KOREAN WAR PRISONERS (REPATRIATION)

HC Deb 30 May 1952 vol 501 cc1815-35

1.17 p.m.

Mr. Christopher Mayhew (Woolwich, East)

I wish to raise the whole question of the Chinese and North Korean prisoners-of-war. No one questions the importance of this subject, for we see constantly in the newspapers reports of disorders in the camps in which British soldiers are now involved, and this is the last remaining issue between the parties in the negotiations for a truce in Korea. It is true that the recent statement of the Prime Minister, with his story of a military build-up by China, might suggest that the prospects of a truce are very gloomy, and the facts there might be interpreted as meaning that the Chinese are using the truce deliberately in order to gain time for a military build-up for a further offensive.

I think the Prime Minister's statement can also be interpreted in a different way, however. I think the action taken is one which the Chinese would take in any case if they wished to build up strength after the negotiations in Panmungjom or if, indeed, they were genuinely though misguidedly under the impression that the United Nations might be about to attack them.

The last 10 months of the truce talks, although they have had many ups and downs and have been very protracted and bitter, have greatly narrowed the issues. There has been agreement on substantial issues where previously serious differences existed—on the truce line, which is north of the 38th Parallel, on the arrangements for a neutral commission after the war on which Russia need not be a member, on the arrangements for a political conference to be held three months after an armistice, on the agreement that airfields may be used by the Chinese during the truce period. These represent substantial negotiated agreements in which both sides have made concessions, and that suggests to me that it would be a crime, having got so far, to despair of reaching a truce. consider that we should act on the assumption that the Chinese want a truce until we are perfectly certain beyond any doubt that they do not.

That being so, the importance of trying to settle the question of prisoners-of-war is plainly immense. In his statement of 7th May, the Foreign Secretary said that only about 70,000 out of 132,000 prisoners would not forcibly resist repatriation, and he described the screening process by which those numbers had been reached as scrupulously fair. But ever since that time, evidence has accumulated to the effect that not merely the screening but the whole management of those prisoner-of-war camps has been grossly incompetent. There have been serious riots in which many people have been killed and wounded and control has been lost by the United Nations over a substantial number of the compounds. There was a riot during the period when the screening was going on —and information about this riot was strangely held up for over six weeks.

We know that Communist and anti-Communist minorities are dominating the camps and that the Communist minorities have actually held trials and executions of prisoners under their own jurisdiction inside the camps. We know, too, that the screening process was both incomplete and incompetently handled, and it was no surprise that the two generals mainly concerned in all this were subsequently dismissed, nor was it a surprise that public opinion itself was thoroughly aroused on this point.

My hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) intends to deal in greater detail with the question of order in the camps and the British role in it. I want to confine myself to what I think is the related point, but also the major point, of this screening. It is necessary, in view of some newspaper comments, to say that none on this side of the House in any way objects to—indeed we champion—the principle that no one must be forcibly repatriated who cannot safely go home and against whom reprisals might be taken when he got home.

What we insist, in the interests of getting a truce, is that the United Nations should take every possible measure to distinguish between those, on the one hand, who object to repatriation because they have real grounds for fearing reprisal if they return and, on the other hand, those who strongly object to repatriation on other grounds. Such other grounds might be a general dislike of Communism—praiseworthy but not sufficient reason for continuing to fight with our troops in Korea—or it might be pressure from their fellow prisoners, or it might be distorted but genuinely believed reports about conditions in the home country and the reception they would get if they went back.

Indeed, it might be, less praiseworthy, a preference for the economic conditions which they can expect if they remain in the Western camp, or it might even be a hope against hope of re-settlement in some other country, even in the United States of America, if they stick in their toes and decline to be repatriated.

Experience of the international refugee organisations after the war has shown that the reluctance to be repatriated is an extremely complicated thing. In a case like this we must understand that there would be many motivations behind those who say, and manage to convince the United Nations, that they would forcibly object to repatriation. Arising out of their experience, the International Refugee Organisation had trained men, trained eligibility teams, whose job it was not to ask whether people would forcibly object to repatriation but why and on what grounds they would do so, in order that they might sort out the huge category of what used to be known as economic dissidents—those who said they would be persecuted if they went home but who, in fact, preferred the economic conditions in the West. These people had to be separated from those who had valid objections.

