HC Deb 24 January 1957 vol 563 cc509-23

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.

9.30 p.m.

Mr. S. Silverman

I did not move the Amendment, in page 4, line 10, leave out subsection (2), because it seemed to me that such argument as is worth making on any rational issue to the Government is better directed to the Clause as a whole.

This Clause will turn out, in practice, to be completely unworkable. It will raise injustice after injustice, because no man will ever be able to be fairly tried on a single charge without the whole argument being generally perverted from the outset by suspicions that may or may not appear to lend weight to the argument. The hon. and gallant Member for Knutsford (Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport) may find it amusing if he is ever—

Lieut.-Colonel W. H. Bromley-Davenport (Knutsford)

If the hon. Gentleman will give way—

Mr. Silverman

No, I will not give way. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has been dining rather too well.

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley Davenport

I have had no dinner at all, and nothing since lunch.

The Temporary Chairman (Sir Norman Hulbert)

The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) made a remark which he should withdraw.

Mr. Silverman

I withdraw gladly. I accept at once the hon. and gallant Gentleman's assurance that he has not merely not dined too well, but has not dined at all. What I said, therefore, was unjustified, and I withdraw it. I only wonder why he bothered to have any lunch, either. If that is the effect of such unaccustomed abstinence I would suggest to him that he brings his self-restraint to an end.

The Temporary Chairman

I think that it would be very much better were the hon. Member to direct himself to the Clause.

Mr. Silverman

I was only dealing with the invitation from the Chair to withdraw the completely unjustified remark I had made. If the hon. and gallant Member now really wishes to make an intelligible intervention, I will gladly give way.

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley Davenport

The hon. Member called attention to the fact that I was laughing. I was not laughing at what he said, but at his moronic method of delivery.

Mr. Silverman

I accept the charge at once. There is no Member of the Committee more qualified to form an opinion on such a point than is the hon. and gallant Member.

I am not going to delay the Committee. The whole of the Bill is so full of illogicalities, anomalies, untenable propositions and unmaintainable principles that, after all, what does one more anomaly matter? The Bill would be an equally bad Bill without the Clause. With the Clause it is hardly any worse.

However, as we have taken the trouble to try to persuade the Government out of their irresponsibility, I suppose it could only be consistent that we should now give them the opportunity on this occasion, which they have previously rejected in the past and which they will no doubt reject again, to try to explain how this Bill can be made to work sensibly or to serve the end of justice. I have no hope whatever that the Attorney-General will have anything useful to say, but I oppose the inclusion of this Clause in the Bill in order to give him an opportunity of a death bed repentance.

Mr. Paget

Surely my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has entirely misunderstood the purpose of this Clause. This Clause has got nothing to do with murder. Nobody thinks it will work. Indeed, nobody intends that it shall work. It has done its work. Incredible as it may seem, it has patched up the Tory Party. That is all it was designed to do. No logical argument has received any attention. There was never any intention to do so. A bargain has been made. This is not to do with hanging. It is to do with the Tory Party hanging together. That is all there is to it and, miraculous as it seems, it has worked.

It seems incredible that people who have conscientious convictions on this subject should have been satisfied by such a sorry piece of nonsense, but they are. It has worked, and one can only congratulate the Government upon it.

Mr. Silverman

I can understand my hon. and learned Friend's argument that nothing but a rope will keep the Tory Party together, but why do they need the gallows, too?

Mr. Paget

It seems to have worked. That is all one can say. Incredible as it may seem, and odd as the consciences of hon. Members opposite appear to be, they are satisfied by this. Of course, the Clause will not work. Indeed, every Clause makes utter nonsense. The Government have not attempted to argue the matter seriously, but the Clause has done its job.

The Attorney-General

I do not think that anyone would dispute that the debate on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill" has covered a remarkable range in a very short time.

Mr. Silverman

Far more than the Clause covers.

The Attorney-General

I agree, far more than the Clause covers.

