TITLE

HC Deb 15 July 1955 vol 543 cc2255-72

The Attorney-General

I beg to move. in line 2, after "to" to insert: amend the law as to costs in and transfers to the High Court. This Amendment to the Title is required in view of the new Clause dealing with transfer of proceedings, and it is also desirable to pick up the reference to costs.

Amendment agreed to.

11.29 a.m.

The Attorney-General

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

I believe that this Bill will be useful and that it is a good Bill. I am grateful to all hon. Members who, in Committee, have helped to polish it up and make it even better than when originally introduced; although I think that the improvements are what I call polishing improvements rather than improvements which go to the root of the Measure.

If you will permit me, Mr. Speaker. I should like now to express our thanks to the members of the Austin Jones Committee and of the Evershed Committee for the work they did. It has enabled us—after, I must admit, some lapse of time—to bring a Measure of this sort before the House. It is a Measure which, I believe, will be of great value in the administration of justice and will, one hopes, tend towards a reduction in the cost of litigation.

11.30 a.m.

Mr. E. Fletcher

On this side of the House I am sure that we all appreciate what the Attorney-General has just said. We, too, believe that the Bill is a good Bill and that it has been considerably improved in Committee. There may still be some points of detail about which some of my hon. Friends would have wished that the Bill had emerged in a slightly different form. For example, some of us would have preferred that the cushion figure should have been £250 and not £300. But the Government have made a notable concession in having responded to the wishes very generally expressed on both sides of the House and in both sections of the profession that there should be a cushion.

There is also the debatable question whether there should be appeals on questions of fact from the county court to the Court of Appeal. Opinion is divided on that subject, and I think, divided not on political lines. The Government have adopted the recommendations of the Evershed Committee that there should be appeals on questions of fact, and we hope that that will work successfully, but we also hope that it will be treated as an experiment and that its working will be watched.

Having said that, I want to turn to an aspect of this Third Reading stage which seems to me to be of cardinal importance. The blessing which we have given on this side of the House to the Bill is conditional, and I think this is the occasion to emphasise the condition on which it is based. The condition on which we are supporting this Bill is that legal aid will be extended to the county court and that legal aid will be so extended to the county court in a way which will enable the Bill to be operated successfully, as it is designed, for the benefit of poor litigants.

This question arises under Clause 7, and it is this Clause to which I want to draw particular attention because it will be appreciated that this Bill does not come into operation immediately. It will not come into operation until an appointed day is fixed by the Lord Chancellor. It was a tacit assumption; it may have been an expressed statement—I have not checked it—made by the Attorney-General and I think by the Solicitor-General also, that this Bill would not be brought into operation under Clause 7 until legal aid is also extended to the county court.

The Attorney-General

I said so expressly in moving the Second Reading.

Mr. Fletcher

I am very grateful to the Attorney-General.

It has been expressly stated that the Bill will not be brought into operation until legal aid has been extended to the county court. It is not enough to leave the matter there. It is also important—and I hope the Attorney-General will give his mind to this—to see that before legal aid is introduced into the county court the present administration of legal aid is improved and that the abuses which have come to light and of which the Attorney-General is aware are changed, because if we are to have legal aid in the county court it must be administered in a more sympathetic way and on a different scale from the legal aid administered in the High Court.

A number of my hon. Friends and I have received a good many communications on this subject since the Second Reading. I am, in fact, continually receiving complaints about the unduly high assessments on legal aid in respect of cases administered in the High Court, and I very much hope——

Mr. Speaker

The hon. Member is now going a little wide of the Third Reading. He has made his point, I think. He really cannot discuss legal aid on the Third Reading of the Bill, not in any detail.

Mr. Fletcher

With great respect, Mr. Speaker, I am always, as you know, the last to challenge your Ruling but I do wish to make this submission. On a Friday morning the House has plenty of time. There is no other Government business on the Order Paper after this Order. We are not a very full House, and there are not a great many Members wishing to speak. I submit with the greatest respect to you, Mr. Speaker, that this is perfectly in order and perfectly proper on the Third Reading. As a matter of convenience to the House, I am trying to make a point which is the basis on which this Bill is being given a Third Reading.

