HC Deb 15 November 1956 vol 560 cc1259-68

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]

9.58 p.m.

Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing (Hendon, North)

I am glad to have an opportunity, even in a short debate on the Adjournment, of drawing attention to the need for the United Nations Police Force which is now being formed in the Middle East to have an air component.

Mr. Speaker

To avoid any trouble, I ought to say that there is a very curious question as to Ministerial responsibility in this matter. It is true that the hon. Gentleman may ask Her Majesty's Ministers to adopt a certain attitude in the matter, but the composition of the United Nations Force is really a matter for the United Nations. If the hon. Member will attempt—and succeed. I hope—in linking his thoughts on the subject to Ministerial responsibility he will be in order, but not otherwise.

Mr. Orr-Ewing

Yes, Mr. Speaker. I wanted the Minister who is to reply to the debate to give me some assurance that these problems are being studied, and that our representative at the United Nations will press for the inclusion of an air component in this force.

I take this opportunity of raising the matter, first, because the force is now in process of creation, and I believe that unless it has an air force it will be totally incapable of carrying out its duties. I raise it, secondly, because I believe that both sides of the House wish to see this force made truly effective. So much publicity has been given to the differences between the two sides of the House that it may come as a pleasant change to the world outside that we are agreed—

It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Hughes-Young.]

Mr. Orr-Ewing

When the Prime Minister announced the cease-fire on 6th November he said that it was subject to the setting up of an international force … competent to secure and supervise the attainment of the objectives set out in the operative paragraphs … Resolution passed by the General Assembly on 2nd November …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th November, 1956; Vol. 559, c. 76.] The General Assembly Resolution to which he referred has two relevant paragraphs. The first states: The General Assembly urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and as part thereof halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area. The third paragraph of the Resolution recommends That all members refrain from introducing military goods into the area of hostilities. It was, of course, the subsequent Canadian Resolution discussed at the United Nations on the 3rd and 4th November, which set up the emergency international force.

I submit that if these terms are to be carried out the United Nations Force has to be very much stronger and better equipped than the present plans indicate, and I hope that the Minister will press for this whilst these plans are still being formed. Earlier reports mentioned a force of 10,000 or 15,000 men. Now, very much smaller numbers are being mentioned.

If this force is to stop a fresh outbreak of hostilities in this vital area, it must surely watch for the build-up and disposition of armed forces and arms of all types, including aeroplanes, tanks, guns and other offensive weapons. I submit that this means that this force must have inspection teams. These teams must be free to go to other ports, to airfields and to other military installations to watch the disposition of arms. I believe, also, that it must have air reconnaissance teams free to go anywhere in the area.

Every one of us in the House must remember the very bitter experience of United Nations teams in different parts of the world. There was the United Nations Armistice Commission, which was formed to supervise the armistice terms after the war between North and South Korea. That team was completely frustrated in its designs. It was quite unable to do its duty. North Korea continued to develop immense military areadromes and build up military strength, and it forbade Swiss, Swedish and other observers from going into that part of the country. In the end, the United Nations team had to be withdrawn, completely frustrated. Equally, United Nations observers in the Middle East in this very area, were quite unable to stop the outbreak of war between Egypt and Israel and many of the heinous crimes which have occurred there in recent years.

If this force is to prevent a fresh outbreak it must presumably watch for signs of trouble, first, along a broad band each side of the frontier between Israel and the surrounding Arab States. That frontier is itself nearly 600 miles long. It seems unrealistic to think that it can be properly supervised, much of it in very wild country, by a few white-painted jeeps and without any air reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance must be used if it is to examine the military dispositions, and particularly the aircraft deployments, not only immediately in the frontier area, but possibly well behind it as well.

With the vast hitting power and the mobility of aircraft it is not only in the frontier area that the United Nations Force may have to examine the position. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Israel cover half a million square miles. If we add the million square miles which makes up Saudi Arabia, this United Nations Force has somehow to supervise military dispositions over 1½ million square miles. It is unrealistic to think that this can be done by a few men in jeeps.

Perhaps my hon. Friend could say whether the Foreign Office is pressing this aspect of the problem in the negotiations now going on. I would point out to him that this proposal is in accord with the suggestion put forward by President Eisenhower at the time of the Summit Conference in July, 1955. He was talking about means of lowering tension, and he underlined the importance of an efficient inspection and reporting system if nations were to trust the United Nations disarmament plan. He followed those proposals with the "open sky" policy, which is also in accord with the suggestions I am putting forward tonight.

I also ask the Minister to tell us whether the United Nations Force, if it is properly equipped to detect build-up, will be equipped to take action? That is a matter on which we have had no information up to the present. If it is to detect build-up, to detect a dangerous situation developing, what will it do? Will it report that situation to the United Nations and ask that body to take action? Or will it take action itself?

