Clause 2.—(PERSONS SUFFERING FROM DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY.)

HC Deb 27 November 1956 vol 561 cc314-55

Mr. S. Silverman

I beg to move, in page 1, line 21, to leave out from "mind" to "as" in line 23 and insert "however arising".

The Clause is one which the Royal Commission did not recommend. It is the Clause which applies to the English law of murder the Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility. I applaud the decision of the Government on this occasion not to follow the advice of the Royal Commission and to include in Part I of the Bill in which we are dealing with the fact of murder this very sensible, sane and merciful doctrine which has already applied in Scotland.

When the Royal Commission finally decided not to include that in its recommendations, it was not, as I understand the matter, influenced by any lack of sympathy with the proposition. On the contrary it thought that it was a very good and sensible provision but it had a doubt. I do not wish to make long quotations from the Report. To summarise the Royal Commission's views, it said that if one was to import into the criminal law the doctrine that men may have different degrees of accountability to the law because of their mental condition—I am using a neutral, summarised expression—then, in the opinion of the Royal Commission, it was undesirable to do so for only one crime.

The Royal Commission argued that if the doctrine of diminished responsibility was a good one and therefore ought to be imported into the English criminal law, it ought to be imported into the English criminal law for all purposes and not merely in the case of the law of murder. If a man was not guilty of murder because of his mental condition whereas a man who had no such mental limitation would have been guilty of murder, then that man ought not to be guilty of theft, rape, burglary, false pretences or any other crime in the same circumstances. It was that consideration which prompted the Royal Commission not to recommend it for inclusion in any legislation dealing with the law, or definition, of murder.

For my part, though one respects the Royal Commission's reasons, I think it was wrong, and I believe the Government were right to include this matter in the Bill. After all, whatever may be the logic of an academic approach to the question, in practice its only importance is the penalty. One can always make an attempt to fit the penalty to the crime while the criminal remains alive, and the doctrine of diminished responsibility enables a man not to be convicted of murder.

There appear to be doubts as to whether all this is directed to the Amendment when it ought, rather, to be directed to the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill." I am specifically directing my remarks to the Amendment. I want to show precisely why I agree with the Government in including the provision, and I want to explain why I think they have included in the proposal an unnecessary and inconsistent limitation.

As it stands, the Clause reads: Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind …

I leave out the parenthesis. … as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.

If the Clause had been drafted without the parenthesis, I should have had nothing but praise for it. Indeed, in the Clause without the parenthesis there is everything that the doctrine of diminished responsibility requires. First, the man has to be suffering from an abnormality of mind, and. secondly, the abnormality of mind has to be sufficient substantially to impair his mental responsibility for his acts.

I am not sure why "mental" is introduced there. What we are dealing with is legal accountability, whether the man is to be held responsible or not responsible in the full sense or in a diminished sense. While one understands that the doctrine and the Clause are limited to mental considerations, that seems to me to be sufficiently covered by "abnormality of mind"; consequently it seems to me that "mental" later in the subsection is, at best, superfluous. At all events, leaving it in—I understand that the Amendment seeking to delete it will not be called—one has, without the parenthesis, every reasonable requirement to establish the doctrine of diminished responsibility.

Now let us look at the parenthesis. It says: whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury.

I should like the Attorney-General to tell me what is intended to be excluded by that parenthesis. What cause of abnormality of mind is not to be covered by the Clause? It seems to me, in my simplicity, that there are only two possible answers to that question. One is "There are some things to be excluded by it." The other is "We do not intend to exclude anything by it. We included the parenthesis meaning to define every possible cause of abnormality of mind which might have this result."

Taking the second answer, it may or may not be that those words are apt to cover every known cause of abnormality of mind. I doubt very much whether the words do cover every known cause of abnormality of mind, but I am no expert on that subject, and I express no opinion about it one way or the other. All I say is that, even if the words are apt to include everything that is now-known which might give rise to the mental abnormality required to establish this kind of defence, we all know that medical science, particularly in this field, is—or so we hope—progressing.

I am certain that the judges in the middle of the nineteenth century who, when called upon to frame adequate reasonable and just rules to define insanity, produced the M'Naghten Rules, did everything in their power to work out such a definition as would cover everything that was accepted as insanity in their day, and yet we all know how unsatisfactory those Rules are now. No one defends them.

It is true that the Government do not abolish the M'Naghten Rules by this Bill. Again, I think that the Government were right not to abolish them. They have introduced this provision as an additional line of defence so as not to absolve a defendant from having to prove all that could be required to be proved in order to establish the defence of insanity, however statutorily defined, In their day the M'Naghten Rules were well done, or at any rate were thought to be well done. They were not well done, because it happens that we know, or think we know, a great deal more today about the causes or nature of insanity than we knew then. I suppose that there is not a living psychiatrist who would not admit that even now we are only on the threshold of knowledge in that respect. It is admitted that there is much which is not known.

8.0 p.m.

If the Government intended by these words to cover every possible cause of mental abnormality for the purpose of this Clause, it would have been much better had those words been left out altogether and the Clause had said: … such abnormality of mind as substantially impaired …

If the Government wanted to be absolutely certain that there was some pathological foundation, some detectable, provable and ascertainable foundation for the abnormality of mind, I suggest with some diffidence, but with every confidence, that the words "however arising "are the words which they want. I commend those words to them, and I hope that on this occasion I shall satisfy the Attorney-General that the Amendment is one which he can reasonably accept.

There is the other possibility, that the parenthesis would not include, and was so framed because it was not intended to include, a catalogue of all the kinds of mental abnormality, but was intended to exclude some. If that is the case, then the Attorney-General should tell us what he wishes to exclude and why he wishes to exclude it. Once one has conceded that abnormality of mind may afford a partial, although not complete, defence to a charge of murder, it does not really matter how the abnormality of mind arose. The important thing is that the mind was abnormal to such a degree as partially to excuse the accused person from what would otherwise have been full responsibility for the criminal law. For those reasons we suggest that the words in parenthesis should be omitted and "however arising" substituted.

The Attorney-General

I want at one to reply to the interesting observation of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) on this very important Clause. I hope that I shall be able to make him understand why the Government cannot accept the Amendment ant feel compelled to take that course.

The object of Clause 2 is to introduce into English law the Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility. With that object the hon. Member agrees, as, I think, do most hon. Members. While doing that, we want to make the doctrine the same in both countries as far as we can. One objection to accepting the Amendment—not a primary objection, because it might be said that we could enlarge the Scottish doctrine if we so wanted; I merely mention it in passing—is that, if we did so, in England the application of the doctrine might become wider and more extensive than in Scotland.

Mr. S. Silverman

Does it not apply to Scotland?

The Attorney-General

Parts of the Bill apply to Scotland, but this part applies only to England and Wales.

The Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility means that a defence has to show—we will discuss later what degree has to be established—that the mental abnormality must be "bordering on insanity". The hon. Member will see that paragraph 378 of the Royal Commission's Report refers to that. If we are to make the English doctrine the same as the Scottish doctrine, it must be a defence of diminished responsibility in conditions "bordering on insanity".

Here one gets into the difficulty that Scotland has been in the fortunate position of never being troubled by the M'Naghten Rules. We have every intention of making provision for cases bordering on insanity and for cases of insanity in the medical sense which are less than insanity under the M'Naghten Rules and Clause 2 is designed to cover both those categories.

Having said that by way of preface, I would add that the hon. Member made some comment on the word "mental" as it appears before "responsibility". It is put there by design, because one is there considering mental responsibility with a view to determining whether legal responsibility would be reduced. It would not read very well to say: … such abnormality of mind as substantially impaired his legal responsibility. It is either one or the other and the word "mental" is inserted to remove the doubt. If his mental responsibility has been impaired, then his legal responsibility is reduced. That follows from the operation of subsection (1).

Mr. Anthony Greenwood

Can the Attorney-General say whether there is a precedent in statute law for the term "mental responsibility"?

The Attorney-General

Offhand I cannot do so, but I see no reason why those words should not be used in conjunction. The phrase shows the distinction from legal responsibility and there would be doubt, if "responsibility" were left alone, as to which it was. No great importance will be attached to that. It merely clarifies the meaning.

Mr. Silverman

The Attorney-General is now obviously making a valid point. Is not the issue sufficiently covered by the words "abnormality of mind", which are already included?

The Attorney-General

It really is not, and, on reflection, the hon. Member will see that one does not necessarily flow from the other.

