HC Deb 26 January 1953 vol 510 cc781-803

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £35,000,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1953, for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Army Services for the year.

SCHEDULE
Sums not exceeding
Supply Grants Appropriations in Aid
Vote. £ £
1. Pay, &c., of the Army 11,300,000 *—690,000
2. Reserve Forces (to an additional number not exceeding 6,000, other ranks, for the Regular Reserve and to an additional number not exceeding 29,000, all ranks, for the Army Emergency Reserve), Territorial Army, Home Guard and Cadet Forces 400,000 —
4. Civilians 3,800,000 *—630,000
5. Movements 4,500,000 —
6. Supplies, &c. 4,400,000 *—300,000
7. Stores 7,500,000 *—250,000
8. Works, Buildings and Lands 1,950,000 *—410,000
9. Miscellaneous Effective Services 150,000 400,000
10. Non-effective Services 1,000,000 —
Total, Army (Supplementary) 1952–53£ 35,000,000 *—1,880,000

* Deficit

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head)

I am very well aware that, in asking the Committee for £35 million, I am fulfilling a task which will not be welcome to most hon. Members on either side, because, although this sum represents only about 8 per cent. of our total expenditure on Army Estimates, it is, nevertheless, a very large sum. At the present time, when I think hon. Members on both sides of the Committee are agreed that expenditure must, as far as possible, be held down for obvious economic reasons, such a Supplementary Estimate is bound to be one on which hon. Members on both sides will wish to satisfy themselves as to the reasons.

Since I have been at the War Office, a very large amount of the efforts which I have made there have been directed towards the field of creating economies, both in expenditure and manpower, without interfering with our preparedness for war and fighting efficiency. I hope to be able to explain to the Committee that this Supplementary Estimate does not represent a failure in these attempts at economy, but that it rather underlines the fact that, unless certain economies had been made, the Supplementary Estimate would have been much bigger.

The major reasons for this Supplementary Estimate stem from reasons which were to a large extent outside our control. The economies to which I refer have enabled us, as the Prime Minister said in the defence debate, to level off to some extent the upward trend initiated in the £4,700 million programme. Indeed, that process of levelling off is, perhaps, more relevant to this year's Estimates than to last year's, although that trend was reflected in the Estimates of last year as well. I shall have a good deal more to say about measures introduced for the purpose of achieving economies when I introduce the Estimates for this year.

As I say, the main reason for this Supplementary Estimate can be attributed to factors which were outside our immediate control, and, in the main, they stem, firstly, from the increased orders for and delivery of textiles owing to the difficult situation in the textile trade; secondly, from the increased numbers in regular recruiting; and thirdly, from rises in prices and wages over and above the agreed basis of calculation in the Estimate. It may well be said that those rises are common to all three Services and it may be asked why the increase should arise only in regard to the Army Estimate.

In the Estimate for 1952–53, we budgeted very closely indeed. There was, so to speak, no fat left in the Estimate. In addition, I think that hon. Members who have studied this subject will agree that in attempting to level off this expenditure to some extent the Army is in a somewhat different position from the other two Services because it has, so to speak, far less freedom of manoeuvre for that purpose. The Admiralty, and to a marked extent the Air Ministry, are expanding at a comparatively rapid rate as a hot-war preparation. They are expanding their forces and ordering very large quantities of new equipment.

The size of the Army is fixed by our overseas commitments. It is not intended to expand its size, and there is no possibility, or question, at the present time of reducing it. Therefore, the framework and size of the Army—which is equivalent to 11⅓ divisions—has at the present moment to be maintained, clothed, fed, paid and moved, and in many areas sustained in its cold-war commitments. Thus the field for reductions is a limited one.

In the Estimates now under discussion and in respect of which we ask for a Supplementary Estimate, there were, of course, broadly speaking, two fields in which some economies could be realised. The first was in the field of new production which is, strictly speaking, rearmament in its most literal sense—the production of new weapons, and so forth. The second field was that of maintenance which covers, as I have said, clothing, equipment, movement, pay, and so forth.

In preparing the Estimates for 1952–53, some reductions of a minor kind were made in the new production field. We attempted to place as much as possible of that reduction on maintenance. In doing so, as I have stated, we budgeted very close. Last year's Estimates would have been without any supplement this year had it not been for these new factors which I have mentioned, and had we been a Service perhaps more dependent on deliveries for rapid growth it is likely that under-delivery would have more than absorbed these unforeseen factors. I will say something about that in a moment.

9.0 p.m.

