HC Deb 15 October 1952 vol 505 cc341-52

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith.]

10.58 p.m.

Mr. Ernest Davies (Enfield, East)

On 7th July, the Minister of State announced that the ban on arms for Spain, which had been imposed since the war, was to be lifted. As justification for this action he said that it was required on economic grounds because British firms were being deprived of important commercial advantages. Apparently, this selfish and narrow view was taken without full consideration of the international implications of such an act. World democratic opinion, apparently, was ignored. The fact we had voted for, and stood by, the United Nations resolution which condemned the Franco régime as Fascist was not taken into account.

I want to ask the Under-Secretary tonight what are the great advantages which are to accrue to commercial interests in this country from the removal of this ban. Can they be so great as to outweigh the harm that is being done throughout the democratic world by announcing to the world that our attitude to Franco has apparently changed and that we are now recognising him as a suitable recipient of arms?

This ban was removed in July. I want to know from the Under-Secretary to what extent arms have been shipped to Spain since then, and what is the commercial value of them, and to what extent sterling or other currency has been received. I cannot believe that the advantages which have accrued are worth the damage which is being done throughout the free world as a result of this condoning of something which we had previously condemned, a régime condemned by the United Nations as Fascist.

This action is bound to have an adverse effect on the morale and political leadership of the West. The morale of the countries which have united to preserve the democratic way of life, joining the Atlantic Pact so to do, is bound to be upset by this coming closer to a régime which represents everything which we condemn and everything which is abhorrent to the free world. Small as this action may be in the result, it will have a wide effect on those Spaniards, both inside and outside Spain, who look to the Western world to assist them, if in no other way, at least in moral leadership in encouraging them to rid themselves of a régime which they detest.

It is not the size of the gain that matters, but what it signifies that harms. This is one of many gestures which have been made and one of many which, taken together, can have a considerable effect. To this must be added the fact that at the recent meeting of U.N.E.S.C.O. we endorsed Spain's admission. I want the Under-Secretary to tell me where we stand in that regard now. In the near future, at the meeting of the United Nations, the question of the admission of Spain will again arise.

Meanwhile, since we first gave our adherence to the admission of Spain to membership of U.N.E.S.C.O., Spain has banned the import of certain U.N.E.S.C.O. publications. If a country refuses to have the publications of a United Nations organisation within its borders, surely it is not worthy to be a member of the organisation. One of the books banned by the Spanish Government and returned to the Secretary-General of U.N.E.S.C.O. by the Spanish censors was the Human Rights Charter of the United Nations.

Another gesture indicating this movement closer to Franco and bringing him nearer as an ally has been the visit to Spanish ports of some of the vessels of the Royal Navy. What can Franco give in return for these gestures, and what is he doing to merit them? I believe that by making these gestures to bring Franco into closer friendship with us we are whittling away the potential bargaining power which might ultimately be used to bring pressure upon Franco perhaps to liberalise, if that were possible, his regime, or, if he refused to do so, would enable us to get rid of the present Spanish régime or, perhaps I should say, for the Spanish people themselves to get rid of it.

Franco has shown quite clearly, particularly in the negotiations which have been going on with the American Government, that he will take all and give nothing. I understand that in these negotiations between America and Spain. for the lease of air bases and military bases, Franco has demanded that the credit of 125 million dollars which has already been voted by the United States Congress, but which has not yet been received by Spain, should be handed over, not for the economic purposes which are so essential for the welfare of the Spanish people, but to be used to equip 10 or 12 divisions of the Spanish Army.

If my information is correct it is a clear indication that all Franco wants is an army and not the additional monetary help which the country so badly needs. What he wants is a strong well-equipped army, not to be an ally of N.A.T.O. or to assist the Western world to defend democracy, but to back up and maintain his own dictatorship. I know that the talks which have been going on between the United States and Spain are not directly our concern; that they are an American affair. But I recall that the previous Government took a strong line in that regard, and when there were indications that America would not be averse to Spain becoming a member of N.A.T.O. it was made quite clear by the then Government that it would not receive our support.

