HC Deb 13 June 1956 vol 554 cc587-605

  1. (1) If the High Court is satisfied, upon application made by the Registrar, that default has been made in furnishing particulars under section eight of this Act of an agreement which is subject to registration under this Part of this Act, or of any variation or determination of such an agreement, the High Court may—
    1. (a) in any case, authorise the Registrar to treat as particulars duly furnished under the said section eight any document or information in his possession relating to the agreement;
    2. (b) if the application is made against any person party to the agreement, order that person to furnish those particulars to the Registrar within such time as may be specified in the order.
  2. (2) In any case where an order is or could be made against any person under paragraph (b) of the foregoing subsection, and the court is satisfied that the failure of that person to furnish particulars in respect of the agreement was wilful, the court may, in addition to or in lieu of making such an order, make against that person any such order as could be made by the Restrictive Practices Court under subsection (2) of section fifteen of this Act if all restrictions by virtue of which this Part of this Act applies to the agreement were found by that Court to be contrary to the public interest.
  3. (3) An order made by the High Court under the last foregoing subsection may be discharged by the Restrictive Practices Court upon application made under section fifteen of this Act, and shall continue in force until so discharged;
  4. (4) In the application of this section to Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively, for any reference to the High Court there shall be substituted a reference to the Court of Session or the High Court of Northern Ireland.—[Mr. P. Thorneycroft.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

This Clause arises out of a number of discussions during the Committee stage when hon. Members expressed concern about whether we were dealing adequately with those people who showed a wilful refusal to register their agreement. This Clause, together with some consequential Amendments, enables the Court, where there has been a wilful refusal to register, to ban the agreement. The consequential Amendments are, in page 8, line 28; in page 9, line 14; in page 14, line 34; and in page 17, line 14.

As some hon. Members pointed out, this is an effective way of ensuring that where registration ought to take place it does take place. Some hon. Members may think that it is not perhaps as effective as Amendments which they suggested, but it is a powerful addition to the measures already contained in the Bill. It gives the Court power to ban the arrangement for a two-year period; and only at the end of that period will it be possible for the parties to the agreement to ask, under the normal provisions of Clauses 15 and 16, to have the agreement registered and reinstated. Of course, the Registrar can apply at any time.

As I say, I am not suggesting that this goes as far as some hon. Members would like. I do not wish to reopen the whole question about default in registration, which was debated during the Committee stage. We then discussed other methods, and arguments advanced by hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the Committee were widely canvassed. I think that the House as a whole will agree that this is an additional, and I think, a useful weapon in the hands of the Court to deal with what I hope will be few and rare cases where there has been a wilful refusal to register as desired by the Measure as a whole.

Mr. Mulley

I do not think that the President is seized of the main point of the criticism we raised on this matter during our discussions in Committee. It seems to me likely that the sort of person who will wilfully refuse to register is a person who is suspicious that such registration would inevitably lead to the banning of his agreement altogether as being contrary to the public interest. If that be so, as I believe it will be in most cases of wilful refusal to register, such a person will lose nothing whatever under this new Clause, or under the Bill as it was previously.

We desired the President to try to provide a deterrent so that people would be at risk in wilfully refusing to register and to disclose information. No doubt such people would be fortified by counsel's opinion, and guidance of that sort, and if they were certain that their agreement would be banned, I believe that the unscrupulous ones would be prepared to run a risk of such slight sanction as might be imposed it might be that they need only pay the costs—to continue their practices until they were found out.

Although we cannot do much about it at this stage. I hope that the President will consider the matter with a view to making some further provision before the Bill becomes law.

Mr. Wilfred Fienburgh (Islington, North)

Sometimes one despairs completely of the Minister—

Mr. Kenneth Thompson (Liverpool, Walton)

Do not do that.

Mr. Fienburgh

Sometimes a proposal comes from the other side of the House which is so stupid that one has a feeling of despair, and asks oneself, "Will reason never strike this man at all? "

The point has been ably expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley). If we tell a man that he must register, and in his assessment the likely consequences of his registration would be that his agreement would be banned, he will say, "Wilfully I will not register. I will get away with things as long as I can." We can say to him, "You are very wicked. You refuse to register, so we are going to ban your agreement." That is in no sense a punishment at all.