May I make this suggestion? If I am not allowed to make this point on Third Reading, the only consequence will be that I shall have to make it on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House when the Third Reading has been carried. If that is the case, I should like to give notice to the Law Officers of the Crown now that, subject to any other matters which you may have called for the Adjournment today, I want to raise this question about the administration of legal aid before the House adjourns. I only say that because I want to illustrate to you, Sir, for whom I have the greatest respect, that I am entitled to raise this matter before the House adjourns, and it seemed to me that it would be more convenient and in order and germane to raise it now.

Mr. Janner

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it not in order on a Third Reading debate, in trying to assist the House to come to a conclusion, to say whether what is in the Bill under discussion is good or bad and why it is good or bad?

In those circumstances, would it not be in order to say, as my hon. Friend has been saying, that this Bill, when it becomes an Act of Parliament, will depend for its strength or weakness upon certain rules which may be brought in under the Legal Aid and Advice Act? Surely that is material. It does not suggest any amendment to the Act itself. It merely refers to the strength or the advantage or the disadvantage of what is contained in the Bill as it now stands.

Mr. David Weitzman (Stoke Newington and Hackney, North)

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I respectfully submit to you that the question of legal aid may well be raised on the Third Reading, for this reason. We can speak presumably on any provision contained in the Bill on Third Reading. Clause 7 (1) specifically says: Sections one to four of this Act shall come into force on such day as may be appointed by order of the Lord Chancellor … The learned Attorney-General has expressly stated that this Measure is subject to an express undertaking with regard to bringing in the provisions of the Legal Aid and Advice Act in the county court. I respectfully submit in those circumstances that it is surely in order to ask any question in connection with legal aid, in view of provision of Clause 7 (1) and the express statement made by the Attorney-General.

Mr. Speaker

The House will realise that I am as much bound by the rules of order as hon. Members. On the Third Reading of a Bill, as hon. Members are aware, the rules are that one can discuss only what is in the Bill. The hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) founded what he had to say correctly upon Clause 7 (2). I think there is something to be said for that, and I was quite prepared to listen to what he had to say about the advantages of legal aid applied to the county courts. I gather, however, that the hon. Member was going on to discuss the present administration of legal aid, because he was telling us of complaints which he had received about its maladministration. That must be out of order on Third Reading of this Bill. I know that there is plenty of time, but that does not permit me to escape from the rules of order, which I have to enforce.

Mr. Fletcher

I am obliged to you for your Ruling, Mr. Speaker. If I may say so, it is a very sympathetic Ruling, which takes account of the fact that the House is not unduly pressed this morning.

Mr. Speaker

The hon. Member should not say that I am entitled to take that into account. I am not.

Mr. Fletcher

I think that within your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, I shall be able effectively to make the point which I wish to make.

Our welcome to the Bill is conditional not merely upon the introduction of legal aid to the county courts, which has been promised, but upon its introduction in the county courts in a form which is different from the legal aid at present available in the High Court. It is admitted on both sides that it would have been wrong to increase the jurisdiction of the county courts as long as legal aid was available in the High Court but not available in the county court. The Bill considerably extends the jurisdiction of the county courts and we are postponing its application until a date in the future to be determined by the extension of legal aid in the county courts.

I think I am entitled to say this on Third Reading: In our view, it will not be sufficient to bring this Bill into operation merely by extending to the county court legal aid in its present form in the High Court. I want to support that argument by reminding the Law Officers of the Crown, as my hon. Friends and I have had occasion to remind them before, that legal aid in the High Court is not working out at all satisfactorily.

If the Bill is to have the desired effect of giving extended jurisdiction in the county courts and making it available to people of poor means and of humble status, who will litigate in the county courts, it is essential that the bringing into operation of the Bill should be postponed until the Law Officers have considered the abuses and injustices which are resulting from the legal aid system at present. They are aware of the numerous cases in which people have been assessed for sums which they find the greatest difficulty in paying, and in which legal-aided litigants have had to pay more than they would have paid had they not been given legal aid.