On page 7 of the Supplementary Estimate there is tabulated the division of the Supplementary Estimate broadly speaking by causes. I hope that it will be for the convenience of the Committee if I go through these main divisions by causes in general terms and then touch aspects in the more detailed Votes of interest or particular importance. The first table gives a sum of some 10,250,000 increased expenditure on pay and maintenance of personnel. I have already said that recruiting figures have exceeded expectations. Hon. Members may ask why that was not foreseen. I think that hon. Members who have studied this problem will agree that the introduction of the three-year Regular Service scheme was one the immediate results of which it was not easy to foresee.

In 1951 when Regular recruiting was on a longer basis the total of Regular recruits was 23,000. In 1952 the total was 49,000, or more than double and an increase of 26,000.

Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

rose—

Mr. Head

Perhaps I have taken the point out of the hon. Member's mouth. Hon. Members will say, "But those extra recruits do not make much difference because you would have had them anyway as National Service men." The point is that of that increase of 26,000 in recruiting, 23,000 is an increase of recruiting from civil life, that is to say, young men who come straight from civilian life into the Army. The point about these young men is that almost all of them aim to join the Army as soon as they can, that is to say, at 17½ years, because that means that if they mean to leave at the end of three years they will be out at 20½.

By and large, young men from civil life join at a younger age. Therefore, this increase in the Regular recruiting to some extent has had the result in this field of lowering the age limit. Hon. Members know that we lowered the age limit by three months and it made a great difference in the number of National Service men. Those young men would not normally have been in the field of National Service during this first year of the short service scheme.

Mr. Wigg

I am sure that it would save time if we cleared up what appears to be a mistake in the figures. The figures put over at the weekend by the right hon. Gentleman's public relations officer, that is, the total number of recruits obtained during 1952, were 40,157. But if one takes the return published in the Vote Office—the last being on 11th November—and adds to it the figures given in "The Times" this morning, the total is 52,000. There is that difference. I think that the explanation is that the figure of 40,157 which the public relations officer published was the number of men who had entered through the recruiting offices. Now the right hon. Gentleman has given two more figures—23.000 for 1951 and 49.000 for 1952. Will he explain his 49,000 and the 40,157? Comparing 1951 and 1952, will the right hon. Gentleman say what numbers of men would have been serving in the Army had they not taken the three-year engagement?

Mr. Head

That is a perfectly fair point, though I hope we are not going too deeply into the question of recruiting. I am only too glad to give the figures. The 40,000 to which the hon. Gentleman referred was the return which came through the recruiting offices. That is checked by the record offices. There are a certain number of men who can join in other ways than by going properly through the recruiting offices. I will read the figures. Would the hon. Gentleman like the figures only for 1952 or for 1951 as well?

Mr. Wigg

For 1951 and 1952.

Mr. Head

The figures are as follows: Regular engagements: the recruits from civil life in 1951 were 12,068 and in 1952, 35,742. That is the field which may join a bit younger than the age of 18. The numbers of soldiers with previous service are about the same—1951, 4,233; 1952, 4,449. Transfers from short-service engagements: 1951, 2,177; 1952, 892. Transfers from National Service: 1951, 4,604; 1952, 8,306. Those total respectively: 1951, 23,082; 1952, 49,389.

I think those are the main figures. There are, of course, boys to be added on to that, short-service engagements and, of course, the W.R.A.C.s. The figures I have announced give the main picture of the growth of Regular recruiting which has taken place in the last year. As I say, that has contributed to a higher Regular content in the Army at the present time, and also increased numbers, because we have been recruiting from a field which would be closed to us—that is to say, young men between 17½ and 18. There have been certain other increases. For instance, the recruiting of W.R.A.C.s has doubled, and I am sure we should all be pleased about that. There has also been some increase in the numbers of officers.

There has been some under-estimate in the War Office of the average or mean rate of pay throughout the Army. This is always a difficult problem. Army pay is calculated by taking a mean rate to cover the whole field and it is proved by events that that was slightly too low. Even a fractional under-estimate can, with the numbers that we are dealing with, amount to a considerable sum.

Mr. Wigg

If I may interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, he mentioned short-service engagements. As I understand it, what he means by the term "short-service engagement" is a current engagement which carries no reserve service; so that technically it is not a Regular engagement at all. Or is he calling the short-term engagement the three years' and four years' service?

Mr. Head

I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for putting that point. One can confuse the new Regular short engagement with a short-service engagement. The figures which I read out were the transfers from short-service engagements—the real short-service engagements. That is the type to which the hon. Gentleman referred. Anything to do with Regular recruiting is the new short three-year engagement and is not to be confused with the new short-service engagement. I hope that explains the first of those items.

