§ The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head)I wish, Sir, with your permission, and that of the House, to make a statement arising out of yesterday's debate.
I stated yesterday that on 19th January a signal was sent from the War Office to America. The War Office said that they agreed to standardise on the .280 bore and develop the F.N. rifle; that is to say, they made a choice then, in 1951, between the E.M.2 and the F.N.—the Belgian rifle—and they chose the F.N.
In response to requests by hon. Members opposite, I said that, provided there was no security objection, I would give the text of the signal.
The following is the signal:
Date: 19th January, 1951Sender: The War Office.Recipient: The British Joint Services Mission, Washington.The contents are as follows:Personal for Ritchie from Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff.One. Executive Committee of the Army Council have considered under two courses Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces proposal that United Kingdom adopt M1 rifle (Garand) and M2 ammunition (.300).Course A. To accept production of this interim weapon and ammunition in the United Kingdom. This course would entail either acceptance of complete range of United States small arms or conversion of our machine guns to United States calibre.Course B. United Kingdom to rely on United States for supply of complete range of small arms and ammunition during interim period until final calibre selected.Two. Course A. Would entail another change in the not too distant future to the improved range of weapons. United Kingdom economy could NOT withstand two changes in production within this short period.Course B. Strategical implications and resultant closing down of United Kingdom small arms production potential unacceptable. Detailed reasons covering both courses follow by air.Three. Executive Committee of the Army Council instruct that you inform United States authorities at the appropriate time that these possibilities have been carefully examined but regretfully rejected.Paragraph 4—and this is the relevant paragraph—states:Further action. Our object remains complete standardisation on FN and .280 as recommended by Joint Report. Shoosmith to stand by this at meeting of Senior Standardisation 215 Officers. As a matter of principle considered important Senior Standardisation Officers meet even though agreement unlikely.
§ Mr. StracheyDoes not the Secretary of State realise that that telegram was sent in the hope that the United States Government would accept both the .280 round and the Belgian rifle? In that event, of course, the standardisation by us on those weapons would certainly have had to be considered, but, in the event, both those hopes were falsified and the United States rejected—and still reject—the .280 round and the Belgian rifle. In the event, therefore, neither of the propositions contained in the signal was considered either by the Army Council, the Ministry of Defence or the Government, because this eventually did not arise.
Therefore, will not the Secretary of State now unreservedly withdraw—[Interruption.]—the House had better wait perhaps until I finish the sentence—unreservedly withdraw the allegation which he made yesterday that any member of the late Administration at any time authorised or accepted the adoption of the Belgian rifle?
§ Mr. HeadI stated yesterday, first of all, that when standardisation on the .280 round had seemed possible, the policy of the War Office—and I stress that—had been to accept the F.N. rifle;that is to say, under similar circumstances the policy had been the same as ours. I stated that this policy was a matter which I assumed came under the right hon. Gentleman. Since I have been in this job, I have accepted responsibility for all matters, large or small; and I have never admitted, in matters which it would have been almost impossible for me to know, that the state of ignorance in such matters was any excuse which reduced my own responsibility. That signal stated that standardisation on 280 would be accepted on the F.N. That, in my view, stands fair and square on the shoulders of the late Secretary of State.
§ Mr. StracheyThe Secretary of State did not say that yesterday. He said, as reported in Hansard, that my right hon. Friend the then Minister of Defence made this decision and accepted the rifle. There are the words, in column 100 of yesterday's Hansard, "The right hop. Gentleman did." This is an allegation which has been proved, by the right hon. Gentleman's 216 own reading of the signal, to be totally unfounded. If the hypothesis mentioned in the signal—the acceptance by the Americans of this rifle and this round—had eventuated, it might have been possible—I do not know—that my right hon. Friend might have accepted the Belgian rifle, but as the situation never arose, he never had even the opportunity to authorise it. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman should surely withdraw that direct statement that my right hon. Friend made the decision when, on the Secretary of State's own showing, he made no such decision.
§ Mr. HeadI have looked closely at column 100 and can find nothing equivalent to the words which the right hon. Member has read out. What I stated then is that one assumes that when such policy telegrams went to Washington the right hon. Gentleman was aware of them. That is all I said.
