HC Deb 23 July 1956 vol 557 cc165-76

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. R. Thompson.]

10.14 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

When I sought the Adjournment debate in order to discuss recruiting for the Regular Forces, I had no idea that I should be fortunate enough to take an Adjournment on the same day as a debate on foreign policy.

I certainly did not think that my Adjournment debate would be a curtain raiser to a defence debate which, I understand, is to be held next week, when the Labour Party will be putting forward a policy from which I violently dissent. The facts are, however, that we have had today a debate which outlines a defence bill which the country has to meet. The view of my right hon. and hon. Friends is that the bill can be met by abolishing National Service in 1958 and recruiting about 200,000 Regulars for the Army. I shall not go into details, but I want to say categorically that I dissent from that policy.

It is four years—May, 1952—since, in an Adjournment debate, I pointed out the burden which National Service imposed on the young men of this country. I ventured the opinion that it would not be possible indefinitely for Britain to subscribe to a Commonwealth policy in which our young men did two years' National Service and the young Canadian nothing. Likewise, I expressed the view that I did not believe that N.A.T.O. would remain viable if the burdens of cost and the burdens of our young men were much greater than those of the other members of that organisation.

The purpose of my speech tonight springs from the fact that on 1st April the Government introduced a new pay code. It was a very bold and courageous step, a step which I supported, for the idea behind it was to spend about £67 million in the hope that internal and external recruiting would be so stimulated as to make possible the abolition of National Service after some years. Of course, only three months have passed and that is little enough time to form any hard and fast judgment. However, we have some information—and I think sufficient information—to form a tentative judgment.

The fact has to be faced that the improvement in recruiting—both prolongations and men coming into the Army from civilian life—is nothing like enough even to dream of getting rid of National Service. We have some figures which give us an idea of what would happen to the Army if National Service were abolished in 1958 and by 1960 the last National Service man had gone. Of about 89,000 young men who are serving on the three-year engagement, which was introduced in November, 1951, only 51 per cent. are prolonging their service.

That means that if National Service goes by 1961 we will probably have lost all of the three-year men but 5 per cent., and that the manpower ceiling, which, it was stated in the Defence White Paper, was expected to be 192,000 on 1st April, 1957. will have shrunk by 84,000 to about 108,000. I am not surprised, although disappointed, that there has not been an increase in prolongations of that category. The fact that there has been no improvement establishes beyond any shadow of a doubt that the three-year engagement is not a true Regular engagement in the sense that the pre-war Regular Army understood that term.

The three-year engagement is an extended National Service engagement. It is tied up with National Service and the option presented to a young man, when the time for his National Service comes along, is whether he will be paid at 4s. 6d. per day for the first 18 months and 7s. 6d. a day for the last six months, or whether he will take 9s. a day and do three years' service. Thirty thousand men a year have accepted 9s. a day and the three-year engagement. It is on that issue that we have a complaint against the Government, for great hopes were anchored to these new rates of pay. We know that it has not completely come off.

That strikes me as an astonishing fact. The last adjustment in March, 1954, amounted only to £16 million and this time it is £67 million—four times as much; yet it has not done the trick. One cannot be sure about it, but I believe that when young men are given the straight choice between 4s. 6d. a day and 9s. a day many will opt for the 9s. and the three-year engagement, but as soon as the Prime Minister goes to Norwich and Bradford and hints that National Service may be cut or terminated, and that is picked up by various hon. Members not only upon that side of the House but upon this, and some influential organs of the Press repeat it, the problem facing the young National Service man then is not a choice merely between 4s. 6d. and 9s. but between 9s. and three years in the Army and £10 or £12 a week and staying in civilian life.

I therefore beg the Secretary of State, the Minister of Defence and even the Prime Minister himself, whatever the Government's policy is to be, to tell the country, and particularly the young men who are facing their National Service, what the choice will be. If the Secretary of State for War cannot do it tonight, we must be told in the defence debate next week. In other words, the Government have spent £67 million on an incentive, and to that extent they put their foot upon the accelerator. But, at the same time, by spreading guesses about the duration and continuance of National Service, they put their foot on the brake. It is, therefore, clear that the lack of results in the first three months of the new pay code—which will be catastrophic if it continues—is, in large measure, the direct consequence of uncertainty which has been spread by Government statements.