The second point is the increase which is caused by an increase in prices, wages, fares and freight rates. As hon. Members know, when Estimates are made out an agreed basis for wages is arrived at and our total requirements are calculated on that basis. During the current year prices have exceeded those on which calculations were made and with the amount of activity going on with an Army of this size—almost all abroad and with very considerable movements—any increase in prices is reflected in our Estimate. Increases in respect of such items as petrol, oil, lubricants, food, movements. wages, increases in National Insurance and so forth, has meant an increase in the amount of the Estimate.

The third cause, namely, increased pensions, is the result of Government action, which hon. Members will recall, whereby disabled pensioners were given some increase in May, 1952, and there is some charge for the new Forces families' pensions which have only just been introduced, to cover them to the end of the year. That is partly consequential on changes in the rates of pensions.

The fourth cause is concerned with the extra orders placed to relieve the situation in the textile industry. Hon. Members will see that that is put at £4½ million in the Estimates. Those orders were deliberately placed by the Government to relieve the situation. I do not want to anticipate by going through particular Votes, but I think it is relevant to mention the item for stores, in Vote 7. Hon. Members will see that the total asked for in the Supplementary Estimate in the clothing field is £10 million, and after taking away the £4½ million I have just mentioned, practically the whole of the remaining £5½ million can be attributed to faster deliveries of orders placed than was forecast by the Ministry of Supply for this year. I think that is a natural consequence of under-employment in the textile industry, resulting in an added concentration on Goverment orders when consumer orders in this country and export orders overseas were failing. Those two factors combine to cause that increase of £10 million.

The fifth item consists of a list which cannot be classified except by a lot of subheads, but the main item is movements, which shows an increase of £3.7 million. That movements increase is caused mainly by increased activity in the Middle East. There has been an increased amount of movement and we now have very considerable forces in the Middle East. In addition there is a variety of other items under this heading, such as works, stores, postage, local overseas allowances and so on, which I shall touch upon in a moment, when I come to the particular Votes.

There is also a decrease in appropriations in aid which amounts to about £3 million. Of the total appropriations in aid that is not a very vast proportion. It amounts to about 3 per cent. of the total, and estimating for appropriations in aid, I think hon. Members will agree, is a somewhat conjectural and speculative matter. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), in the year before last, found that he was a little pessimistic in his appropriations in aid. As a result his Estimates were a little less and his pessimism considerably benefited the Treasury. We attempted to make our Estimate very tight and this year we have under-done it by some 3 per cent.

Before hon. Members make their comments, it might be of use if I run briefly through the items which I think are of particular interest in the actual Votes. I think I have covered fairly fully the question of pay, under Vote 1. and I do not think that needs any further explanation. Vote 2, which is a sum of just under half a million pounds, is largely attributable to the fact that attendance at camp and for training in the Territorial Army in the past year has been extremely good and has exceeded the forecast of those who were working out the expenditure. In addition, more men have gone to the Army Emergency Reserve, as hon. Members will see, from the note at the end of this Vote, which is a very welcome state of affairs. This Estimate would have been larger had we spent more on the Home Guard, but that is a matter into which I cannot go now.

The main single contributor in Vote 4 is the wage increase, which accounts for some £2 million. In addition, contained in Subhead K particularly, is an added expense caused by the disappearance of civil labour in Egypt. When the situation deteriorated the majority of civil labour in Tel el Kebir and other big depots walked out and essential jobs had to be filled by substitutes. Some of the substitutes were expensive.

In addition, we have succeeded in building rather more covered accommodation than we thought we should, in order to store the valuable equipment we are now getting, which is a very welcome fact, and that covered accommodation is being manned by storemen and those who look after equipment. That accounts for an increase in numbers covered in Subhead K of the same Vote.

There is also some increase in civilians in the British Forces Educational Services, which hon. Members may remember we took over from the Foreign Office about six or nine months ago. That now appears on our Vote. The remainder of Vote 4 is self-explanatory and in Vote 5 I have stated that the main factor is the increase in movement due to the situation in the Middle East.

9.15 p.m.

There are other points which are contributory. Hon. Members may remember that it was decided last year, in order to avoid cross posting, to move units as a whole instead of posting men to one unit remaining for a long period abroad. In the interests of regimental morale this is a welcome step, and for that reason the added expenditure will be welcome. We also decided that no one unit should have more than one winter in Korea at one stage, and that has put something extra on to the movements Bill.

In addition, the present tempo and state of the cold war is not likely to decrease our movements bill in any way, because every time there is some particular incident or difficulty it is apt to stimulate movement and causes changes in units, big or small.

Mr. Wyatt

Could the right hon. Gentleman give us any idea of the number of people moving at any one time?

Mr. Head

I should not like to be specific about the present minimum, but it has been estimated that on an approximate estimate there are about 30,000 at any one time. It is our object—and we are now studying the subject—to get down the number of non-effectives, notably by the use of air transport.

