HC Deb 07 November 1956 vol 560 cc245-54

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]

9.59 p.m.

Mr. Julian Snow (Lichfield and Tamworth)

The subject which I wish to raise on this Adjournment Motion concerns the voting powers of local authority representatives in matters which arise chiefly with regard to housing. As the House is aware, I am not allowed, under the Standing Order, to base my case on anything which may produce the question of amending legislation. Therefore, I must try to address my remarks to the whole question of the interpretation of the law as it exists.

It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.)

Mr. Snow

The law in this case is the Local Government Act, 1933.

It is not always very easy for people outside the House of Commons to appreciate how difficult it is to find an appropriate occasion to propose amending legislation, and no doubt other hon. Members who are also perturbed about the present situation will join with me in trying to find an appropriate Bill to which we may table an Amendment on this matter. For the moment, therefore, I must restrict myself to the question whether or not the Act is being properly interpreted.

I was given to understand from a not unfriendly source, shortly before this debate began, that the question of interpretation is, finally, the responsibility of the court, but I am also advised that interpretation so far as personal pecuniary interest is concerned, once the subject of a ruling by the Ministry, would be very strong evidence in any subsequent court action. I make that point because I shall in a few minutes take the liberty of refreshing the memory of the House on the recent Northampton case which concerns this particular matter. I am raising this issue tonight at the instance of the Lichfield Rural District Council, and I am also supported by correspondence which I have been shown concerning the proceedings of Rugeley Urban District Council on the same matter. In the Northampton case, the Lord Chief Justice, in summing up—the case is more properly known as Brown and others v. the Director of Public Prosecutions—said this: The simple question is whether or not the vote they gave on this occasion was contrary to Section 76 of the Act of 1933, and it is no doubt of the greatest possible importance that there should be a strict observance of the Act. I do not wish to challenge anything which the Lord Chief Justice said. It would be very improper if I did so. I should, however, like to ask the Minister how he reconciles that court observation with the answer which he gave to the hon. Member for Dartford (Mr. Sydney Irving) on 19th March last. In that case, my hon. Friend had raised the question of a ruling which the Minister had given about certain members of the Dartford Rural District Council, and the general complaint of my hon. Friend was that certain councillors who were tenants of council houses were debarred from voting in connection with the rent question while certain owner-occupiers on the same council had not been debarred on the question of charges for the emptying of cesspools.

The Minister was asked by my hon. Friend how he could differentiate on the question of personal pecuniary interest. He said: … my right hon. Friend took the view that the degree of pecuniary interest involved was not enough to justify refusing the application."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th March, 1956; Vol. 550, c. 824.]

The question which I should like to ask the Minister is this: if the Lord Chief Justice is to be supported in saying that there must be strict observance, how can the argument be introduced that a small pecuniary interest does not matter but a rental pecuniary interest does matter? That is my first point.

I have also been looking into Parliamentary practice on this matter. I would be the first to say that the rules by which we govern ourselves here are not necessarily applicable to local government and that local government has its own legislation, but, at the same time, if the Parliamentary Secretary will be good enough to refer to Erskine May on this point—Chapter 17, page 418—so far as this honourable House is concerned, it says: In the Commons it is a rule that no Member who has a direct pecuniary interest in a question shall be allowed to vote upon it; but, in order to operate as a disqualification, this interest must be immediate and personal, and not merely of a general or remote character.

There is an explanation of that by Mr. Speaker Abbot in a Ruling which he gave on 17th July, 1811.

I suggest that in Circular No. 30, of 1956, which was issued by the Ministry on this question, there is ample evidence that whereas it may be argued that the court is the final arbiter on pecuniary interest, nevertheless the Minister on that occasion—and there were many precedents—exercised a great deal of discretion as to what should or should not represent a pecuniary interest disqualifying members of a given council.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. J. Enoch Powell)

Could the hon. Member draw my attention to the part of Circular No. 30 which he has in mind?

Mr. Snow

Section 7.