§ Mr. StracheyMay I just refresh the right hon. Gentleman's memory? Here is the passage in HANSARD:
The War Office said that they agreed to standardise on .280 and develop the F.N. rifle; that is to say, they made a choice then between the E.M.2 and the F.N.. and they chose the F.N.MR. SHINWELL: The Americans did.MR. HEAD: The right hon. Gentleman did."—[Official Report, 1st February, 1954; Vol. 523, c. 100.]
There is the direct allegation that my right hon. Friend made this decision; but he made no decision at the time—neither did any other Minister of the Government—because the hypothesis upon which that telegram was based never arose.
§ Mr. ShinwellAs my name has been mentioned in this matter—and perhaps the Prime Minister would permit me to put my question without making inaudible remarks—may I put this to the right hon. Gentleman, in the hope of clearing up this matter to the satisfaction of all parties? Does not the Secretary of State agree, first of all, that the impression which he sought to convey yesterday—perhaps unwittingly, in the course of a somewhat confused winding up of the debate due to the temper of the House at the time—was that I was responsible for the acceptance of a decision, reached by a branch of the War Office, that the Belgian rifle should be accepted? 217 Secondly, does he not agree that what transpired was that, as appears on the signal, here was a discussion taking place, which is quite customary in Departments, between the technical branch of the War Office—the Board of Ordnance—and their opposite numbers on the British Joint Services Mission and their opposite numbers in Washington, in order to reach an agreement, and—this is the point—because of the failure to reach agreement, as is obvious from the signal, it was decided by the War Office subsequently to January, 1951, that they would stand by the British rifle?
Is not that made abundantly clear from the telegram to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred? In those circumstances, is it not obvious to everyone that the Minister at the War Office and the Minister of Defence, as I was at the time, could not have been aware of what had transpired between the technical branch of the War Office and their technical opposite numbers in the United States?
§ Mr. HeadIn answer to the points raised, I would just say that it is quite right that it appears in Hansard that I said: "The right hon. Gentleman did." I am not trying to avoid anything, but I remember quite well that I actually said, quite out of order, "You did." The "you" was out of order, but I was referring to the Government of the time. But that is beside the point, and I am not trying to get out of anything.
As regards the right hon. Gentleman's position, I would say, on the military side, that this signal was sent by the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who is a member of the Army Council. His decision was that the policy which the War Office must adopt, on the assumption that .280 was to be standardised, was that the F.N.—the Belgian rifle—would be the one we would select. That was the policy put to Washington by a member of the Army Council. I assumed, and I think not improperly, that such a policy had received the blessing of the then Secretary of State.
§ Mr. WiggIf the right hon. Gentleman had wanted to play fair, it is perfectly obvious that he could have confirmed this yesterday. If he now tells the House that he assumed that my right hon. Friend, as a member of the Army Council, was a party to this, he might have found out, 218 but he did not take that trouble. I have long suspected that there were leaks when the Labour Government were in office. The most serious aspect here is that my right hon. Friend went to Washington and argued for the acceptance of the British rifle, and we now learn that a member of the Army Council, without the authority of my right hon. Friend and without his knowledge, sent a signal on behalf of the War Office. I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he got a copy of this telegram after he became Secretary of State or before?
§ Mr. HeadIn fairness to the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and to members of the Army Council, I should like to make it quite clear that this recommendation was made before the United States had decided to reverse its decision about the .280. It has absolutely no reference to that visit and has been entirely misrepresented by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). There was no question of any recommendation being made which was in conflict with the right hon. Gentleman's visit to Washington, which took place the following May. This was in January. All I am saying is that in January it was proposed that standardisation should be on the .280 and the policy put forward by a member of the Army Council was standardisation on the F.N.
§ Mr. SimmonsI would not trust the right hon. Gentleman's brasshats a yard.
§ Mr. ChetwyndIs it not clear that this whole issue of the telegram was deliberately brought into the debate yesterday and has no relevance whatsoever to the matter?
§ Mr. HeadIt seems to me to be extremely relevant to the case. The only reason I brought the telegram into the debate is that there is an exact parallel. The policy decision in 1951 was, assuming standardisation, which rifle should we choose? The then policy decision was in favour of the Belgian rifle. More than two years later, hon. Members opposite have taken us to task, using very extreme language, for having taken exactly the same policy decision as was taken in 1951.
§ Mr. SpeakerOrder. The House has had a reasonable opportunity of debating this matter. I have to protect the interests of hon. Members from Wales. 219 Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Buchan-Hepburn.]