Mr. Paget

On a point of order. I understood that we were discussing the first Amendment to Clause 2, which proposes to leave out certain words in parenthesis and to insert others. The next Amendment on the Notice Paper, which, I understand, is not to be called, is in page 1, line 24, to leave out "mental". The Attorney-General's remarks seem to have been so far addressed entirely to the Amendment which is not to be called, I wonder whether he has not got it muddled and got the wrong Amendment.

The Attorney-General

I have not got it muddled in the least degree. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne mentioned that wording in passing—I expect the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) did not appreciate it at the time—and, in passing, I have sought to deal with it so that the Amendment which we are discussing may be considered against its appropriate background.

The Chairman

The hon. and learned Member for Northampton is quite right in saying that the second Amendment has not been selected, but I think that the issue has been quite reasonably met.

Mr. Paget

I was only trying to seek clarity. I can assure the Attorney-General that we are deeply grateful for any observations of his which make this Bill a little more intelligible.

The Attorney-General

Perhaps I can now continue to make some observations upon the Amendment.

I was coming to the real point which the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne raised. He asked why we had these words in brackets in subsection (1). Was it to exclude something? If not, would not it be much simpler just to leave them out, or to use the phrase, "however arising"? We want to do two things by the inclusion of those words. First, we want to indicate that the serious abnormality of mind must in some way be similar to the Scottish phrase, "bordering upon insanity". The hon. Member will see that the words: arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes appear in Section 1 (2) of the Mental Deficiency Act, 1927. The advantage of including those words is that they give some indication to the judge and jury of the sort of abnormality that has to be established. I am sure that the hon. Member will agree that although it may be an impossible task to put into a Statute a definition which would meet the views both of psychiatrists and lawyers, what is really essential is to define a standard which can be applied in the courts. We therefore start with the advantage that the words give an indication to judge and jury of the kind of abnormality that is meant to enable a defence to run under this provision.

The hon. Member asked what we wanted to exclude. We want to exclude the mere outburst of rage or jealousy. If we did not have words of that kind in the Clause we consider that a person who committed a murder as a result of an outburst of rage, jealousy or temper—especially if he were a bad-tempered man—might be able to run the defence of diminished responsibility on that and that alone.

We consider that that would be going too far, and would be going outside the Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility as it now stands. We have sought, by the wording we have introduced first, to bring English law into line with the Scottish doctrine, and not to go further than that, and then to give a valuable indication to judge and jury of the kind of matters which they are to take into account, namely, abnormality whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury and to exclude, at the same time, the possibility of a mere outburst of temper by a bad-tempered man being put forward, without anything else, as entitling him to succeed upon a defence of diminished responsibility.

I hope that I have made the defence of these words clear. When we considered the wording of the Clause we wondered whether we could not follow some line such as the hon. Member suggested, but for the reasons I have given we came to the conclusion that if the Clause were really to work as the equivalent provision works in Scotland words of this sort would be necessary and, indeed, desirable.

Mr. Paget

I feel that in this case a very good effort has been made in drafting the subsection, and that it is a good and valuable one. But I am still a little worried by some of the things which the learned Attorney-General has said. I gather that he retains the present words and does not accept "for any cause" because he desires to cut down the meaning of the words "abnormality of mind." I will give way if that is not a correct definition of what he has said.

8.15 p.m.

I am rather doubtful whether they do. First, considerations of jealousy or temper would not arise unless the jealousy or temper was of such a kind as to amount to an abnormality of mind. Temper or jealousy would be irrelevant unless it amounted to an abnormality of mind. If such temper or jealousy does amount to an abnormality of mind, must it not arise either from an arrested or retarded development of mind or from an inherent cause within the mind? If it be an abnormality of the mind it seems to me that it must either be a defect in the development of the mind—something which ought to be in the mind but is not—or something which is in the mind and ought not to be.

The Attorney-General

The phrase "inherent causes" is not limited to the mind. The hon. and learned Gentleman read it as if it meant "inherent causes in the mind." I hope he follows that.

Mr. Paget

I entirely agree. The phrase from such abnormality of mind is the governing phrase. That phrase must be there. We then consider words which apparently provide a limitation of abnormality of the mind. In fact, abnormality of the mind would cover more if the words in brackets were omitted. I understand that to be the right hon. and learned Gentleman's argument.

The Attorney-General

The phrase might cover more.

Mr. Paget

Yes—might. I wonder whether that is so. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that he wanted to exclude mere temper and jealousy. I humbly submit that neither jealousy nor temper can come in unless it be such as to amount to abnormality of the mind. The question does not arise otherwise.

If the temper is such that it arises from an abnormality of the mind, it is an abnormality of the mind because there is something lacking in the mind—in this case control—which should be there, or there is something in the mind which ought not to be there. If there is something, such as control, which is not there and ought to be, that must be a case of arrested development because, if the mind had developed properly—unless there were disease or injury, which is also covered—what ought to be there would be there, namely, control. On the other hand, if there is something in the mind which ought not to be there, that must surely arise from an inherent cause.

I find it a little difficult to see how these words can cut down the range of the words "abnormality of mind". If they are there simply to illustrate the sort of thing which is meant, I should have thought that it would be desirable, as a precaution, to add some such words as "or however else arising". But still, I feel that the existing words are an explanation of what is meant by abnormality of the mind and do not in any way cut it down. I do not think that they would in practice be enlarged if we added to them, "from any causes". I do not therefore take any particular objection either to the words in the bracket; nor have I any great enthusiasm for substituting them. I should have thought it would have been tidier simply to leave the words suggested in the Amendment, as I find it difficult to see that it makes any substantial difference.

The Attorney-General

I have listened with interest to what the hon. and learned Gentleman has said. The wording is important. I think it true to say that they are a valuable signpost which is required, if this is to be used in the courts; and also there is the desirability of keeping in line with the Scottish system. It is a useful indication and one must seek to exclude the case of temper which does arise.

Mr. Rees-Davies

I wish to congratulate the Government, and in particular I should like to congratulate the Parliamentary draftsmen, on the inclusion of this important matter in parenthesis. To my mind, for any person who might have to undertake the defence or prosecution in connection with a charge, it will be essential to have some clear guidance. I hope that the Committee will bear with me if I give the reason why, and illustrate it by a particular case.

First, Clause 2 is introduced to introduce the Scottish doctrine for one reason only. The Royal Commission reported clearly that it accepted this doctrine as an effective doctrine and one which would work. But the Commission came to the conclusion that it was unnecessary, for one reason. It recommended that the jury should decide the question of sentence, and as the jury were to do that, it did not trouble to adopt this particular doctrine of diminished responsibility. Now the doctrine comes before this Committee as an essential element in relation to the death penalty in this case so that the Prerogative shall not be used, and in those circumstances the Scottish doctrine has been introduced with the words: … if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind … as substantially impaired his mental responsibility … and there would be returned a verdict of manslaughter. The whole doctrine of diminished responsibiity is one, and only one, of mental abnormality. It deals purely with mental abnormality and not abnormality which might arise from any other cause.

The essence of the importance of the words in parenthesis is this. "Abnormality of mind" may not cover certain aspects unless they are included in the parenthesis. It would not include one most important element. Without some guidance or definition it would not include simplicity of the mind. On the other hand, it would exclude irresponsibility of the mind.

Let us consider simplicity of the mind. A simple mind is not, in ordinary circumstances, an abnormality of the mind. There would be a great deal of trouble if there were no definition laid down in that matter. We should be leaving it to the courts to decide, and if there was one thing that I should have thought that hon. Gentlemen opposite did not want it would be for the courts to build up a guide to what they would determine should be regarded as abnormality of the mind. Therefore the Government have, quite rightly, laid down a guide, which is not a definition, but a guide as to abnormality of mind; and one of those matters which they have stated would be abnormality of mind is in fact arrested or retarded development.

Let me give an example of a case which clearly would not have been regarded as one of abnormality of mind, if the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) had his way, and these words in parenthesis did not exist. The case is that of Bass Woodcock. He killed his sister-in-law, who was in fact his mistress, in a suicide pact.

This boy was tried, I think at the age of 21. He had been a minor, and the evidence given was that he was a person whose mental ability was that of a person aged 10. Nonetheless he was perfectly sound and perfectly normal of mind, but he had a completely arrested and a simple mind. What he was doing he thought to be a very good thing to do, and perfectly proper. Without some guidance the jury might easily have held that that person had no abnormality of the mind, although his mind was ten or twelve years younger than it should have been. It is for that reason—and here is one of the matters on which I have pressed the Government for a long time—that it seems to me that some guidance is necessary, particularly in regard to those who are arrested or retarded in their development.

