HC Deb 31 May 1956 vol 553 cc534-43
The Attorney-General (Sir Reginald Manningham-Biller)

I beg to move, in page 6, line 39, to leave out "or attempting to drive".

This Amendment is closely connected with the Amendment to page 7, line 36, to leave out subsection (6). Therefore, if the House will permit me, I will deal with both Amendments together.

When the Clause was discussed in Committee I indicated that I would try, before the Report stage, to see if we could improve the form of the Clause, and the Amendments are directed to that end. The House will remember that under Section 15 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, a person driving, or attempting to drive, under the influence of drink or drugs is liable to heavy penalties. However, the view was expressed in another place, and in Committee, that where the driver was merely in charge of the vehicle, and it could be shown that he was not driving, bad not attempted to drive, and would not drive in that condition, he should not be subjected to these heavy and automatic penalties, and this Clause was an attempt to meet that point of view as those hon. Members in the Committee will remember.

8.30 p.m.

The effect of this Amendment is to delete the words "or attempting to drive" in subsection (1). With those words standing there, as they did, it made it clear that a person who was attempting to drive should not be charged with an offence under the Clause. A complication arose in view of subsection (6) of the Clause, which went on to provide that a person charged with an offence under the Clause might be convicted of it if, notwithstanding, it appeared from the evidence that, at the time the person was charged with committing the offence, he was attempting to drive.

Attention was called to the difficulties that might arise from the exclusion in subsection (1) of persons attempting to drive and apparently being brought back in subsection (6) into the scope of the Clause. On further consideration, therefore, we have felt that it is a rather artificial procedure and possibly would be extremely confusing, not only to juries, but also perhaps in some magistrates courts, to make this express exclusion in subsection (1) and then, as it were, to bring back those attempting to drive by express provision in subsection (6).

The effect of this Amendment, which I do not think affects the substance, is that a person who is thought by the prosecution merely to have been in charge, will be charged under this subsection. If, in the course of the case, a witness says something which he or she has not said before when statements were being taken, to the effect that he was attempting to drive or had been driving, then that will make him guilty of an offence under this Clause because he is clearly in charge, whether attempting to drive or driving.

Where, however, the evidence in the hands of the proscution would lead it to suppose that he was, while under the influence, driving or attempting to drive, the proper charge would be a charge under Section 15 of the 1930 Act, which would involve much heavier penalties than those under this Clause, where a man is proved merely to have been in charge of the vehicle. So it is an improvement. Without lessening the sanctions, it makes the Clause simpler, and I hope it will be found to work better in practice.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. G. R. Strauss

rose—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

I have collected the voices. I did not see anybody get up.

Mr. Strauss

As hon. Gentlemen opposite were waiting to get up, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I thought they would get up first and make some comment. I did not realise that you had reached the stage of collecting the voices.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

Nobody got up, and I looked around.

Mr. Strauss

Someone was trying to catch your eye, Sir.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

Yes, but unless hon. Members stand up there is nothing I can do about it. I am afraid that I have collected the voices. Mr. Ede.

Mr. Ede

I beg to move, in page 6. line 43, to leave out "four" and to insert "three".

I have moved this Amendment in pursuance of a line of argument which I used on Second Reading and to which I alluded yesterday. I am convinced that the penalties for some of these offences are so out of keeping with what the people who have to adjudicate upon them feel is the correct sort of penalty to impose in these cases, that many people are not convicted who ought to be convicted.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Isaacs), whose name along with mine is inscribed on the Commission of the Peace for the County of Surrey, has had the same experience as I have had on many occasions of sitting at quarter sessions and hearing a case most convincingly proved, with appropriate comments made by the chairman of the quarter sessions bench before which it came, and realising by the looks on the faces of the jury that nothing would convince them that so respectable a person as the person in the dock ought to be in jeopardy of being sent to prison.

In fact, one deputy-chairman of that bench, now retired, used to try to get round the jury by saying, in the course of his summing up, "Of course, if you find this man guilty, the law says that he may go to prison, but, personally, I do not think, if I had to consider the sentence, that I would send him to prison." In that way, he boasted that he got convictions where some of his colleagues, acting as either chairman or deputy-chairman, failed to do so.

My own view is that, when I sit at petty sessions and a person charged with any offence that would give him four months' imprisonment is given the option of being tried summarily or of going to quarter sessions, when he elects to be dealt with summarily, I am inclined to think that he has been very badly advised, for no matter how bad his case may be, my own view is that if he goes to quarter sessions he has a fighting chance of being found not guilty, particularly if he looks respectable.