Nothing of this kind has been attempted by the United Nations. They do not even recognise the problem. All their questions are addressed to the point of whether these people would resist repatriation. Of these seven questions—which I assume were correctly reported by the "New York Herald Tribune"—one is, "What would you do if repatriated?" Another is, "Are you still determined that you would violently resist repatriation?" Not one of them asks why they would resist repatriation.

One question I would ask is, "If you go back, do you think there is any chance that you would be subject to reprisals?" That is the key thing. If they answer, "No," well, back they go. If they answer, "Yes," we then ask, "What grounds have you for thinking it?" The I.L.O. can produce expert men, though perhaps not knowing the same language, who will sort out the sheep from the goats. It is a difficult task, and the United Nations are not even attempting it.

Of course just asking the questions is only a tiny part of the problem. There is the necessity to make sure that the answers are given without political pressure, which is a job of administration and psychology of great difficulty. We see, from the deserters in the camps now how far away we are from the situation where prisoners can give their answers freely without pressure from one dominant minority or the other. Contrary to the statement of the Foreign Secretary, we know now that a large proportion of these men have not been screened at all. In the Communist camps not only was it impossible for the prisoners to give a reply freely, but it was impossible for the United Nations even to ask the questions. Thus there seems to be a section of prisoners who have not been asked whether they wish to be repatriated or not. It may be that this will produce a larger number of more genuine people with valid objections than we know about.

What about the camps which have anti-Communist minorities? Are we quite sure that pressure is not put on prisoners in those camps? How do the figures of one compound compare with another? Plainly, if the number of those wishing to be repatriated is fairly constant as between one compound and another, that would suggest that the choosing was freely done. If, however, there is one compound in which everyone resists repatriation and another one in which nobody does, there is a strong presumption that prisoners have not freedom there to choose as they would. It is not only the pressure of fear that will operate but the pressure of propaganda. Therefore, the second point is not only asking questions but the removal of political pressure.

The third point concerns the screeners and the screening organisation. It must not only be impartial but it must be known by the prisoners to be impartial. Who have done the screening so far? We are short of information. All we are told is that no Nationalist Chinese have done it. I assume that they are Chinese and Korean-speaking American soldiers who have done it. If this is wrong, perhaps the Minister will correct me?

Naturally, such people are strongly anti-Communist, as we are, as is proper. Probably they have even been fighting. Also, naturally, the Chinese-speaking American soldiers have Nationalist Chinese sympathy. Is it possible that those soldiers who were responsible for the screening were also responsible for the anti-Communist propaganda which the United Nations have carried out in the same camps? From a recent answer given me by the Minister I gathered that anti-Communist propaganda is still being circulated in these prisoner camps.

I shall come to that later, but I want to know whether it is a fact that the same Chinese and Korean-speaking American soldiers screened these men as had been previously held responsible for turning them into anti-Communists. The House will see the implications of all this. I am not saying that these soldiers did not do their duty, but that they are put in a difficult position.

The interest of the United Nations is to repatriate these men. I have no doubt that is the desire of the United Nations High Command, but the natural wishes of the men on the spot, their job, their reputation, are all bound up with anti-Communist feelings in respect of those they are screening. The North Koreans are not highly educated people with strong independent views they come from a police state. I should think there was likely to be a considerable tendency on their part to give the answers which would give pleasure to those asking the questions. This is a serious matter.

Now I come to the fourth point, which is the circulation of anti-Communist propaganda by the United Nations. We can all sympathise with this. We all want people to see the failure and lies of Communism, and the more that is done the better. But there are limits, and I would say that at the present time to circulate anti-Communist propaganda among those who have to make up their minds is a thoroughly stupid thing.