I do not wish to prolong the discussion, which has been entertaining; I merely wish to say a word in response to the invitation by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). He condemned the Clause in advance. I think the Clause will work. It is clear in its language, and it is necessary to ensure that not only the professional criminal but the professional murderer, also, shall remain liable to the death penalty. But for this Clause, people such as Haigh and others would not remain liable to the death sentence, and it is, in our view, necessary that that liability should remain. That is the purpose of subsection (1) of the Clause.

Subsection (2), as the hon. Gentleman knows, makes an alteration with regard to a rule of practice—of practice and no more. If, in a particular case, it might be awkward for the defence, the old practice will apply. There will be separate trials. In some cases nowadays evidence of other offences is adduced by the defence and sometimes by the prosecution. Where that does happen, it seems to be convenient, I should have thought—though views may differ—that there should be power to dispose of the whole matter in the course of one trial. Though it may be convenient in one particular case, as I have pointed out, there is ample power here, if the defence requires it, to secure a separate trial although there is a joint indictment.

I hope that I have explained the Clause satisfactorily. It is a necessary Clause, and that is all there is in it.

Mr. Ede

I hope that the Attorney-General will not think I am taking exception to anything he has said, but I should like to have subsection (2) explained to me in rather more detail.

I know, to my cost, that up to the present, in a case of murder, no matter how many murders the person is supposed to have committed for which he has not previously been tried, each case has a separate indictment and is tried separately, a verdict having to be reached on each before consideration passes to the next. As an example, I will take one case that is notorious, the case of Evans, who was indicted for the murder of his child and for the murder of his wife. The trial actually took place on the charge that he had murdered his child. Do I understand that this subsection means that, in future, such an accused could be tried on both indictments at one time before the judge and jury?

The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that, if the defence wanted it, the trials could still take place separately. What words in the subsection give that right? I suppose that anything approaching it probably depends on the first set of words in brackets, namely: (unless separate trials are desirable in the interest of justice). As I understand—I know that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will realise that I am putting these questions, to some extent, out of ignorance—a decision on that matter rests with the judge and not with the defence. The defence might submit that it desired to have separate trials, but, as I read the wording of the subsection, the defence has no absolute right to it; it will be a question for the judge to determine.

Speaking as a layman, I regard with some fear the idea that a person can be tried on two indictments of this gravity together and, as it were, a case be built up on each simultaneously in order to buttress the other on which success might not be attainable if the indictments were tried separately. I may be putting this rather vaguely and not quite correctly from a legal point of view, but I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will understand the question in my mind.

Departures of this kind from the general practice of the courts should have a rather more detailed justification in this Committee than has so far been given by the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I admit that he intervened at an early stage, when the point had not been raised in this detail. I assure him that I am putting these questions because I am genuinely concerned as to what might be the effect of this Clause on the procedure of the courts. I hope that he will be able to say a little more about it.

9.45 p.m.

The Attorney-General

I will certainly endeavour to say more about it. I dealt with it rather shortly because I did not think that it was the desire of the Committee then to hear a further explanation, and in dealing with it shortly I dealt with it also, I apologise, not entirely accurately. What the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) said about the right to obtain a separate trial was quite accurate.

Mr. Ede

That the judge will decide?

The Attorney-General

Yes.

Perhaps I may deal with the position as I see it. I think it is worthy of investigation and that it is right to make this possible alteration in practice. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, apart from murder and manslaughter there is no rule of practice to prevent a number of counts being joined in the same indictment; but the rule is, again, that where the defence may be prejudiced, the judge can order a separate trial of the different counts. To the general rule that there can be a joinder of counts, murder and manslaughter have now to form an exception. That is the present position.

In the cases of, for instance, Evans and Christie, looking at the question purely from that one type of case, one finds the charge of murder advanced and evidence of other murders perhaps brought in by the prosecution in support of that charge of murder. That does not happen too infrequently.