I have had letters from constituents who complain that they have been ruined by legal aid and would have been much better off without it. Under legal aid as at present administered—and this must be cured before it is introduced into the county courts—they are assessed for contribution on a maximum basis and there is, therefore, no inducement to the professional advisers to keep the costs as low as possible.

That criticism of the present working of legal aid will become more acute in the county courts because, ex-hypothesi, the cases in which legal aid will be required in the county courts are cases in which the amounts involved are smaller and the costs involved should be smaller. It will, therefore, not be right or just to apply the existing system whereby every legal-aided litigant makes a contribution according to the maximum amount he can afford to pay. Such a system would work unjustly. I am pressing the point with some emphasis only because it has not emerged at all during the debate.

The Attorney-General

On a point of order. The hon. Gentleman says that the point has not emerged during the debate. Surely it is not in order, Sir, to discuss the operation of the regulation concerning assessment of means.

Mr. Speaker

The subject of legal aid is connected with the Bill in the sense that the Bill will not be introduced until legal aid is extended to the county courts; and that provides a tenuous thread between that subject and the Third Reading of the Bill. Nevertheless, I am bound to say that I cannot see that what the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) is now saying can possibly be in order on Third Reading. He suggested another course which he might adopt. That has nothing to do with me. I am bound to keep the debate on Third Reading within the limits of what is in the Bill. While I realise the force of the hon. Member's observations—I am not concerned with that at all but with their relevance to Third Reading—I think he is going wide of the Bill.

Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas

I am sure that nobody wants to bring forward matters which might be embarrassing at this stage and which might not be suitable for full consideration at the moment. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) is not pressing what he says in that way. I am sorry the Attorney-General felt that he had done so in his last sentence.

On the other hand, as the Bill is conditional upon the introduction of legal aid, I suggest with great respect that it is in order for my hon. Friend to outline the nature of the legal aid upon which it should be conditional, although I appreciate, as he appreciates, that it is undesirable to go too far outside the limits of the Bill. I respectfully suggest that it would be in order for him to indicate the nature of the legal aid involved and to say that legal aid as at present administered would not be suitable to be the legal aid conditional upon which the Bill is to be brought into operation.

The Attorney-General

I did not raise the point of order out of any sense of embarrassment, because I have answered the points raised by the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) on many occasions and, no doubt, will deal with them on many future occasions. I asked for your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, for this reason: the Bill does not deal with legal aid but merely with the extension of county court jurisdiction, and I wanted your Ruling on whether it was in order on Third Reading to debate the operation of legal aid in its present form, so that I might know the position when I replied to the debate.

On Second Reading, I made what I hope was a not inappropriate observation about legal aid, but the Bill does not deal with legal aid and the hon. Member for Islington, East is now beginning to discuss the operation of the assessment regulations which are part and parcel of the present legal aid system. I was merely suggesting, with great respect, that that is not in order on Third Reading of a Bill such as this.

Mr. Weitzman

Further to that point of order. The House is being asked to give its blessing to the Third Reading of the Bill and we on this side of the House are doing so specifically because of the express opinion of the Attorney-General that legal aid would be implemented in the county courts. Our agreement and approval of the Bill are entirely subject to that.

How can we possibly discuss the merits of the Third Reading unless we discuss the basis upon which that legal aid is to be given? Is it not in order to criticise the existing system of legal aid and to suggest what sort of provisions ought to apply in granting legal aid to implement the provisions of the Bill in the county courts? Our approval is given only upon that basis and I respectfully submit that criticism of the legal aid system is, therefore, in order.

Mr. Speaker

I really must rule on this. I am sure that I am right about it and I must ask the House to obey the rules of order. The rules on what is relevant and what is not relevant on Third Reading do not depend upon any condition, expressed or implied, by which hon. Members in various parts of the House give their support to the Bill. That is not the point. What we have to consider is what is relevant to the Bill as it stands at this moment.