Mr. S. Silverman

Would the hon. Gentleman consider that there is anything in the Clause to give any guidance as to what abnormality of mind means? If the judges are able to build up a system of law by decision, they can do it in respect of abnormality of mind which is not defined. The hon. Gentleman appears to think that the words in parenthesis afford some guide as to what abnormality of mind shall mean. With respect, they do not do that. "Abnormality of mind" is still open and undefined in any way. What the words in parenthesis do is to give some guidance as to the causes of the abnormality of the mind, whether arising from this, that or the other. Conceding that there might be something in what the hon. Gentleman is saying, if the words in parenthesis were left out and there were substituted the words, "however arising," would not all his points be met?

Mr. Rees-Davies

No, I think not. If I may deal with this point, I did say in opening my argument that it was quite clear to me that this part of the subsection in parenthesis is not a definition. This is not a definition, it is a guide; and, not being a definition, cannot deal with matters of abnormality of the mind beyond those specifically outlined in the parenthesis. Therefore it can do no possible harm to anyone who is seeking to say that it is a limiting factor. It is not a limiting factor.

When the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said that it was a limiting factor in relation to "abnormality of mind", he was quite wrong. It is nothing of the kind. It is carrying out a twin purpose. It is, first, drawing attention to what is abnormality of the mind, which is to be found in the summing up to the jury by Lord Justice Cooper in the case of Braithwaite in 1945, in the Journal Cases of that year, and the words in parenthesis are merely an epitome of the reasons of that particular judge for his judgment which he gave to afford a guidance. I think the hon. and learned Member for Paisley (Mr. D. Johnston) will agree that one is trying to give, from the Scottish law, guidance in the absence of which an English judge would have no form of guidance.

8.30 p.m.

Let me turn to the other point made by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne. He says that we should exclude altogether these words in parenthesis and have just "however arising" as an alternative. I do not agree with that suggestion. If we had "however arising" there would still be the words "abnormality of mind". The words might cover simplicity of mind, because it would be an abnormality "however arising". We can differ about these matters, but we do not want to have a jury trying to decide whether a man of 21 who has a mental age of 10 years has an abnormal mind. Some people might say that he had a simple mind and others would say that if he is not of normal mental age then his mind is abnormal. I can see tremendous arguments, which would be very unfortunate.

Another abnormality of mind is irresponsibility. The difficulty here would be just as great. One does not want to include somebody who is passionately jealous or has an exceptional mind, abnormal in the sense that it is abnormally irresponsible. What is intended here from the law of Scotland is some-think bordering upon mental disease, and so we include retarded development and inherent disease of the mind, or something bordering on it, sufficient for a jury to say, "He is so abnormal that he ought not to be found guilty of murder", and return a verdict of manslaughter.

I urge the Committee not to support the Amendment. I believe it to be essential to give the guidance contained in the Clause if this law is to be effectively carried out.

Mr. Arthur Moyle (Oldbury and Halesowen)

The speech which has just been made by the hon. Member for Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) convinces me that the view expressed by my colleagues is right and that the sentence in the parenthesis limits rather than widens the scope of the subsection. The Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) would strengthen the admirable purpose of the Clause.

It was significant that the Attorney-General, when replying to my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne, did not reply on the merits of the issue but rather expressed sympathy and took refuge in the argument that what had been found good in Scots law about the acceptance of diminished responsibility ought, by virtue of that simple fact, to operate in England. Some of us on this side of the Committee are laymen and not too familiar with the doctrine of diminished responsibility and how it has worked, but I have not the slightest doubt that the Secretary of State for Scotland could tell the Committee that many Scotsmen disagree with the Scots law about diminished responsibility and how it has been interpreted there in the courts. I cannot imagine that its operation is regarded as perfect by the Scots.

Clause 2 is the best part of the Bill. The hon. Member for Isle of Thanet took courage in his hands and brought forward a number of cases with which he was familiar to demonstrate the necessity for the words in the parenthesis, without which, he argued, the purpose of the Clause would not be fully realised, because it would be left to judges to determine its provisions. I submit that in any case that will have to be decided by the courts, whether the phrase is included in the parenthesis or not.

I wish to put a concrete case to the Solicitor-General. That is the reason I have risen, not so much for the purpose of arguing the merits of the Clause, but to obtain some clarity on what it really means. The Clause seems to be drafted in such a way that what is given in the first part of it is taken away in the latter part. I want to know how the following case would apply if the Amendment were not accepted.

It so happens that I knew Albert Marjoram, a youngster of 20, who was convicted of murder and hanged at Wandsworth Gaol in 1928. I was a witness in that trial. What is important is the motives which led him to commit murder. Those, I submit, are exceedingly relevant to this Clause. Why did he commit murder? His conduct in the court was impeccable. There was no history in relation to him which could be described as one of arrested development or retarded mind, nor that he had been injured at any time by a fall, by a shock, or an impact with a car which had affected his brain. Apparently he was a normal citizen, except that from time to time he had been guilty of robberies with violence and had caused some trouble to the police as a result.

Why did he commit murder on Dart-ford Heath? He said that he wanted to be the last man to be hanged at Maidstone Gaol which, at that time, was the subject of a great deal of controversy. There was a genuine belief at that time that the gaol was to be closed. He made a bet with Sidney Fox, who was put in the condemned cell there and later hanged for the murder of his mother. Marjoram said that if he killed a policeman he would have a more sensational trial than Fox had, that he would have a packed court and be regarded as more famous than Fox. That was the main motive.

Would one call that an abnormal mind? I say that any act of murder is abnormal. I say that any person committing a murder must obviously be abnormal at the time of its commission. Here was a young man who was obviously suffering from an excessive vanity. He went to his death proud of the fact that he had been condemned to death for murder. He regretted that he could not kill a policeman, and he did what he said was the next best thing—he killed a young woman.

Having related the facts briefly—facts of which I had some knowledge at the time—I should like to ask the Solicitor-General a question. I felt at the time that in a more civilised world Marjoram would not have been hanged. Can the Solicitor-General tell the Committee, if, in 1928, the Clause as it stands without the suggested Amendment had been the law, whether Albert Marjoram would have been hanged? Briefly, would he have been hanged if this interpretation of diminished responsibility had been part of the English law at that time?

Mr. M. Stewart

The right hon. and learned Gentleman argued that one reason for accepting the Clause in its present form rather than the Amendment is that we shall then keep in step with Scottish law on this point. No doubt we shall all want to give a certain amount of weight to that, but I think it will be generally agreed that if it can be shown that the Amendment is substantially better than the Clause in its original form the mere fact that it differs from Scottish practice would not be a sufficient reason for rejecting the Amendment.

If we could establish that the Amendment was a substantial improvement on the Clause, then, if anything, the argument would be to try to see whether we could not, at the same time, improve the Scottish law in the matter; or, at any rate, that we should not lose this opportunity of making the Amendment to the English law in the best and most durable fashion that we could find.

We therefore have to ask ourselves: is the Amendment a substantial improvement on the Clause? That immediately raises a further question: is there, in practice, any substantial difference between what the Clause says and what the Amendment says? Does the Clause, in its present form, include some cases which the Amendment would not include, or does it exclude any cases which the Amendment would not exclude? The hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies), if I followed him rightly, argued that the Clause both included some cases which the Amendment would not include and excluded some which the Amendment would not exclude. Let us suppose, for a moment, with the greatest respect to him, that he is wrong. I will return a little later to the other hypothesis, the hypothesis that he is right.

Let us suppose for a moment that there is no substantial difference and that we cannot establish that anything would be excluded or included under the Clause which would not likewise be excluded or included under the Amendment. If that is so, I submit that the case for the Amendment is overwhelming because of its much greater simplicity. If that is so, all the parenthesis is doing is to invite us and the courts and the jury to consider, not a legal, but a medical and psychological problem as to what are the causes of abnormality of mind. In the present state of human knowledge, we really do not know the answer. It may well be that in a few years' time we shall know much more about the causes of abnormality, and this, which is intended to be a helpful definition, could then be a very confusing one.

The only justification, therefore, for putting in such a description—that is a better word than definition—is that it is absolutely necessary. Unless it produces a substantial difference in the law, its only result can be to confuse by inviting the courts to try to answer a problem which, in the present state of medical and psychiatric knowledge, cannot properly be answered.