This is really an appalling thing, and I heard an hon. Friend of mine say in the House yesterday in regard to a similar kind of offences that people do not like associating motorists with the criminal classes. Let us be quite clear that if a person in charge of one of these lethal weapons uses it in the kind of way in which it ought not to be used, having regard to the ordinary safety of the general public, there can hardly be a more criminal act that a man can commit. Whether we like it or not, anyone who is a fairly regular attender at the courts must be aware, as is the hon. Member for Ruislip—Northwood (Mr. F. P. Crowder)—whom we occasionally see facing us, not in the dock, but doing his best for the fellow who is in the dock, and I know the hon. Gentleman and his father so well that I do not really need to put in even those safeguarding words—must be aware of the problem that I am submitting to the House.

I admit that it is with some reluctance that I put it forward, because, of course, the effect of this Amendment would be to withdraw from the defendant the right of being tried by a jury. I was talking the other day to a chairman of quarter sessions—not the chairman of quarter sessions to whom people might think I was alluding—who said: "My difficulty is this. My under-sheriff selects people from different places to come together; that is to say, from one town on one occasion and from another town on another occasion. If I get a jury from one town in my county, they will find every motorist guilty and every alleged burglar not guilty. If they come from another town, they will find every person charged with burglary guilty, but no motorist." I said to him, "Why do you not try mixing them?" He said, "If I did, I should never get a conviction at all; no jury would agree."

I hope that one result of this short discussion will mean that we can bring home to magistrates and jurors the really devastating loss of life that is caused by the improper use of vehicles, and that people who run risks which the law declares to be indefensible ought, no matter what they look like, to be dealt with on the evidence that both magistrates and jurors have taken oaths shall be the basis of any decision that they have to make.

If the Amendment were carried, the defendant, if he objected to either the decision or the sentence imposed by the court of summary jurisdiction, would have the right of appeal to the appeal committee of quarter sessions. I admit that is not, perhaps, from his point of view quite as good as getting in front of a jury, because he is still being dealt with by people who have a fairly continuous experience of the courts, whereas on many occasions one might get a whole jury not one member of which has ever been in a court before. While jurors try to do their best—I believe that they try as far as they possibly can to discharge the oath which they have taken—they are in unusual circumstances and are being subjected to a fairly heavy strain.

I am convinced that any increase in penalties at the present time would lead to an increase in the number of failures to convict rather than in anything else. I am also convinced that if the failures of the police to secure convictions before juries in motoring cases were in as high a proportion in any other form of case there would be an outcry in the House and elsewhere as to the inefficiency and tyranny of the police forces.

I move my Amendment with considerable regret because it is an expression of doubt about the efficiency of the judicial system and particularly of that part of it to which most of us would like to pay the highest respect. I am convinced that at the present time, when faced with the practical points in the court, public opinion, as expressed by jurors, is not sufficiently well-informed and acquainted with the procedures to be able to make the law effective. It is with considerable regret but nonetheless because I believe the point ought to be ventilated that I move my Amendment.

The Attorney-General

I have listened with great interest to what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) has had to say. I appreciate the reasons why he has thought it right to move his Amendment, but I cannot say that I agree with him either in his line of argument or in the conclusion that he reached. He very frankly said that what he was seeking to do was to remove from the possibility of trial by jury the more serious motoring offences. Indeed, the whole of his speech, as I think he recognised, was an attack upon and criticism of our jury system.

8.45 p.m.

Mr. Ede

As applied to this particular class of offence.

The Attorney-General

As applied to this particular class of offence.

One often hears talk of the thin end of the wedge, and I can well understand that those who are accustomed more to sitting on benches than on juries may take the view that, on the whole, trial before a bench of magistrates is more satisfactory than trial before a jury. I do not share that view. I agree with the right hon. Member for South Shields that where we have a whole range of automatic penalties there is a possibility that not only a jury but a bench of magistrates may, to avoid that automatic consequence, refrain from convicting on more serious offences. The same reasoning does not apply where the penalties are not well known to be entirely automatic, and it does not apply in my experience in trials before a jury, because unless it is a jury sitting regularly to try these cases, it often does not know what penalties can be imposed if a conviction is recorded.

A jury is not concerned with what penalty can be imposed. Its task is comparatively simple. I suppose that it happens to all of us on occasions that we think that a jury has reached a wrong conclusion, but I have never been ready to be absolutely certain that in reaching a conclusion on a question of fact the jury might not have been right and my view entirely wrong. It would be a very retrograde step at this time to take away from the motorist accused of the more serious motoring crimes the right of electing to go for trial before a jury, a right which he has had in relation to these offences ever since 1930.

I do not believe that the system works so badly, nor do I believe that this increase of penalties will lead to a large increase in the number of those who elect to go for trial. There is a substantial number of motorists who do not wish to go for trial for one reason or another. One reason may be the realisation that there is no large chance of acquittal before any court and it is simpler to get the thing dealt with straight away.

