consistent principle, that the damages are based on loss and not on some other and alien principle.

The cases would number only one in a million, and consequently there is not a shred or a shadow of excuse for saying that because of the financial impact of such claims the Board will be in difficulty, and that we shall have to pay more for our coal. Of all these cases everybody regards the fatal cases as those which evoke our greatest sympathy. I say that it should be the object of the right hon. Gentleman to apply one well-settled, clearly defined legal principle which has stood the test of generations of experience in our courts. If that is done, I think it will be a tremendous improvement to the Bill and we can all be of one mind in relation to it.

You will see from what I have said, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that I have covered all the ground which would have been covered by all our Amendments down to the new Clause. Our object is to bring this point forcibly before the Paymaster-General. I would even go so far as to say that if he will consider it, and consider having it implemented in another place, I will accept even that, but I must say to him, in the friendliest spirit, that if he asks us to accept the new Clause which contains mutually contradictory principles in relation to persons who are injured by the same things I shall at the appropriate time be obliged, and very much against the grain, because we have had a happy, friendly time in Committee, to invite my right hon. and hon. Friends to divide. We do not want to on this. I beg the Paymaster-General to say at the appropriate time that he realises the strength and force of this argument and that he will give the matter further consideration.

This argument applies equally, of course, to Scotland. I mentioned that it was in relation to England and Wales. I claim to have some acquaintance with the law in this respect in England and Wales. I know absolutely nothing about the law of Scotland, but I do know that it would be necessary there as here to have one clear, consistent principle running through the new Clause.

Mr. Oliver

After hearing the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams), the Paymaster-General must appreciate that he has fallen rather short of what we expected of him when dealing with this matter. If a person who is deceased by reason of damage arising from mining subsidence is to be in the same position as a person who has been killed by an act of negligence, why not do the good, right and normal thing and not confine the damages to those obtainable only under the Fatal Accidents Acts? Why not permit damage to be claimed under the general heading which applies to cases of death caused through negligence which at present come before the courts, that is, under both the Fatal Accidents Acts and the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act, 1954? Both those Acts are used almost daily in cases where death occurs.

I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan that in the case of a man killed as a result of damage caused by mining subsidence, if the widow is at work and is not at all dependent upon her husband, or if by reason of her husband's death she should come into a small legacy in excess of the damage assessed by the court, she would be completely out of this provision and not entitled to anything at all. We recognise that under the Fatal Accidents Acts the man's wages before he was killed are taken into account. Account is also taken of how much went to the wife for the maintenance of the home and the children, and the court deducts an amount which was attributable to maintaining the husband.

The weekly figure is then multiplied by 52 to make a yearly figure and then a number of years, according to the age of the parties or the age of the children, is taken into account. That fixes the amount, but if by reason of the husband's death the wife should succeed to a sum of money, that sum is deducted. Insurance money is excluded, the wife's benefits are excluded, and pensions are excluded.

The purpose of passing the 1954 Act was to provide for a more extensive claim. Instead of the claim being brought by the wife or the children or grandchildren or grandparents, the claim could be brought by an executor or administrator and by that means it would be the estate that would be benefiting. Furthermore, under the Law Reform Act, account would be taken of the pain and suffering of the person who was killed. That is another item which by reason of drawing this new Clause so narrowly is excluded from consideration.

In addition there is the question of loss of expectation of life. If the man was young and was likely to have lived a long time, the expectation would be much longer and a much larger sum would be allowed. Instead of being paid into the courts, as the money under the Fatal Accidents Acts is paid into a court which in turn pays it out weekly to the dependants, the money is paid to the executors or administrators under the Law Reform Act. The result is that there is greater freedom for members of the family in dealing with the sum of money.

It is very strange that when the Government want to do something for people who are killed in these circumstances they should permit only one-half of the remedy to be applied to the relatives of the deceased person. Why not deal with the matter generously, as would be the case if a person in the employ of the National Coal Board were killed as a result of negligence? Anyone acting on behalf of the deceased person in a case of negligence would not bring a claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts only. He would bring it under the Law Reform Act as well, because of the benefit that would result.

I agree that if the dependency is substantial it is set against any expectation of life. To that extent the sum is diminished, but that does not apply in all cases. The Minister said that very few, if any, cases of the kind with which we are now dealing had been brought to the notice of the Coal Board. If those were not the Minister's precise words, I think that he indicated that there was no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, why be so niggardly in so small a matter as this and limit claims to just one statute when the Minister could so generously, and probably at no greater expense, apply both statutes?

That is exactly what the Amendments ask. I am sure that if the Amendments were accepted it would not involve a very large sum of money, because, on past experience, I am assured that the number of people who are killed in circumstances such as those to which the Bill relates would be negligible.