Mr. S. Silverman rose—

The Attorney-General

I am trying to follow this out in detail to the right hon. Gentleman. I will certainly give way later.

That happens fairly frequently. Where it happens, and where all the evidence is properly before the court and the evidence of system being evidence of proof of the commission of other murders, it seems rather unnecessary from the point of view of the interests of justice that the jury, having heard all that evidence, should then at the conclusion of the trial be told, "You can return a verdict on only one count. Later, there will have to be another jury to hear all the evidence of the system which has already been heard."

That is looking at it from the angle where the evidence is brought in by the prosecution, but there are also cases where evidence of the commission of other murders is brought in by the defence, where the defence rather welcomes evidence of other murders which have been committed, perhaps to found the defence of insanity. There it is. Again, under the rule of practice as it now stands, although there may be separate indictments for those various murders, and although all the evidence may be heard before that one jury, it seems to us to be a rather unnecessary rule of practice that in those circumstances there is no possibility of the jury finding a verdict on all the matters which are the subject of charges which are before them.

That is what the subsection will permit of happening, but it is subject to the safeguard that if the defence shows that it would be prejudiced by this taking place, the judge has power—and I certainly do not for one moment doubt that he would exercise the power—of ordering a separate trial. If there is any chance of the accused being prejudiced by being tried for two murders at once, if one puts it that way, I feel in no doubt that the judge would order a separate trial in every case

Where, however, there was, for instance, a case of someone being charged with murdering A and evidence of system being brought in that he had also murdered B. and that evidence was clearly admissible in relation to the charge of murdering A, it would be perhaps difficult to say—at least, I would find it difficult to visualise—that the jury who were hearing the evidence showing that A had been murdered, and also B, and having to make up their minds as to the truth or falsity of that charge, would, at the end of the day, only be able to return a verdict in relation to one of those cases and that another jury may then have to be empannelled to hear again evidence which had been heard by a jury already in connection with another case.

I hope that I have made the point clear to the right hon. Gentleman. It does give a fair discretion to the judge, a discretion which. in my belief, he would hesitate to exercise in every case where there is the slightest reality of a risk of prejudice to the defence; and, at the same time, it does, I think, clear up what is really rather an anomaly at the present time, that where we have all the evidence before the court the jury should not be empowered to return a verdict in respect of all that evidence.

Mr. Ede

I should like to thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for the care and clarity with which he has explained this, and to say that the clearer he has been the more he has increased my misgivings.

Mr. S. Silverman

I entirely agree with the last observation of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede). If the Clause is really intended to do what the Attorney-General has just said I am more against it than I was. The right hon. and learned Gentleman must realise that the rule of practice which prevents two murders being tried together in one trial by one jury is founded upon the opinion which all of us have always held, that such a trial would necessarily be prejudicial to the defence whenever he pleaded not guilty.

It is perfectly clear from what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says that this kind of thing has sometimes been welcomed by the defence, but I think I am right in saying that it has been welcomed by the defence only in cases where the defence does not dispute the facts but wishes to raise a special defence like the defence of insanity.

Mr. Ede

The case of Haigh.

Mr. Silverman

The case of Haigh, or, indeed, of Christie.

In every case where the accused's interests are in securing an absolute verdict in his favour, to charge him with two murders at the same time before the same jury in the same indictment and at the same trial can only be prejudicial to him; prejudicial, therefore, to the interests of justice; and has always been disallowed by the common law except in one set of circumstances. The one set of circumstances is this: if the prosecution can satisfy the judge that the facts establish that the other murders not charged in the indictment before the jury tend to establish a system which the accused has consistently followed. That is the only exception to the rule.

There is absolutely nothing in this Clause about system. There is no limitation in this Clause of any kind. If this Clause goes through as it stands, then that old rule, founded upon an obviously commonsense principle, will be completely abrogated unless, indeed, the defence is able to establish to the satisfaction of the judge that the interests of justice would be imperilled unless there were separate trials.