We are, therefore, put in this position. There is no case for rejecting the Amendment unless is can be shown that the Clause has a substantial difference in meaning and that its meaning and effect would be better than that of the Amendment. What are the differences in meaning which it is suggested there might be? On the one hand, there was the difference suggested by the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet, who argued, I think, that the Clause as it now stands would include cases of extreme simplicity of mind that might be excluded by the Amendment. I must say that I disagree with him there.

Let us take the particular case which he gave us. On the facts as he described them to us, the young man's mind was such that he believed that the act of murder was quite a right and proper thing. I think that those were the words, or very nearly the words, which the hon. Gentleman used.

8.45 p.m.

Mr. Rees-Davies

In a suicide pact.

Mr. Stewart

Yes, in a suicide pact, the act of murder was a right and proper thing. It was also established that he had the mental age of a child of 12. Is it conceivable that if those facts had been established to a jury, the jury—or, indeed, any reasonable person—could have said that that man's mind was not abnormal?

We already use the word "subnormal" for children who suffer from severely retarded development, as is apparent in their education. Surely, subnormality is one form of abnormality. It is a definition of a development less than normal. Abnormality can occur as being either less or more than normal, and subnormality is, therefore, one form of abnormality.

Mr. Rees-Davies

The hon. Member draws from that exactly the point I was making, that there is a difference of opinion straight away. That is the exact reason why it should be clarified in the parenthesis.

Mr. Stewart

If the hon. Gentleman is not happy about my use of the word "subnormality", I return to the point which I made before. If a young man has a mental age of 12, and thinks that murder in a suicide pact is a right and proper thing to do, is it conceivable that any jury could say that he was not … suffering from such abnormality of mind … as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts …"? I do not believe that any reasonable jury could come to that conclusion, and it is very significant that the learned Attorney-General did not advance this argument. The Clause is evidently drafted on the assumption that the word "abnormality" can include simplicity, because it goes on to say, in as many words, that abnormality can arise from simplicity. That is based on the assumption that the word "abnormality" must, in itself, include simplicity.

Perhaps the most serious matter in the whole of the argument is this. The learned Attorney-General is arguing that if we adopted the Amendment rather than the Clause we might bring within the ambit of this subsection murders committed, say, from jealousy or bad temper—what, I think, the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet described as irresponsible murders. The question I would put is this. Can the argument be sustained that a man's jealousy or bad temper are such that any reasonable person would regard them as … such abnormality of mind … as substantially impaired his mental responsibility …"? If we are satisfied that the man's state of mind—jealousy, or bad temper, or whatever it is—is an abnormality such as … substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts … then, we should be obliged to conclude that he was covered by this Clause, even as it now stands, because jealousy or bad temper is certainly something inherent in the personality.

Let us take what is, perhaps, the most famous jealousy case on record—that of Othello. Surely, if Othello were being tried under this Clause the question for the jury would be this: was his jealousy—and he was certainly more addicted to that vice than other men—such that it could be described as … such abnormality of mind … as substantially impaired his mental responsibility …"? If the jury decided that it was—and I trust that they would not, because I think that it would be a very bad precedent-then, under the Clause as it now stands, they would have to say that he was not liable to be charged with murder, because whatever view was taken of his jealousy it was certainly something inherent in his personality. If it were felt that his jealousy was to be dignified with the name of abnormality of mind, it would certainly be an abnormality of the mind covered by this Clause.

So it would be in the case of anybody who could manage to convince the court that the jealousy or bad temper was such as to be dignified with the name of abnormality. If he could once jump over that hurdle, he would be safely over the other, even in its present form, because conditions of the mind like that are inherent in the personality.

I should have thought that the proper answer to somebody like that would be. "Your jealousy or bad temper cannot be regarded as an abnormality such as to impair your mental responsibility." I am arguing, therefore, that the jealousy and bad temper cases are not affected by whether we have the Clause or whether we have the Amendment, because the question which has to be asked is: is this lack of virtue, this irresponsibility, or whatever we may call it, so great as to be dignified with the name of abnormality? If it is, we are anxious to make it a case of diminished responsibility. If it is not, we do not want to do so. But the result will be the same whether we have the Clause or whether we have the Amendment.

I submit, therefore, that neither in inclusion nor in exclusion has it been shown that there is any practical difference between the Clause and the Amendment. That being so, the difference between the two is only that the Clause brings in unnecessary medical and psychological discussions with which there is really no point in bothering the courts. For that reason, therefore, I am sure that we should be more wise to accept the simpler and more straightforward wording of the Amendment than the unnecessarily complicated wording of the Clause.

Mr. Hale

I always listen to my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) with very great attention and complete agreement. Indeed, I envy him his clarity of reasoning and his forceful approach to the subject. However, with the concluding part of his remarks I found myself in some little difficulty. I have not perused the Oxford Dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the word "inherent", but according to my humble recollection it implies the question of heredity.

Mr. Ellis Smith (Stoke-on-Trent, South)

Send for the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels).

Mr. Hale

That would certainly add clarity to a drab and dismal subject.

This is an important Clause. I want to approach it with sincerity and not in any provocative way. I am bound to say that I find the observations of the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) a little interesting. His reference to a man of 21 with the mind of a child of 12 who is not regarded as normal seemed to me to be perhaps a possibility at Llandudno, but not normal elsewhere.

In producing this Clause and in following the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, we are doing something today which probably will affect only three or four cases in a year, but we are introducing a major modification applied to a very minor number of people which, if extended, might produce a great social reform and one for which many of us have waited a long time.

I do not think that there is any question that the M'Naghten Rules are inadequate and unsatisfactory. Most people who have considered them have thought of the possibility of substituting something else. We have all had to face the dilemma of what is abnormality. Many of us have started from the point of view that much crime is due to abnormality of some sort—heredity, environment or something like that—to a condition of the mind or pressure on the brain. Those of us who have considered this matter seriously are conscious that whether that be true or not, we are fifty or sixty years from the possibility of giving to it any effective application.

We are still remotely considering crimes resulting from sexual abnormality. There is overwhelming evidence that sexual abnormality may be inherited. There is equally overwhelming evidence that it can be acquired. There is much evidence that the sufferer who inherited the disease should be treated as a victim of the disease. It is equally true that these people can spread this foul contagion and spread it widely over a whole area. This is a conflict which all of us who are keen on the question of penal reform have to face. I ask the Solicitor-General to apply his mind to this.

I should have thought that there was a general move to support the contention that in almost every legal interpretation if one adds a number of sub-headings after a general classification the effect is to limit it. Obviously, if we have a couple of general words or a general word like "abnormality" or "abnormality of mind" and particularise the methods in which it can arise we shall obviously limit it.

Mr. Paget

The ejusdem generis rule.

Mr. Hale

My hon. and learned Friend learned his Latin at Eton, with the pronunciation of Eton. I, unfortunately, got mine at Ashby-de-la-Zouch, with the pronunciation of Rome; but we will not divide on that. It does limit as a rule of law. It is not a rule of law which we have to pronounce correctly, but it is a rule of law which we have to interpret correctly.

I want to put seriously to the Solicitor-General one or two propositions. I believe that it is important that we should have in our minds the sort of thing we are considering which may be the germ of a very great social reform. Hon. Members will remember the history of the Jukes family, which was written in the United States and has been the subject of a great many books. It originated from one, Thomas Dugdale, who was inspecting prisons, who found a number of people of the same name and was determined to investigate this family. He exercised a great deal of patience and care in tracing about seven generations from Ada, I think it was, who was a respectable and religious-minded harlot who did no great harm to anyone except to contaminate people with venereal disease. He traced just over 700 members of the family, of 639 of which he was able to get particulars. He was able to show that a very large number of them were convicted criminals; but a large number of the women were prostitutes or brothel keepers. All over the years the original infection, coupled with environment, had debased the whole of the family, until it became a serious social menace. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member wishes to intervene I will willingly give way.

Mr. Rees-Davies

I was only saying that I hoped the hon. Gentleman would address the Chair.

Mr. Hale

I have not had the privilege of congratulating you, Sir Gordon, on your recent and well-merited elevation. If there is any fault in the form of my observations I am sure that you will not be too timid to call my attention to the fact. I am quite sure you will understand that I would willingly give you the full benefit of the observations which I am making.

Since that time, as the Solicitor-General knows, study after study has taken place, in France and America chiefly, and it has been found that we get this condition of things about which nobody can dogmatise. It is nonsense to say that a jury can say that this is inherent, even if they know what "inherent" means, which I, apparently, did not. It is no use saying that a jury can isolate this or that.