Mr. Ellis Smith

I hope that the Minister will accept the suggestion made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams) about the proposals in the new Clause and that he will give further consideration to the matter, on the lines suggested by my hon. Friend, between now and the time when the Bill goes to another place. In the meantime, I hope that one or two questions which I feel compelled to put to the Minister today will be answered.

I liked the right hon. Gentleman's approach not only to the matter with which the Clause deals, but to all these questions when we considered the Bill in Committee. I am disturbed, however, by this constant reiteration that there are only a few cases of this kind. I shall produce evidence later to show that either we have been very unfortunate, or that there were more cases than we were aware of.

I understood the Minister to say that in fatal accident cases the Board will accept absolute liability, except where there is contributory negligence. I should like to make a few observations on that proviso relating to contributory negligence, but before doing so I would ask the Paymaster-General to refer to col. 525 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of the Standing Committee, in which he said: …I should like to see whether it is possible to draw up a Government new Clause on Report which would provide compensation strictly in those cases where injury or death is the direct result, and the direct result only of mining subsidence."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 14th May, 1957; c. 525.] I ask the Minister whether, in his opinion, the proposed Clause carries out the desire which he expressed on that occasion?

5.30 p.m.

The next question is: what is the meaning of "direct result"? It is upon this point that, later, I shall make one or two remarks. I have been subjecting this proposed Clause to a close analysis, based upon my experience and upon that of those with whom I am associated. I am uneasy lest the Board use its legal advisers to enable it to make a defence based upon contributory negligence. The proposed Clause reads: If, as the result of an injury…any person dies or is seriously and permanently disabled… I will give two or three concrete examples which have been given to me by our city authorities. The first one is of a miner going to work early one morning in the darkness of winter. The road gives way, the man falls into the hole, he is never seen again and the funeral service is held in the street and attended by his neighbours. He leaves a widow and children. Will they be eligible for full compensation? Will their interests be safeguarded, as long as that is necessary, throughout their lives? Would that man's widow be in the position I have just mentioned? Are there any means of using the phrase "contributory negligence" to create difficulties in such a case?

I now come to the second case. In our area, the whole city is undermined with new mining, above which has been left the old mining. As a result of modernisation, the old mining is likely to be worked at any time and, therefore, it remains the property of the Board. Because we suffer from a lack of playing fields to a greater extent than any other part of the country, within the last two years the education committee has embarked upon a policy of making the land as safe as possible and laying it out as playing fields for the children. Much to the surprise of everyone, including the mining engineers who advised the education committee, the playing fields gave way. The city council obtained the best legal advice possible and called in scores of assessors, and as a result of the expert advice received they laid out the playing fields.

To the great relief of all the parents, the subsidence occurred at night. We can all visualise what would have happened if that had taken place while the children were playing there. In such a case would those concerned have received full compensation under the proposed Clause? Would there be any contributory negligence on the part of anybody, since everyone is innocent?

I have much more evidence here which has been sent on to me, but I will not weary the House with it. The Minister will realise that there are grounds for the uneasiness, so I ask him to consider the constructive proposal made by my hon. Friend about this difficult situation, so that when the Bill roes to another place the Minister will be able to take steps to cover all the points we have made. In that way, the harmonious proceedings which have been maintained from the time when this Bill first entered on its Committee stage can be continued and it will enable us to get the best results possible for the areas for which we are speaking.

Mr. T. Brown

I support strongly the arguments advanced by the three previous speakers on the question of compensation for loss of life and limb caused by mining subsidence. It is true that the Minister has gone a long way along the road we wish him to travel, but he appears to have fallen short of the goal that we desired him to reach. It is the first time in the history of compensation for damage from mining subsidence that the question of payment for maiming or death is included. Happily for this country and for the mining areas, there are not many such cases.

I can put forward the claim that it was in the constituency which I have the honour to represent that the first death from mining subsidence took place in the year 1874. That is going back a long way. It ought to be remembered, however, that we have been giving deep-mined coal to the nation since the year 1546. I will not go into the amount of damage caused since then, but the area in which I reside is a veritable honeycomb of underground workings for miles and miles. The next death took place in 1954, so that we have had only two deaths in practically a century.

I want the Minister to respond to the pleas put forward from this side of the House. Instead of the Minister stopping where he has done in this proposed new Clause, will he travel along a little further and cover the dependants and estates of men or women who are maimed or killed as a result of mining subsidence?

We are not asking that there shall be put upon the National Coal Board a tremendous financial responsibility. We are asking that, where loss of life occurs through mining subsidence, not only the family but the estate also shall receive the compensation to which they are entitled, following the general line of compensation throughout the country. I have spent more years than I care to remember in dealing with compensation cases. I have always found that the judge has been very generous and humane in his approach to the dependants and relatives of men who lose their lives in industry. Why not in these cases?