There is not much to choose now between Government and Opposition, for the Opposition have said that they will get rid of National Service in 1958. Of course, they will do nothing of the kind. It merely means that they do not yet appreciate the facts. That is one reason why we are having this debate tonight. I hope that the Secretary of State will join forces with me in this matter in presenting the facts about our manpower position so that an informed public opinion can be built up.

Mr. Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire)

My hon. Friend has now become an inverted conscientious objector. He is now against the abolition of conscription.

Mr. Wigg

I have only a quarter of an hour in which to present my case. Next week I shall be pleased to cross swords with my hon. Friend. I always respect his views, and I hope that he will respect mine and allow me to make my speech without further interruption.

We now know the amount of the manpower bill and how it is to be met. When National Service ceases we shall have 192,000 Regulars, less 84,000 men on the three-year engagement who will have left the Army by 1961, which will give us a Regular Army of about 108,000. But there is another disappointing result which will further reduce this figure. In 1952, the right hon. Gentleman wisely introduced a long-term engagement of twenty-two years and gave young men the statutory right, after giving six months' notice, to leave the Army in three-year cycles—at intervals of three, six, nine years, and so on.

I thought that the number of young men who would stay on would be about 60 or 70 per cent., but, as I understand, only 12 per cent. have decided to stay in. This is really very disturbing, because those of us who know the Army know that for a private soldier to go through all the channels of communication from company sergeant major up to commanding officer in order to give six months' notice is a formidable business. One would have thought that the powers of inertia would have acted as a restraining influence. But a 12 per cent. continuance among the long-service men is a fact, and it seems to me that if the proposals to abolish National Service in 1958 are put into operation the country will be faced with a Regular Army whose strength is not much more than 100,000 men.

Let me do the sum in another way. Many of my right hon. and hon. Friends often argue that before the war we had a Regular Army with an annual recruitment figure of about 27,000. This gave us an Army of between 180,000 and 190,000 and they go on to argue that we ought to be able to do as well today. But what my hon. Friends forget is that considerable numbers of those recruited before the war were recruited from two depressed industries, the mines and agriculture, and now, of course, they are no longer depressed industries. Furthermore, men working in agriculture and mining are exempt from National Service. Looking at the pre-war figures, and making allowances for that change, I suggest that we could not expect to get more than 20,000 from that source. If 20,000 are recruited on a six-year engagement, that would give us a figure of only 120,000.

Let us look at it from a third angle. According to the Defence White Paper, the Government anticipate, in the current year, a recruiting figure of 42,000 for the Army. At present, there are 89,000 three-year men, which means that approximately 30,000 men a year undertake a three-year engagement. Abolish that engagement, and the recruiting figure is 12,000. Multiply that by six years and we get an estimate of 72,000, which is a very pessimistic figure indeed. Look at it as one may, we are driven to the irresistible conclusion, first, on the recruiting figures and, secondly, on the timetable, that if we abolish National Service in 1958 and the last National Service man is out in 1960 and the last three-year engagement man is out in 1961, we have then to spend at least six years building up a Regular force to its maximum. This brings us to 1967 and a Regular ceiling of 120,000 men.

Let us look at that proposition again. This is 1956. Supposing that the Secretary of State for War said tonight that the Government had examined the figures and were proposing to abolish the three-year engagement, and give further pay increases and extra bounties, and supposing that there was an overwhelming response, it would take six years from now to do the trick. However we look at it, my right hon. and hon. Friends have to face that in the most favourable circumstances there is a gap from 1958 to 1962, and then the target will not exceed 120,000.

We must not run away from the fact that this is a black picture. It is certainly a costly picture and in defence terms it does not give the country the results it needs. I do not propose to harp on this tonight, but I have held the view that the three-year engagement, if it failed, would ultimately present a very difficult problem. As I have indicated, I wholeheartedly support the policy, instituted by the Government, of sharpening the differential and giving more pay and improving conditions. That, I think, is the way to tackle the problem. But when increases of pay do not do the trick, and we are still left with the problem of the three years. and the certainty that if there is a popular clamour—and a not very informed clamour, may I say—to get rid of National Service, come what may—

Mr. Emrys Hughes

Hear, hear.

Mr. Wigg

My hon. Friend says, "Hear, hear". That is the difference between us. I respect his view. He does not want any defence. He does not mind an Army of 72,000 because. so far as he is concerned, it would be 72,000 too many. He holds that view and I hold mine, but I take it that the majority of hon. Members, and the people of this country, want an adequate defence force within our capacity to pay, and without breaking our backs economically.

Mr. Hughes

Impossible.