May I relate this matter to a homely analogy which I am sure the President will understand? About seven o'clock on a summer evening, when we wish our children to go to bed, we say to them, "Children, come in and go to bed." The children wilfully refuse to register their intention of going to bed. After that, we say to them, "You horrible little brats. If you do not come in and go to bed, we shall punish you. And do you know what we are going to do to you? We are going to send you to bed." The only sanction we can apply is swift application of the hand to the fleshy part of the body below the waist. If the only punishment an offender must fear is that which he knows he will get anyway, we deny ourselves of any power of sanction at all.

I ask the President of the Board of Trade to reflect upon this homely. domestic analogy, which even in his stratospheric circles must occur from time to time.

4.0 p.m.

Mr. A. J. Irvine (Liverpool, Edge Hill)

I am glad that the President of the Board of Trade has introduced a sanction, although I agree with my hon. Friends that it is the wrong one. There may be default in the supply of information about an agreement which is contrary to the public interest. It is wrong that the penalty for the default should be the same as when the agreement is found to be contrary to the public interest. The sanction is hopelessly misconceived.

It will cut both ways. Where there has been default, yet the Court is satisfied that the agreement is not contrary to the public interest, the Court will be very reluctant to impose the penalty for default. The danger is that the Court, observing that the only penalty available is inappropriate, will decide in its discretion not to impose any penalties.

There is an additional difficulty. Nobody knows upon whom is placed the duty of supplying the information. That is still left in the dark. The right hon. Gentleman has indicated subsequent Amendments by which he proposes to deal with this point, but they go only a very short distance. Parties to agreements which are registrable are told that they may furnish particulars, but nothing more explicit than that is in the Bill. One of the faults in the procedure is that the duty of supplying information is nowhere laid upon any particular shoulders.

A central principle of our system of law is that we do not impose penalties without making quite sure who the culprits are. In respect of that, the Bill is at fault. The sanction is wrong because of its nature and because the Bill nowhere makes clear against whom it is to be applied. I do not want to make a false point. If the right hon. Gentleman thinks that I am wrong and that anywhere in the Bill, as amended, the duty of supplying information is imposed fairly and squarely upon a particular party, I shall be glad to be told where it is to be found. I see no sign of it in the Bill at present.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time.

Mr. Eric Fletcher (Islington, East)

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Clause, in subsection (3), to leave out from "discharged" to "and" and to insert: upon application made by the person concerned not less than two years from the date on which such order was made". The President of the Board of Trade referred to consequential Amendments of his. It may be convenient if we can consider them, and also the Government Amendment in Clause 15, page 14, line 39, at the same time as we discuss my Amendment. The right hon. Gentleman has put those Amendments on the Paper to meet criticisms that were made in the Committee about the probability of people wilfully disregarding their obligation to register agreements which ought to be registered under the Bill.

As the Bill is conceived, the primary deterrent will be the obligation to register all agreements of a restrictive nature whether contrary to the public interest or not. The Registrar will bring the agreements in turn before the Restrictive Practices Court for adjudication. We pointed out in Committee that it would be relatively easy for someone who feared that a restrictive agreement would be adjudicated upon adversely to take the short cut of declining to register. The proposed new Clause is an attempt to meet that criticism.

I agree that the sanction is not as potent as we would desire, but it is better than none. It places the person who is in doubt whether his agreement is contrary to public policy or not in the position of running the risk, if he wilfully defaults, that the Court may say, "Not only ought the agreement to have been registered but it shall automatically be considered as contrary to the public interest, and it will be banned for a period of two years." I believe that is the intention.

If the intention is carried into effect that may well be an effective sanction. The Amendment has been put down to strengthen it. The operative words of the proposed new Clause are: If the High Court is satisfied … that the failure of that person to furnish particulars in respect of the agreement was wilful, the court may, in addition to or in lieu of making such an order, make against that person any such order as could be made by the Restrictive Practices Court under subsection (2) of section fifteen of this Act if all restrictions by virtue of which this Part of this Act applies to the agreement were found by that Court to be contrary to the public interest. When that provision is incorporated it will be clear that in deciding whether or not to ban the agreement in question the High Court will have regard not to the merits of the agreement but merely to the question whether or not there has been wilful default about registering.