I say with all respect that there seems to be on the part of the Department a hesitancy or, in the phrase coined by the Parliamentary Secretary, ultra-cautiousness. I say that, although I have a great admiration for the Department in spite of the strong words I have to use to the Minister from time to time. Why stop here? In effect, what is being said is, "Let us try to persuade the House and the Members of the Opposition to accept what we think is right." It should be remembered, however, that we on this side of the House have had considerable experience.

We have not put down the nine Amendments for fun. We put them down for the specific and definite purpose of trying to get fair play and honest treatment for those unfortunate people who suffer death and injury because of mining subsidence. My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith) referred to a death in his constituency and quoted a case of a narrow escape. In Committee in May this year I referred to what is called the Crankwood Road case where it was only by the providence of God that a whole row of houses did not slip down because of mining subsidence.

The problem of subsidence is known to everyone in mining areas and by this time it is known to the Department, but the Department does not know the full extent of the damage and the loss of human life. While the Department is not fully conversant with the circumstances prevailing in the coal fields, I beg the Minister to take some little notice of the people who do. We are not unreasonable. We have set out to get fair play when property is damaged and to do our best for the unfortunate people who live in coal fields. We must see to it that people and dependants who lose their lives or who are injured are covered.

I beg the Minister not to fall short. He should go as far as we want, which is not unreasonable, and that is to say that those who are left after they have had the misfortune to lose their breadwinner should not be left high and dry, but should be fully compensated according to the principles governing the payment of compensation in this country.

I hope that the Minister and the Department will consider that plea. I am not anxious to divide the House. What I am anxious about is that we should continue the harmony which has existed throughout the proceedings on the Bill since 31st January, 1957, so that at the end we can say that we have played our part and played fair with those who are unfortunately placed.

Mr. Probert

I hesitate to enter into any legal argument, but one aspect of the new Clause does concern me. It is subsection (2, c), which contains the words: the injury was wholly attributable to the negligence of that person". I do not know how the courts will interpret such a phrase and it is for that reason, my inadequacy in that connection, that I raise the matter now. The Minister will recall that in Committee we dealt with an Amendment in which we sought to include the tenant as a person who would be obliged to notify the Coal Board of subsidence damage.

We did not succeed in that Amendment and we are now in some danger. Let us suppose that a tenant has notified the owner of a house that there is subsidence damage, but the owner of the house does not notify the Coal Board. If the tenant is killed, does the phrase which I have quoted debar the tenant's dependants from any recompense from the Coal Board?

Mr. Maudling

That would surely be the negligence of the house owner, not of the tenant.

5.45 p.m.

Mr. Probert

It is precisely that with which I am concerned. It is all right if the owner of the house is a wealthy person, but he may not be and may not be able to pay for the damages which the court may decide. What is the position of the tenant or his relatives in that case? Does the Coal Board get away with it if the tenant has notified the owner of the damage and is then injured or killed, if the owner has not notified the Coal Board?

I see that danger if we do not include the tenant as one of the people who can notify the Coal Board of such damage. It is all very well to say that the house owner is responsible, but house owners are not always wealthy people. The Coal Board will have money to pay for this and the tenant should not be at the mercy of the negligence of a third party. However, I add my congratulations to those already given to the Paymaster-General for introducing this important Clause.

Sir Lancelot Joynson-Hicks (Chichester)

The hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. Probert) has been raising a specific matter of some detail. I hope that he will not mind if I do not pursue it, but leave my right hon. Friend to deal with it. I want to put a view arising from the speech of the hon. Member for Ince (Mr. T. Brown). I can understand his point of view and sympathise with it; and although we evidently have different views about the Amendment to the new Clause, I do not believe that there is anything of substance between us on the subject matter.

Hon. Members who have spoken on this Clause seem to be under some misapprehension. The Clause does and is intended to lay upon the Board the responsibility, notwithstanding that there is no negligence by the Board, to pay by way of damages such compensation as may be proper to the dependants of the deceased and, as the hon. Member for Ince said, if the situation can arise, to the estate of the dependants of the deceased. What the Clause does not do —and I must confess that I was very surprised to hear Opposition Members who belong to the legal profession arguing that it should do—is to introduce an entirely new principle into our law where negligence is not involved and require the Board to pay compensation to the estate of a deceased in any event.

While that is perfectly right and proper where compensation is payable as a result of the negligence of the person who would be the defendant in the case, because that is a measure of the damages for which he is responsible, at present there is no legal responsibility on the Board in this case and we are introducing a new statutory responsibility which is something far more narrow than the common law responsibility for negligence.

