ROYAL AIR FORCE

HC Deb 24 October 1956 vol 558 cc785-94

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Wills.]

10.33 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas (Lincoln)

I have two points to put to the Under-Secretary of State for Air, who has had notice of them. I am sure that he will be here in a minute. The first point is about the procedure of inquiry into accidents, and the second is the shortage of transport aircraft, shown by the Suez mobilisation.

The present procedure does great harm to the Royal Air Force. No one suggests that security should be ignored, but the present policy of secrecy is not suited to conditions in which the public are concerned. Crashes affect not only the public directly, in the case of loss of life to civilians on the ground, but, as in the case of the recent Vulcan crash at London, where the facilities used by the Service aircraft are civilian.

The object of the Air Ministry should be to show to the public that the Royal Air Force is a Fighting Service caring for the people of the country it serves. I regret to say that there is increasing hostility among the people towards the Air Ministry because the Royal Air Force is made out to be a self-satisfied Service indifferent to the feelings of the people outside the Service. I know that the Royal Air Force is in no way self-satisfied ; it is the duty of the Air Ministry to see that the public knows that also.

I recently had the task of going through the papers of the case of one of the 15 young officers killed when a Valetta crashed in January, 1954, that of Pilot Officer Purcell. Everything that could have been done to sadden the parents of that young man was done. The telegram giving information of the death was sent to the wrong address, and so was the telegram as to the funeral. The parents were told that their son had been killed instantly, whereas in fact he died in hospital. Even at the funeral the wrong initials were on the coffin. It appeared to the parents and to their friends that they were being treated as intruders into a matter which concerned the Service only. The result is that the parents and their friends have become anti-Air Force. I am certain that no other member of that family will choose to serve in the Royal Air Force. These were defects in administration, but how much would have been avoided if the Air Ministry had set out to show how much it cared, and if subsequently the inquiry had been public so that parents and friends could have heard everything that happened.

Another and more recent case of what can be crudely termed bad public relations was the handling of the Vulcan crash at London Airport, in which so many fine men lost their lives. The whole country felt for them and their families. The aircraft, which was using a civil airport, was using the ordinary civil ground control system. Naturally, there has been disquiet at the veil of Service secrecy which has been thrown over the operations of this civil ground control system. Once more it appears as if the Air Ministry regards the public as a nuisance, as intruders to be pushed off.

I believe the root cause of all this is the system of closed inquiries which makes the public believe that a group of professionals are getting together to cover up something. I ask the Under-Secretary, and through him the Secretary of State, in fairness to the Royal Air Force, to examine carefully the present procedure to see if in the interests of the Service there should be so much secrecy on matters which cannot possibly have any problem of security.

My second point is an entirely different one. For several years now we have been pointing to the neglect by the Air Ministry of Transport Command. Tonight I ask the Under-Secretary not only to tell us how Transport Command and the transport services have operated in the Suez mobilisation, but what changes the Government are making in their policy towards Transport Command. The Minister of Defence told me today in a Written Answer: we still have a long way to go in formulating a long term policy for the transportation by air of men and materials. That is indeed true. Recently in The Times, Sir John Slessor and Sir George Pirie, writing in his capacity as Chairman of the Air League, have referred to Transport Command as the Cinderella of the Royal Air Force. If this is the Cinderella, when can we expect to have the transformation scene, when can we expect that Transport Command will be allowed and equipped to play its true part?

The Air Council should begin by studying what the United States Military Air Transport Service does. I have been impressed with that service ever since 1948, when, as Under-Secretary, I saw some of the operations of the Berlin Airlift. Let the Air Council notice not only the size of M.A.T.S. but its policy. Of course, we cannot compete with the size of the gigantic United States force with its 450 four-engined aircraft and 100 twin-engined aircraft, not counting the Navy's 100 four-engined aircraft and about 50 twin-engined aircraft. But let us look at their policy. The policy of the United States services is that all of them adopt trooping by air whenever possible because it is cheaper. Compare that with the Answer I got just before the Recess from the Minister of Defence—that the percentage of trooping by air is still only, I think, 54 per cent. It has gone up by about 1 per cent. since last year—it is very small indeed.

Secondly, the United States policy is to cut the overheads on their material by using air freight for all such equipment as aero engines—

Mr. Paul Williams (Sunderland, South)

Was the figure quoted by the hon. Member that carried by Transport Command or by independent companies'?

Mr. de Freitas

The figures, I recall, covered everything—air trooping by Transport Command, independents and everyone.

Mr. Williams

I think the hon. Member would accept that, in fact, it is mainly done by the independents.

Mr. de Freitas

Yes, that is the point. The policy of trooping by air is not accepted generally in our Services as it is in the American Services. Again, on the carrying of freight they cut their overheads by always taking aero engines by air. This reduces the number in the lines of communication, storage and so on, because the time is cut to one-ninth or one-tenth.