We are partners in N.A.T.O. with the United States and our other Allies and if this independent action of hers makes more arms available to Spain and reduces the amount of equipment available to the West, it is clearly our concern. I would add that one cannot be certain about what Franco would do in the event of an emergency arising, or if one could be confident that he would be with the West—which I certainly am not—from his behaviour in the last war, when he was quite clearly an ally of Hitler and Mussolini in the early days. One wonders also, what would be the attitude of the Spanish people once war started, and whether they would stand behind him. From my experience of Spain and the Spanish people I would certainly think that that would not be the case.

What I should like the Under-Secretary to tell the House tonight, if he is able, is how far these negotiations between America and Spain have gone. How do they stand? Have we been informed about them and of their progress and result; and, above all, have we made it clear to the United States that we are strongly in opposition to Spain coming into N.A.T.O., either by the front door or the back door? I should like an assurance from him that the policy which I stated from where he stands now on 20th February, 1951, that the then Government were opposed to Spain becoming a member of N.A.T.O., still stands. I failed to get such an assurance from the Minister of State on 25th March of this year. Perhaps the Under-Secretary will be able to give it to me tonight.

I regret very much that the decision has been made to let Spain purchase arms in this country. I say that because of the present state of Spain; because of the régime which rules there and because of the political plight of the Spanish people; and, above all, because of the effect which this has on peoples of the free world and because it undermines the moral leadership which we are able to provide. It is a strategic mistake, a practical error, because Spain's dependence upon outside economic and defensive help might ultimately be used by us in conjunction with others, and particularly in co-operation with democratic Spaniards who want to restore democracy to their country.

The potential power we possess to assist her should be kept in reserve for the day when we could use it as a bargaining counter to obtain a change in that régime. I do not say that it is possible to achieve that, or that at any stage will Franco be willing to liberate his country in return for aid, but if the Spanish people, at the opportune time, were aware that this economic help was available, and that their country could be put on its feet and accepted as a partner in the free world—and Franco refused—he might be driven out by the force of public opinion. By whittling away this potential power we are putting ourselves in a weaker position.

I say that because I was in Spain for a short time this summer, not having been there for some six years. No one can visit Spain today without being overwhelmed by the fear and oppression of the Spanish people. That fear has increased during these years because of the large number of people who have suffered under the Franco régime and who have been deprived of their political and human rights. It is all very well for the Under-Secretary of State for Air to laugh. If he had been to Spain this summer, as he indicates, I doubt very much whether he met some of the people I did, or that he moved in the same circles or associated with those who had suffered under the régime. I imagine that those with whom he associated were those who were benefiting from the régime, and not the vast majority who have suffered.

Generally, when this question of Spain is raised in the House, at Question time or on other occasions, someone from the opposite benches asks about Tito. The difference between the two régimes is very great. In the first place, Tito liberated his country from the Germans. He fought against Hitler and established himself by conquering the enemy, and was put in power with the free support of his people. Franco was put into power with the assistance of Hitler and Mussolini and established a régime which was abhorrent to us, and one which we have condemned at the United Nations. It is the kind of régime we fought during the war. He was an enemy of the United Nations. Yugoslavia is a member of the United Nations while Spain cannot be a member, and it is on the records of the United Nations that she cannot be as long as the Franco régime persists.

It is understandable that the Spanish people—who see today this country, which sets itself out as one of the great democracies and leaders of democracy, and the United States also, being more ready and willing to accept the undemocratic régime which persists in Spain and to make this gesture of greater friendship and co-operation towards this Fascist State—are almost in a state of despair about bringing about a change there and are losing hope, belief, and faith in the democratic countries when they see their erstwhile friends deserting them. Although the actual result of the action taken in allowing arms to go to Spain makes little difference economically it means a great deal politically. It is an error which a democratic country like ours should be ashamed of making.

11.15 p.m.