Mr. Wigg

As I have said many times before, I do not believe that a solution to this problem can be found on party lines. If either party seeks to make political capital out of this, in the long run the country will certainly be the losers. I have, therefore, pleaded over the last four years, and I plead again tonight, that the Government will come forward and say definitely what their manpower proposals are and how a solution to the problem should be sought. Having said that, they should seek the maximum amount of good will from both sides of the House to find a solution of what is an overwhelming and most difficult national problem.

10.30 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head)

The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has raised a complicated and, at the moment, somewhat controversial subject, and I have 14 minutes in which to attempt to give him some elucidation.

The hon. Gentleman referred to internal and external recruiting in the three Services. I think he would agree that he concentrated his remarks to a very large extent on the Army. I hope that the other two Services will not think me discourteous if I follow the hon. Gentleman to some extent, although I have all the information about them. It is true that the main user and the main justification for National Service at present is the Army.

At the outset, let me establish the currency in which I shall talk about this subject. One can talk about strengths in terms of all ranks, male other ranks, or male other ranks, women and boys. The best currency is to talk in terms of male other ranks. The officers can be taken as roughly 10 per cent. of the total of the strengths, which can be referred to in many different terms when discussing the subject of manpower.

I do not intend, in the limited time at my disposal, to go into the history of this subject, but I do not think that any remarks are relevant unless we recall the background. The broad history is that from 1945 up to the pay rises of 1950 was a period of difficulty. It was hoped that the pay rises of 1950 would put up recruiting, and enable the Army, at any rate, to retain long-service engagements. That was no so. Although recruiting went up it did not go up sufficiently. To meet our commitments we were forced to introduce the short-service engagement. It was impossible to have a pay rise in 1951, and it was always our plan that when the money was forthcoming for the next pay rise—they come at intervals of about five or six years—we should put the emphasis upon long service. That was what we did.

The thing that matters today, and is the most relevant side of the problem, is the rate of prolongation and the number of men who are recruiting on the new six to nine-year engagement. In the Navy, 35 per cent. were seven-year men up to the time of the pay rise. Only 6 per cent. of the seven-year men were prolonging, whereas the Navy's optimum requirement is 50 per cent. In the Army, the 22–23–year men showed only 7½ per cent. of prolongations, whereas the ideal—although not the target—is 33 per cent. In the Royal Air Force, only 1 per cent. of the three-year men and 3 per cent. of the four-year men were prolonging; and 55 per cent. of the ground tradesmen and specialists were National Service men, or men on three or four-year short service engagements.

The next thing that occurred was the pay increases, which had the object of increasing the long-service element, and of obtaining more recruits for long service engagements. It is early to say, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, what the results will be, but certain things are already apparent.

The first is that the total number of recruits has increased. The figures for the Navy for April/May, 1956, are 1,499 as against 1,246 for the corresponding period of last year. That is nothing spectacular. The figure for the Army is 7,108 as against 5,597; and for the R.A.F. 3,755 as against 3,086. That, again, is not spectacular, but it is satisfactory, if it holds.

Nobody, at this stage, can forecast whether that gradual climb will hold, whether it will level out, or, as was the case in 1950, will sink. Apart from the actual numbers who are coming in on recruiting both for the long-term and the short-term, the prolongations have been encouraging. The Navy's prolongations have shown a real trend upwards, well in excess of that which obtained before these pay rises were made.

In the Army, the monthly man years gained in 1955 were, on the average, 5,350. The average for April and May, 1956, was 27,250—five times as much. It is admitted that we are eating into something that may not continue, because we are eating up the pool there, but there has been a very marked increase in prolongations. In the Air Force, prolongations have taken a turn for the better; and of the 6,000 due out, in April and May 900 have prolonged, which is, again, a definite improvement on what has happened before.

This is of interest and relevant; but what I think the hon. Gentleman was getting at, and in a way was his main purpose in raising the question, was its relevance to National Service. It is not my job and, indeed, it could not be my job on this occasion—to say anything about the Government's policy on National Service. That is a matter of high policy which will no doubt be discussed in the House later.

However, I can give certain factual information which I think is extremely relevant to the question of National Service, which, I know, is of burning interest to a number of hon. Members. I can give this information best, and, I think, most clearly, if I use the Army as a guinea pig. To do it for all three Services would be extremely diffuse and highly complicated. The deductions which hon. Members draw from the factual information I give are purely their own; but this information I can give. I am speaking in terms of male all ranks, excluding officers and women and boys.