Where do we draw the line between anti-Communist propaganda and anti-repatriation propaganda? Presumably anti-Communist propaganda deals with conditions in North Korea and China where these men will go back. Presumably it shows them in an unenviable light. This seems to be a matter which needs to be cleared up, and I have asked the Minister to put in the Library translations of anti-Communist literature which he has said is still being circulated by United Nations—

The Minister of State (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd)

The hon. Member has mentioned that twice. Would he refer me to what was said?

Mr. Mayhew

I asked the Foreign Secretary on 20th May if he will make a statement on the policy of United Nations with respect to the political re-education of Chinese and North Korean prisoners. His hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State replied: The United Nations Command provide information and educational material to prisoner-of-war camps under their control for the voluntary use of prisoners. There is, of course, no political re-education under any sort of compulsion."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th May, 1952; Vol. 501, c. 46.] I have been in the Foreign Office and I know that that means that anti-Communist propaganda is circulated to the camps.

Therefore, the points about the screening I wish to make are four. First, the questions which were all about whether they objected and not why they objected; second, the removal of pressure on prisoners when giving an answer; third, the impartiality of the screeners, whose good faith I am not questioning; fourth, the circulation of anti-Communist propaganda in the camps. There is one further point I wish to make, and that is about the use as propaganda by the United Nations of the fact that so many prisoners do not want to go back home. I think that is a very sad thing, when from the beginning it was so clear there would be great difficulty in reconciling the moral principle on which we all stand of not forcibly repatriating people, with the need to get the Chinese to accept the very bitter pill that there was obviously difficulty in reaching agreement on numbers. It would have been much more statesmanlike and indeed the best way to make the bitter pill as easy as possible for the Chinese to swallow. I think that would have been the sensible and restrained course to take. Instead, the whole thing is erected by propaganda into the greatest possible prestige issue and it has gone to the outside world by radio as well as to the Chinese themselves.

I get the impression that in the handling of this issue, both in the camps and at the conference table, those who are doing this job have become emotionally involved. I wish that our country had much more influence in the negotiations and in handling this prisoner question. It is a shame that we should appear to be called in only to clear up the mess. The Government should take a more active interest. In particular, Lord Alexander should make this whole question a priority task. As soon as order has been restored the camps should be completely re-organised; and thorough and comprehensive re-screening should be done immediately by a neutral commission before the armistice, and not afterwards as the Government have promised. Since it is one of the things which prevents the armistice being signed, surely the thing to do is to have it first.

The whole administration of the camps and compounds should be reorganised in order to assist this neutral commission in what I agree will be an extremely laborious and difficult job. But we have a great responsibility in this matter, a responsibility to those who have been fighting in Korea, and one trusts that the Minister will look into this matter extremely carefully.

1.35 p.m.

Mr. T. Driberg (Maldon)

My hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) has addressed some extremely shrewd questions to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and I hope that we shall get specific answers to them today and also to a few questions which I shall ask him in a moment or two. For that reason I hope to allow him ample time for his reply.

I personally agree very strongly with almost everything my hon. Friend has said, including—as is, I think, generally agreed in this House—the proposition that we should not forcibly repatriate those who are genuinely in fear of victimisation in their own land, if any such there be. Personally, I think that the figures, if we could find out how many are genuinely in such danger, would be very small indeed.

It is, however, if I may say so in passing, a curious aspect of what is regarded as an age of scepticism that we are perhaps in some ways more susceptible to humbug than our Victorian ancestors were. It is fair to the Foreign Secretary to say that when he made his statement on 7th May he carried most of the House with him. When the agreeable voice of the Foreign Secretary takes on that solemn, slightly troubled, almost pontifical tone, when he uses emotive phrases like "the sense of values of the free world," reason is suspended; we are conditional to acquiescence; our voices are hypnotised to muted applause.

It is only when we get outside the Chamber and start reading an uncomfortable factual despatch in the New York "Herald Tribune" or some well-balanced editorial in a genuinely liberal newspaper like "The Times," that reason begins to operate again, and we wonder if we have been sold quite a different article in liberal wrappings.