There is no indication as to how the court is to resolve such a question. As the law stands, the basis on which it resolves the question is this business of system, and there the onus is on the prosecution. If we abrogate that, it is extremely difficult to see how the defence would ever be able to satisfy the court that the interests of justice demanded a separate trial. In what circumstances? If I read the Clause correctly, the prosecution no longer has to establish system to enable evidence of other charges to be given at the same time.

It seems to me that the Clause goes very far beyond what might have been acceptable, namely, that where a system had already been established, and where all the evidence of all the charges is inevitably before the jury anyhow, it might be held to be an artificial restriction which prevented the jury from giving verdicts on all the matters which were being debated before them. But system has gone under this Clause, and in those circumstances it is difficult to see how, the prosecution no longer having to prove system, the operation of the Clause can be anything but prejudicial to any defence in which the prosecution chooses to assert that the accused has been guilty of other things of a like kind, but not necessarily committed as part of a common system, with the main charge in the indictment.

Mr. Hale

My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has said about twelve times in the last seven or eight days, with nearly as much clarity as I would have said them, the sort of things that I was about to rise to say, and I can pay no higher compliment than that. Because I am indebted to him for his clarity, I would not have risen but for the feeling that he put it with some inaccuracy, and I rise to correct him very briefly.

In my respectful submission, there are two circumstances, normally, in which double charges can be tried together. I would agree with my hon. Friend, and, indeed, I would have wanted to put it as a fundamental of our common law, that we try one case at once. This is the first thing that the Attorney-General has not said to the Committee. It is the first and fundamental thing that, if we put a man on trial, we try one case at once. Any interference with that is the greatest breach of an obviously fundamental principle. It tends to introduce prejudice, it tends to introduce the consideration of other matters and it tends to widen the ambit of inquiry and add to the risk which the accused man has to face. Therefore, we do not charge two cases in one indictment unless we have special dispensation for the purpose and special reasons which permit us to do it.

I am quite prepared to find that I am wrong, as I frequently am, but I can only call to mind two main classes of cases. The first is the quite simple one of res gestae, where a whole series of events, in which one crime is involved, also embraces another. One cannot charge a man with murdering one person lying in a bed and then charge him with murdering a second person lying in the same bed, or on the same evening in the same circumstances. If the same set of circumstances embraces two separate crimes, it is impossible to differentiate between them, and quite impossible to present evidence limited to one and not the other. Therefore, the law recognises that, whilst it is essentially undesirable, it is inevitable in these circumstances that the cases should be tried together.

10.0 p.m.

My hon. Friend referred to the question of system. We must not comment upon contemporary events, but this is a difficult principle on which there has been some widening. There was the case of George Joseph Smith, which was the classic case—[An Hon. Member: "And Armstrong."]—and Armstrong. Smith was the central figure in "the brides in the bath" case, the gentleman who entered into matrimonial entanglements and got rid of them, roughly speaking, through the plug.

Smith was able, on any charge brought against him, to say, "All this happened by accident. It was very unfortunate that my wife was inclined to cleanliness rather than to godliness. It was very unfortunate that she chose this particular moment in her matrimonial career to take a bath."

Sir Leslie Plummer (Deptford)

After a heavy meal.

Mr. Hale

I do not myself eat to the extent that my hon. Friend does, but I can understand that that is a romantic reason.

The court said, "If you really are going to raise such a defence, if there comes the moment in the course of the trial when your cross-examination clearly indicates that that defence is part of it, then you must face the question of evidence which tends to show not merely that Mrs. Jones died in the bath, which you say was an accident, but that your second wife, Mrs. Smith, did also and so did your third wife, Mrs. Brown, and that the whole lot perished in the same way." [Laughter.] It is a serious matter and I cannot understand why it is that when I get up to enunciate legal principles with dignity and precision, someone seems to think that it is an emotional moment and one to treat with frivolity. After all, Mr. Smith and his various wives ultimately perished in the course of these experiments. What is even more to the point, Sir Bernard Spilsbury nearly perished too -no, not Sir Bernard, but the lady he sent into the bathroom in order to experiment. I cannot think what would have happened to Sir Bernard Spilsbury under this Bill. It narrows the principle, and although I have great admiration for the Attorney-General, I know that he is in training and he may have to present cases under this Measure.