Mr. Patrick Maitland (Lanark)

I intervene only briefly because of one or two statements made that seemed to be a little wide of the mark, and I speak only to make a plea for moderation in the discussion of the whole matter. I have not had the advantage enjoyed by the hon. Member opposite of spending some time this summer in Spain, but a relative of mine who had not so long ago escaped from bondage in Tito's Yugoslavia was staying there and found the people there more carefree than in any of the countries of eastern Europe through which she had to pass in the course of her escape.

The hon. Gentleman the Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies) referred to the banning by the Spanish censorship of free circulation in Spain of publications authorised by the United Nations—U.N.E.S.C.O., in particular.

Mr. Ernest Davies

Banning even the entry of those publications.

Mr. Maitland

I am not for one moment attempting to dispute that fact, but I think that research would show that something not far different pertains over the territories of many members of the United Nations; one has in mind Tito's Yugoslavia; one has in mind the Soviet Union.

Mr. Davies

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that Yugoslavia is a member of U.N.E.S.C.O., that there is no censorship on the entry into Yugoslavia of such publications, and, further, that British periodicals circulate freely in the well patronised British reading room in Belgrade?

Mr. Maitland

I do not wish to prolong my intervention, and I shall not take advantage of the indulgence of the House to pursue the matter, but I was referring to free circulation.

There was one other point mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, that we might, in consideration of our membership of N.A.T.O., exercise some restraining influence on the United States. Surely we should also consider our alliance, which is ancient, and which is fortified again in N.A.T.O., with Portugal? Portugal is pressing for a policy of moderation to Spain.

11.17 p.m.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Nutting)

The hon. Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies), who has recently visited Spain, has raised some important points, and I shall do my best in the short time available to cover them and, I hope, to satisfy him about the policy of the Government in this respect. Our policy towards Spain, as has already been said in the House, is to work for correct and friendly relations. Surely there is nothing very novel or startling or reprehensible in that. Surely it is better, surely it benefits the peoples of both countries, that we should conduct our policy and our relationships on this basis, rather than on a basis of political, social and economic ostracism.

The hon. Gentleman asked me whether there had been any change in our policy since that of his Government. This policy is no more than the further development of the policy pursued by the late Government after the United Nations had rescinded, in November, 1950, certain parts of their 1946 resolution. The hon. Gentleman will recall that his Government joined with other United Nations Governments in sending ambassadors once more to Madrid. He will also recall that they voted in favour of the admission of Spain both to the World Health Organisation and to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. These actions surely represented a significant modification of the late Government's former policy of ostracism, and all that we are doing from the political point of view today is to continue along those lines.

The hon. Gentleman asked me about United States policy. He, from his own experience in the office I now hold, will be aware that I obviously cannot speak about the policy of the United States Government in this regard. I have no authority or right to do so. Without their authority it is quite impossible for me to give an account of confidential discussions which they have been pursuing with the Spanish Government. But I can assure him of this, that the United States Government are well aware of our interests and of our views in this matter, and those of our other N.A.T.O. allies; and I can assure him that we have been kept informed of the course of these discussions.

The hon. Gentleman asked me also about our policy as regards Spain and N.A.T.O., and he complained that the Minister of State had not been very clear on this subject. Her Majesty's Government's policy, as I have told the House at Question time in the past, is not to invite Spain into N.A.T.O. But, as the Minister of State said in the debate in the House on 25th March, that is not an actual problem today; it is not a matter which requires a decision at the present time, and it is obviously a matter which must require the consent of the members of N.A.T.O.

Now I come to deal with the specific question of U.N.E.S.C.O., which the hon. Gentleman raised. As I said in answer to a Question on 11th June last, we saw no good reason to oppose the admission of Spain to U.N.E.S.C.O., and we trust that this, if it takes place, may be of some benefit to the Spanish people. What is more, as I also said then, we believe that the way to get the best out of these organisations is to make them as universal and all-embracing as possible. Spain's application for membership of U.N.E.S.C.O. has yet to come before the General Assembly of the United Nations at its present Session, and has yet to be confirmed by the General Assembly before she becomes a member of the organisation.