The only other thing I wish to say on the ethical aspect is to quote from a newspaper, known to many hon. Members, the "British Weekly"—an organ which circulates widely among Free Churchmen, a Nonconformist organ of high repute—which made this comment last week on the moral aspect of the question: The negotiators on our side, and Mr. Eden and Mr. Truman say that they will not take the inhuman step of repatriating the Chinese and North Korean 'reluctants.' But when the Archbishop of York protests against the inhumanity of at least one of our weapons in Korea, an American spokesman replies blandly 'all war is inhuman.'… If repatriation is so inhuman, and 'all war is inhuman,' and because all war is inhuman we continue to use the napalm bomb, which inhumanity do we abhor and repudiate? The one that is most convenient as a screen for our defeat? The Commons explanation of the comparative harmlessness of the napalm bomb must go down in history. The Minister who made it is unlikely to have any other claim on the recollection of our descendants. Whatever the merits of this argument, at least we must agree that, as my hon. Friend showed very clearly, there has been the most stupendous administrative and disciplinary muddle in these camps and compounds. This Koje Island business is the most serious and dangerous blunder since the Chinese were first provoked into coming into Korea by the disastrous strategy of General MacArthur. Now our troops, the Shropshires—the K.S.L.I.—have been sent in to help clear up the mess made by other people. It is symbolic and typical that only yesterday, as they were doing what they had to do, two prisoners were killed when an American automatic rifle went off accidentally.

Granted the premise to which Koje Island and all that it means is a conclusion, I for one, and I think most of us in this House, welcome the use of British troops to restore some order in these compounds. They at least will be humane, efficient, well-disciplined, and steady. They will not get rattled and start boo-hooing if a Communist looks their way or if the Coca-cola plant runs dry. In short, they are brave men and good soldiers doing a distasteful job. All the more have we in this House a duty and a right to prevent any waste or misuse of the lives and efforts of these constituents of ours. They can look after themselves vis-à-vis the enemy, but they cannot protect themselves—we must protect them—against the clumsiness and ineptitude of some of those in the United Nations Command who may now be in a position to give them orders.

It is, of course, formally correct, as Mr. Speaker remarked the other day when I sought to move the Adjournment of the House to discuss this matter, that there is no difference in principle between the use of British troops, Canadian troops or any other troops by the United Nations Command for any purpose, in the field, or for guarding prisoner-of-war camps; but I should have thought that in this special case the muddle which has been made of the prisoner-of-war camps would provide Her Majesty's Government with a new reason for looking again into the whole business of direct representation in the chain of command.

One of the issues ventilated in December, 1950, when my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, then Prime Minister, flew to Washington for his talks with President Truman, was the channel of communication and the responsibility, direct or indirect, of the various member Governments whose troops are under United Nations Command in Korea. It was disclosed eventually—so far as I know, the position is still exactly the same—that we have no direct say at all and that the channel of communication is through the State Department and the American Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

Judging only by results, I submit that that has been tried thoroughly and found to be a not particularly satisfactory procedure, and I hope that it will now be found possible for us to have more direct representation both in the United Nations Command in Korea—where there is, indeed, now a Commonwealth representative, but there ought to be a representative of this country—and at the truce talks and also in the control of these camps.

It will not have escaped the notice of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, I am sure, that the Canadian Government saw fit the other day to send a Note to Washington on the use of Canadian troops for this purpose. The great Dominion of Canada is much more closely linked with the United States, geographically and economically, than we are. Is Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom so subservient to Washington that we cannot utter even a squeak publicly in defence of our own soldiers?

I welcomed the Prime Minister's announcement on Wednesday that the Minister of Defence is going to the Far East. The reply which the Prime Minister gave to a supplementary question which I put on that occasion confirmed the view that we all take of the Prime Minister's firm preference for government by cronies. The conference in the Far East will be just a get-together of old buddies. I do not mind that very much in this case, when one of the cronies concerned is a man for whom all of us have such respect as the noble Lord the Minister of Defence. I feel sure that Lord Alexander himself will want to visit the camps and the compounds, to see for himself what has gone wrong and to talk to the British troops and British officers there. I take it that when he has done so he will be reporting back to Her Majesty's Government and that we shall have the opportunity in this House, as well as in another place, of a full discussion on the subject.