What will catch the eye of hon. Members in Vote 7 is something which is rather a disappointment, though not disaster, and it is that warlike stores are down by £13 million. As I told hon. Members, when we made out the Estimates we were very careful not unduly to reduce in any way our expectation of warlike stores and we were more tender on the subject of any reduction than anything in any other field affecting us. The Ministry of Supply have not been able to fulfil the complete orders, but that is not in any way a failure. It amounts to about 8 per cent. of the total, or, to express it in another way, it is about three weeks' worth of deliveries. That compares favourably with the performance of the year before, when they were 20 per cent. down on the forecast.

When one considers the very large amount of orders, and the difficulties that exist in production, and of course the general problems which there have been in industry regarding exports and other matters, we cannot complain. I am sure all hon. Members would like to see us getting as near as we possibly can to that target which is the insurance that the large Army that we possess will be adequately equipped in the event of war.

The remainder of Vote 7 consists of subheads A and B, which are the main items. I have already referred to them. They cover first of all the textile trade, with increased purchases and a higher rate of delivery owing to difficulties elsewhere in placing orders. Secondly, in the field of general stores, there is almost the equivalent sum. To a limited extent it reflects the difficulties in the textile industry because it includes such things as tents and tarpaulins. They reflect the easement of demand elsewhere for these types of stores, making it easier to meet Service requests for such items.

Mr. M. Stewart

In his remarks about Vote 7, Subhead D, the right hon. Gentleman demonstrated clearly that it is possible to give a very brief explanation of a decrease and keep within the rules of order. Profiting by that experience, will he say a little about the decrease shown in Vote 2, Subhead H?

The Deputy-Chairman (Mr. Hopkin Morris)

The right hon. Gentleman must not go too far.

Mr. Stewart

I am only suggesting that we might have a few words of explanation comparable with those which we have had just now from the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Head

I have no objection. I apologise to you, Mr. Hopkin Morris, if I transgressed the rules of order in this matter. I have not looked at Vote 2, Subhead H, but I am guessing that it means the Home Guard. I can perhaps put the matter in one or two lines. The decrease is due to the fact that we got out the Estimate before recruiting had started and I have never made any bones about the fact that we hoped that more people would join the Home Guard than did. It is almost as simple as that. I am very much more hopeful than hon. Gentlemen opposite are about the number that will join in the future. Perhaps we had better get off that topic and pass on to the next.

Vote 8 covers works, buildings and lands. The main item is an increase in works stores, which enabled us to complete certain works which had been started, like pipes, fittings, and so forth. They partly reflect some easement in the circumstances and are a very welcome addition to us because they have been very helpful to our building programme. They were a source of some difficulty in the past. Subhead E, covering rent of buildings, shows an increase which is largely due to the increase in married quarter hirings. It is also partly due to homeless families returning from overseas. During the cold war it is an actuality which often arises.

Vote 9 consists of four minor items the major one of which is for postage, mail. etc. It reflects the added use of the Forces' mail concessions which have been brought in, and is partly because of the increased numbers overseas. More people know about the concessions and have availed themselves of them. That traffic has been brisker during this year than was anticipated.

Subhead E is largely due to payments we have made to civilian doctors for certain work. It does reflect a matter about which I, and probably the right hon. Gentleman as well, have felt anxious, namely, the supply of Regular doctors for the Army. In some cases we have had to ask for the help of civilian doctors, especially surgeons and specialists, and of course we have had to pay for it.

I am aware that there will be many items of this Supplementary Estimate in which hon. Members are particularly interested and points which they will want answered. We shall do our best to deal with those points as they arise. As I said at the beginning, it is a matter of regret to me to have to ask for a Supplementary Estimate, but I feel that hon. Members will appreciate that the majority of this extra money for which we are asking is due to forces outside our control. Any additions we have had have been strongly outlined and reflected because we have attempted to reduce our Estimates for last year, and indeed this year, to the lowest possible point compatible with preparedness and with fighting efficiency.

Mr. Wigg

I am sure that the Minister need not have been diffident about coming and asking for this Supplementary Estimate if he was confident that he could convince the Committee that the money granted under the original Estimate had been well spent. I am afraid, however, that he will find himself in some difficulty in convincing the Committee of that.

Before one considers a Supplementary Estimate in detail, the first step is to look at the original Estimate from which it arises. I know that we cannot delve too deeply into policy, but we were told last March, when we were passing the Army Estimate, that the Government had come to office to clear up the mess left by the Socialists. We were told that from now on everything in the Army would be all right; the delays, the shilly-shallyings and vacillations, which always inspire Service Ministers when they do not happen to be Members of the Conservative Party, were all things of the past and all the Government had to do was to introduce the new system of recruiting and to increase the rates of pay.