During the last few months there has been published a book written by Caryl Chessman, a man who is still in the "death row" at St. Quentin prison in the United States of America. He is still waiting to go into the gas chamber, after seven years of imprisonment. He is a brilliant, able and thoughtful man who could do a great deal for the world if he were allowed to live. He quotes a case of a man who came into the "death row" while he was there, a young officer —his name was Norris, if I remember aright—who had served in the American forces in the war with Japan, with an admirable record, a man marked for promotion, liked by his colleagues and respected by his men.

9.0 p.m.

There came a moment when, for three or four consecutive days, this man was at Leyte involved, not merely in heavy bombardments, but primarily in hand-to-hand warfare. For nights he lay out in the heat, surrounded by the stench of rotting corpses. At the end of that experience, he changed. Finally, after being promoted, he left the Army, and committed a series of crimes. He gave all sorts of fantastic reasons for his crimes; he was trying to capture a bizarre, undiscovered secret weapon to destroy his enemies, and so on. He was executed for murder.

Under this Clause, that man would still be executed. Is that an abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development"— certainly not that— or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury)"? Is it such an abnormality?

During the war I had to defend a similar case myself, though the charge was not anything like so serious; if it had been, I should not have been defending. A young man of admirable character and first-class education, a sportsman, esteemed and respected everywhere, joined the Forces in the ranks. He was employed as a dispatch rider. He was very proud of his motorcycle, and once in delivering a ceremonial dispatch on a ceremonial parade, he applied his brakes too sharply, came to too abrupt a stop and went over the handlebars, falling on his head.

He had a perfunctory examination by a medical officer, and was told he was fit to go back to duty. All his friends noticed that his character changed. He got in bad company, with a gang of housebreakers. In all he did there seems to have been some element of automatism because the reports of all his friends were that he seemed to be a dazed and uncollected man. He committed a series of offences, but his participation was not detected.

Later, he saw another medical officer, who examined him and asked why he had received no treatment. He answered that he had seen a medical officer who had told him he was all right. This last medical officer sent him for X-ray, as a result of which he was found to have been walking about for three months with a compound fracture of the skull. He had treatment in hospital, and was discharged cured. He continued his service in the Forces, and later won a medal for gallantry in very difficult circumstances.

A month or two later the police found out about his crimes. They were not murder, so perhaps it might be said that this does not apply. But suppose it had been. It would have been said that in this case he would be all right, because his condition was the result of injury. That may well be so; but we must remember that the onus of proof is now put upon him to show that it was due to injury. The burden of proof has shifted to the accused, who is often a poor person without enough money to call a doctor at all. This is an important consideration.

We are, Sir Gordon, in the infancy of knowledge upon these subjects. I appreciate that one must use a word of fairly collective meaning like "abnormality" and hope that it will cover the situation. But how much do we know about it? Is there such a disease as kleptomania? Is there such a thing as kleptomania, and, if there is, is it a disease? I once traced kleptomania through three generations of the same family, in circumstances which were sufficiently convincing to me.

It all arose from the case of a lad in the Forces who was charged with theft. The officer who was due to defend him wrote to me and said, "This lad has given me a statement in which he says that he has never' pinched' anything of value in his life but has always had this compelling force which has made him pick up comparatively worthless articles, which were of not much use to him and of little use to those from whom they were taken. He is the third generation of his family in which this has appeared. His grandfather, a parson, is still in your district. Will you see him and find out the truth?"

I saw the old man, who was over seventy years of age, but I could not persuade him to give evidence. I checked the evidence with neighbours and people in the village and found out that this was true. Three generations had been kleptomaniacs. Is that a disease? Is there such a thing as kleptomania? Can one have partial kleptomania, or a slight attack of it?

We now acknowledge some of these things which over the years we have disputed and said did not exist. We criticised hypnotism as a charlatan science. We talked about claustrophobia as something which people had invented. We now know that these things happen, but that is about all that we do know. Can somebody have a partial claustrophobia? Is that a compelling reason why he should seek to escape arrest? Would that be a disease if he sought to escape arrest because he just could not physically stand the strain and stress of incarceration in a small cell? Would that be the kind of abnormality which would justify escape?

We really are at a time when our knowledge of these things is slight. Therefore, it is extremely important that we should not try to put upon a jury the extra burden of having to make a separate decision upon five or six separate issues every time that this is raised.

I used, for my sins, to take cases for the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, with a very good officer, whose name was mentioned in the House not so long ago—Inspector Riley, of Nuneaton, a man of courage, a decent man, who was anxious only to help children and not to put people in prison.

Whenever we went to a really bad case, however, we were confronted with a father and a mother who, generally speaking, were so moronic that there was nothing that could be done. Punishment was no good because they had long passed beyond the normal sense of humanity. They were far below that standard. One might say that they had wallowed like pigs in their own filth until they had reduced themselves to that state. I do not myself generally believe it. I believe that they were the victims of something, either of our social system or of wars or a combination of it all, or of environment or heredity. No jury would ever be able to decide an issue like that. Nobody would be able to know.

When the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet says that a lad of 20, with the mind of a 10-year-old, may not be abnormal—

Mr. Rees-Davies

I did not say that.

Mr. Hale

I give way at once if the hon. Member wants to correct me.

Mr. Rees-Davies

I said that the definition as laid down in the Clause would not necessarily come within the term of abnormality, which was one of the reasons why this provision was needed.

Mr. Hale

I apologise to the hon. Member. I did not want to misrepresent him. I remember now that he made the point as a correction to my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham.

What does this come to? I thought it was conceded that under the ejusdem generis rules this is a limitation, that whatever the result of those words it reduces the ambit of the words if they are left untouched and uncorrected. How, therefore, can it be argued that that lad might be in as the Clause is drawn and could not be in if we widened it? We are certainly widening it—there cannot be any question about that.

Mr. Paget

I am not at all sure that we are widening it. Even if—I cannot think of one offhand—one could find some abnormality of mind which arose neither from arrested or retarded development of mind nor from some inherent or inside cause induced by … injury surely it must be something of the same sort. If it were something of the same sort, it would not be excluded.

Mr. S. Silverman

Before my hon. Friend answers that question, perhaps he will agree to include in his answer a reply to this one. Can he conceive of any words which would widen the Clause more than the words "however arising "?

Mr. Hale

I think that we ought to have the words "or body" after the word "mind". We could have said: abnormality of mind or body (whether arising … I think that that would be as wide as it could or should be.

I always listen to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) with the very greatest respect, but I think that in his interjection he was speaking out of the back of his honourable and learned neck. The words: Whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development represent a marked limitation. There are all sorts and sizes of moronic conditions which would not normally be included under the words "arrested or retarded development".

I said that inherent causes would cover causes inherited, but I was corrected and told that it was an inside cause. What is an inside cause? It sounds like gastric trouble. Suppose a child is born a mongol. What is that?

Mr. Paget

It is a cause inside the child's mind.

Mr. Hale

I agree, but it is not necessarily "arrested or retarded development". I do not profess to be a medical expert, but I believe that it can result from pre-natal causes in the mother. We are not having heredity in any case, apparently, if my hon. Friend is right. What is a disease? If my hon. and learned Friend had followed he would have known that I had been trying to make the point for a long time. Disease does not cover every affliction of mind or body. These are being limited to abnormality of mind.

Mr. Paget

Even if I am talking out of the back of my neck, may I say that "abnormality of mind" may be too narrow a phrase? What I am saying is that I do not think that once we have "abnormality of mind" the words in the brackets in any way confine that abnormality of mind, because they are instances. They do not purport to be inclusive of everything. Under the ejusdem generis rules they might exclude something of quite a different sort, but I find it difficult to believe that there could be something of a different sort.

Mr. Hale

We started with two propositions. My hon. and learned Friend has now admitted the first. The first challenge was whether I could find words which would make the Clause wider. We have now agreed that we could make it wider and that, therefore, this is narrower. The second challenge was that I should name something. Jealousy. Is that inherent?

Mr. Paget

Yes. if it is abnormality of mind.

Mr. Hale

Inherent?

Mr. Paget

Yes.

Mr. Hale

Does my hon. and learned Friend really suggest that he could go to a jury confident that he could convince them that Othello was entitled to an acquittal on a charge of having murdered Desdemona, because of an inherent ailment named jealousy? I should have little confidence if I were defending. Can one say that jealousy is itself an abnormality of mind?

Mr. M. Stewart

No, but if my hon. Friend were defending Othello that would be the first thing he would have to try to establish—that the jealousy was an abnormality. If he could establish that then I think, either under the Clause or under the Amendment, the charge could be reduced from that of murder. Whether the jealousy of Othello can properly be described as abnormality is something which, under both the Clause and the Amendment, is still, presumably, left for the courts to decide.