Although I allowed the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) to make what use he could of Clause 7, I must rule that a discussion on the administration of legal aid would be quite out of order on this Bill now. The Bill does not deal with legal aid. I have been told that in some way legal aid in the future is a condition of the Bill coming into effect, but that does not permit a discussion of legal aid as such. The hon. Member must take some other course to discuss this matter. He cannot do it on the Third Reading of this Bill.

Mr. Fletcher

I am grateful for your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and will not depart from it. I will not discuss any further the way in which legal aid is at present administered, but I should like here and now to give notice to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that when we have finished the Third Reading debate, subject to other matters being discussed on the Adjournment, I shall raise the question then.

I conclude my observations on Third Reading by saying that we all welcome the Bill. We welcome the assurance that its provisions will not be introduced until legal aid has been introduced into the county court, but we shall not be satisfied unless the abuses of the present system of legal aid in the High Court have been changed before it is extended to the county court.

11.53 a.m.

Mr. Janner

While, of course, I must abide by your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and although we shall have an opportunity of speaking again on this subject later, I shall vote for the Third Reading of the Bill with considerable reluctance.

In Committee and in earlier stages I raised questions on the subject of legal aid. I said then, as I still believe, that the whole benefit of the Bill depends entirely upon the manner in which poor persons in the county court will be able to utilise its provisions. That is something which the Attorney-General has never yet really understood. We have consistently asked him to tell us what he intends to do, but all we have heard is, wait and see. Wait and see is the policy of the Attorney-General and the Government when we ask them to let us know what they have in mind.

I am very disappointed. I think that the provisions of the Bill are very important. A poor person, or any litigant, who goes to the county court is entitled to have the very best possible advice and advocacy on his behalf. Points of law are just as involved and complicated there. If a person is applying for a smaller sum within the province of the county court he is just as entitled as a person applying for a very large sum by way of damages or otherwise in the High Court, to have the best advice and proper law administered in the fullest sense of the term.

As we are pushing into the county court a lot of things which, otherwise, would have been dealt with by High Court procedure and by a High Court judge, we have to be extremely careful that we do not place in the hands of the Government a Measure which, if not carried out in that spirit, will be a disadvantage rather than an advantage.

You have held, Mr. Speaker, that we should not at the moment discuss in detail questions of legal aid, but there is another question I want to raise. I do not want to transgress the rules in these matters, but there is something which has been brought into the Bill in relation to scales of costs, and that is very relevant. That, too, will bear precisely on the point I am trying to make. Whether the Measure is of any use or not, or of more value or less value, will, to a considerable extent, depend on what scales of costs are available for those who plead on behalf of plaintiffs and defendants in the county court. We have heard nothing about that from the Government. Perhaps that is a matter which also may be dealt with on the Adjournment. I shall certainly raise it then if I cannot do so now.

Why does not the Attorney-General tell us what he intends to do about helping people who go to the county court, so that we can decide to vote for the Third Reading or not?

11.56 a.m.

Mr. Charles Doughty (Surrey, East)

Now that we have reached the concluding stages of this Bill, I rise to give it my blessing in its final form. Although it is called the County Courts Bill, in fact it does not only affect county courts but all the courts of the land. That is because one of its provisions is what really amounts to a penal Clause against those who bring a number of actions in the High Court which at present they are in a position to bring. The result must be that there will be fewer actions in the High Court. We hope that when parties set down actions in the High Court they will reach trial at a more rapid rate than at present.

Another effect must be an increase in the number of actions in the county court. Very rightly and properly, the Bill provides for the appointment of additional county court judges. I hope we shall hear from the Attorney-General that those judges will be appointed before or at the same time as the Bill comes into effect so that the immediate increase of work which must result may have the necessary judicial staff ready to deal with it and that this will not merely result in a congestion in the county court subsequently to be relieved by the appointment of judges.