What we are seeking to do is to provide a means whereby those who suffer damage shall receive compensation. I believe that that is what the new Clause does. The Amendment can be well illustrated by the example of the occupant of a house and his wife, having no children or dependants, both, unhappily, being killed as a result of subsidence and their estate going to the benefit of a fifth cousin resident in Australia. The compensation which would then be payable if the Amendment were accepted would go not to people who had suffered any damage as a result of subsidence, but to this possible beneficiary of the deceased's estate who was resident in Australia. I am sure that that is not the intention of hon. Members opposite any more than it is the Government's intention. Their intention, I am sure, is the same as ours—that those who suffer should be compensated. That is what I believe the Clause does.

Notwithstanding his very natural and proper sympathy with pleas advanced by hon. Members with practical knowledge of this subject, I hope that my right hon. Friend will take steps to ensure that we do not depart from the legal principles of this country and that we do not introduce an entirely fresh precedent which might go a long way further than we can see at present. We know that hon. Members opposite have practical knowledge of these cases, and that examples have been put forward by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross) and the hon. Member for Ince and lathers, but I hope that my right hon. Friends will not depart from our normal legal principles.

Mr. Harold Davies (Leek)

I appreciate the point which the hon. Member has made, but I should like his guidance on one aspect of it. Let us assume that I am killed in a road accident. It does not follow that only my next-of-kin or dependants would get compensation. Would not the money go to someone else who was entitled to my estate?

Sir L. Joynson-Hicks

This clearly illustrates the difficulty in getting the matter understood. I am not asking the hon. Member to accept this as a legal opinion. For that, he had much better go to his hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), who is in a better position to give him that opinion.

I suggest that this is the answer: if it were somebody else's fault that the hon. Member was killed—for instance, if there were negligence on the part of the driver of the motor car or a third party—then the hon. Member's estate would recover in full and the money might go to his fifth cousin in Australia. If it were nobody else's fault, as it is admitted that it is not the Coal Board's fault if subsidence takes place, then the hon. Member's estate would not recover.

Dr. Barnett Stross (Stoke-on-Trent, Central)

I know that this is not a simple subject but is complicated, and I am not conversant with the legal ramifications. I rise only for a few minutes to say that from the practical point of view my hon. Friend the Member for Ince (Mr. T. Brown) was perhaps mistaken in speaking of only two deaths in a century as a result of subsidence. Perhaps he had forgotten what must have happened frequently in his constituency and has certainly happened in mine—that, as a result of subsidence, there is a tendency for gas mains to fracture, and the number of deaths from gas poisoning has been by no means a few. I remember very many such cases in the twenty-five years that I was in practice in my constituency and I attended one or two inquests. These are not the types of death which we get in an area where there is no subsidence.

It is a mistake to consider that only one or two deaths have occurred in a century. The dramatic cases, such as that which occurred in my constituency when the ground opened up and a man disappeared and was never seen again, are rare, and perhaps my hon. Friend had only that type of case in mind. In the northern constituency of Stoke-on-Trent there was a loss of life many years ago, but it was not human life. The ornamental pond in a garden disappeared one night and the ducks which had been swimming in it also disappeared and were never seen again. We are not asking for compensation on that ground tonight.

I should like to reinforce what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith) about the danger which we face in Stoke-on-Trent. After spending a vast sum of money to create playing fields and after having taken the very best possible advice we could get and having been told that the old pit shafts had been successfully filled in, we created many acres of playing fields and then, suddenly and unluckily in the night, me big shaft opened for hundreds of feet. Had children been playing in the area it would have created an impossible situation; we could never have held up our heads again. Nevertheless, what can a local authority do when it takes the best possible advice it can get, spares no money in obtaining that advice, takes every possible precaution and still the danger exists?

I recognise that in respect of property anyone who is injured or a relative of anyone who dies as a result of subsidence should have recourse at law to the owner of the property, but I ask the Minister to look again—and that is all I ask him to do—at the number of cases where subsidence, and only subsidence directly due to the work of the National Coal Board, brings about injury, illness or in some cases death, often, perhaps, death from gas poisoning due to the fracture of gas mains. It is not enough that a local authority should insure against that type of eventuality, as local authorities do. They should have redress against those who are responsible for the damage, the illness and the death which may result.

Mr. Harold Davies

I should like the guidance of the Minister on this point. It seems obvious from subsection (1) that if as the result of an injury caused…by the happening of subsidence damage permanent disablement takes place to any person in an area liable to mining subsidence, such a person will receive compensation under the new Clause only if he is not getting compensation from anywhere else.

6.0 p.m.

I do not know whether I heard the Minister clearly, but I think he said that that might seem fair to some people. But why should a person who lives in an area where mining subsidence occurs, and who has had the foresight to insure himself, not get compensation because of the effect of mining subsidence? Why should the courts take into account the fact that a person has had the foresight to take out some form of insurance?