Well, the Minister did that. We had the new three years' scheme introduced in November, 1951. I do not want to take any credit away from the Minister although, of course, it had been on the stocks for some time. He introduced it and his is the credit and the responsibility. Then we had the increased rates of pay and, this weekend, we had the figures and the results of his policy. I must congratulate the Minister on his Public Relations Department, for they certainly turned on the sunshine. In every paper we saw statements about the highest returns for 20 years. Some people were almost lyrical and went back to the year 1905 for better figures.

Therefore, we take it that the Minister is claiming that his policy is successful and that from now on all recruiting problems for the Regular Army have been solved—

Mr. Head

indicated dissent.

Mr. Wigg

Well, the highest number of recruits since 1932 is the claim of his Department. I do not begrudge footing the bill, and I shall have no hesitation, if a Division is called, in going into the Lobby in support of the right hon. Gentleman. I have always done that. I do not begrudge money spent on the Service Departments if it. is properly spent, but, as far as I can remain in order. I want to look at the results. We have had 40,157 Regular enlistments and re-enlistments during the last year—40,000 young men went through the recruiting office. Of course, the first thing to note is that that figure must be discounted by no less than 33⅓ per cent., because the National Service man is a gain only in his third year. 35,570 of the young men who joined in 1952 would be serving in the Army in any case on a two years' National Service engagement; and the number of men who would have been in civilian life but who, in fact, have re-enlisted is somewhere about 5,000. The total number of additional recruits to the strength of the Regular Army secured in the year 1952 as the result of the right hon. Gentleman's policy is. therefore, 5,000.

9.30 p.m.

I concede, of course, that a young man who comes in for three years is of much more value to the Army in the long run than a young man who comes in for two years. That extra year makes an enormous difference. It turns a man from a good junior N.C.O. into, probably, a first-class senior N.C.O. or, perhaps, warrant officer, and for an officer the gain is perhaps even greater for the addition of that year.

The figures I am quoting, and what I am inferring from them, are not quite all the story, because whilst there was a build-up of recruiting until September, from October onwards there has been quite a fall. It would be very wrong and quite irresponsible to be over-pessimistic about the December figures, which I think are always bad—Christmas is in young people's minds and if they think of joining the Regular Army they say, "Let us have Christmas at home with mother and we will join in the New Year"; but when the figures drop, as they have done, right through the fourth quarter of the year, one pauses to think that perhaps the recruits which the Minister got in the first nine months of the year have only been borrowed from the future.

My right hon. Friends who were responsible in the Service Department were wise to be a little cautious in pushing up the rates of pay, because by so doing they were putting all their eggs in one basket. Not only has the right hon. Gentleman borrowed, perhaps, from the future, in the sense that the numbers appear to be up whereas, in fact, they are not and are now beginning to fall. but there is another aspect.

The right hon. Gentleman and I have quarrelled in the past. It is perhaps one of the signs that I am getting old that I venerate the Services of Lord Haldane to the Army, for Lord Haldane was a man of wisdom and approached this problem from a wise angle. That is one of the advantages of having a civilian at the head of a Service Department. When faced with a similar problem, he was very cautious indeed before he began to play around with terms of service.

It is within the knowledge of every hon. and right hon. Gentleman who served in the Regular Army that, right up to 1939, we tried to solve these problems with some regard to the composition of the Army. For example, in the Brigade of Guards, where large numbers of young men were wanted in their early years, the terms of service were three with the Colours and nine with the Reserve. With the infantry, where men were wanted to serve overseas for a considerable period, many thousands in India, the terms of service were seven and five; with the Royal Artillery, six and six, and with the Royal Army Service Corps, eight and four. These terms of service, however, were varied to meet the needs of the Army as they varied between the different arms of the Service.

One of the things that has happened to these recruiting figures—I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman did not tell the Committee; he was a little less than frank in not saying this-is that from May, 1952, no longer in the recruiting figures do we have men serving for five years with the Colours and seven years with the Reserve, or seven years with the Colours and five years with the Reserve. Now, we have two categories: those who are serving for three years, and those who want to take a long-service engagement far 22 years. As the right hon. Gentleman well knows, the men who are serving on the 22 years' engagement are, from the point of view of being able to leave the Army, in the same category as those who are serving for three years, because any one of them can go at the end of any three-year period of service.

Mr. Head

The hon. Member accused me of being less than frank to the Committee about the 22 years of service, but I must say I could not see that it had any direct consequence on the Supplementary Estimate.