I am, therefore, saying that if we in Parliament abide by a rule which says that personal pecuniary interest is not a disqualifying factor if the interest is general or remote, then a perfect example of that is the question of rent matters in housing debates of local authorities. That is my contention.

What is the situation at present? We have some members who are not disqualified, who were personally very much interested in rating assessments and who are allowed to vote; yet members who are very interested in rentals are not allowed to vote. I cannot see how we can differentiate between the two. I concede that valuation and assessment are no longer local authority questions, but they were at the time of the passing of the 1933 Act, which is in question.

The reasons which the Minister accepts for the removal of a disability, which are explained in Circular No. 30, are twofold. First, he would give a dispensation where too great a proportion would be disqualified, thereby impeding the transaction of business. Secondly, he would give a dispensation where it appeared to the Minister that the overall interest of the inhabitants would be adversely affected. These observations about discretion in the circular make one believe that it is not a good argument to say that the Minister cannot take responsibility for defining pecuniary interest.

Incidentally, in the correspondence between the Ministry and the Lichfield Rural District Council, the clerk of that council raised the question of what ought to be the position of a councillor who is prepared to pay an economic rent. That question was not answered in the subsequent replies by the Minister. It may have been considered a bad point by the Minister, but I think that the Minister might like to see that a reply is sent to the local authority.

In the Lichfield Rural District—and I merely cite this because it may be applicable in other parts of the country —at least one-third of the total population of the rural district council area, I am advised, are council house tenants. It is frankly a question of disfranchisement when matters of rent are raised on the local council and the local authority representatives are not to be allowed to fulfil their ordinary functions.

I should like at this point to say that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) has given me certain information on the matter. In my examination of the problem, it has become quite obvious that, as a result of earlier Questions in February last on this matter of voting rights, the Ministry adopted a most progressive attitude and went a long way in their subsequent Circular No. 30 to improve the position.

But I think that there is still room for improvement. I believe that this is a developing problem. How can one justify a position in, for instance, local authority elections where the electorate can say, "Candidate A is a council tenant. It is no use voting for him, because we, as council house tenants, could not have our viewpoint on rent voted upon or even discussed by him under the present rule? "

Mr. Powell

It can be discussed, because Circular No. 30/1956 points out that the Minister is always ready to grant the necessary dispensation for discussion to such a councillor.

Mr. Snow

That was the next point to which I was coming.

Discussion is possible provided that the prior permission of the Minister is obtained. I consider that that comes within the category of impeding business. It may sound odd, but if one says to a local authority that, before one will allow discussion and voting on the matter by certain interested councillors, it must write stating when the discussion is to take place, the precise matter to be discussed, and so on, that is, in my understanding of local government work, a definite hindrance to normal activity and progress.

A friend in my constituency said, when the matter was discussed at the Lichfield Rural District Council, that if one wanted to fulfil one's proper function as a councillor in matters relating to rents and allied subjects one simply had to be occupying a privately-owned house. That is the situation, and I think it is very unfair.

The Lord Chief Justice makes it clear that, in his judgment, the Act of 1933 should be strictly observed. I have tried to demonstrate that the Minister himself is exercising a lot of discretion, and that, if that means that the interpretation of the law is still in a certain stage of development, we should go straight forward and ensure that such councillors are not disfranchised.

It must be realised that the problem is exercising the minds of many people, irrespective of party. Indeed, the Lichfield Rural District Council, which asked me formally to put the matter forward, is a Conservative-dominated council. There should be all the more praise for it in asking to have the matter aired in a way which, if my demand was met—I know it cannot be met tonight—might result in an alteration in the political decisions of the council.

I have been asked to consult my Parliamentary colleagues. I must in all frankness tell the Minister that, so far as I have been able to do that, I have not secured unanimity of opinion on the matter. I believe that the matter should be explored. Since I cannot suggest amending legislation, I ask the Minister again to review the whole question of the interpretation.

10.14 p.m.