Mr. Philip Bell

There is nothing new in that. Under the existing law, it is not necessary to prove dependency in this case when damages are assessed. Account is taken of whatever other mitigation of damages occurs. It exists under the existing law.

Mr. Davies

I know that, but I am asking why it should be so if a person has the foresight to insure himself. Hon. Members may not agree with me, but I am accustomed to people disagreeing with me.

The expression "dependant" appears to me to be old-fashioned. It smacks of the mendicant period of our social history. In a virile society we want women to work. We urge as many as possible to go out to work to help production. But if they do, it seems that, should the death of their husbands occur as a result of mining subsidence, the benefits accruing from their work are entirely lost because their earnings are taken into account when the question of compensation is considered. I think that that is unfair.

My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross) knows as well as I do that there are indirect consequences of mining subsidence damage and I am grateful to him for what he said. The House should not be under the impression that no ill-health or injury, or even death, results from mining subsidence. Only a few months ago all the members of a family living in Kidgrove, in North Staffordshire, were gassed, except one child, because the gas mains were cracked as a result of mining subsidence. Under the provisions of this Clause, would that child be compensated and looked after or would it be assumed that there had been negligence? Could it be argued that the local authority was negligent because there were not enough men employed on inspecting the gas mains?

Those hon. Members who served on the Turner Committee will know that we discovered how expensive it was for local authorities to keep men to inspect gas mains. Could it be argued in the courts that because a local authority employed, say, only two men to inspect the gas mains instead of three or four, it had been negligent? It might be argued that there had been negligence on the part of the local authority because there were not enough inspectors. All this may sound unreal when mentioned in the House of Commons, but to those people who live in areas where mining subsidence occurs the danger resulting from cracked gas mains may occur almost every week.

During the Committee stage we dealt with the question of consultation between the Coal Board and local authorities when new areas are being worked. Suppose I built a new house in an area where mining subsidence occurs, and, after about ten weeks, there was a crack in the gas mains which resulted in the death of a person. Could it be argued that the owner of the house was negligent because he had not consulted the Coal Board about where he should build his house, and had built in an area where he ought not to have built a house?

There would appear to be an avenue of escape from the provisions of the Clause if it is not compulsory for the Coal Board to inform the local authority about its development schemes. That is a point which will affect people living in areas where mining subsidence may occur.

I wish to thank the Minister for the work he has done on this Bill. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman and those who assisted him have implemented still further the recommendations contained in the Turner Report; and, bearing in mind that the art of politics lies in obtaining not what we want, but what we can get, I am grateful for what has been done.

Mr. B. Taylor

I wish to thank the Minister for his efforts and to give a welcome to the Clause. For the first time, recognition is to be given to the need to compensate the victims of mining subsidence damage as well as providing compensation in respect of property. A great deal was said about this during the Committee stage discussions and I myself commented on the necessity for compensating victims of such accidents. Were I in the position of the Minister, I should consider the legal arguments advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ilkeston (Mr. Oliver) to be irresistible, and I think that on the grounds of fairness and humanity the right hon. Gentleman should concede all that he has been asked to concede.

I wish to ask for clarification on a small but important point regarding subsection (2, e) where it is stated: at the time when that person incurred the injury he was a trespasser. I do not know how that is to be interpreted. In some circumstances I can imagine that it would be easy to interpret. But a case might arise where people were in a house without any right to be there, and then the interpretation would not be so easy.

Dr. Stross

Has my hon. Friend in mind the case of a person who might be committing a burglary in a house and the house fell on him, and whether such a person would be able to go to the Coal Board for damages?

Mr. Taylor

That is one case, but there are others. I have in mind the case of a family comprising a widower and his son or daughter who might be living in a house of which the widower was the tenant. Suppose the widower died and the landlord of the property gave notice to the son or daughter to quit the premises. Suppose that the notice stated that in law the son or daughter were trespassers if they continued to occupy the house. Suppose that in the period between the serving of the notice and the time when the premises were vacated mining subsidence occurred and that the son or daughter were either fatally injured or disabled. What would then be the position, bearing in mind that in law they would be trespassers? I should be grateful if the right hon. Gentleman would clear up that point. Such cases may be few, but I regard them as important.

Mr. Philip Bell

I should like to give an explanation to the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) who was good enough to give way to me when I intervened. As I understood him, he was saying that he thought it unfair that a person who suffered damage by subsidence, who had taken the precaution of insuring against that damage, should have that sort of insurance deducted from the compensation which he received. I rose to intervene and said that this was nothing new, for every claim for damages was made under the (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act which lays down that account has to be taken of other sources of compensation coming in.