The object of the Amendment is to tighten the provisions of the Clause by providing that if the High Court makes such an order the declaration that the agreement is banned shall operate for a minimum period of two years and that at the end of the two years the applicant shall not have the right to go to the Restrictive Practices Court for reexamination of the merits of the agreement but shall be obliged to go back to the High Court itself.

First, as we envisage it, the Restrictive Practices Court will have quite enough work to do once the Bill is passed in dealing with the ordinary run of applications that the Registrar makes to it. We think it would be very unfortunate, therefore, if in addition to its ordinary work the Court were burdened with applications under this new Clause. It seems far more desirable that if anyone wants to make an application, having ex hypothesi made a wilful default in not registering an agreement, he should be obliged to come back to the High Court which made the order. I think there is something inherently of advantage in giving jurisdiction to the High Court as well as to the Restrictive Practices Court.

We do not want to find that the operations of the Restrictive Practices Court are encumbered in dealing with applications of this kind, which might quite well have priority over the more important things with which that Court has to deal. Therefore, the Amendment has been moved with a view to tightening the sanction which the President has introduced.

Mr. Mulley

I beg to second the Amendment.

Sir Lionel Heald (Chertsey)

I hope my right hon. Friend will not accept the Amendment. Whilst there may be something to be said for discussion as to whether the High Court should have this jurisdiction as well as the Restrictive Practices Court, and that arises later, I think, in connection with certain other Clauses or Amendments and may be discussed then, I suggest that the provision about "not less than two years" is something which is very undesirable and entirely novel.

We do not have minimum penalties in this country; we have a maximum penalty and the court is given discretion as to what punishment shall be inflicted. The Amendment seems to be merely an attempt to show a great desire to be more firm and drastic but it really becomes vindictive. The proper way to deal with these matters is to leave them to the discretion of the Court, and I hope my right hon. Friend will resist the Amendment.

Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas (Leicester, North-East)

As I understand it, in the proposed Amendment to Clause 15, page 14, line 39, this unpleasant and vindictive provision, as the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) called it. is already part of the scheme put forward by his Government. The observations of the right hon. and learned Member are utterly irrelevant to this Amendment. The only point of the Amendment is to ensure that the application shall be made to the High Court and not to the Restrictive Practices Court.

Mr. Jay

Before the President replies, I should like to press him about the related point made earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Edge Hill (Mr. A. J. Irvine). I am sure that the President will agree that there will be only a minority of people who wilfully default on their obligations to register information about these agreements. Nevertheless, none of us wants the Bill to go forward in a form which would enable some people—and perhaps even tempt others—to refrain from registration on the ground that they did not believe anything very dreadful would happen to them if they kept quiet and said nothing.

The whole of the new Clause describes what will happen if there is wilful failure by somebody to furnish information. What still puzzles me—we raised this point in Committee and do not seem yet to have had a full answer—is whether it is quite certain and clear under the Bill on what individual the obligation to furnish particulars rests. It seems that if there has to be failure in carrying out an obligation there has to be an obligation. If there has to be an obligation there has to be an obligation on somebody. There- fore, I think it puzzling that the Bill nowhere tells us who that somebody is. Of course, in Clause 8 the obligation to register is laid down, but the words are still in the passive tense. Clause 8 (1) says: Within the period specified in this section the following particulars shall be furnished to the Registrar…. I speak always as a non-lawyer, but would not someone who did not wish to register an agreement be tempted to argue like this? "All the Bill says is that the agreement has got to be registered. It does not say I have got to register it. Somebody else may register it. Then it will have been registered and, if I fail to do it, I have not committed a breach of the law." I ask this particularly because the Clause speaks of a wilful failure to register and, presumably, one can wilfully fail to do something only if it is quite clear that there is an obligation on one to do it.

Even if this is no more than a doubt, and perhaps a layman's doubt, I still do not quite understand why the Bill should not say that there is an obligation to register on the part of any party to an agreement. If it does say that somewhere and we have overlooked it, we should be glad to know, but I hope that here we are not letting a serious flaw at the root of the Bill slip through.