Mr. Douglas Houghton (Sowerby)

I am sure the House will be grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow) for raising this subject. Many members of local authorities will be very interested to hear a further statement from the Government.

I have received representations from members of a local authority in my constituency. Some of them have said that they are very sensitive about the ban which is placed upon their full participation of the work of the council because they happen to be resident on a council housing estate. One of them was chairman of the council's housing committee. He felt that he was in a most invidious position; although he was chairman of the housing committee, he was at a disadvantage in endeavouring to play his proper part in the work of his local authority. Since the hon. Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan) is in his place, I may mention that these councillors were members of the Sowerby Urban District Council of which he was once a distinguished member.

I am sure we all want to keep local government and all forms of government clear of any suspicion that those who serve their fellow citizens are not free of corruption and self-interest. That is a fundamental condition of healthy democratic government, and in this country we pride ourselves on having that throughout central and local government. We want to safeguard the good name of local government in every way.

However, is this state of affairs not carrying things too far? The law was laid down in 1933 before local authorities had anything like the responsibilities they have today for local housing affairs. As my hon. Friend rightly said, as time goes on the functions and the scope of work of local authorities are likely to extend. I have heard of a proposal made in a certain political quarter to municipalise all tenanted property covered by the Rent Restrictions Acts. If that ever comes about, we shall be in a still stranger position, although not very different from the existing position of local citizens who have a personal and pecuniary interest in the level of rates.

My hon. Friend mentioned that before the transfer of responsibility for assessments of property for rating purposes all members of local authorities had a responsibility for the level—the tone, as the experts call it—of valuations for rating purposes locally. Street works, cesspool clearage and many other aspects of local affairs all created a personal pecuniary interest in some member of the council.

This is carrying matters too far. The fact that members of local authorities live in council houses is more likely to persuade them to discharge their public duty with complete disregard for their personal interest than otherwise. On the whole, if we feel that there is any suspicion that we may be exercising our vote in our own interest, we tend to lean backwards to avoid any suspicion being levelled against us. I do not believe for a single moment that local government would be imperilled in any way by a more liberal interpretation of the law.

10.19 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. J. Enoch Powell)

I am glad that the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow) raised this topic tonight, because I am sure that there is a good deal of misunderstanding about Section 76 of the Local Government Act, 1933, which this debate gives me an opportunity to attempt to dispel.

I should first explain that, apart from subsection (8), to which I will come in a moment, the interpretation of it is entirely a matter for the courts. In particular, what is a "pecuniary interest" within the meaning of the Section—that is mentioned in subsection (1)—is a matter for the courts to decide. It is not a matter on which the Minister has any right to give a ruling, and it is not a matter on which his ruling would protect any person against prosecution in the courts. It could not be pleaded and it would not weigh in the decision of the court. So that, apart from subsection (8), although my right hon. Friend can express opinions about the Section, his opinions have no authority. The interpretation is for the courts and it is is for each individual councillor, after taking what advice he thinks fit, to decide for himself whether he is within the mischief of the Section.

I now come to subsection (8), which relates to the action of the Minister—I am ignoring, for simplicity, the county council in relation to a parish council— in removing "in any case" the disability which the Section imposes. That is a discretionary power of the Minister: the word is "may". It is true that the subsection sets out the considerations to which he has to have regard in exercising his discretion; but it is his discretion. It is there, and there alone, that the Minister can say from time to time by what sort of considerations he proposes to be guided and what sort of rules he intends to lay down for himself and to make known for the guidance of others in exercising his discretion to remove the disability.

May I illustrate that sharp contrast which I have tried to point out from one or two of the points which the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth made? He reminded the House that the Lord Chief Justice had insisted in a recent case that this Section ought to be applied strictly. He then argued that the decision of my right hon. Friend to remove the disability in a case mentioned by the hon. Member for Dartford (Mr. Sydney Irving) had been inconsistent with that, because in that instance my right hon. Friend had said that the degree of pecuniary interest appeared to him such as not to justify the maintenance of the disability. But there the Minister was not interpreting subsection (1). He was not saying, "This is not a pecuniary interest for the purposes of the Section". He was saying, "In the exercise of my discretionary power to remove the disability, I take into account in connection with the transaction of council business and the other considerations there set out, the fact that, after all, the pecuniary interest is very slight".