If it reports to the United Nations then the Middle East may be in flames long before any action is taken. I would point out that Soviet policy in this matter since the war is aimed at frustrating effective action by the free nations by insisting on all occasions that reference should be made to the Security Council, which should be subject to the right of veto.

During the negotiations for control of disarmament, which have been going on for the last one and a half years, the Foreign Secretary said in this House: Every Soviet plan for control that I have ever seen has said that the agents of the control can only make recommendations and that nothing can happen without the Security Council having the right to impose a veto. Then the Foreign Secretary went on to say: I say that control run on that basis is not effective control. There will be months of argument before anything ever happens."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th February. 1956. Vol. 549. c. 865.] If this force is to take action itself, how does it do it? Does it have its own air force? Does it have its own bombers? Does it have its own fighter bombers? Or does it perhaps ask some other power to take on this responsibility? These are all questions which must trouble us at this time and which, as far as I can trace, have gone completely unanswered. I believe that it is essential policy to underline the need not only for an effective force but, above all, a force that can act with great speed, and that great speed will not be achieved if this is subject to long discussions in the United Nations before any action can be taken.

It would be unrealistic if we did not recognise that Colonel Nasser has had a severe reverse. He is no doubt anxious to get quick revenge against both Israel and the West. He is anxious to retain his dictatorship, and perhaps also to please those Russian masters who supplied him with £150 million worth of arms and all his modern equipment and tanks.

That being so, we must face the fact that Nasser has repaired his aerodromes, that he is repairing his aircraft, and that at any moment he may wish to strike again and take revenge against Israel. It may be argued that at present he has not the trained pilots adequate to fly these modern jet fighters and twin jet bombers. That may be true. But within a few hours 200 fully-trained pilots could be flown in from Russia and in a few days Nasser's air force, which is perhaps not of great strength now, would become a supreme menace to the peace of the Middle East. It is only 12 to 15 minutes' flying time from Egypt to Tel Aviv, the capital of Israel.

If Israel is to withdraw she will surely want assurances, as we all want assurances, that the United Nations Force will be effective and will have powers not only for ground inspection but for air inspection as well. I maintain that it should have powers which will stretch not just to the confined area of the Sinai Peninsula but to a much wider area, if it is, in fact, to detect the dangerous build-ups which might produce a fresh outbreak in that part of the world.

Here is a great opportunity for the United Nations to prove itself. It is on trial. We have learned the lessons of eleven years. We have seen the frustration of its designs for eleven years. We have seen, unfortunately, that it has been totally unable to stop conflicts in many parts of the world. Now it has an opportunity, through the formation of this international police force. I feel a considerable degree of alarm and despondency that this force, as at present envisaged, will not be man enough for the job. If that is so, instead of strengthening the reputation and the effectiveness of the United Nations, we shall, in fact, weaken it further, and there is not one of us in this House who would wish to see that done.

I hope sincerely that my hon. Friend will press that the United Nations Force should be a realistic one, and an effective one in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations and in accordance with our cease-fire terms. If it is not effective then I must say that Britain and France would be wise to maintain strong forces in that area until such time as the United Nations is effective to maintain peace in that vital part of the world.

10.13 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas (Lincoln)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) and to the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for allowing me a few minutes of the time of this debate. In the circumstances, I shall not emphasise the points on which I disagree with the hon. Member for Hendon, North in his analysis of this problem, nor go into such deeply controversial matters as why the Government continued to supply war material in such quantity to Egypt, in spite of the protests that were made on this side of the House.

We can all agree that the United Nations Force must be effective. We may disagree as to whether the Government or the United Nations should decide if the force is effective. The Government have been far too cagey on this in their replies. Anyone who has studied the problem of the United Nations Force must recognise from the experience in Korea and, so far as observers are concerned, the experience in this area, that an air component is of the greatest importance.

The first and obvious point is that of air reconnaissance. The hon. Member for Hendon, North has quoted figures to show the gigantic area of the region concerned. He gave a figure of 500,000 square miles and 600 miles of frontier and, of course, the airfields behind the frontiers are, for all purposes, as important as the movement of troops in the front line.

I have asked Questions in the House about the attitude of the Government to President Eisenhower's open skies proposal. Also, in the last few days I have asked Questions of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Air about the availability for the United Nations Force of the Royal Air Force airfields in Cyprus and Malta. I have not been happy about the replies which I have received.

As to which countries should supply the air component, whether for reconnaissance or for action, if needed, I must say that I cannot see the United Nations agreeing to the United Kingdom or France providing part of the air component. Hon. Members must remember that we are regarded as aggressors. What about countries like Sweden and Canada? They have not been branded by the United Nations as aggressors. In the days when I had some direct knowledge of those air forces they were highly efficient both for air reconnaissance and action, if necessary. I have no reason to believe that they are less efficient today.

The Joint Under-Secretary has had certain questions put to him by his hon. Friend and by myself. I must give him time to answer.