9.15 p.m.

Mr. Hale

Yes, I agree. If I were defending Othello, I should sub-poena Iago and rely upon my cross-examination to put the whole thing in its proper perspective. I think it would be difficult to establish my hon. Friend's point. It would be getting near the borderline.

My hon. Friend has put the answer to my hon. and learned Friend's point in my mind. There is, for instance, anger, perhaps not provoked in the sense of parts of the Bill. It may be a hereditary disease which is beyond control. At some point it may approach near to madness. However, the whole case against my hon. and learned Friend is that somebody has to draw the demarcation line and say "On one side, it is hereditary; on the other, it is mental disease". Where does it end? That is why we should leave it to the jury unhampered and without any restriction upon it.

Mr. Rees-Davies

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will come back to the realities of the situation for one moment. If there is no definition in parenthesis here, there will within a year or two be a definition by the judges. What does he want—a definition laid down by the House of Commons or one on the basis of case law? The answer must be the former.

Mr. Hale

That would depend a little on the future of the office of the Paymaster-General, a matter which I cannot go into at the moment.

I still find it difficult to understand how the words "however arising" could, even by Her Majesty's present judges, be judicially defined as meaning very much different from what we think they mean. "However arising" relate to the Amendment that we are talking about. The hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet made a passionate plea for me to come down to brass tacks. Here we are in the midst of it, but he said it is another point. Surely, the words "however arising" constitute a clear and capable definition.

This is an important point, and the Clause is an important one. This matter approaches the Scots view of diminished responsibility and the French view of extenuating circumstances. The French jury does not consider whether they are extenuating circumstances in the sense in which we use the phrase. It considers whether there are circumstances in relation to the physical or mental condition of the man himself, or in relation to the crime, which could free him from the capital penalty. Therefore, I believe that it is a change of some importance, and it is one that I should like to welcome. It is a serious matter.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for referring to Othello. When we talk about these matters we come back to Othello, and particularly to what Othello himself said as he thought over the problem that confronted him, blinded as he was by his jealousy: Put out the light, and then—Put out the light? If I quench thee, thou flaming minister! I can again thy former light restore, Should I repent me:—but once put out thy light, Thou cunning'st pattern of excelling nature. I know not where is that Promethean heat That can thy light relume.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood

The sporting and romantic instinct of all of us were stirred when, after four and a half hours of debate which did not reflect any great credit on the Government, we saw the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) galloping to the rescue of the Attorney-General. I am sorry that there have not been more hon. Gentlemen opposite to share the zeal that we on this side of the Committee have for clarifying a Bill which in many respects seems to be a little obscure.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) has reminded us, we are now dealing with one of the most important and, in a way, one of the most complicated aspects of the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Oldbury and Halesowen (Mr. Moyle) was right in saying that this is probably the best part of the Bill. We are trying to make it better by making it clearer and less restrictive. To do this we are proposing to leave out the words which limit abnormality of mind, the words: … (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury.) It is, as the Attorney-General told us, broadly true that that is the wording which appears in the Mental Deficiency Acts relating in their case to young people under the age of 18. Although the Government have adopted the words of the Mental Deficiency Acts, with certain qualifications, it is interesting to notice that the Royal Commission used the expression "mental abnormality" in a rather different sense. The Commission said in paragraph 212 that it used "mental abnormality" … as a general term to cover all forms of mental disease, mental deficiency and disorders of personality. The inclusion of "disorders of personality "seems to make" mental abnormality "a good deal wider than the Clause which we are now considering.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said, it is true that the Royal Commission did not go as far as the Government or the Opposition in adopting the doctrine of diminished responsibility for England and Wales. The Commission did not recommend that change, but in paragraph 411 of its Report it said: … there is no sharp dividing line between sanity and insanity, but the two extremes of' sanity' and' insanity' shade into one another by imperceptible gradations. The degree of individual responsibility varies equally widely; no clear boundary can be drawn between responsibility and irresponsibility. Later in the same paragraph the Commission said: The acceptance of the doctrine of diminished responsibility would undoubtedly bring the law into closer harmony with the facts and would enable the courts to avoid passing sentence of death in numerous cases in which it will not be carried out. The Commission did not feel able to recommend the adoption of this change, because in its view it also affected a large number of other offences which the members of the Commission believed to be outside their terms of reference. We are all grateful to the Government for not finding the same difficulty in this respect.

This Clause is the Government's attempt to translate that point of view into effect. We are disappointed at the inclusion of the words in brackets, because we believe that they hedge around "abnormality of mind" with qualifications which must be either superfluous, or, as my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West argued, restrictive. The Attorney-General justified the words by saying that they had two objects. The first was to show that any mental abnormality must be bordering on insanity. He argued that the words indicated the sort of abnormality which the Government had in mind. The second, he said, was that the words were intended to exclude outbreaks of rage or jealousy.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) gave the answer to that when he said that outbreaks of rage or jealousy would come within the scope of the Clause only if they amounted to or revealed some mental abnormality. One of the difficulties in which we all find ourselves is that we do not know what types of mental abnormality will be excluded or included in the wording.

I should have thought that the test which we ought to apply is the degree of abnormality which exists, and not the cause from which it springs. I do not believe that we can legislate for a definition of abnormality and responsibility in this context. I believe that in every case it must be decided by the court in the light of all the circumstances and all the evidence which is given. We find great difficulty in knowing how this doctrine would apply in cases which have already resulted in the hanging of three men. I should very much like the guidance of the Government as to whether, if the Clause had been in operation at the time, the hangings of Miles Giffard, George Newland and Francis Wilkinson would have taken place.

Miles Giffard was the young man, aged 26, who murdered his parents in Cornwall and then threw their bodies over a cliff in order to steal his parents' car and some money and visit a girl friend in London. That man, as his uncle later revealed in a letter to The Times, had a long history of abnormality and mental illness from the age of 4 and onwards. He had seen a mental specialist at the age of 15, and had been under treatment for two years. His uncle wrote to The Times and said that at the trial very little weight was given to the long history of abnormality and mental disease. It must be fairly clear that that case at least would come within the scope of the new Clause.

I now come to the case of George Newland—a metal toy maker, aged 21, living in Walthamstow. I think that that case is not so easy to decide. He battered to death a 65-year-old tradesman and also attacked his victim's wife. He said that he got desperate and wanted money for a new suit. He added: What really got into my mind was the cosh boy picture I saw the other day. The electro-encephalograph showed what was described as abnormality of an unspecific character. There is a case of abnormality, as reported at the time, which was unspecific in its character. I should like the guidance of the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General as to whether, in their view, that man would have hanged if this Clause had been in operation at that time.

The third case to which I want to draw attention is that of Frances Wilkinson—a 24-year-old furnaceman, who beat to death his landlord's five-year-old daughter and then attempted a sexual assault upon her. His mother told the court that at an early age he suffered a shock when he found a new-born baby torn in half in a dustbin. That had obviously caused all sorts of disturbances in his mind. I should like to know whether the abnormality thus produced would come within the scope of the words which the Attorney-General has included in the Clause.

The hon. Member for Isle of Thanet asked if we wanted to build up a body of case law on this subject. I should have thought that that was almost inevitable in a matter of this kind, and I should have thought that it was preferable to leave it to the reasonable discretion of the court to decide whether the abnormality was such as to justify reducing the charge from one of murder to one of manslaughter.

I believe that as the Clause stands it will be difficult to interpret, and because it includes certain categories of mental abnormality it may be that judges will be tempted to interpret it much too strictly, and not with the same flexibility that they would have done if the words proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne were adopted. If we pass the Clause in its present form I believe that on subsequent occasions the Secertary of State will find it very difficult indeed to advise the Queen to exercise the Royal Prerogative of mercy if a defence of diminished responsibility has been rejected by the court.

I hope that that will not be the case. If the Attorney-General or the Home Secretary will give the Committee an assurance of that kind, it will allay a good deal of the uneasiness that we feel. We say that we should not try to circumscribe the jury too much in reaching a decision upon this matter. We say that the test should be the degree of abnormality involved. We hope that the Government will either accept the Amendment or think about the matter again—otherwise, we shall regretfully find it necessary to divide on it.

9.30 p.m.

The Attorney-General

I spoke after the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) and said that we are not able to accept this Amendment. That position still stands, for the reason which I have advanced and which I will not repeat.