I said that the Bill has my blessing, I meant the alterations in the latter part of Clause 1 dealing with a question raised by myself and others on Second Reading—the question of the cushion. In its original form, the Bill was wholly unacceptable in the provision it made in that respect, because it put litigants and advisers in an impossible position. I join with those who from all parts of the House have congratulated the Law Officers on listening to those who have made helpful criticism which has resulted in improvements and amendments to the Bill.

I want to draw attention to the provisions of Clause 1 (5) giving power by Order in Council to increase the scales of county court jurisdiction. I am sure it is wise to put in that provision. If by any chance the value of money should increase, or if county court jurisdiction should be increased, it is necessary to act in this manner rather than by coming to the House for leave to introduce a further Bill. I am sure it is not intended that as soon as this Bill is passed its substance and essence should be immediately changed by passing an Order in Council raising the jurisdiction to the amount set out in the subsection. Hon. Members of this House had in mind that county court jurisdiction should be increased to £400 and no more. If at some future date that is required to be altered, it would have to be well in the future. I hope the Government will not use the powers of that subsection immediately to increase the jurisdiction of the county court.

I also welcome the fact that there is now to be an appeal on questions of fact from decisions of the judges of the county court. Up to now they have been the sole judges on questions of fact—and I should like here and now to give great praise to that hardworking body of men who are our county court judges. But nobody, however good, is infallible. If at any time they should make a mistake on a question of fact, it is only right that the Court of Appeal, which has more time and can go into these questions in greater detail, should have power in proper cases to reverse those decisions of fact.

A number of the Clauses of the Bill deal with special matters and special jurisdiction and I should not like to go through them in great detail in the time available today. Subject to what I have said, I certainly give the Bill in its final stages my unqualified blessing.

12.1 p.m.

Mr. Weitzman

I should like to add one or two words on Third Reading. I, too, agree that this is a very good and much improved Bill, having regard to the changes which have been made during its passage. In view of your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, I should not dream of going in detail into the question of legal aid, but I emphasise what my hon. Friends have said and I ask the Attorney-General to appreciate that, as far as this side of the House is concerned, we realise that the successful working of the Bill must depend upon the implementation of the Legal Aid Scheme in a proper and satisfactory form. One must realise that there are many unsatisfactory features which will have to be looked into; and apart from that, there is also the question, which must be very carefully considered, of legal advice for people who bring actions in the county court.

12.2 p.m.

Sir Patrick Spens (Kensington, South)

I have taken no part in the proceedings on the Bill up to date, and I did not intend to do so until I had seen it in its final shape. I want, however, to take up a point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Surrey, East (Mr. Doughty) and the question as to what will be the result of the Bill. While the arrears of litigation in every country have been growing for at least two generations, my experience far away was that the arrears of litigation were on a scale unknown in this country.

I appreciate that the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and other people are gravely concerned at the delays that take place in the disposal of business in the superior courts in this country, and quite rightly so. But those delays are delays of months, whereas my experience has been delays of years; and in 90 per cent. of the cases that came up to the highest court for disposal, the parties generally had to be rearranged because the original litigants, and even some of their successors, had died years before. We have nothing whatever like that in this country, but I emphasise that delay in litigation is the very worst thing that can possibly happen.

One hon. Member used the expression that we were pushing down to the county court a lot of business from the High Court. In a sense that may be so, but what I am much more concerned about is that it is perfectly obvious that the moment the Bill gets working, there will be an immense increase of litigation in the county courts. Whether the contemplated 15 extra judges will be sufficient, I do not know. If one adds legal aid on the lines for which hon. Members, very properly, are pressing, the stream of litigation may be something terrific. I view with grave apprehension the enormous flow of additional litigation in this country, particularly what I call, quite frankly, the very speculative litigation assisted by legal aid. Those in charge of the administration of the law will have to watch with great anxiety and care the results which finally emerge from the Bill.