Mr. Wigg

The right hon. Gentleman must not try to put me out of order. We are discussing the grant for the Regular Army, and I did not make the point exclusively on the 22 years' engagement. I was trying to make the point that as from May, 1952, recruiting figures did not include men with five and seven or seven and five years; that has all gone. What we now have is exclusively men with three years' service. I wanted to make the obvious point that it included men with 22 years although, for the purpose of my argument, they were on all fours with the men with three years' service.

I hope that the Under-Secretary will say a word about the three years' engagement scheme in relation to the Supplementary Estimate. If the recruiting figures continue to show a downward trend—and we shall know a little more about that by the time the Army Estimates come along —if we find that over a period of five months, say from October to the end of February, the figures, despite the lowering of terms of engagement to three years, have fallen off, then a most serious problem will have arisen. It will require very serious attention when we consider the Army Estimates. If this tendency for recruiting to fall off continues, then any hope of ever raising the Regular Army to the level which will enable us to rid ourselves of compulsory military service as a permanent part of our national life, will have gone for a very long time.

I am not going through the Votes point by point as did the right hon. Gentleman, but there are one or two points to which I should like to invite attention. I noticed that the right hon. Gentleman said nothing about the non-effective service. I am surprised about that because, not only does the increase carry the element of the cost in 1952, but also it carries the element in the increased cost published in the White Paper, Cmd. 8741.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison)

What is the date?

Mr. Wigg

January, 1953. It deals with the increased pensions for Forces Family Pensions. I was extremely disappointed to find that this White Paper is, once again, part of the policy of "jam tomorrow." I have said to the right hon. Gentleman, and I said to my right hon. Friends when they occupied his position, that the problem of recruiting for the Regular Army is not only to be found in terms of increasing the rates of pay of those serving in the Army at present.

The best recruiting sergeant does not get paid, but is the father or mother of the young man whose family has given years of service in the ranks of the Regular Army. A discontented long service warrant officer or long service N.C.O. is a very bad recruiting sergeant. I also pointed out to my right hon. Friends, when discussing questions of the Regular Army, how akin they are to questions of recruiting men to the mines. I should have thought it in the interests of the Government to make quite certain that they give a square deal to the retired officer, the ex-warrant officer and ex-N.C.O. Then this White Paper comes along and once again what is being given is something for the man who is entering the Service for the first time or who is already serving. I will not trespass on your generosity, Sir Charles, as I shall be out of order if I say too much about that.

I wish to make a plea to the right hon. Gentleman to go to the Minister of Defence and urge him to do something to end the sense of grievance which exists—and rightly exists—in the minds of the retired officer who is now living on a pittance. That is one of the points which the right hon. Gentleman can do something about. It is not only a question of giving a few shillings or pounds or of merely making life a little easier for the ex-officer and his family living in modest retirement in Brighton, Bournemouth or wherever it might be. But even more important we should remove the burning sense of injustice which makes a parent turn to his son and say, "For goodness sake, go into the Civil Service, or be a doctor or a civil servant or a miner but do not make the mistake I made; so whatever you do, do not join the Army."

I know that the right hon. Gentleman has always taken the view that increasing the rates of pay would mean that recruiting would come right. I am sorry that that has not happened. It is in no sense of "I told you so" that one feels that Government policy has failed. If that fails the Government is hurt, but much more important is the fact that the Army is hurt and the country is hurt. We are spending a lot of money on the Armed Forces and it is important that we should see that we get the best possible Army we can for our money. We do not get it unless we have a contented officer corps, and a corps of warrant officers and N.C.O.s who really put their backs into their job and are convinced that they are getting a square deal. My last point ties up with my first. I hope that the Minister will go to the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister and plead that those who have served and have now left the Force should be turned into the enthusiastic recruiting sergeants without which we cannot get the kind of Army we want.

Mr. Hylton-Foster (York)

It is difficult for a layman to relate Vote 4 to Vote 1. It is very important, if we are to get the best possible value for money, that we should see that when a soldier is substituted for a civilian, or vice versa, that is the cheapest way of proceeding. In the way in which the Estimates are necessarily presented, it is difficult to discover how much the increase is due to either branch of that process which is a balancing one.

I inquire about it because the feeling is abroad, I understand, that the National Service man, of whose activities everybody approves, is in a difficult position in this respect compared with a member of the civilian staff of the War Office. There must surely be some point of balance at which it is more expensive to put a National Service man on a job than to keep a civilian at it. I find it impossible to discover how much Vote 1 and Vote 4 do or do not indicate the economy of the process of "civilianisation," as I believe it is called. If we could have some guidance about that, I should be very grateful.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman (Coventry, East)

I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman one or two questions about one issue which he raised. He made it clear that a considerable cause of this increase asked for in the Supplementary Estimate is due to problems in the Middle East. Therefore I think we are justified in asking one or two questions, for instance, in regard to Subheads C. and D. of Vote 5 —"Movements." The right hon. Gentleman also mentioned the Middle East in reference to Vote 4 K. relating to the substitution of civilians for soldiers in R.A.O.C. establishments. I reckon that on transport alone he seems to calculate that he needs some £3 million more, largely to do with movements in the Middle East. I was struck when he answered my hon. Friend about the number of men at any given time in the pipeline. I thought it was 25,000. He has told us now that at any one time, I think be said, there were no fewer than 30,000 men being transported to and fro.