When we have that discussion, or even earlier, immediately after the Recess, it will surely also be necessary for the Government to make a statement on the extraordinary political and constitutional situation that has now arisen in South Korea, where, as today's "Daily Telegraph" reports, the President, Synghman Rhee, is attempting to stage what is almost a military coup threatening the allied conduct of the war and the position in the peace talks. Only last night the Vice-President sought political refuge on board an American hospital ship from the military dictatorship of the President—a most extraordinary position.

I said that the use of British troops in this matter is welcome if certain premises and certain assumptions are accepted, but I should now like to ask one or two questions supplementary to those which my hon. Friend has already put to the Minister of State. I should like him to tell us a little about what happened at first in these camps, before there was any suggestion of screening. How did they ever, originally, get themselves into this condition in which we now find them? What was done by way of organisation in the earliest days?

Is it the case that tens of thousands of prisoners were simply, as it were, decanted on to Koje Island and that barbed wire was put round them and they were told "Sort yourselves out as best you can," in conditions which inevitably gave an opportunity for gangster leaders to arise and terrorise the rest of the inmates, one way or the other, and thus obtain a general ascendancy? Is it true that at any time during the screening process some of these leaders acted as spokesmen on behalf of some of those under their despotism? Is it true that they were able to say, "I speak for X hundreds or X thousands of men"?

The screening itself was dealt with exhaustively by my hon. Friend. In his statement on 7th May the Foreign Secretary used a curious phrase which, I must admit, escaped our notice at the time. He said that all prisoners were interrogated by "impartial United Nations Command personnel." How can there be such a creature? United Nations Command personnel cannot be, and indeed ought not to be, impartial; they are surely loyal to the United Nations Command and its action in Korea.

There are two other points on which I should like answers. I take it that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will be free to continue for about five minutes after two o'clock, since we started this debate late. On Monday last an hon. Friend of mine asked the right hon. and learned Gentleman: … whether Her Majesty's Government are satisfied as to the legality of these screening operations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 26th May, 1952; Vol. 501, c. 925.] I was a little surprised, but very much interested, when the right hon. and learned Gentleman disclosed that he was by no means sure that these screening operations were legal at all. He refused to answer the question and said that he would like to see it on the Order Paper, thus clearly implying that he had doubts in his own mind about the legality of the screening operations. He has had time now to resolve those doubts, and I hope that he will give us the answer to-day.

A final particular point is this. One most peculiar, and, in the strict sense of the word, piquant detail is that of the thousand or so prisoners who have tattooed themselves or have been tattooed with anti-Communist slogans: of course, their lives may be in great danger if they go back to North Korea or China. Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman any authentic information on how this happened?

All that I know about it is what I see in the magazine "Life," which is not usually regarded as a Communist source. In "Life" magazine, there is a picture of one of these tattoo marks with a slogan in what looks like Chinese, and also in English, reading: "To oppose the Reds and destroy Russia." The calligraphy of the English part of the tattoo is recognisable as an American style of handwriting by anybody who has had extensive correspondence with Americans. It is the absolutely standard cursive handwriting taught in all American schools. I should like to know how this has happened.

I hope most earnestly that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will answer all these questions, that he will tell us that the Communists are to be allowed to send missions to talk directly to the prisoners, and that he will take every step necessary to protect the interests of our troops, to secure peace, and to secure all the information that we in this House are entitled to have.

1.52 p.m.

Colonel J. H. Harrison (Eye)

I should like to make a very short intervention in this debate, because I had close contact with the Koreans from 1942 to 1945, and it appeared to me that they are a hard, brutal lot of men, who only understand the law of force.

It seems to me that we may have allowed a certain amount of sentiment to enter into the present position. Surely, men who are taken prisoners of war, when fighting against and killing our troops and those of the United Nations. must be assumed to have supported the Government for which they were fighting.