The Minister was not departing from any strict interpretation of the Section but was mentioning one of the factors which had weighed in his mind in his purely discretionary power under subsection (8) of removing the disability.

Similarly, in paragraph 7 of the Circular to which the hon. Gentleman referred, what is in question is not the meaning of "pecuniary interest," it is not the question whether any particular councillor in any particular debate is within the mischief of Section 76. It refers to the circumstances in which the Minister is prepared to exercise his discretionary power under subsection (8) to remove the disability. The hon. Member argued that there is a difference between the practice of this House in comparable circumstances as set out in Erskine May, whereby the interest to be taken into account requires to be immediate and personal, and what is the interpretation given to Section 76. But of course the words of the Statute are very different from the practice of this House as set out in Erskine May; and, being on the Adjournment, it is to the words of the Statute that we must adhere. Those words, amongst others, are: … any pecuniary interest, direct, or indirect … Clearly, the words of the Statute go beyond the comparatively narrow sphere to which the practice of this House restricts this matter.

Mr. Snow

The hon. Gentleman will understand that I was very much bound in the debate by the rules of order. I was trying, so far as my bulk will permit, to exercise a very tight figure of eight round the rules of order.

Mr. Powell

All the same, I think it is of use to point out that Parliament has drawn the definition in this Section—and the hon. Member has brought this out—in a much stricter way than the practice of this House.

Both the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth and the hon. Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton) mentioned the position of a councillor as ratepayer who, of course, is in many ways affected in his quality as ratepayer by the decisions which he helps to arrive at; but the Section specifically exempts that capacity of a councillor by the words: Provided that this section shall not apply to an interest … which a member may have as a ratepayer … Although, therefore, we may feel that there might be some inconsistency in this matter, it is an inconsistency which is provided for and foreseen in the Statute.

The hon. Member finally asks, "Given all this, ought the Minister not to exercise his discretion under subsection (8) in a different"—perhaps the hon. Gentleman would say "in a more generous"—"way?" The hon. Gentleman made two suggestions. One was that it might be possible for the Minister to give a blanket removal of disability in advance. I am afraid that the Minister is debarred by the Statute from doing that. Quite clearly the words "in any case" oblige the Minister to take each case on its merits and as it arises. He must know before he can exercise his discretion under subsection (8) the circumstances of each particular case. Otherwise he would be exercising a discretion which Parliament has not given to him.

Secondly, the hon. Gentleman said, "Are there not cases, lying outside the scope within which the Minister is working in Circular 30/56, in which it would be beneficial and would affect substantially the deliberations and decisions of a council if the disability were removed?" I would repeat that so far as discretion is concerned, the Minister has stated in the Circular that he finds no difficulty in removing the disability for a council-tenant councillor to discuss matters concerning rent. It is only, therefore, the question of voting which remains. As the disability is removed either where the majority are concerned or where the decision would be affected it does appear that the manner in which the Minister is already exercising the discretion given to him by subsection (8) is such as to ensure that a council does not, by reason of the disability, take a decision different from what it would have taken if the disability did not exist.

It seems to me that, working under the terms of Circular 30, those who elect to represent them a councillor who is a council tenant can genuinely feel that they are as fully represented in any debate or discussion as they would be by electing anyone else, and that the decisions of the council will not be different by reason of the fact that they have elected a council tenant as their councillor.

I hope that this opportunity to explain Section 76 and the manner in which the Minister exercises such discretion as that Section allows will have allayed anxieties and removed certain doubts from the minds of councillors in various parts of the country.

Mr. Snow

While thanking the Parliamentary Secretary very much for his observations, many of which I find disagreeable and unsatisfactory, may I say that on a more favourable occasion we shall try to amend the existing law in this respect?

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Ten o'clock.