4.15 p.m.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft

In reply to the question about who registers the answer is that the obligation is on all but it may be discharged by any. We are going to have a discussion about that on an Amendment to Clause 8. I think perhaps it will be convenient to postpone that question until we reach the Government Amendment to Clause 8, page 8, line 28, to leave out subsections (5) and (6) and to insert: (5) The particulars required by this section may be furnished by or on behalf of any person who is party to the agreement or, as the case may be, was party thereto immediately before its determination, and where such particulars are duly furnished by or on behalf of any such person the provisions of this section shall be deemed to be complied with on the part of all such persons. The answer to the example concerning children is that one must first find the children before one puts them to bed. The same problem arises here. For all we may say about people who fail to register, until someone knows that there is an agreement it is really impossible to take any steps about it. If one knows that then there are a variety of steps which can be taken and which are outlined in various parts of the Bill. We may be doubtful as to which ought to be adopted, but I hope that all hon. Members will agree that this is a useful additional step—namely, that if there is a wilful refusal to register the High Court should have the sanction of being able to say that the agreement will be treated as something which is contrary to the public interest.

We say that there should be provision for the parties to apply at the end of two years for their case to be heard, and the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) wants that application to be dealt with by the High Court. I hope that on reflection he will not press that, because it seems to me that if the Court gets an application all it can do is to discharge the order. The matter has to be spelled out rather further. It has to be judged on some test or basis and the only test or basis would be that in Clause 16.

It would have to be decided whether it was or was not against the public interest. That is why as a matter of practice we use here the words "Restrictive Practices Court." That is really the only Court which could be properly seized of the public interest element in this matter. I rather agree with the hon. Member that that Court might well hold that if there was hesitation to register it showed a shrewd suspicion on the part of the parties concerned that the practice was contrary to the public interest. The Restrictive Practices Court might well hold that, but I think the application should go to the Restrictive Practices Court.

Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas

I appreciate the point that, if one is going into the merits of the agreement, of course the Restrictive Practices Court is the Court to go before. I appreciate, likewise, that if the High Court were satisfied that the penalty obligation was finished, then the merits come up for consideration and they would have to be dealt with by the Restrictive Practices Court. I appreciate all that. The important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) was that about clogging up the Restrictive Practices Court. We should like to know how the President contemplates that that would work. It is obviously most undesirable that the Court should be hampered in any way by applications made otherwise than through the Registrar. This is a case of an agreement which will not have been operated for two years, and, at the end of two years, under the President's scheme, apparently, the parties to the agreement have the right to go before the Court in circumstances in which, under the scheme of this Bill, it is not contemplated that the penalty should apply to them any longer. Therefore, as it is not contemplated that that penalty should apply, they have a right, since the question involves the rights and liberties of the subject, to be heard by the Court.

There is nothing in the Bill, as far as I can see, which deals with the priority as between the rights of the parties and the rights of the Registrar. Obviously, anything which affects the President's scheme for the Registrar deciding the priorities is most undesirable. That is a practical consideration put by my hon. Friend to which we should like an answer.

The second point is one of logic rather than of the practice and practical application of the Restrictive Practices Court, but it is not without relevance. The matter comes before the High Court, which imposes a penalty, to run for two years, that the agreement cannot be operated. I have a god deal of sympathy with the point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), although not with the manner in which he presented it to the House. The point of substance which he made is that here, automatically, if the applicant fails to furnish the particulars, there is a penalty for two years. Obviously, the Court may hesitate to impose a penalty for two years. We should prefer an automatic penalty, but the right hon. Gentleman has not adopted that course. He has given the Court a discretion. The penalty is to operate for two years, and, at the end of that period, it is to cease to operate, from the practical point of view, because the party to the agreement can then make an application to the Restrictive Practices Court.