Most important of all is that United States military thinking recognises the importance of air transport. I shall quote this extract from the House of Representatives Defence Appropriations Committee: The mission assigned to M.A.T.S. is of major strategic importance. It is more than just a convenient air transport system; it is a significant portion of our over-all Air Defence Forces. I ask the Government to consider setting up a military transport service, trained and operated by the Royal Air Force and borne—and I think this is fair—on a Ministry of Defence Vote, because, after all, it would work for the three Services. If the Army developed its Mobile Strategic Reserve, what would move it at this moment? If the Navy developed its fleet trains in far-off parts of the world, what would move its supplies? And I emphasise again that, of course, I am here referring not only to men but to equipment. I know that the Hermes can carry a 25-pounder, but how many Hermes are there?

It has been the Government's policy to look for reserves among the independent civil operators. They look to them for aircraft and for aircrews at short notice, but it has proved impossible to rely on them for many reasons. The first is shortage of aircraft. I think it is right to say that there were only 13 long-range aircraft available at the time of the Suez mobilisation. So we found civilian Dakotas taking twice as long to transport the men, and transporting only, say, one-third of what could be transported in a Britannia—and using two pilots.

That brings me to the second point. There is a shortage not only of aircraft but of aircrew. There were aircraft ready and waiting on the ground—and that with an important line like Skyways—because there were not enough pilots. The basic problem is shortage of money to buy the aircraft. That is the problem everywhere. It is the problem in the United States, too. I know that the independent airline firms claim that they could provide the aircraft if they got, as do the shipping firms, long-term contracts for trooping—seven to ten years. Unfortunately I have not time to develop or argue that point.

Looking ahead, must we not recognise that there will be no future for us in military or civil transport unless we are prepared to find a really large sum of money for the design and development of a supersonic bomber and transport, for civil and military use? Therefore, I ask the Under-Secretary to ask his colleagues in the Government for an urgent inquiry into the supply of aircraft and aircrews for the transport of men and equipment of all three Services.

10.45 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Christopher Soames)

May I first say how glad we are to see the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) none the worse off for being in the unpleasant incident which we all regret so much?

The hon. Member suggested first that we should hold public inquiries into accidents to R.A.F. aircraft. Of course, he knows quite well that the Air Ministry does not in any way under-rate the natural and considerable concern felt by the House and the public about aircraft accidents. But we feel that the public inquiry is not the right way to satisfy it. In the first place, the full investigation of an accident to a Service aircraft will generally involve constant reference to secret information—such as the performance of the aircraft and what it was doing at the time.

Secondly, we feel that both witnesses and the court itself will give their views much more freely in private than in public. This point was explained by my predecessor in the full statement he made to the House on the accident at Tom's Hill, to which the hon. Gentleman referred, in January, 1954. I was deeply sorry to hear about the sadness then caused to the parents of one of the victims, but the story as recounted by the hon. Gentleman seems to reflect on administration rather than on the form which the inquiry took.

The hon. Gentleman himself, when he occupied the office which I now hold, was no doubt swayed himself by the same arguments. Of course, the outside observer's point of view naturally differs a little, but I am sure that anyone actually concerned with the running of the Service would feel as I do. There is no question of any desire to cover up. The basis of our view is that we get a franker, speedier and more effective investigation from a private inquiry than from a public one. We appreciate that this in no way detracts from the right of the House to be kept informed, and my right hon. Friend will continue, as he has done in the past, to report to the House his conclusions about accidents of special public concern.

The hon. Gentleman particularly mentioned the Vulcan. My right hon. Friend answered a question on that today, to the effect that there are still inquiries going on and it is too early to give any additional information, but he will do so as soon as possible in the House.

I come now to the main topic—the question of transport aircraft. I believe there is a widespread misapprehension on what is the primary rôle of Transport Command. The primary rôle is to provide a military air transport force available to all three Services, which can transport men and material into a theatre of active operations and provide them with logistic support on active service. It follows from that that the further we are from the danger of war, the more we are able to use Transport Command on day-to-day tasks. Conversely, the greater a threat becomes, the more we must collect, concentrate and conserve the force lest the risk become a reality and it be necessary to commit it to its primary rôle.

It is essential to bear this overall strategic concept in mind when examining the use which has been made of Transport Command during the Suez emergency. In fact, all the troop movement that has been done by air in this connection could have been carried out by Transport Command alone without recourse to civil charter aircraft had we wished to use the Command in this fashion. But how wrong we would have been to have done so.

We have never made any secret of the military value we place on the existence of a thriving civil air charter industry. In undisturbed times, they do our routine air trooping for us. As I said in the Air Estimates debate, in the year 1954–55, 172,000 troops were carried by air, and 92 per cent. of them were moved by civil aircraft. Meanwhile, the aircraft of Transport Command—again in undisturbed times—are performing numerous functions which, for security or other reasons, are more suitable for military aircraft. But we do not like to commit too large a proportion of Transport Command to routine tasks. I would liken Transport Command in some ways to a fire service. There are certain functions which a fire service is prepared to perform on a day-to-day basis, and it must, of course, be kept in constant training, but it is not part of its duty to use its fire engines, so to speak, as Green Line buses on routine scheduled services.