I welcome the Bill because I feel that under present circumstances there are persons with personally good causes of action which they cannot have litigated, and it is a serious personal complaint when that happens. But I view with apprehension the enormously increased litigation which may result from the Bill. Therefore, while I welcome it, I do so subject to very different reasons from those expressed by hon. Members opposite.

12.5 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton (Brixton)

I have always viewed with some misgiving the provision in Clause 1 of the Bill which will enable the Government, whenever they think fit, to alter the maximum limit in the county courts. I am reinforced in my apprehension by what has just been said by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens).

It is quite obvious that there will be a large influx in cases into the county courts. Why, in those circumstances, the Government should reserve to themselves the right to raise the limit and to that extent increase the number of cases coming within the jurisdiction of the county court, is something I cannot understand. This point has been stressed in previous stages of the Bill. The Attorney-General was adamant on the subject. He insists upon the Government having this power by Order in Council, although I still do not believe that he has made out a sufficiently strong case to justify this most unusual provision—and it is an unusual provision—in legislation of this kind.

The main reason I support the Bill is that we have had an assurance from the Attorney-General that at the time when the Bill is operated, the Legal Aid Scheme will be introduced. The one provision without the other would not serve any purpose at all and some of us are justified in our fears that the Bill that we are now asked to approve cannot properly operate until various other Measures are taken, into which it is not possible for me to go at the present time.

Some of us have had a little experience of the invaluable work that is rendered to litigants in the county courts. It would appear that the Bill will extend the usefulness of county courts and county court judges. Coupled with the legal aid provisions that are to be introduced, there is every possibility that the Bill will serve a really useful purpose.

12.8 p.m.

Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas

I wish to associate the Opposition with the Attorney-General's remarks about the Evershed Report and the Austin Jones Report. They have provided the invaluable basis for the Bill and an invaluable basis for a good deal of law reform which I hope in due course will be carried out. A tremendous amount of work has been put into these Reports and they provide a fund from which we can draw to our advantage.

The Bill has been a non-party Bill and has been treated as such. On behalf of my hon. Friends and myself, I thank the Attorney-General for his acceptance of the substantial improvements that have been suggested during our discussions on the Bill. There has been a rather different approach by the Government from the approach which we on this side favour. The emphasis on the Government side has rather been upon administrative convenience, whereas our approach certainly is an approach, not in favour of administrative convenience, but in favour of providing an efficient, cheap court, where there is no delay, for the small people who have to resort to litigation.

The Government's attitude was at its worst on the question of the cushion. It was only after every hon. Member had spoken in the debate on both sides of the House—and I certainly pay my tribute to those on the Government benches who joined with us in pressing this matter—that eventually the Government, after obstinately resisting pressure to bring in the cushion, conceded it.

I am very glad that they did so, and I wish to thank the Attorney-General for eventually taking that course. The argument which he put forward for resisting it on Second Reading was that it was essential to push into the county courts, as a matter of administrative convenience, a good deal of the work which is now in the High Court. With the greatest respect, I cannot share the enthusiasm of the Attorney-General for relieving the pressure on the High Court, because the Chancery Division at the moment is certainly not overpowered with pressure of work. I understand that even the Queen's Bench Division is not over-pressed with arrears of litigation.

There is the consideration that work which is diverted from the High Court into the county courts will certainly lead —and I entirely agree with the observations made by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens)—to a great deal of pressure of work in the county courts. It is essential, in our view, to have the county courts efficient, cheap and free from delay. Those three tests are the tests which we bring to assessing the value of this Bill. Unfortunately, of course, much of the answer is not to be found within the four corners of this Bill. Much of the answer will be provided by the way in which the Government administer the Bill itself.

On the question of delay, we debated this matter, and there were very different views expressed about the question of appeal on fact. I recognise the strength of what the hon. and learned Member for Surrey, East (Mr. Doughty) said about it. But we must not lose sight of the fact that it is desirable in these small cases to keep litigation cheap, to reduce appeals to the minimum, and to provide the final answer with the minimum of delay.