Here we have a provision for a penalty which is, willy-nilly, for two years. That is an extraordinary provision. If we are dealing with a penalty at all and dealing with it from the penalising aspect—and it is only because of that aspect that this Clause exists at all—it is as a penalty that it is imposed, and it should be the High Court which should deal with that aspect. There may be practical difficulties and considerations from the point of view of the parties to the agreement in the sense that they may want to know whether the agreement will be valid or invalid. It is for their convenience to know that, but that applies also when the penalty is first imposed, because, on any showing, they will have the agreement suspended for two years. That argument, although I recognise that it exists, does not apply here, because it is not a logical or reasonable argument on the footing on which the President has presented the Clause to the House.

Therefore, for the practical reason put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East—namely, clogging up the Restrictive Practices Court—and also for the reason that this penalty should be dealt with in the way I have suggested, this matter is one for the High Court and not for the Restrictive Practices Court.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft

If I may have the leave of the House, may I say that I will look at the argument which the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) has just addressed to the House and will consider it, but I should like to make the points which we had in mind about this.

Let us consider that there has been a wilful default—we agree this will probably be a rare case—and the High Court says that for a period of two years this agreement will be ruled out. The parties may then wish to go back to the Registrar. If they go to the High Court only, clearly no decision on the merits of their case or of the agreement can be made, but it is arguable that one could go, first of all, back to the High Court and have the order discharged. and then come back to the Restrictive Practices Court to have the merits discussed under the order determined by the Registrar. I am not saying that that is an impossible way of doing it, but that there are some advantages in doing it the other way.

I should like to make it absolutely clear that it is not our intention, just because the parties happen to be defaulters, that they should jump the queue with regard to the merits of the case being discussed, which is the substance of the point which the hon. and learned Gentleman put to me. It depends on the condition of the list. If we get a lot of cases like this piling up, it may affect the work of the Restrictive Practices Court when very important cases are coming forward. What is proposed here is that the parties should go back to the Restrictive Practices Court, where, according to the words of the new Clause, an order may be discharged— upon application made under section fifteen of this Act, and shall continue in force until so discharged. It is not proposed that they should, as it were, seize some particular place in the lists. What the Restrictive Practices Court can do is to discharge the order and put them in the same position as anybody else. That is what is intended, and not that they should necessarily be forced to hear, there and then, all the arguments about the merits of any particular case they may be considering.

Therefore, what the application would suggest is that, at any rate, the penalty provision should come to an end. If the Restrictive Practices Court was ready to hear the merits argued at that time, then certainly it could hear them, if the state of the lists was such that it was quite happy to do so. It is not our intention that the Court should be under any obligation to do so, but merely to put the parties in the same position as anybody else, so that when the Registrar calls that case forward the merits of the case can be heard in the normal way.

Mr. Holt

Would the right hon. Gentleman clear up one point? Does that mean that a person who had defaulted and had had an order made against him could have that order discharged, and would therefore be allowed to continue the practice before the Court heard the case; or is it the President's intention that, in fact, the Court should not discharge the case until it was ready to continue it? Otherwise, it might be possible for the parties concerned to carry on for another two years, making perhaps four years from the time when it was originally considered by the Court that the practice was possibly restrictive?

Mr. M. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester)

I want to ask the President of the Board of Trade to look at this matter a little closer. I have heard what has been said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas), and I also heard part of what was said by the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald). There is however a further point here which I should like the President to consider, because I am sure when it is brought to his attention he would wish to do so in this particular context. This is not a case where someone inadvertently overlooks the furnishing of particulars, which are an essential preliminary step to operating this machinery; and not only to the machinery operating, but operating in a field which may be of the greatest importance to the public interest. The agreement involved might therefore be of very great moment to the country.

4.30 p.m.

The President will realise that he has to make the machinery of the new Clause operate in such a way and to such an extent that it will be thought by those concerned better to do what is required of them than not to do it, that is to say, that it is better for them not to take a gamble on this particular obligation and not wilfully—and that is the gravamen of the matter—default in giving the requisite information. It is on that crucial point that I want the President of the Board of Trade to consider whether the Amendment is not necessary. I am certain that the President of the Board of Trade has tried his utmost here to do what is fair and adequate and to fill in an obvious lacuna in the Bill as it stands. I do not think that Clause at present goes far enough, because the whole purpose of the Clause, if it is to be effective at all, is that it should operate as a sanction in case of default.