So it is with Transport Command. Both men and machines are kept in a constant state of readiness in case an emergency arises which cannot be met by civil aircraft, such as dropping parachutists and flying men and materials into an active theatre of operations. They perform many valuable day-to-day transport tasks, but one cannot expect a number of aircraft to fulfil two different tasks at one and the same time. They cannot be scattered all over the world on routine flights and at the same time provide a reserve of mobility for all three Services in case of urgent need.

It is the latter which we regard as the main task of Transport Command, and we must not lose sight of it. In other words, the greater and more imminent the danger the more necessary does it become to preserve the power of Transport Command, and the greater use do we make of the civil fleet.

This is what happened when the Suez crisis burst upon us. We have been able to provide the aircraft we needed by diverting civil aircraft which were already on charter to us, and by taking on other aircraft as and when they became available in the charter market. The efficiency and scale of effort of the independent operators and of B.O.A.C. did the greatest credit to civil aviation. With their cooperation we have been able to fulfil all the calls made on us without having to resort to any compulsory direction or requisition of aircraft.

Meanwhile Transport Command has been relieved of as many of its day-to-day duties as possible, and brought up to a peak of operational readiness lest the crisis should develop into war. Then, and only then, would be the moment to bring its full force to bear. That would be the testing time for which its strength must be conserved.

So much for the military rôle of transport aircraft. It would appear that there are many misconceptions on what can be asked of an air transport force. It should be able to move troops and parachutists to a trouble spot with their personal equipment, close support weapons and such vehicles as they need for their immediate tactical support. But there are severe limitations on the type of operations which air lift can support. One cannot, for example, lift a Centurion tank in an aeroplane. There is no aircraft in the world that can carry one. It follows then that one cannot rely on an air transport force to mount an operation which requires the use of modern armour. It would also be unrealistic to suppose that we could keep an air transport force capable of committing to battle an infantry division which requires for its support vehicles numbered in thousands rather than in hundreds. We must rely on sea transport for movements on this scale.

So the sort of operation which can be mounted and supported solely by airlift is in the nature of things limited—what might be described as a military policing operation most certainly, but not an operation which requires a large number of troops to be committed in the early stages together with their armour, heavy artillery and impedimenta.

I reject completely the allegation that the Suez crisis found either Transport Command or the civil air fleet wanting. The build-up of forces which the emergency required could never in our wildest dreams have been undertaken by air alone, and Transport Command was in no way a limiting factor in our precautionary preparations.

The hon. Gentleman has urged us to speed up the re-equipment of Transport Command with the most modern aircraft. We will never of course have all that we should like. I fully agree with him that Transport Command is becoming more and more a vital force in our strategic military thought, and I can assure him that nowhere is the importance of Transport Command in the general defence picture more appreciated than in the Air Ministry.

I told the House last March of our plans for re-equipment. Since then Comets and Beverleys have joined the force. More will come in next year, and in 1958 we shall be getting Britannias. We plan by March, 1959, to treble the airlift capacity compared with March, 1956, and, of course, speeds will be ever so much higher. That is a very big improvement, and things are going along well.

The hon. Gentleman asked if we had learned lessons from the use of civil aircraft in the Suez emergency. Certainly we have learned lessons. I do not believe that we shall ever get a Secretary of State for Air or a Minister of Defence who is happy that he has enough at his disposal. But, broadly speaking, the machinery has worked extremely well. There are one or two minor improvements which we feel can be made, but there was no important factor which seemed to weigh against efficient operations in the field of air transport.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman suggested that Transport Command might be taken away from the Air Ministry and set up as an entity on its own after the fashion of the American M.A.T.S. He believed that that would render it more capable of providing the needs of all three Services and place it more directly under the control of the Minister of Defence.

At first blush that may seem to have certain attractions, but it would certainly also have many disadvantages. In fact, under present arrangements Transport Command is available to all three Services, and as a weapon it is in the hands of the Minister of Defence. Whenever there are conflicting demands for air transport it is the Chiefs of Staff and not the Air Ministry who advise the Minister of Defence what the priorities should be.

The difficulties of the hon. Gentleman's suggestions speak for themselves. If the transport force were to be removed from the Air Ministry it would have to take with it to the Ministry of Defence all facilities for the formulation of operational requirements, for planning, manning, training and operational control. All these facilities exist anyway in the Air Ministry, and to set up this extra machinery would involve prohibitive overhead costs to administer a single Command. The hon. Gentleman asked—

Mr. de Freitas

I said that the training and operation should be left at the Air Ministry, but that they should be on the Ministry of Defence Vote.

Mr. Soames

If they are to remain within the Air Ministry except that the Vote would be hived off to the Ministry of Defence, then I do not see what different arrangements are going to be reached apart from the fact that the money comes from a different source. I do not believe that would give the Minister of Defence any greater control over the activities of Transport Command than he has at the moment.

The hon. Gentleman asked for an inquiry to be set up to look into this matter. I can assure him that both my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence will look most carefully at all that he has said, but I am bound to say that the balance of advantage seems to rest with the present arrangements.

Adjourned accordingly at one minute to Eleven o'clock.