In answer to the hon. Member for Rossendale (Mr. Anthony Greenwood), I cannot say whether this defence would have succeeded had it been put forward in any particular case. In some cases it might have, and in others it might not. The hon. Gentleman cannot expect me, without careful consideration of all the facts, to express a view on what the decision would have been on this issue had it been put forward. Therefore, I must refrain from expressing any view on the particular cases which he mentioned. I can give him the assurance that there is nothing in Clause 2 which in any way limits or puts a fetter on the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of mercy.

Mr. S. Silverman

I am a little disappointed to find the Attorney-General not able—I am sure he was perfectly willing, but he explained that he was not able—to answer my hon. Friend's question whether, in the cases that he put to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, there was a possibility—no one would ask the Attorney-General to say more than that—that this defence, had it been advanced, would have succeeded. I should like to tell the Attorney-General why that is important.

One must remember that the Government are putting forward this Bill as an alternative to something which the House of Commons decided last Session, and, therefore, it is most important to know what effect the proposals of the Government would have on the death penalty generally. I am not discussing that at large or in principle, but, of course, one of the matters which will influence hon. Members in their voting is how far the proposals can deal with certain anomalies and what kind of new anomalies they will create in doing so.

I should like to put one or two other cases to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, in addition to those put by my hon. Friend. I find it extremely difficult to believe that, in deciding whether they would accept the recommendation of the Royal Commission not to do this, or whether they would reject that recommendation and do it, the Government never addressed themselves at all to the question of what effect it would have, what kind of cases it would cover and what kind of cases it would exclude. This is a surprising proposal and I should like to know whether this Clause was intended to cover psychopaths generally.

Would Neville Heath, for instance, still be guilty of murder under this Clause? Would Haigh be guilty of murder under this Clause? There is not the slightest doubt that both these were what are—loosely, I dare say—called psychopathic personalities; undoubtedly they were. Is the Clause intended to cover cases of that kind? Is that abnormality of the mind arising from any of the matters set out in the parenthesis? If it is, people will draw all kinds of distinctions and wonder whether the Government are really recommending to the House of Commons an improvement in the law, if people like Heath and Haigh are to escape the death penalty and people like Ruth Ellis are still to suffer it.

It is one of the matters relevant to the argument and I think it very disappointing that the Government should not be able to say how far they intended cases of that kind should be covered. I do not intend to proceed any further as I do not think that one should delay the Committee in coming to a decision on this Amendment. But I am bound to say that, although the right hon. and learned Gentleman made a very much more praiseworthy effort to answer the arguments addressed to him on this Amendment than the rather critical abdication of responsibility to which he treated us when we were discussing the previous Amendment, it did not satisfy me and I shall be greatly surprised if it satisfied many other hon. Members.

Mr. David Weitzman (Stoke Newington and Hackney, North)

I, too, find great difficulty in understanding exactly what the Clause does. Perhaps I might explain my difficulty in a practical way by reference to a case with which I was intimately connected.

Hon. Members will remember a Cypriot woman, Mrs. Christofi, who, about a year ago, was hanged for the murder of her daughter-in-law. She was held by the prison doctor to be insane—there is no question about that—he having had her under his care. She was tried, and no plea of insanity was put forward. She was not willing for a plea of that kind to be put forward. She was found guilty. She was examined, as is usual in such cases, by three doctors appointed by the Home Secretary, and they did not find her insane.

Clearly, that woman was suffering from an abnormality of mind which impaired her responsibility for her act. Could it be shown that that abnormality arose from arrested development, inherent cause, or disease or injury? So far as I know, there was no evidence to satisfy any one of the matters which are included within the brackets in this Clause. Therefore, the Clause puts a limitation on a person who clearly suffers from abnormality of mind which impairs his mental responsibility by putting upon him the onus of satisfying one of the conditions set out within the brackets. If a person is suffering from abnormality of mind and it substantially impairs his mental responsibility for the act, that ought to be sufficient. I have cited this case as a practical example of the real difficulties that will arise if the Amendment is not accepted.

Mr. Kenneth Robinson (St. Pancras, North)

I have listened to most of the debate—not, I am afraid, the earlier part of it—and I think that the Attorney-General has not dealt with the question, what exactly do the Government intend to exclude by the words in parenthesis? What do they mean when they say "induced by disease"? Will the Attorney-General tell the Committee whether by that phrase the Government intend to embrace the whole field of mental illness? If that is so, do they regard neurosis as one of the factors bringing about the abnormality of mind required, under Clause 2, to bring about a reduction of the charge?

The Attorney-General

I should have thought that it would be a recognised condition which brings about abnormality of mind, and which would come either within inherent causes, or disease or

Division No. 9.]	AYES	[9.40 p.m.
Agnew, Cmdr, P. G.	Cunningham, Knox	Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.
Aitken, W. T.	Currie, G. B. H.	Hesketh, R. F.
Alport, C. J. M.	Dance, J. C. G.	Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)
Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)	D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry	Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William	Deedes, W. F.	Hill, John (S. Norfolk)
Arbuthnot, John	Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.	Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Armstrong, C. W.	Doughty, C. J. A.	Hirst, Geoffrey
Ashton, H.	du Cann, E. D. L.	Holland-Martin, C. J.
Atkins, H. E.	Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)	Hornby, R. p.
Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.	Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.	Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.
Baldwin, A. E.	Duthie, W. S.	Horobin, Sir Ian
Balniel, Lord	Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)	Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence
Barber, Anthony	Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.	Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Barlow, Sir John	Errington, Sir Eric	Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)
Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)	Erroll, F. J.	Howard, John (Test)
Bidgood, J. C.	Fell, A.	Hughes Hallet, Vice-Admiral J.
Biggs-Davison, J. A.	Finlay, Graeme	Hughes-Young, M. H. C.
Bishop, F. P.	Fisher, Nigel	Hurd, A. R.
Body, R. F.	Fletcher-Cooke, C.	Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)
Bossom, Sir Alfred	Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe & Lonsdale)	Hyde, Montgomery
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.	Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.	Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.
Boyle, Sir Edward	George, J. C. (Pollok)	Iremonger, T. L.
Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry	Gibson-Watt, D.	Irvine, Byant Godman (Rye)
Brooman-White, R. C.	Godber, J. B.	Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.	Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan	Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.	Gower, H. R.	Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Burden, F. F. A.	Graham, Sir Fergus	Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Campbell, Sir David	Grant, W. (Woodside)	Joseph, Sir Keith
Carr, Robert	Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)	Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot
Cary, Sir Robert	Green, A.	Kaberry, D.
Channon, H.	Gresham Cooke, R.	Keegan, D.
Chichester-Clark, R.	Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)	Kimball, M.
Cole, Norman	Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.	Kirk, P. M.
Conant, Maj, Sir Roger	Gurden, Harold	Lagden, G. W.
Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.	Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)	Lambert, Hon. G.
Corfield, Capt. F. V.	Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)	Lambton, Viscount
Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)	Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)	Langford-Holt, J. A.
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col, O. E.	Harvie-Watt, Sir George	Leavey, J. A.
Crouch, R. F.
Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)	Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel	Leburn, W. G.

injury, or the other two factors mentioned.

Mr. Paget

Does the Attorney-General regard the effect of the words in the brackets as exclusive? Suppose it were shown that an abnormality of mind which substantially impairs responsibility, and which arises from some cause of a roughly similar nature but different from those mentioned—I cannot quite think what it could be, off-hand—would it be excluded? As I read the words I do not think the words in the brackets set out to be exclusive but are merely illustrative.

The Attorney-General

Illustrative in one sense, but also exclusive in the other. They would not permit, I think, of someone saying that irritation induced by the behaviour of someone else—that is to say, from an external cause, a prolonged period of irritation—would lead to the serious abnormality of mind with which the Clause deals.

Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 209, Noes 157.