So far, so good, but I was, in fact, wrong, because claims under this Bill, are made analogous to claims under the Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act, 1908, and I am glad to be able to contradict myself and to assure the hon. Member for Leek that the real position is as laid down under that Act in assessing damages. I quote from that Act: …there shall not be taken into account any sum paid or payable on the death of the deceased under any contract of assurance". Therefore, if a person is wise enough to insure against this damage, it will not prejudice him in his claim, and I am very glad of the opportunity of correcting myself.

Mr. McKay

I think the Minister must be thinking that something ought to be done to improve the new Clause, and I feel sure that all hon. Members on this side of the House are convinced that some change is necessary, while the right hon. Gentleman himself has only had one speaker from the other side to support him, and he seemed to throw some doubt on whether his right hon. Friend would be wise in amending the Clause to meet our requirements.

The remarkable thing about this new Clause is that the Minister, in drawing up his Bill, has definitely laid down that compensation will be paid on grounds of negligence, but, having introduced that principle into the Bill, he then hangs fire at one of the most vital points. Let us take the case of a family living in a house subject to subsidence which has caused definite and serious damage to the occupants of that house. Under the Bill as it now stands, the occupier can claim and will get a great degree of compensation, and that, I understand, is acknowledged in the Bill. Taking the same family in the same house, but in the circumstances where the man is killed, if his wife and children are considered to be fairly comfortably placed, the idea is that there will be no compensation at all.

Mr. Maudling

No.

Mr. McKay

Is that not so? I understand that it is so. If the man is killed and the family cannot show that they were mainly dependent upon him when he was alive, in those circumstances no compensation will be paid. I understand that to be the right hon. Gentleman's contention in this discussion. I think it should be said that my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams) in presenting our arguments put a brilliant case before the House. I listened to him with great attention, and, to my mind, trying to be as impartial as possible, I think he presented a case that could not by any means in logic be denied.

Therefore, I am very much surprised by the Minister's action on this occasion, because of the small amount involved to start with, and also because of the inconsistency of the new Clause, if it is not amended. I cannot understand why the Minister should fail to meet our views on this point. One hon. Member seemed to suggest that the Minister was doing all that could be considered necessary, and that we had put an extreme case before the House. He seemed to be trying to strengthen the attitude of the Minister in standing still rather than going out to meet the feelings of the majority of hon. Members on this side. The hon. Member quoted a case which he said might happen, but which was an extreme case, in which the compensation might go to the estate of the deceased person and finally land up in Australia. I do not think that any of us are worried about people in Australia getting any benefit from the Bill as the result of the death of any individual from mining subsidence.

6.15 p.m.

That is not the point. What we are trying to get is justice for the victims of subsidence and their dependants. How any Government or Minister can bring in a Bill which provides a new principle of accepting negligence where subsidence is concerned, and then drop it down to apply only where the people injured are still living whereas the dependants of those who are killed get nothing, seems to my mind to be absolutely illogical and against all past practice. The expense involved is likely to be infinitesimal, as far as all the evidence goes. I therefore desire to support this appeal which has been made to the Minister, because I think it is one of the most powerful and logical appeals that has ever been made.

Mr. Maudling

As has been said more than once in the debate, this new Clause introduces a new principle in our mining subsidence law, and, for that reason if for no other, it was a difficult Clause to draft. Those who advise us in these matters and draft these things for us are extremely helpful and wise, and I know that they will not take it amiss if I say that I do not think that the drafting in this case is necessarily perfect.

I have listened with a great deal of interest to the points which have been raised, a number of which, I readily admit, will need further consideration, though, for reasons which I shall explain, I cannot accept any of them tonight. There are, however, a number of points which need further consideration before the Bill passes to another place.

I think we must start by remembering what we are doing here. The general law is that if someone is killed, damages cannot be obtained unless it is due to the negligence of somebody else. No one is supposing that the National Coal Board is being negligent. If the Board is negligent and a person is killed, there are the normal rights of compensation, but we say that in these cases where there is no negligence it will still have to pay compensation, and negligence is "presumed" largely to give the measure of the compensation which the Board will have to pay.

Therefore, it is necessary, in considering some of the points which have been put forward, to remember that we are not dealing with a tortious act by the Coal Board, as someone has described it, or negligence, but a payment by the Coal Board on the same scale as if there had been negligence, in all cases where liability has been made by Statute absolute.

Starting from that point, I will now deal with one or two points which have been raised in the discussion, and perhaps, finally, deal with the most important points made by the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams). The hon. and learned Member for Ilkeston (Mr. Oliver) made several points, on one of which I think he was in error, when he suggested that if a man died, and, as a result of his death, his widow received a small legacy, she would not receive compensation. In fact, I think the hon. and learned Gentleman will see that provision is made that, if the family was dependent on him, or if, apart from the occurrence of the injury, they would have been dependent on him, then she is included, because apart from the man's death, she would have been dependent upon him, and she would not have had the legacy.