There must be a certain amount of innocence in putting forward a complex series of facts and of law. I would not for a moment wish to detain the Committee at this time of the night, when we all want to go home, but I remember the kind of difficulty, which the right hon. and learned Gentleman may experience, in the consideration by the court of appeal of a decision of the county court judge which seemed to me to be a perfectly fair decision. The learned county court judge had made a large number of findings of fact and of law in this matter, findings of fact unsupported by evidence and findings of law on law which never existed. The Court of Appeal went on to say, with some ability and clarity, that when one endeavours to apply facts which have not and cannot be supported to law which does not and never has existed, some confusion of mind must inevitably arise.

That is the situation into which we got a few moments ago, when my hon. Friend rose to make his inquiry. I do not flatter myself, but I hope that as a result of this intervention some of the confusion has been dissipated.

Mr. Ede

I do not regard this as other than a very serious issue, and I am not satisfied with the explanation so far given. May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman this question: what is the procedure contemplated in a case of this kind? As I understand the position, the prisoner is asked to plead. One indictment will be read; he will plead "Not guilty"; then a second indictment will be read. At that stage I take it that his counsel will rise to object to the two cases being taken together.

The Attorney-General

I think that I can help the right hon. Gentleman. First, before there are two counts in one indictment for murder that will have to be decided upon by the Director of Public Prosecutions. I am dealing with the safeguards. If there is any doubt about the propriety of it—a fear that it might prejudice the defence—that would not happen. Let us take the case where an indictment is drawn containing two counts for murder, which is the case that the right hon. Gentleman was putting. That indictment is signed and the defence knows that the indictment is in that form.

If the defence wants to make application for a separate trial, that application will be made before the defendant pleads to either count in the indictment, and it will be made in the absence of all possible jurors. Before the judge's decision there

would be no publicity of the fact that there were two counts of murder.

Mr. S. Silverman

Of course there would be. What about the committal proceedings?

The Attorney-General

I was talking about the content of the indictment. The committal proceedings will not affect that. In the Christie case there were several charges of murder preferred at the magistrates' court, and all the evidence of the other murders was brought out in the magistrates' court. When Christie came to the Old Bailey he was tried on one charge of murder.

I hope that I have dealt with the point that the right hon. Gentleman had in mind. I would say that there is no fear of an accused having to plead to the counts in the indictment, or a count being read out to the jury before counsel will have had an opportunity, if he so desires, to apply to the judge for separate trials. Where the evidence is on the depositions, although the man has not been charged with several murders in the magistrates' court, the indictment itself, based on the depositions, may contain more than one charge of murder.

Question put, That the Clause stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 140, Noes 87.