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.	Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)	Speir, R. M.
Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)	Nugent, G. R. H.	Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)
Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)	Oakshott, H. D.	Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard
Linstead, Sir H. N.	O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)	Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.	Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D	Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)
Longden, Gilbert	Orr, Capt. L. P. S.	Storey, S.
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)	Osborne, C.	Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh	Page, R. G.	Studholme, Sir Henry
McCallum, Major Sir Duncan	Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)	Temple, J. M.
Macdonald, Sir Peter	Partridge, E.	Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)
McKibbin, A. J.	Pickthorn, K. W. M.	Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.
Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)	Pitman, I. J.	Tilney, John (Wavertree)
McLaughlin, Mrs. P.	Pitt, Miss E. M.	Turner, H. F. L.
McLean, Neil (Inverness)	Pott, H. P.	Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)	Powell, J. Enoch	Vane, W. M. F.
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)	Price, David (Eastleigh)	Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.
Maddan, Martin	Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)	Vosper, D. F.
Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)	Raikes, Sir Victor	Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.	Redmayne, M.	Wall, Major Patrick
Markham, Major Sir Frank	Rees-Davies, W. R.	Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)
Marshall, Douglas	Remnant, Hon. P.	Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.
Maude, Angus	Renton, D. L. M.	Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith & Border)
Mawby, R. L.	Ridsdale, J. E.	Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)
Maydon, Lt.-Comdr, S. L. C.	Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)	Wills, G. (Bridgwater)
Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.	Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)	Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh	Roper, Sir Harold	Wood, Hon. R.
Morrison, John (Salisbury)	Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard	Woollam, John Victor
Nabarro, G. D. N.	Russell, R. S.
Nairn, D. L. S.	Schofield, Lt.- Col. W.	TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Neave, Airey	Shepherd, William	Mr. E. Wakefield and
Nicholls, Harmar	Smithers, Peter (Winchester)	Mr. Bryan.
Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)	Spearman, Sir Alexander

NOES
Ainsley, J. W.	Grimond, J.	Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)
Albu, A. H.	Hale, Leslie	Oliver, G. H.
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)	Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)	Oswald, T.
Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)	Hannan, W.	Padley, W. E.
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)	Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)	Paget, R. T.
Anderson, Frank	Hastings, S.	Palmer, A. M. F.
Awbery, S. S.	Hayman, F. H.	Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Balfour, A.	Healey, Denis	Parker, J.
Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S. E.)	Herbison, Miss M.	Peart, T. F.
Benson, G.	Holmes, Horace	Pentland, N.
Beswick, F.	Holt, A. F.	Plummer, Sir Leslie
Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)	Houghton, Douglas	Popplewell, E.
Blackburn, F.	Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)	Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.	Howell, Denis (All Saints)	Probert, A. R.
Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S. W.)	Hubbard, T. F.	Proctor, W. T.
Brockway, A. F.	Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)	Pryde, D. J.
Brown, Thomas (Ince)	Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)	Randall, H. E.
Burke, W. A.	Hunter, A. E.	Rankin, John
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)	Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)	Redhead, E. C.
Champion, A. J.	Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.	Reeves, J.
Chapman, W. D.	Janner, B.	Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Chetwynd, G. R.	Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.	Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)
Clunie, J.	Johnson, James (Rugby)	Ross, William
Coldrick, W.	Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)	Royle, C.
Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)	Jones, David (The Hartlepools)	Short, E. W.
Corbet, Mrs. Freda	Jones, Jack (Rotherham)	Silverman, Julius (Aston)
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)	Kenyon, C.	Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Cronin, J. D.	King, Dr. H. M.	Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)
Cullen, Mrs. A.	Lawson, G. M.	Slater, J. (Sedgefield)
Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.	Ledger, R. J.	Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)	Lee, Frederick (Newton)	Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Deer, G.	Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)	Sparks, J. A.
Delargy, H. J.	Lindgren, G. S.	Steele, T.
Dodds, N. N.	Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson	Stewart, Michael (Fulham)
Dye, S.	MacColl, J. E.	Stones, W. (Consett)
Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)	McGhee, H. G.	Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent. C.)
Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)	McInnes, J.	Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.
Fernyhough, E.	McKay, John (Wallsend)	Sylvester, G. O.
Finch, H. J.	McLeavy, Frank	Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Forman, J. C.	MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)	Thornton, E.
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)	Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)	Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn
Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.	Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.	Wade, D. W.
Gooch, E. G.	Mason, Roy	Warbey, W. N.
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.	Mikardo, Ian	Weitzman, D.
Greenwood, Anthony	Mitchison, G. R.	Wheeldon, W. E.
Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.	Monslow, W.	White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)
Grey, C. F.	Moyle, A.	White, Henry (Derbyshire, N. E.)
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)	Neal, Harold (Bolsover)	Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)	Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)	Wilkins, W. A.

Willey, Frederick	Winterbottom, Richard
Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)	Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.	TELLERS FOR THE NOES
Williams, Ronald (Wigan)	Woof, R. E.	Mr. Pearson and
Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)	Yates, V. (Ladywood)	Mr. Simmons.
Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)	Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

The Chairman

The Amendment Standing in the name of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), in page 1, line 24, to leave out "mental", is not selected.

Mr. S. Silverman

On a point of order, Sir Charles. I know that one must not, and I certainly do not, question the discretion of the Chair in the selection of Amendments, but if it were possible for you to explain why the Amendment to which you have referred did not find favour I think that many of us would be grateful, because when we put it down we thought that it did deal with a substantial point—not merely a drafting point—to which we attached some little importance. I know that none of that is in any way binding on, or indeed of interest to, the Chair, but from our point of view, in deciding our subsequent course of action, it would be of great interest if that decision could be explained.

The Chairman

The hon. Member has asked me a question which, of course, I could answer, but if I made a practice of saying why I did or did not select an Amendment my job would become quite intolerable. I must, therefore, ask to be excused; but if the hon. Member comes to see me afterwards, I will give him an explanation. At all events, the Amendment is not selected.

Mr. Paget

I beg to move, in page 2, line 1, to leave out "defence" and insert "prosecution".

The Chairman

The Amendment, in page 2, line 1, to leave out subsection (2), has not been selected, but I think that it can be discussed with this Amendment, as can the last Amendment on this Clause, in page 2, line 2, to leave out "not".

Mr. Paget

I respectfully agree, Sir Charles.

If the two Amendments were accepted, the Clause would read: On a charge of murder, it shall be for the prosecution to prove that the person charged is by virtue of this section liable to be convicted of murder. In other words, the effect of this Amendment is to shift the burden of proof to the prosecution, where, I believe, the burden of proof should lie. I have always believed that people should be presumed innocent until they are proved guilty.

There has been one exception, and one exception only, to that rule, and that is the defence of insanity, in which the burden of proof has been placed on the defence. We shall have an opportunity later, when we consider a new Clause, to shift the burden there to where it ought to belong, which is on the prosecution, but at this stage we are dealing, not with the defence of insanity, but with the defence of diminished responsibility.

There was at one time in the evolution in the law on murder a tendency to shift the responsibility of proof on to the defence. It was said originally, both by Sir John Forster and by Stephen, that once one proved the killing, the person who killed had to justify that killing. He had to show circumstances which showed that the killing was justified, or that it took place in such circumstances that it could be reduced to manslaughter. That view of the law, which had been generally held for nearly a hundred years, was reversed in the House of Lords in the case of Woolmington, which was referred to earlier in this debate by the Attorney-General, but it left the single anomaly of insanity. I believe that we should do far better to take the opportunity of this Bill to correct the anomaly of insanity, rather than add to it by putting diminished responsibility into the same category.

I believe it is important that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution for reasons of principle and of practice. The offence of murder is not simply killing. It is killing with what is artificially referred to as malice aforethought, and the crime is not proved unless both the deed and the will be proved.

Why, where the will is defective, do we say nonetheless that that defect must be established by the defence, instead of leaving the prosecution to establish that the will, the intention, to kill was there, that the malice aforethought was there? The prosecution have to show an intention. They have to show that the killing was not accidental, that it was not merely negligence, that it was the special intention which distinguishes murder from manslaughter. Surely they should show that there is the mental capacity to form the necessary intention.

I say, therefore, that as a matter of principle the crime of murder is not proved unless its most essential element is proved, which is the element of malice aforethought; and that the element of malice aforethought is not there unless it is shown that the man has a mind capable of that intention. That is the reason why I say that as a matter of principle the burden of proof should here be on the prosecution.

As a matter of convenience, I think it is more important still because the prosecution are the people who have got the man. If he is charged with murder he is in prison. He is almost certainly in the prison hospital, because people awaiting trial for murder are put there. He is in the prison hospital precisely for observation as to his mental quality. About half the murderers are found to be mad anyway. That is the time when it is ascertained. Since they have the opportunity for watching and for examining him for this very purpose, surely they are the people to bring the evidence before the court of the very thing for which they have examined him.

It is often a tremendous hardship on the defence to have to bear this burden. The madder the man is, the greater the problem to get responsible instructions from him. The man who has a mental abnormality may be the very man whose sensitivity makes him utterly reject the possibility of having it pleaded. The case to which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) referred is a very striking one. Mrs. Christofi was certainly odd, to say the least of it. The prison doctor thought she was raving mad, and he said so. But Mrs. Christofi would not allow the defence of insanity to be put forward. Therefore, a person whom the prison doctor, who had had her in his charge—

It being Ten o'clock. The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Committee report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.