9.45 p.m.

Mr. Head

I did say that I had not the figure. I gave an approximate figure which comes to somewhere about 30,000. I should be quite prepared to say 25,000 because I have not the actual figure, but it is somewhere around that amount.

Mr. Crossman

I find it interesting that the Secretary of State for War cannot say whether it is 25,000 men or 30,000 men who are at any given time in the pipeline. The transport of National Service men—

Mr. Head

If the hon. Gentleman is going to belabour me over the head for not knowing the exact figure without notice, I would say that if he or any other genius in the intellectual field were doing the job they, or any other man, could not do better. I say the figure is somewhere round 30,000 and I do not think that anyone, without notice, could answer further.

Mr. Crossman

This is a question which has been constantly asked of the Secretary of State for War on this subject of costs. I asked it of our own Secretary of State for War, and at that time the answer was 25,000. Now I am interested to hear, as I expected to hear, that, owing to movement to the Middle East in particular, the number has risen once again.

I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that in one way this is a good thing. The other day I was in the Canal Zone. It is true that the morale of the National Service men out there is relatively high, because of the movements for which we are now paying such enormous sums. Any man who feels he is going to do only "18 months hard" in the Canal Zone, and is then going to get out, has a relatively high morale, and the morale of the National Service men there is undoubtedly much higher than that of the Regular soldiers, precisely because of the increase in this Supplementary Estimate which is an increase for movements to and fro, very largely between the Middle East and this country.

The National Service man takes part in the movement. Of course, the one movement he likes is not the one out but the one back, and what struck me as having the most important effect on morale in the Middle East was the lack of movement for the Regular soldier. It is a fact that the National Service man, so to speak, can look forward after 18 months to getting home, whereas the Regular soldier may be moved from Malaya to Suez, having done two years in Malaya, and then have a three-year term in Suez. It creates a deep sense of depression among the ordinary soldiers who are concerned only to know when they can come home.

Then on the question whether the money has been well or badly used, there is the point whether money spent in the Middle East, would have been well spent on the provision of married quarters, but I think the right hon. Gentleman knows about that better than I do. I gather he visited them a few months ago and heard their complaints. It is the absence of married quarters which is the main problem in maintaining morale among the Regular soldiers out there.

There is the question, which is again part of the Supplementary Estimate, of putting an extra division and an extra parachute brigade into the Canal Zone. The problem of married quarters was made infinitely more acute at the beginning of last year. I took a good deal of trouble to inquire into the method of allocating the limited number of married quarters available and I gather that a very just method is instituted. However long a unit has been there does not matter. What matters is the length of time a soldier has served abroad and the number of points he individually has acquired; so that the division which came out last is not penalised as regards married quarters compared with those who have been there earlier.

By the way, those who have been there earlier were somewhat disconcerted to discover that they might be two or three years down the list as a result of the arrivals of reinforcements in the Canal Zone. That means there is less and less chance of any hope of married quarters the more reinforcements we put in, which have to be paid for out of this Supplementary Estimate.

Of course, out of that absence of married quarters comes the other bitter complaint which I gather was also put to the right hon. Gentleman. I refer to the absence of a separation allowance. When a soldier is in a situation where he not only does not get married quarters but finds that he gets no sort of assistance to maintain his family at home, although he cannot have them out with him, then the contrast between other areas and the Middle East becomes even more striking. The soldier in Malaya not only has a soldier's job to do; he has also got a far higher chance of married quarters.

If one gets married quarters one does not complain about having no separation allowance, but to have no married quarters and then to find oneself penalised for not having them, and to have no leave whatever to Britain, Cairo or Alexandria and to have occasional possible leave to Cyprus is not satisfactory. There is no Supplementary Estimate here for home leave. There is no Supplementary Estimate for leave outside this vast perimeter in which the Regular soldier may have to live for two or three years.

I thought that, on the whole, it was amazing when they were up against it, as they were, to see how cheerful they were and how good was the morale despite the appalling depression of living behind that vast perimeter of barbed wire and having these new reinforcements piled in for no purpose to the average soldier except to overcrowd the area. This is now costing us vast sums of money because we are trying to pile into the area a garrison which it was never intended to have. What would the right hon. Gentleman say? I think that we might reasonably say that before the war the garrison of the Canal Zone was a division.