On the other hand, troops who came over, laying down their arms, because they did not want to go on fighting any more, might well have been treated separately and placed in different camps. I believe that, largely, our failure here is because the nations of the world are not recognising and are not observing once again the recognised standard of treatment of prisoners of war under The Hague Conventions.

Mistakes may have been made by the United Nations, but let us be quite clear that we can get no information whatever on how our own prisoners, some 900, and the rest of United Nations' prisoners, are being treated in enemy hands. At any rate, that was the reply which I received from my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, and I think it must be extremely hard on those who are suffering as prisoners of war in seeing these negotiations being protracted.

I was delighted to hear my right lion. Friend the Foreign Secretary when he said that one of the conditions for peace must be the return of all our own prisoners of war. The corollary to that is that, regarding those who were fighting and were taken in arms from the other side, it is not really our job to try to convert them to our way of thinking while they are prisoners of war. On the other hand, those who, after fighting against us, and having laid down their arms and come over voluntarily, had a right to be separated and placed under the control of something like the Red Cross organisation.

I want to make the point that we are still concerned in this House about the conditions under which our own prisoners of war, the men from this country, as well as those from the rest of the United Nations, are being treated, and, possibly, tortured, at the present time.

Mr. Driberg

On a point of order. May I inform the right hon. and learned Gentleman that my hon. Friend the Member for Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) has been good enough to inform me that he has been given rather more time than he needs for his debate, and that he will be content if he is able to start his speech at 2.15 p.m.?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Hopkin Morris)

That is not a point of order.

1.54 p.m.

The Minister of State (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd)

I agree with every word that was said by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Eye (Colonel Harrison) in his remarks. I think it is quite true that some of the troubles that have arisen in this matter may well have been due to the fact that no differentiation took place between those captured in battle with arms in their hands and those who were swept into the prisoner-of-war cages in the very considerable ebb and flow which has taken place in the Korean campaign.

In seeking to reply to the debate, I should like to begin by repudiating what seemed to me to be implicit throughout the first part of the remarks of the hon. Gentleman, the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg), and that was the attempt to make an attack on the American conduct of the campaign in Korea. I do repudiate that, because, first of all, I think people in this country should be reminded as frequently as possible that the United States has contributed nine-tenths of the forces taking part in this war, and has suffered about nine-tenths of the casualties which have been incurred. We believe that this campaign has been undertaken to defend the principle of law in international relations and to resist aggression, and, when seeking to criticise the command under which our people are serving, it should be remembered what the United States have contributed to the common cause.

Mr. Driberg

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman mean that he is repudiating the Prime Minister's own criticism and repudiation of General MacArthur's strategy in November. 1950?

Mr. Lloyd

What I was referring to was what seemed to me to be the spirit of the hon. Gentleman's remarks; not so much what he said, as the spirit in which his remarks were addressed, and I do repudiate that. I do not believe that any but a very small number of hon. Members share what I think was the spirit of his remarks.

I think we would all agree, from what has been made clear in the Press of both this country and the United States and from reports that have come in, that the situation in the prisoner-of-war camps has been highly unsatisfactory. That fact has been acknowledged by the American High Command, and General Mark Clark has ordered an inquiry into certain incidents. We have all read that certain American high ranking officers who had responsibility have been demoted. Let nobody get away with the impression that there is not dissatisfaction with the state of affairs existing in these camps, but I also believe that it is the purpose of the United Nations Commander to clear up that situation, and I quite agree that it is important that it should be cleared up as quickly as possible.

The hon. Gentleman who initiated the debate agreed in principle, as I think also the hon. Member for Maldon agreed, with the proposition that we should not force people to go back if they feel that their lives would be in jeopardy—

Mr. Driberg

If they know.

Mr. Lloyd

—they have reasonable grounds for thinking so and if it is established that it is a genuine belief. If we have that common ground between all the people considering the matter, I think that it is a fairly firm foundation.

Mr. Mayhew

Does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that it may be a genuine, but misguided, belief and that it may not be reasonable for them to suspect severe reprisals if they went back?