Mr. Oliver

If the compensation is based on the Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that it is true that the insurance is completely excluded, that widows' pensions are completely excluded and pensions are excluded, but not money which is invested or any legacy which might come as a result. That is how I understand the Act.

Mr. Maudling

The wording I had in mind is contained in subsection (3, a): The expression 'dependant' in relation to a deceased person means any person who at the time of the death was, or but for the injury would have been, wholly or mainly maintained by the deceased. Anything that happens after the injury or as the result of it is not affected. The other point made by the hon. and learned Member was that under this provision, although dependants can claim damages, they would not be able to claim as much damages as in the case to which I have referred. That is a point that I would like to look into.

The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith) referred to our Standing Committee proceedings, where I said that I was satisfied with the Clause as drawn because it fell into line with what I had said about directly attributable damages. So far as I can satisfy myself, I think it does so exactly. He then referred to contributory negligence and asked what it was. It is very difficult in this House to say what a court would decide.

If the case mentioned by the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) was one that is likely to come before a court it would be quite wrong of me to express any sort of opinion about it. I can give the example of walking down the road in a normal way. If the road suddenly opens up in front of us, there is no negligence on our part. On the other hand, if there is a crack in the road and warnings like, "Road liable to subsidence", then if we walk along the road and fall into a hole we are guilty of contributory negligence. That is the sort of principle which would operate, but it would be wrong of me to try to predict a decision of a court in any case. That general principle of law is widely understood.

The Coal Board should have exactly the same protection in a case of contributory negligence as normally arises. In fact, it has an even stronger case than normally. When a man is negligent he does not pay the full amount of damages if the man he injures has been negligent, too. In this case, the Coal Board is not guilty of negligence and should not be forced to pay for the negligence of someone else.

Mr. Ellis Smith

This is an important point. Where I live there are signs for some distance along the road, but in the winter men and women going to work will not see the signs because they will be rushing for their buses. In those circumstances, I feel that responsibility would be on nobody but the Coal Board.

Mr. Maudling

The classical case is that of a man who was leading a donkey along the middle of the high road when someone drove furiously around the corner and bumped into them. It was held that both were negligent. The man should not have had a donkey in the middle of the road and the second man should not have driven so fast. If we walk down the road in circumstances in which we cannot see the whole of the road, we are negligent. That is a fair description of the general principle, but it may not apply to particular cases.

Mr. Ede (South Shields)

Has the right hon. Gentleman considered the case in County Durham, where there is a notice on the side of the road saying, "Danger. Reduce speed owing to mining subsidence"?

Mr. Maudling

The motorist is intended to reduce his speed to that appropriate to deal with any mining subsidence that might occur.

On contributory negligence, points were also raised by the hon. Members for Aberdare (Mr. Probert) and Leek which, I think, are relevant to this discussion. The hon. Member for Aberdare talked about the position where a tenant had told the owner of a house that damage was likely to occur and the owner had failed to notify the Coal Board. I do not think that that would affect his claim in any way. Subsection (2, c) refers to injury…wholly attributable to the negligence of that person who was injured.

Under subsection (1) an injured person cannot claim from the Coal Board if an action for damages is maintainable against some other party. If someone is injured and he can proceed against another person, that presupposes that the other person was careless. We presuppose that the Coal Board has not done anything wrong if the person can claim damages from someone else.

Dr. Stross

If there is a fracture of gas mains and consequent sickness in a house, or possibly death of one or more people in the house, to whom must the relatives go for redress? Against the local authority in the first place, or directly against the Coal Board?

Mr. Maudling

It would be wrong to try to predict upon a particular case. If the injury was caused by subsidence they can claim, unless they have a right to claim against some one else. That is a fair position, as far as one can see.

Mr. Douglas Johnston (Paisley)

If it is the intention of the Minister that a person who is injured should have no claim if an action can be raised against a party other than the Coal Board, may I point out that that is not in the Bill? In the damaged gas main case, surely, while an action might possibly lie against a local authority as being the gas undertaker, an action would certainly lie against the Coal Board, also. Is that not so?

Mr. Maudling

The Board would not be negligent. If the local authority had been negligent there would be a cause of action against it and the injured party could proceed against it. Therefore, he would not proceed against the Coal Board. That is in subsection (1). If the local authority is not negligent and the individual cannot proceed against it, he can get compensation from the Coal Board even though the Board has not been negligent. The hon. Member for Mansfield (Mr. B. Taylor) raised a point about compensation. It would be wrong for the Coal Board to compensate someone who was injured at a place where he had no right to be. The hon. Gentleman made an interesting point and, once more, I will see that it is considered.