Mr. Head

A brigade.

Mr. Crossman

I thought so. What is the number of troops in the area where, before the war, we had one brigade. There are 80,000 men packed into that area—80,000 men packed into an area where the permanent accommodation is for one brigade. That produces conditions which are not amenable to high morale and not amenable to a very pleasant life, especially when the soldier does not know what on earth he is supposed to do there. There is no real military service as there is in Malaya. The soldier does not know what on earth he is supposed to do but sit there and wait for the politicians to make up their minds what is to happen to him.

I wish to ask one or two other questions about the use of this large Supplementary Estimate which the right hon. Gentleman specifically told us was to be used for the Middle East. How far do we try to make use of local materials and local labour? I gathered that not only were civilians being brought in now but that we had to bring in 12,000 pioneers from Mauritius and East Africa. That is also a pretty expensive extra cost owing to the withdrawal of Egyptian labour.

How much Egyptian labour was withdrawn at the worst point last year? How much has come back? How much are we having to replace by civilians brought in from outside or by pioneers from East Africa and Mauritius? We need to know the answers to these questions. They are questions directly related to this Supplementary Estimate of which such a large portion is composed of extra amounts to be paid for the Suez base and its upkeep. I was told that virtually no local labour was employed now and that every piece of food and raw material has to be imported into this area of the desert, thereby enormously increasing the cost.

Perhaps the tragedy is that, despite this vast cost, the sense of dreary dilapidation is one of the most depressing features of the zone for the average soldier. One cannot blame the Treasury for saying, "We cannot bother about this; we are not going to bother about mending a pane of glass; we do not know how long you will be there," so we continue to spend millions and millions of pounds on maintaining this enormously inflated area in the Canal Zone and the base continues to fall into dilapidation.

If I might quote one instance to the right hon. Gentleman, I was talking to a very nice commanding officer of the Border Regiment who said, after showing me round the dilapidated huts and the broken windows, "We are not complaining, of course, but an Egyptian train passes within 50 yards, and we are supposed to be maintaining British prestige. When the passengers look out of the windows and see the conditions in which we live I wonder if we really are maintaining British prestige at all. Perhaps you might mention that to the Secretary of State for War when you get back."

I have mentioned it to the Secretary of State for War, and I have fulfilled my promise. It did seem to me to be an extraordinary way of maintaining British prestige to pack 80,000 men into an area where one brigade was intended to be, to allow the cantonments to become gradually dilapidated, and to leave them there while we make up our minds.

So I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he thinks this Supplementary Estimate is justifiable, and in what sense it is justifiable as regards the Middle East. What have we actually gained during the last 12 or 14 months by the extra two and a half divisions which we have packed into the Canal Zone? What extra demonstration of strength have we made? Have we made anybody believe that we are stronger than they would otherwise have thought by having this vast number of British soldiers in such conditions, with hardly any married quarters and no home leave or leave in the neighbourhood, doing nothing at all, while Egyptian trains pass by with the people in them watching them?

What exactly has this vast cost achieved in terms of British prestige? I should like the Secretary of State to answer, but perhaps he is not the person to answer. He has got to spend the money. Let me say to him that I was impressed by the candour of the soldiers, who talked of this vast space as completely useless without full Egyptian cooperation, which, it is quite clear, will not be received until we withdraw. Therefore, on what are we spending this Supplementary Estimate? What exactly is the point of it?

If the base has been rendered useless by the refusal of the Egyptians to cooperate, if a base in a hostile country is no base at all, because we have to use all the men supposed to be fighting the real enemy on guarding the base from the people who are supposed to be our friends; if that is all true, if the Government even admit, as they do, if the Secretary of State for War admits, as he does, that the Canal base is the biggest obstacle to Regular recruiting which exists; if it is also true that the existence of the base is the major obstacle to any agreement with any of the people in the Middle East with a view to their taking part in self-defence against the Russians —if all this is true, how can the right hon. Gentleman come here and ask us to agree to spend another £3 million in keeping this array going in the Canal Zone, because that is what he is asking us to do?

The right hon. Gentleman says there is movement. He has 80,000 men there, and National Service men are moving to and fro all the time at a cost very largely in dollars. We have a base with 80,000 men which is preventing men recruiting to the Regular Army, because they know that there is a one-in-two chance of being sent to Suez, which is the most unpopular base, precisely because there is no soldier's life there at all, because there are politicians talking about prestige and trying to maintain it by keeping these men in dilapidated huts in vast numbers in a meaningless occupation. I wanted to ask the right hon. Gentleman one or two questions—

It being Ten o'Clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Resolutions to be reported Tomorrow; Committee also report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.