Division No. 44.] AYES [10.8 p.m.
Agnew, Sir Peter Deedes, W. F. Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Armstrong, C. W. Doughty, C. J. A. Joseph, Sir Keith
Ashton, H. Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West) Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot
Atkins, H. E. Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn Keegan, D.
Baldwin, A. E. Errington, Sir Eric Kerr, H. W.
Barber, Anthony Finlay, Graeme Kimball, M.
Barlow, Sir John Fisher, Nigel Kirk, P. M.
Barter, John Fletoher-Cooke, C. Leavey, J. A.
Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.) Freeth, D. K. Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Bidgood, J. C. Garner-Evans, E. H. Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)
Biggs-Davison, J. A. Glover, D. Lucas. Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)
Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel Graham, Sir Fergus Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)
Bishop, F. P. Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R, (Nantwich) Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Black, C. W. Green, A, Macdonald, Sir Peter
Body, R. F. Gresham Cooke, R. Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry
Boyd, T. C. Crimston, Hon. John (St. Albans) Mackle, J. H. (Galloway)
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A. Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G. McLean, Nell (Inverness)
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H. Gurden, Harold Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)
Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry Hall, John (Wycombe) Maddan, Martin
Brooman-White, R. C. Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.) Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.
Bryan, P. Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd) Markham, Major Sir Frank
Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden) Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel Marlowe, A. A. H.
Carr, Robert Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G. Marples, Rt. Hon. A. E.
Channon, Sir Henry Hesketh, R. F. Mawby, R. L.
Conant, Maj. Sir Roger Hill, john (S. Norfolk) Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.
Cooper-Key, E. M. Hornby, R. P. Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.
Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K. Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P. Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E. Hughes-Young, M. H. C. Nairn, D. L. S.
Crowder, Sir John (Finchley) Hurd, A. R. Neave, Alrey
Crowder, Petre (Ruisllp—Northwood) Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun) Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)
Currie, G. B. H. Hylton-Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)
Dance, J. C. G. Jenkins, Robert (Dulwlch) Oakshott, H. D.
Davidson, Viscountess Jennings, J. C. (Burton) Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. D.
Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare) Russell, R. S. Turner, H. F. L.
Page, R. G. Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R. Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.
Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale) Shepherd, William Vickers, Miss J. H.
Pickthorn, K. W. M. Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.) Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)
Pike, Miss Mervyn Smithers, Peter (Winchester) Wall, Major Patrick
Pitman, I. J. Soames, Capt. C. Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)
Pitt, Miss E. M. Spearman, Sir Alexander Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith & Border)
Pott, H. P. Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.) Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)
Powell, J. Enoch Storey, S. Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)
Profumo, J. D. Studholme, Sir Henry Wills, G. (Bridgwater)
Raikes, Sir Victor Summers, Sir Spencer Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Redmayne, M. Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks) Temple, J. M. TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Roper, Sir Harold Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway) Mr. R. Thompson and
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard Tilney, John (Wavertree) Colonel J. H. Harrison.
NOES
Bacon, Miss Alice Hayman, F. H. Paget, R. T.
Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.) Herbison, Miss M. Palmer, A. M. F.
Benson, G. Holmes, Horace Parker, J.
Beswick, F. Houghton, Douglas Pentland, N.
Blackburn, F. Howell, Charles (Perry Barr) Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Blyton, W. R. Howell, Denis (All Saints) Proctor, W. T.
Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S. W.) Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire) Ross, William
Brown, Thomas (Ince) Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.) Short, E. W.
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green) Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe) Shurmer, P. L. E.
Champion, A. J. Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill) Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Clunie, J. Janner, B. Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)
Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead) Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T. Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)
Collins, V.J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury) Jenkins, Roy (Stechford) Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.) Johnson, James (Rugby) Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Darling, George (Hillsborough) Jones, David (The Hartlepools) Stones, W. (Consett)
Davies, Harold (Leek) Kenyon, C. Warbey, W. N.
Deer, G. King, Dr. H. M. Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch) Lawson, G. M. West, D. G.
Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C. Lee, Frederick (Newton) Wheeldon, W. E.
Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.) Lever, Leslie (Ardwick) Wilkins, W. A.
Fienburgh, W. MacColl, J. E. Willey, Frederick
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton) McGovern, J. Williams, Ronald (Wigan)
Greenwood, Anthony McKay, John (Wallsend) Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)
Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R. Mann, Mrs. Jean Woof, R. E.
Grey, C. F. Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A. Yates, V. (Ladywood)
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly) Mitchison, G. R. Younger, Rt. Hon. K.
Griffiths, William (Exchange) Neal, Harold (Bolsover) Zilliacus, K.
Hale, Leslie Oram, A. E.
Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Coins Valley) Oswald, T. TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Hastings, S. Owen, W. J. Mr. Royle and Sir Leslie Plummer.