Mr. Lloyd

I will not dispute what the hon. Gentleman said, but, irrespective of any legal points that may be raised, we do not think it is right that these people should be repatriated if they genuinely believe for good reason that they will be the victims of reprisals if they were repatriated.

If we do agree on this proposition, we have to consider two matters. First of all, there is the method of screening that would be adopted.

Some point was made by the hon. Member for Maldon about the description by my right hon. Friend of the people who conducted the screening as "impartial." One good reason, which I mentioned in an earlier Adjournment debate, why I think they can be regarded as impartial is because it was made perfectly clear to them that it was contrary to the interests of the United Nations Command to have more of these people who refused repatriation than was necessary. Of course, it was quite obvious from the very beginning that the more people who opted not to be repatriated. the greater embarrassment it would be to the conclusion of a truce. I think I can say that it was the hope of the United Nations Command that there would not be many people who refused to be repatriated because it was recognised this would raise a major issue between the Chinese command and ourselves.

Why I think we can claim that the people who conducted the screening were reasonably impartial is because it was made quite clear that it was contrary to the interests of the United Nations Command to have people unnecessarily sensitive about returning. The other reason why I suggest the screening was conducted with impartiality is because, as I said in an answer on 26th May, It was made clear to all prisoners interrogated that if they refused repatriation they might have to remain in South Korea long after those who chose repatriation had returned home, and that the United Nations Command could not undertake to send them to any given place after their release from camp."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th May, 1952;Vol. 501. c. 927.] According to our information, and I can only inform the House in accordance with the information in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, the screening of the 62,000 people who asked not to go back was done individually and in reasonable privacy. That is our information at the present time, and that is what we believe to be the case. So far as the doubt that has arisen about certain people not being screened, owing to it being impossible for people to get into their camps, is concerned, those were in the Communist dominated camps and it may well be that there is a minority within those camps who may still seek not to be repatriated.

Mr. Glenvil Hall (Colne Valley)

Can the Minister say whether anything was said to these 62,000 people about their continuing to be fed? Were they expected to work, or were they going to be fed and allowed to live in idleness?

Mr. Lloyd

My impression is that they were not guaranteed a continuance of the existing standard of rations or any form of livelihood at all, but, again, with regard to what has happened in the past, I think we shall know much more when my noble Friend has paid his visit and returned and when we have received the reports of the various inquiries which have been instituted into the disorders in the camps. As I say, I think it would be profitable to postpone any opinion as to what has happened in the past until we have rather more information than we have at present as to the details.

Then we come to what I venture to say with respect is the most important part of this discussion, the steps to be taken in future. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) said he considered that the camps should be re-organised and cleaned up and that that should be the first task. I quite agree that that is a pressing task, and as we know British troops are now taking part in that process. He then said there should be re-screening under some impartial organisation. He admitted it would be a long and laborious process, but he said it should take place first and that then there should be an armistice. I disagree with his order of events. I agree that these prisoners-of-war camps should be re-organised as quickly as possible, but it seems to me that it is still right and humane that the armistice should first be concluded quickly as possible on the clear understanding that immediately it has been concluded there shall be this long process of re-screening under the supervision of impartial authorities which the hon. Gentleman says he wishes to have.

Mr. Mayhew

I do not think there is very much between what the Minister is saying and what I asked for but, plainly, this is one of the things we are negotiating about in connection with the armistice, and if we want the armistice should we not do the screening before it is signed? One of the reasons why we cannot get an armistice is because the Minister will not do what I am asking him to do.

Mr. Lloyd

The offer of the United Nations was put forward at the truce negotiations as a package proposal, and it included adjustments on the other two matters. Up to now, it has been turned down, but I still believe there is a chance of the Communist command appreciating the reasonableness of this offer. It seems to me that their interests are completely preserved. The impartial screening can take place and their own people can have full access to these prisoners and the United Nations will be bound by the results.