The hon. Gentleman complained that the Spanish censor had recently banned certain U.N.E.S.C.O. publications which have been sent to Spain, and suggested that for this reason Spain is not fit to be a member of this organisation. Surely, if his object is to get these publications freely circulated in Spain the best way to achieve this would be to get Spain into U.N.E.S.C.O. and not to keep her out of it.

Now let me deal with the hon. Gentleman's further strictures upon us for removing the ban on the sale of military equipment to Spain. First of all, let me deal with his accusation that this action by Her Majesty's Government was taken without consultation with other Powers. That is not true. As the Minister of State said in answer to a Question on this subject, we consulted another N.A.T.O. Power. I am in a position to say that the other N.A.T.O. Power was France and that the French agreed with our policy, and as far as I am aware their policy is in accord with ours.

Let me re-emphasise that the equipment we propose to license for export to Spain is obsolescent in the first place, and in the second place is what we call common-use materials; that is to say, it can be used for military or civil purposes; it is not specifically armaments, it is not specifically war material. The types of equipment which we contemplate sending are, for example, piston-type aero engines, radio direction finders for aerodromes, obsolescent radar and wireless equipment.

As has already been pointed out by myself at Question time, our N.A.T.O and Commonwealth partners are, of course, first in the queue for any military equipment, and the export of this material to Spain will in no way prejudice their interests. Naturally, we have taken into account not only defence considerations but also financial and commercial problems; that is to say, no exports to Spain of this material will be at the expense of countries, such as hard currency countries, to whom for balance of payments purposes it would be more to our advantage to sell. In fact, I assure him that the equipment which we propose to send is material for which there is virtually no demand in any friendly or neutral country.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the economic advantages which we hope to derive from this policy, and I will tell him that apart from tomatoes, citrus fruit and, of course, sherry, we import from Spain certain strategic materials such as pyrites, iron ore, and wolfram. These are of the greatest importance to our industry, and the more we can get the better. Naturally, we hope that by exporting more to Spain we shall get more of these strategic materials in return.

The hon. Member asked, too, for figures of the exports of the material which has so far been shipped. He will understand that, as this development in our policy has only just recently taken place, only a few thousands of pounds worth of exports have been made. But a contract for aero engines to the tune of £500,000 is, I understand, being licensed, and shipment is expected to take place within the next six months. Further licences may, no doubt, be considered in due course.

As for the general figures for trade between Spain and the United Kingdom, I am happy to say that these have shown an improvement in the first eight months of this year. Compared with the corresponding period of 1951, the adverse gap—adverse, that is, to this country—has been narrowed from £19 million to £9 million, and we hope that the export of this material will help still further to reduce this gap.

The House will, however, understand from what I have just said about shipments that these general trade figures I have quoted do not reflect any sales of military material. I need not emphasise that it is imperative for this country to neglect no opportunity, however small, to expand our export trade, and to achieve a better balance in our trading accounts everywhere in the world, subject, of course, to security requirements. It would be dangerous folly for this country to allow any occasion to slip whereby we might establish commercial markets which will help not only to balance our accounts in the immediate future, but to provide for later expansion of trade if and when, as we hope, the demands of re-armament upon our resources can one day safely be reduced. Far from weakening our position, as he suggests, this policy, we hope, will strengthen it.

I cannot accept the suggestion that this attempt to improve economic relations between our countries is likely to lessen public morale in Spain. I simply cannot see that by sending radar equipment to make Spanish aerodromes safer to land on, or by bringing Spain into the cultural orbit of the United Nations, we axe doing anything contrary to the interests or aspirations of the Spanish people. Nor can I understand why it is right to vote for Spain to join the Food and Agriculture Organisation, as his Government did, and wrong to vote for her to join U.N.E.S.C.O.

I would remind the hon. Member that man, whether Spanish or not, cannot live by bread alone. I should have thought that all that we are doing would be to the economic, social, and cultural advantage of the Spanish people as a whole. At any rate, that is what we hope. The idea that—

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'Clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at Twenty-eight Minutes past Eleven o'Clock.