I ask the President, therefore, to address his mind to whether there is in fact any sanction in' the new Clause as it stands. having regard to the fact that the person who has made a wilful—that is the operative word here—default may, as soon as the order has been made by the court, go back to the court under the new Clause and get a fresh order, perhaps an order rescinding the previous one. Apart from the costs involved, which may be small or large according to the circumstances, there is no sanction whatsoever. All such a person has to do is on the morrow of the order being made by the court, to go back again to get the court to discharge that order, if he can. Of course he has to satisfy the court.

Apart from that, there is absolutely no sanction which would impress upon the mind of a person who ought to register this information the penal necessity to register it. That seems to be the crucial point. It is not so much that some person. even if there has been a wilful default, may go back to the court and get the court to rescind it. That is not the case with which we are so completely concerned. It may be perfectly proper and nobody may lose anything by the fact that the order is rescinded, but there may still be someone in default about whose default no order has been made. It is upon that person that one wants to impress the sense and the effect of this sanction.

There is, as I see it, no sanction for that purpose in the new Clause, and I ask the President of the Board of Trade therefore to consider whether the Amendments because of that point alone, is not a proper and valuable Amendment which will import into the Clause a sanction which is essential and is not now there.

Sir L. Heald

As my name has been taken in vain by the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas), who accused me of misleading the House, misunderstanding the Bill and everything else, I hope that the House will give me permission to speak again. I thought that I was behaving properly, because I was dealing with the Bill as it stands. The hon. and learned Member made some observations on the assumption that some later Amendment which my right hon. Friend will move had already been accepted. It has not been accepted and, when it comes on, I might have an opportunity of saying something about it.

At the moment there would be an opportunity for the penalty to be restricted, and that is what I want to do. My right hon. Friend has pointed out that under the Amendment the matter would go to the High Court which has no knowledge of the restrictive practice aspect of the matter and there would be this automatic penalty. He gave good reasons for not accepting it. I should not like anybody to think that I had not read the Bill, or was wasting time. I was doing neither.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft

With the permission of the House again, I believe that it is better for this application to discharge an order and for the merits of the case all to be dealt with in the one court. I think that it will help in practice and be a more convenient way of doing it. It is not our intention that the order should be discharged and the practice revived, without the merits being discussed. The application must be made and the participants in these agreements must wait their turn to get their case heard, according to the arrangement of the order of business and the convenience of the Registrar in working out the order in which these cases should come forward. In fact, I do not think that there

will be any practical difficulty about it, but I will give an undertaking that the questions which have been raised from both sides of the House will be considered to see whether this is a practical and working arrangement. If adjustments have to be made, they can be made in another place.

Mr. E. Fletcher

By leave of the House, I have listened very carefully to what the President of the Board of Trade has said, and the debate has shown that there is here a very real problem. I appreciate that he has said that he will consider it, but I think that the position he has taken up is illogical and impracticable. Since this is the last occasion we shall have of expressing our opinion, I think that we must register our views by dividing the House.

Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the proposed Clause:—

The House divided: Ayes 259, Noes 199.