It is right that where these very heavy penalties can be imposed and the Bill increases the maximum penalty which can be imposed we should not take from an accused motorist the right of electing to go for trial. It may be a trial not at quarter sessions, but before a High Court judge and at which, being a trial on indictment, there is a possibility of punishment heavier than that which he would receive at the hands of the magistrate.

For those reasons, while recognising the point of view of the right hon. Gentleman, I ask the House to reject the Amendment as being one likely to lead not to an enhancement in the administrationof justice but rather to the view being formed by those who find themselves in the dock in magistrates' and other courts that because their right of going before a jury for trial is taken away they are being deprived of one of the privileges of citizens of this country, namely, when charged with a serious offence, of having the right of trial before a jury.

I urge the House to reject the proposal, which is put forward on later Amendments in relation to other and equally important motoring offences. I hope that I have adequately covered the ground in my reply, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will realise that I appreciate his reasons for putting forward his view. I hope that I have convinced him that it would be a bad step to accept the Amendment, which he has advocated so persuasively.

Mr. Ede

Not convinced, but overwhelmed by the courtesy of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The Attorney-General

I beg to move, in page 7, line 4, to leave out from "shall" to "if" in line 5 and to insert: be deemed for the purposes of this section not to have been in charge of a motor vehicle. This Amendment is also designed to simplify the Clause. Cases in which the proviso will afford a defence will, broadly speaking, be cases in which the English decisions have been that, under the existing law, the defendant is strictly held to have been in charge of the vehicle, such as when he is in bed and has left his vehicle outside his front door, or, being seated in the back of his vehicle, has handed the car key to a friend and asked him to get a taxi to take him home. At present, such a person is held to have been in charge of the vehicle, but the proviso allows him to escape the consequences if he can provide proof of the matters mentioned therein.

In the existing drafting, however, the wording refers to an offence, and it seems to be both better English and better in substance to say that he shall be deemed far the purposes of this section not to have been in charge of a motor vehicle ", if the circumstances set out in the proviso are in fact proved.

Amendment agreed to.

The Attorney-General

I beg to move. in page 7, line 6, to leave out "time of the offence" and to insert "material time".

This is the first of two drafting Amendments consequential upon the Amendment in line 4. They merely alter the words "time of the offence" in the proviso to the "material time," as, in fact, no time of the offence has to be specified.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: In page 7. line 9, leave out "time of the offence" and insert "material time".—[The Attorney-General.]

The Attorney-General

I beg to move, in page 7, line 34, after "1930", to insert: otherwise than by virtue of the next following section of this Act". This Amendment is necessary to prevent a conviction for being drunk while riding a bicycle counting as a previous conviction for the purposes of a charge of being drunk in charge of a motor car.

Mr. Ernest Davies

Can the AttorneyGeneral tell us how many such cases he has had?

The Attorney-General

I have never been engaged in any case concerned with being drunk in charge of a bicycle.

Mr. Ede

Is not one of the advantages of a bicycle the fact that it is very difficult to ride if one is not in a sober condition?

The Attorney-General

Under the decisions in relation to motor cars one might well be in charge of a bicycle although off the bicycle and taking refreshment in another place.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: In page 7, line 35, leave out "thereunder" and insert "under this section".—[The Attorney-General.] Amendment proposed: In page 7, line 36, leave out subsection (6).—[The Attorney-General.]

Mr. Cole

I have followed my right hon. and learned Friend most carefully in his explanation of the alterations to the beginning of the Clause. He carefully explained the position about driving or attempting to drive. if I remember correctly, he said that the fact that there was an attempt to drive would not take the offence out of the Clause, but would also bring it within the terms of Section 15 of the 1930 Act, which is a more serious matter. Now we are deleting subsection (6). and I should be grateful if my right hon. and learned Friend could tell me what will be the position of a man who has been found to be drunk or unfit to drive while in charge of a car, when it emerges during the course of the evidence that he has been attempting to drive. As far as I can see, the case comes within the terms of both this Clause and Section 15. If that is so, I am satisfied, but I should be grateful for an explanation.

The Attorney-General

I think I can answer that quite simply. First of all, one has to consider what the accused is charged with. If he is charged under Section 15 and under this Clause and both those charges are before the court, assuming the evidence shows that he was driving or attempting to drive, he obviously would be convicted under Section 15. If, on the other hand, the evidence does not come up to that and it was that he was merely in charge, he would be convicted under this Clause. One can hardly drive or attempt to drive without being in charge, so subsection (6) is really not necessary. It merely adds to confusion to leave it in, particularly in the light of the earlier words in subsection (1).

Mr. Cole

At least my right hon. and learned Friend does admit that there was some confusion.

The Attorney-General

I said that this was to simplify it.

Amendment agreed to.