I must say that I approach this question of appeal on fact, which is now given for the first time from the county courts, with considerable misgivings. I am not surprised that my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher), with his usual candour, has changed his mind upon this subject. It is a difficult subject, one which exercises all of us, and it is a question on which we may very well come down on one side or the other. But whatever our views may be, and whichever way we may eventually come down on this, it is obviously of the greatest importance that the Government should watch how these appeals work in practice.

I hope that the Government will see that statistics are available as a result of the working of the Bill to show how far appeals are made on fact from county courts, how far they are successful, and how far they fail, so that this House shall, in due course, be able to have adequate information on which to review appeals on questions of fact. We do not want to be faced later with the kind of answer on appeals on fact which we had on the extent to which the county court was used for litigation which should have been brought within the county court, cases where less than £100 was recovered in contract and less than £50 in tort in the High Court. We want the facts made available for us when the opportunity comes to us to reconsider this. I hope that we shall not be told, on a later occasion, that the information as to the extent to which appeals on fact are made, and the extent to which they are successful, is not available at all.

On the matter of delay in the county courts, to which I was glad to see the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South brought such forceful attention, it was a matter which concerned us in Committee on the Bill, when we moved for an increase of judges to be available for county courts. I will tell the Attorney-General what perturbs me about the Government's attitude to this question. The Government obviously contemplate that there will be more work in the county courts. They provide for more judges, but the whole of the basis of the assessment which they made in this Bill for the increase of judges appears to be merely to deal with the increased litigation which will be brought in the county courts as a result of this Bill.

What we are anxious to ensure on this side of the House is that there shall be enough judges available to avoid the appalling delays which already occur in the county courts, when cases get put off month after month, instances of which have been given by my hon. Friends from their own experience. We should like to see enough judges available to abolish that kind of delay, which results in inefficiency, and is very hard both upon the county court judges themselves, upon the litigants and upon everyone else engaged in the cases.

The question of cheapness is, of course, bound up with legal aid. I am not going to say anything much about legal aid, except to say that it is, of course, an extremely valuable contribution to administrating and achieving justice. In the speech, with which, if I may say so, I was very much in agreement, made by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South, I regretted his reference to speculative actions under legal aid. It is very easy to bandy about dramatic words of this kind. It is an entirely different matter to substantiate them.

The statistics on legal aid show quite clearly that, so far from their being speculative actions, the actions taken under legal aid have been justified up to the hilt by the very large proportion of successes which have resulted from legal aid cases. We have the provision that these matters are carefully considered by committees, by professional gentlemen, before they are brought to the courts at all. I regret that the right hon. and learned Gentleman—and I know that it is very easy to slip into this kind of thing on the spur of the moment—used this unfortunate phrase.

We see in the Bill a provision for raising the financial limit of county court jurisdiction, and that that is to be done by Order in Council. It is a feature of the Bill to which, of course, we take exception. If inflation goes on as it is going on at present, the Attorney-General will have to get a move on in applying this Order in Council procedure to keep up with the inflation promoted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I hope he will not hesitate to use his powers by Order in Council, but, at the same time, I think it would have been very much more appropriate to have brought these matters before the House by way of Bills, so that we could have considered in detail the very important effects of the administration of the Bill.

It is unfortunate that there is this escape clause for the Government. Of course, it is a favourite Governmental device, but it is unfortunate that in the Bill there is this escape clause of the procedure by Order in Council, because the House will not have the opportunity it otherwise would have had for full consideration of these consequential proposals.

From what has been said in this debate it is quite clear that the administration of the Bill is, perhaps, more important than the legislation itself, because the effect of the legislation will depend upon administration. It is for that reason that I, amongst others, deplore the device of resorting to Order in Council for raising the limit, and the Government's using that device instead of proceeding by way of Bill.

Taking the Bill as a whole, I consider that it is a valuable Bill. It is certainly one which we support, and we on this side would like to thank all those who have co-operated in furthering it. Not least I should like to thank the Attorney-General for his acceptance of some of the Amendments which have been moved.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.