That is the offer which has been made in perfectly clear terms, and it seems to us that to say, "No, you cannot have an armistice until this long and laborious process has taken place," which on the hon. Gentleman's description is going to take many months, means that we are condemning the United Nations forces in Korea to a continuation of this campaign for many months to come.

Mr. Mayhew

I am not objecting to an armistice, but to the postponing of the screening until after the armistice. It is the right hon. and learned Gentleman who is creating the delay.

Mr. Lloyd

That is quite a different point. I took a careful note of what the hon. Gentleman said, and he put his propositions in this order, first, re-organisation, then re-screening and then the armistice. I say that if we let it be known to the other side that there is going to be a long process of re-screening and that the armistice shall come at the end of that, then that is not in the interest of those providing forces in Korea. As my right hon. Friend said in his statement on 7th May, methods would be explored to try to get round this difficulty, and that, of course, will most certainly be done.

Mr. George Chetwynd (Stockton-on-Tees)

Is there any indication from the Chinese in the truce committee that they are willing to go ahead with the consideration of this proposal, or has it been completely rejected?

Mr. Lloyd

It has not been completely rejected in the sense that it has been finally rejected. At the moment, it has certainly not been accepted, and there have been statements that it never will be accepted, but, nevertheless, the truce negotiations have not been terminated.

It seems to me that if we can convince, as we seek to convince, the Chinese authorities that this is a perfectly genuine offer and that there will be full opportunity for people to see these prisoners of every type and that both sides will be bound by whatever result may be achieved under impartial international auspices, that would be a very fair basis on which an armistice could immediately be concluded if there is the will to have it.

Mr. Mayhew

When this screening takes place under the conditions which the right hon. and learned Gentleman envisages what will be the rôle of the Communists there? I have seen them described as observers, but I would prefer that, as with the International Refugee Organisation, they should be able to address the prisoners over the public address system or, indeed, directly in order to reassure them if they have any doubts about returning.

Mr. Lloyd

I cannot pledge the United Nations Command to any particular method of screening or to any particular facilities being given because we have laid this responsibility, by agreement between both sides of the House, on the United Nations Command. It will be for them to decide on the details. They are willing to have an impartial screening, and therefore one may conclude that all reasonable opportunities of achieving that will be given. I would point out that it is not in the interests of the United Nations Command to have more of this new type of displaced persons or, its hands than possible.

Mr. Driberg rose—

Mr. Martin Lindsay (Solihull)

On a point of order. The hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) has already spoken four times.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

The time allocated to an hon. Member is in the hands of the Chair.

Mr. Driberg

It is a bogus point of order, anyway, and it has only resulted in wasting two or three seconds.

I was only going to say that this is a very important point of principle. The right hon. and learned Gentleman says it is a matter for the United Nations Command what method is used, but the proposal made by my hon. Friend and by "The Times" and in many other responsible quarters is that Communist missions should be allowed directly to address those unwilling to be repatriated. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman please give an assurance—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

If the hon. Member is asking a question, will he please make it short, because time is running out?

Mr. Driberg

There are five more minutes, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

No, there are not five more minutes. We have already run over the time of this Adjournment. All I am hoping is that the hon. Member will now put his question as shortly as possible.

Mr. Driberg

I should have finished it long ago, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and was about to do so, but I would draw your attention to what I said at the beginning of the speech of the Minister of State. On the next subject the hon. Gentleman the Member for Solihull (Mr. M. Lindsay) will have plenty of time, if he catches your eye—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

The hon. Member must not presume to trespass on that.

Mr. Driberg

The question I want to ask the Minister of State is whether he will give an undertaking on behalf of the Government to bring such pressure as he can on, and make such representations as he can to, the United Nations Command on this point?

Mr. Lloyd

The point, I gather, is that permission should be given to the Communists to address the prisoners by a public method—

Mr. Driberg

Either by public address system or directly.

Mr. Lloyd

I am not prepared to give any specific undertakings as to the method. I think we can see that people have reasonable access to those prisoners of war, but it could be that, if one particular method were adopted, it would lead to the very evils of which the hon. Gentleman spoke earlier in his speech.