Division No.214.] AYES [4.38 p.m.
Agnew, Cmdr. P. G. Channon, H. Godber, J. B.
Aitken, W. T. Chichester-Clark, R. Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan
Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.) Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.) Gower, H. R.
Alport, C. J. M. Conant, Maj. Sir Roger Graham, Sir Fergus
Amery, Julian (Preston, N.) Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert Green, A.
Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton) Cooper-Key, E. M. Grimond, J.
Arbuthnot, John Craddock, Beresford (Speltthorne) Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)
Armstrong, C. W. Crouch, R. F. Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)
Ashton, H. Crowder, Sir John (Finchley) Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.
Atkins, H. E. Cunningham, Knox Hall, John (Wycombe)
Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M. Currie, G. B. H. Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)
Baldwin, A. E. Dance, J. C. G. Harris, Reader (Heston)
Balniel, Lord Davidson, Viscountess Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)
Barber, Anthony Davies, Rt. Hon.Clement(Montgomery) Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)
Barlow, Sir John D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macolesfd)
Barter, John Deedes, W. F. Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)
Baxter, Sir Beverley Digby, Simon Wingfield Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.) Dodds-Parker, A. D. Hay, John
Bennett, F. M. (Torquay) Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA. Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth) Drayson, G. B. Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.
Bidgood, J. C. du Cann, E. D. L. Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Biggs-Davison, J. A. Duncan, Capt. J. A. L. Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.
Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel Duthie, W. S. Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
Bishop, F. P. Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Black, C. W. Eden, Rt.Hn.SirA.(Warwick & L'm'tn) Hirst, Geoffrey
Body, R. F. Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West) Holland-Martin, C. J.
Boothby, Sir Robert Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn Holt, A. F.
Bossom, Sir Alfred Errington, Sir Eric Hope, Lord John
Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan) Erroll, F. J. Hornby, R. P.
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A. Farey-Jones, F. W. Horobin, Sir Ian
Boyle, Sir Edward Fell, A. Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)
Braine, B. R. Finlay, Graeme Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H. Fisher, Nigel Hulbert, Sir Norman
Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry Fletcher-Cooke, C. Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)
Brooman-White, R. C. Fort, R. Hyde, Montgomery
Bryan, P. Foster, John Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.
Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T. Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe & Lonsdale) Iremonger, T. L.
Bullus, Wing Commander E. E. Freeth, D. K. Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Burden, F. F. A. Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D. Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Butcher, Sir Herbert Garner-Evans, E. H. Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Campbell, Sir David George, J. C. (Pollok) Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Carr, Robert Gibson-Watt, D. Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Cary, Sir Robert Glover, D. Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)
Joseph, Sir Keith Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh Spearman, Sir Alexander
Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot Morrison, John (Salisbury) Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)
Keegan, D. Mott-Radclyffe, C. E. Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard
Kerby, Capt. H. B. Nabarro, G. D. N. Stevens, Geoffrey
Kerr, H. W. Nairn, D. L. S. Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)
Kimball, M. Neave, Airey Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)
Kirk, P. M. Nicholls, Harmar Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.
Lambert, Hon. G. Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Ch'ch) Studholme, Sir Henry
Lambton, Viscount Nield, Basil (Chester) Summers, Sir Spencer
Lancaster, Col. C. G. Noble, Comdr, A. H. P. Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Leather, E. H. C. Oakshott, H. D. Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)
Leburn, W. G. O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.) Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H. Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D. Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)
Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T. Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.) Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)
Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.) Osborne, C. Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)
Lindsay, Martin (Solihull) Page, R. G. Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.
Linstead, Sir H. N. Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale) Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.
Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.) Partridge, E. Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)
Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G. Peyton, J. W. W. Tilney, John (Wavertree)
Longden, Gilbert Pilkington, Capt. R. A. Touche, Sir Gordon
Low, Rt. Hon. A. R. W. Pitman, I. J. Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.) Pitt, Miss E. M. Tweedsmuir, Lady
Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick) Pott, H. P. Vane, W. M. F.
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh Powell, J. Enoch Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.
Macdonald, Sir Peter Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.) Vickers, Miss J. H.
McKibbin, A. J. Prior-Palmer, Brig. 0. L. Vosper, D. F.
Mackie, J. H. (Galloway) Profumo, J. D. Wakefield Edward (Derbyshire, W.)
Mclaughln, Mrs. P. Raikes, Sir Victor Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John Ramsden, J. E. Walker-Smith, D. C.
McLean, Nieil (Inverness) Rawlinson, Peter Wall, Major Patrick
Macleod, Rt. Hn. lain (Enfield, W.) Redmayne, M. Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)
MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty) Renton, D. L. M. Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)