The strength of the Army today is 360,000. As hon. Gentlemen who follow the subject know, we are in the process of a planned run-down. In April, 1957, our strength will be 335,000. By April, 1958, our planned run-down will bring us to 310,000. Let as assume for the purposes of this purely factual examination that National Service were to be abolished, as certain hon. Gentlemen have advocated, in April, 1958. Let us then trace what happens on, as far as possible, a purely factual basis. We will have to make certain assumptions, but I am trying to be factual.

The strength in April, 1958, will be 310,000. By April, 1960, two years later, we shall have lost—and this is factual—150,000 National Service men. They will have completed their time and gone out. I do not think anybody can argue with that. That means that in April, 1960, there will remain 160,000 men in the Army. In addition, by April, 1961, we shall have lost the three-year men, less those three-year men who prolong. Making an allowance of 10 per cent.—any hon. Member can argue whether that is too much, but I think those who have studied the subject will say that it is a fair allowance—that means that we shall lose another 80,000 men, because their total is about 90,000.

Therefore, by April, 1961, three years after abolishing National Service, we should have in the Army 80,000 men: but that is without allowing for Regular recruitment between now and 1961, so we have about five years' worth of Regular recruitment to allow for against that 80,000 to which we should have run down. We have to allow for Regular recruitment of the six- and nine-year men, plus prolongations within the Army, which extends the numbers; less wastage of those who have left. Here we come to a speculative matter, and I admit it; but if we take it at the kind of trend which it looks as if it might follow—which I do not think is wildly optimistic or pessimistic, but just a guess—we might allow for a 40,000 or 50,000 increase by Regular recruitment and prolongations. That would give us a total in the Army in 1961 of between 120,000 and 130,000.

Hon. Gentlemen are apt to tie a Minister to his words, and to quote him, even a long time hence. I do not want hon. Gentlemen to misunderstand: I am trying to make a reasonable appreciation of the problem. I think that unless there is a spectacular success in recruiting, or unless recruiting is a spectacular flop, that figure is a fair estimate. I am not saying it is right: it is a guess that there will be between 120,000 and 130,000 in the Army in 1961, that is, three years, after abolishing National Service.

A responsible Government, having to decide upon such a course in 1958, must consider these estimates. Hon. Gentlemen who have to study defence and all these matters must consider them, too. We have to consider, with the tail, the teeth and the commitments, whether or not we could run the Army with 120,000 or 130,000. I do not wish to dictate to hon. Gentlemen. I can only say that if I, as Secretary of State for War, had to run the Army, with its tail, its teeth and our commitments, with 120,000 or 130,000, I should say, "It cannot possibly be done." I do not know whether he would, but I think the hon. Gentleman the Member for Dudley would say that it could not be done.

Although we may say that 120,000 or 130,000 is too small a number, it must be borne in mind that we do not complete the recruiting cycle until 1965. In 1956 we start a nine-year engagement and a six-year engagement, and we do not get the best out of it until the first nine-year man to join is going out. That will be in 1965; so the tank will not be full until 1965. The 1961 figure will, I hope, be considerably exceeded by the end of 1965. That is so speculative, relating to a time ten years ahead, that I shall not give a figure; but I hope and believe that it will be considerably in excess of the 1961 figure.

What I am trying to do is to demonstrate in reply to the hon. Gentleman, that if we abolished National Service in 1958, we should go through a trough: the number falls and then climbs again, and its peak is in 1965. Nobody can responsibly think for a moment that we can completely abolish National Service, when there is that trough, through the loss of National Service and the three-year men, before the six-year and nine-year men have filled the tank. It is impracticable.

Mr. Emrys Hughesrose—

Mr. Head

I cannot give way. I have only a minute, and I am in rather a hurry.

There are feelings on that side of the House, and there may be on this side too, that the War Office, or the generals, or even I, like National Service. We have tried to analyse why it is difficult to get Regulars in the Army; the healthiest Army would be an all-Regular Army. One of the main causes of men leaving the Army is the rush of National Service men into and out of it; 200,000—half the Army—have been National Service men. We should be happier if we had an all-Regular Army. The last thing we want to do is to hang on to National Service, and have a lot of men: we would far rather have fewer men, and an all-Regular Army.

I have tried to point out as factually and objectively as I can, how the sudden abolition of National Service, in the circumstances in which we are today, seems to me wildly impracticable.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at sixteen minutes to Eleven o'clock.