Now I come to the major points raised by the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams), and by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Sir L. Joynson Hicks). The hon. Gentleman asked whether we had taken the right line in deciding who shall be able to get the benefit of the compensation paid. In one way, the case he was making was sound but in another way it was unsound. So, if I may, I will set both these points before the House.

I accept the principle which I think the hon. Member for Wigan was enunciating, that damages should be based on the pecuniary loss of the dependants. We have provided for this, because the category of people who can carry out claims under the Bill is described as anyone wholly or mainly maintained by the deceased. This goes beyond the Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act, under which only wives, husbands, parents and children have a right to claim. But I would like to consider the hon. Gentleman's point, which I think is a strong one, that we have not covered dependants who are not main dependants. There are people who are partly dependent. This is a concession which I should like to consider between now and consideration of the Bill in another place.

6.30 p.m.

I do not agree with the hon. Member that benefit should go to the deceased's estate. I rather share the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester. If we make this payment to a person's estate it might go to people who were in no way dependent on him at all. From time to time people make wills leaving their money to people who are not dependent on them, and people who are depending on them are not sufficiently provided for. It would be wrong to have a payment made to an estate if, in prac- tice, it went to people who were not dependent on the person concerned and who suffered no loss at all. A person then might suffer no loss, but have pecuniary gain.

This links with what I said at the beginning. We are not considering a case where the Coal Board has done something wrong. Would it be right, in circumstances where the Board had not been negligent, to provide for a person who had not suffered?

Mr. R. Williams

Is not the right hon. Gentleman overlooking the fact that it is the injured person who has lost something? He has lost his expectation of life, and that is something which can be assessed. What happens to the damages after that is not of our concern. Unless we accept that we are in this extraordinary position that if the subsidence damage seriously and permanently incapacitates a man certain payments will ensue and substantial payments be payable, but if he is even more injured and dies the loss of expectation of life—which is something vested in him—is something we shall completely ignore.

Mr. Maudling

I do not agree with the hon. Member when he says that we are not concerned with the question of who receives the money. We are very much concerned with that. I think there is more agreement between us than one might have thought. My concern is that people who have suffered loss should get some money as a result of this Clause. I accept that the present Clause is defective as it might not cover everyone, who should be covered, but I cannot agree that the Coal Board should pay out large sums of money to people who have not suffered, when the Board has not been negligent.

I have endeavoured to explain what underlay our approach to this Clause and to deal with the points which have been raised. Several of the points need, and will receive, further consideration between now and later stages of the Bill. In view of that and in the light of my undertaking that these matters will be considered, I hope the House will agree to accept the Clause.

Mr. Robens

I begin by saying, once again, that we appreciate the work of the right hon. Gentleman in producing this new Clause, which arises from all that was said in Committee on this matter. I am sure that he will not take it that because we have spent a considerable time on this matter, and put a number of arguments to him, we are in any way criticising the motive behind his action in drafting this Clause, but I do not think I have listened to a more clear exposition of a legal point than that which was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams).

It is clear that at least on one point we are looking at the matter from different angles. That point is on the question of dependency. The right hon. Gentleman has said that he will look at subsection (3, a) again. At the same time, he has said that in the case of a man who dies as a result of actions arising from mining subsidence he is not prepared to provide that that money would go into the estate provided there is no dependant at all.

My hon. Friend, in quoting from Charlcsworth, asked the right hon. Gentleman to recognise that in the Bill the Government should not produce another method of dealing with compensation, but that the Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act and the miscellaneous provisions Act are sufficient in themselves to cover matters such as this. When, at the beginning of the Clause, the right hon. Gentleman relies upon the words if the death had been attributable to the negligence of the Board it should follow from that that all benefits should arise as though negligence had taken place, although we are admitting that it is not the direct, wilful negligence or the tortuous act of the Board.

Nevertheless, to provide for payments in respect of death or disablement in certain cases the right hon. Gentleman is relying upon an acceptance of negligence by the Board. As soon as he does that, surely the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan comes in and the right hon. Gentleman should not seek to set aside what is laid down in established law and provide another method by which compensation shall be assessed or to whom it is to be paid.

I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman has been prepared to say that he will look at this matter once again. I have no doubt that he has been persuaded on the arguments put from this side of the House that subsection (3, a) certainly does need revision and we are glad that he has promised to revise it. Accordingly, I would recommend the House to give a Second Reading to this Clause. Now that we have had this thorough discussion, perhaps when we come to the Amendments we might deal with those quickly and pass on to other sections of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker

I understand that the subject matter of the Amendments to the Clause which follow has been dealt with. Does any hon. Member wish to move any of them?

Mr. Robens

By leave of the House, may I say that we shall not move any of those Amendments, Sir, in view of the undertaking given by the Minister.

Clause added to the Bill.