Maddan, Martin Ridsdale, J. E. Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold
Maitand, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle) Robertson, Sir David Webbe, Sir H.
Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark) Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.) Whitelaw, W.S.I.(Penrith & Border)
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R. Robson-Brown, W. Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)
Markham, Major Sir Frank Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks) Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)
Marlowe, A. A. H. Roper, Sir Harold Wills, G. (Bridgwater)
Marples, A. E. Sandys, Rt. Hon. D. Wood, Hon. R.
Mathew, R. Schofield, Lt.-Col. W. Woollam, John Victor
Maude, Angus Sharples, R. C. Yates, William (The Wrekin)
Mawby, R. L. Shepherd, William
Maydon, Lt.-Comdr, S. L. C. Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.) TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R. Smithers, Peter (Winchester) Mr. Legh and Mr. Hughes-Young
Soames, Capt. C.
NOES
Ainsley, J. W. Davies, Harold (Leek) Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Albu, A. H. Davies, Stephen (Merthyr) Hunter, A. E.
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.) Deer, G. Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Allen, Arthur (Bosworth) Dodds, N. N. Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe) Donnelly, D. L. Irving, S. (Dartford)
Awbery, S. S. Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch) Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Bacon, Miss Alice Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C. Janner, B.
Balfour, A. Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly) Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.
Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.) Edwards, Robert (Bilston) Jeger, Mrs.Lena(Holbn & St.Pncs,S.)
Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.) Edwards, W. J. (Stepney) Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)
Benson, G. Evans, Edward (Lowestoft) Johnson, James (Rugby)
Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale) Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury) Jones, Rt. Hon. A.Creech(Wakefield)
Blackburn, F. Fernyhough, E. Jones, David (The Hartlepools)
Blenkinsop, A. Fienburgh, W. Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)
Blyton, W. R. Fletcher, Eric Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G. Forman, J. C. Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.) Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton) Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Bowles, F. G. Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N. Kenyon, C.
Boyd, T. C. Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R. Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth Grey, C. F. King, Dr. H. M.
Brockway, A. F. Griffiths, David (Rother Valley) Lawson, G. M.
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D. Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly) Ledger, R. J.
Brown, Thomas (Ince) Griffiths, William (Exchange) Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Burton, Miss F. E. Hale, Leslie Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.) Hamilton, W. W. Lewis, Arthur
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green) Hastings, S. Logan, D. G.
Callaghan, L. J. Hayman, F. H. Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Castle, Mrs. B. A. Healey, Denis MacColl, J. E.
Chetwynd, G. R. Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis) McGhee, H. G.
Clunie, J. Hobson, C. R. McGovern, J.
Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead) Holman, P. McKay, John (Wallsend)
Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury) Holmes, Horace MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Cove, W. G. Howell, Charles (Perry Barr) Mahon, Simon
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.) Howell, Denis (All Saints) Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Crossman, R. H. S. Hubbard, T. F. Mallalieu J. P. W. (Huddersfd, E.)
Currie, G. B. H. Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey) Mann, Mrs. Jean
Darling, George (Hillsborough) Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire) Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.
Mason, Roy Probert, A. R. Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Mayhew, C. P. Proctor, W. T. Thomas, George (Cardiff)
Messer, Sir F. Pryde, D. J. Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)
Mikardo, Ian Randall, H. E. Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)
Mitchison, G. R. Rankin, John Thornton, E.
Monslow, W. Redhead, E. C. Timmons, J.
Moody, A. S. Reeves, J. Turner-Samuels, M.
Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.) Reid, William Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn
Morrison,Rt.Hn.Herbert(Lewis'm,S.) Robens, Rt. Hon. A. Usborne, H. C.
Mort, D. L. Roberts, Albert (Normanton) Viant, S. P.
Moss, R. Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon) Warbey, W. N.
Moyle, A. Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.) Wells, Percy (Faversham)
Mulley, F. W. Ross, William West, D. G.
Neal, Harold (Bolsover) Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E. Wheeldon, W. E.
Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon) Short, E. W. White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)
Oliver, G. H. Silverman, Julius (Aston) White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)
Oram, A. E. Silverman, Sydney (Nelson) Wigg, George
Oswald, T. Skeffington, A. M. Wilkins, W. A.
Owen, W. J. Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.) Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)
Paget, R. T. Slater, J. (Sedgefield) Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)
Paling, Rt. Hon.W. (Dearne Valley) Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.) Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)
Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury) Snow, J. W. Winterbottom, Richard
Palmer, A. M. F. Sorensen, R. W. Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
Parker, J. Stewart, Michael (Fulham) Woof, R. E.
Parkin, B. T. Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich) Yates, V. (Ladywood)
Paton, John Stones, W. (Consett) Younger, Rt. Hon. K.
Pearson, A. Strachey, Rt. Hon. J. Zilliacus, K.
Plummer, Sir Leslie Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton) Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E. TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.) Sylvester, G. 0. Mr. John Taylor and Mr. Rogers.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause added to the Bill.