10.16 p.m.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Douglas Dodds-Parker)

I start by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) and the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) for what they have said. Everyone will agree that both hon. Gentlemen made interesting contributions. The hon. Member for Lincoln was at one time Under-Secretary of State for Air, and both he and my hon. Friend served in the Royal Air Force during the war. Both were speaking from practical experience. I think that hon. Members will agree that what they said proves the great value of having hon. Members who can speak from practical experience to take part in our debates and give us the benefit of it.

I assure the House that such points as I cannot answer at this moment I will bring to the attention of my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who is in New York at the moment working on these very matters at the United Nations. There was one statement which I should like to correct—about the flying in of Russians to man up the Egyptian Air Force. I am informed that there is not much Air Force left there and, possibly more important, that a modern air force depends not only on aircraft and pilots but on a whole system of ground control which depends on constant training in co-operation between pilots and men on the ground.

A further point which Mr. Speaker made from the Chair when we started the debate was that there is a very considerable limitation of Ministerial responsibility for the matters which have been discussed this evening.

Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing

I made the suggestion that the air force in Egypt might be made more effective at short notice. Whereas I would agree that fighter defence is essentially dependent upon practice with the ground units, that is not quite so true of the bomber force, and it is of the bomber force that I have such fears. I have no doubt that Israel has equal fears. There is not the same degree of co-operation necessary and, after all, we know that many Russian technicians are servicing, or are available to service, those aeroplanes which are at present in Egypt.

Mr. Dodds-Parker

I take the point, but there is not that amount of Egyptian Air Force left.

The point I was making—and I certainly do not wish to over-emphasise it—is that there is only a limited responsibility for the proposal put forward. We are only one country among many others at the United Nations, although that will not prevent us from doing our best to put forward the point of view in which we believe.

Both hon. Members who have spoken have described some of the problems; facing this United Nations Force. Perhaps most important of all is the speed at which events can move in that part of the world, or indeed in any part of the world, in present circumstances.

May I remind the House that under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, all members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council the armed forces necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. It is not from any lack of effort on the part of successive British Governments that that Article has never been implemented. The Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, after lengthy deliberations from 1946 to 1948—when right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite were in office—submitted a report to the Security Council on the constitution, of the United Nations force. Unfortunately, as I think everyone both in this House and outside will agree, it was impossible for the Security Council—owing largely to objections raised by the Soviet Government—to agree on the general principles covering the organisation of the force, and the matter was taken no further.

All Members of the Council, however, agreed in principle that any force which might be constituted should be a balanced force, with naval as well as air components, and that the latter should include both bomber and fighter aircraft. It remains the hope of Her Majesty's Government that such a United Nations force shall one day be created. My hon. Friend mentioned the question of "open skies". I do not think that is relevant to the present problem, but I will certainly check up to see whether anything of value emerges which might help in the present situation.

I think it right to recall to the House all this past history, although the discussion we have had this evening has been concentrated on the force now gathering for duty in the Middle East. Hon. Members will realise that this force is not itself the United Nations force which I have just mentioned as provided for under Article 43. I hope that I shall not be misunderstood in any way if I describe its purposes as more limited. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was required to report on the functions of the force. In his report he said that these functions can be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines established in the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt. That point was raised by my hon. Friend, and I think that will make clear to him that there is at present some limitation in the area for which this force at the outset was designed.

Under the 7-Power Resolution of 7th November, which is sometimes known as the Argentine Resolution, for which the United Kingdom voted, the task of organising this force has been entrusted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The interest of Her Majesty's Government—I quote from the communication we sent to the Secretary General, and which the Prime Minister read to the House on 6th November—is that … the international force to be set up will be competent to secure and supervise the attainment of the objectives set out in the operative paragraphs of the Resolution passed by the General Assembly on 2nd November… I am sure that the Secretary-General to the United Nations is already considering whether the provision of an air component will enable General Burns' force to function more efficiently. It will be for General Burns, to whom I am sure the House will wish to pay a tribute and offer good wishes, to report to the Secretary-General if he considers that his forces and their equipment are insufficent for his task.

Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, as one of the interested Governments in the United Nations, can see nothing in principle against the addition of air, and perhaps even of naval, components to the United Nations security forces in Egypt. I am sure that the House would not expect me to go further than that tonight. My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary is in New York and has been in constant touch with Mr. Hammarskjöld. I shall certainly bring to the attention of the Foreign Secretary the views which have been expressed in this debate. Mr. Hammarskjöld is today flying to Egypt and will form his own impressions of the needs of the police force. I have no doubt that hon. Members will have full confidence in the judgment of our representatives, and of United Nations officials in New York and on the spot.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentlemen who have raised these issues for their interesting and constructive suggestions. As my hon. Friend said, this is a great opportunity. The whole House gave a welcome to the force when it was established, and I think will agree that the task of establishing this United Nations' Force on a proper footing may well prove to be one of the decisive actions for the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East now, and for the future benefit of mankind throughout the world.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-seven minutes past Ten o'clock.