HC Deb 16 December 1952 vol 509 cc1194-8

The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:

46. CAPTAIN RYDER: To ask the Prime Minister whether a decision has yet been reached by the North Atlantic Council concerning the command of Allied naval and air forces in the Mediterranean; and if he will make a statement.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Winston Churchill)

May I, Mr. Speaker, answer Question No. 46, which has not been reached, having given you notice that I wish to make a statement on the subject?

I have learned that N.A.T.O. has approved a system of command for the Mediterranean which was formulated by the Military Committee.

The principal change is the establishment of a Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. By agreement the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will initially be a British Naval Officer, Admiral Mountbatten. His staff will include officers from all nations concerned. He will be directly subordinate and responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

In time of war Commander-in-Chief. Mediterranean, will be responsible for the security of sea communications, the protection of shipping and convoys, the co-ordination of logistic support and the support of adjacent Commands. Other important responsibilities are the co-ordination of mine warfare, and submarine and anti-submarine operations. For all these purposes his Command will include air as well as naval forces.

The duties of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. will include the co-ordination of the movements of all naval forces in the Mediterranean. Admiral Mountbatten will continue to be responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for the security of our communications to the Middle East.

The heavy carriers, amphibious and support forces of the United States 6th Fleet will remain under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, South. The 6th Fleet, sometimes referred to as the striking force, is primarily a force organised for the support of land campaigns in Southern Europe.

The Mediterranean will be sub-divided into a number of areas for the exercise of functions of local or national nature. The several Area Commanders will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for all allied tasks but will remain under their own national authorities for various tasks which are national in character. These areas will include the important French and Italian areas in the Western and Central Mediterranean. National coastal areas will be throughout a national responsibility.

Mr. Wyatt

Is it not a fact that in the Atlantic Command British ships are under the command of the American Supreme Allied Commander, and why should not the right hon. Gentleman insist on the same arrangements for American ships in the Mediterranean to be under the command of the British Supreme Allied Commander; and is it not shameful that he should have agreed to an arrangement altogether much less than the arrangement which we have agreed on in the Atlantic?

The Prime Minister

I think that I will leave the hon. Gentleman, in regard to this important matter, which I think is very satisfactory, to rest on the word "shameful."

Captain Ryder

May I ask my right hon. Friend two questions? First, what will be the relationship between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the projected Middle East Command, bearing in mind that the Mediterranean forms the principal means of access to the Middle East and at present appears to come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe? The second question is—

The Prime Minister

Let me answer one question at a time, please.

In the whole of this vast question there have been two material points to bear in mind. One was that we, with all our experience, should, so far as possible and under whatever form was agreed, be responsible for the reception end across the Atlantic Ocean, which we know so well. The second was that we should have effective control of the through communications in the Mediterranean, enabling us to discharge our responsibilities in the Middle East and also use in full integrity all the bases and forces which we have in that sea. This has been achieved, like the other, though not in the form we may any of us completely desire, but I think that the two essentials have been effectively secured, and I think that it would be a great pity if it should not be an occasion where there should be general agreement between both sides of the House.

Mr. Porter

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Can you say under what circumstances the representatives on the Government Front Bench are entitled to arrogate to themselves your responsibilities and your entitlements and tell one of their own Members to sit down?

Mr. Speaker

I think that a Minister is quite entitled, and always has been in my recollection, when he gets a string of questions fired at him by way of supplementaries, to ask for one question to be put at a time. There is nothing wrong in that.

Mr. Porter

Further to that point of order. I am not suggesting that it is a question of one or two questions. You are entitled, Sir, to suggest that to him, and not Members of the Front Bench.

Mr. Speaker

Sometimes a string of questions can be answered together quite easily; at other times it is difficult.

Mr. Shinwell

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he can recall that, about two years ago, when we were considering this matter in the House, and we were on that side and he was on this side, he was in favour of an American admiral being in control of the Mediterranean? Can he recall the incident that occurred at that time, and is he now satisfied that the scheme formulated by the late Government, with the exception of the British admiral coming under the control of the Supreme Commander, General Ridgway—on that occasion it was General Eisenhower—and which has now been accepted, is satisfactory? Would he say why he has changed his mind on this subject, and why he has now come to the view that we expressed at that time?

The Prime Minister

When the right hon. Gentleman announced that the Supreme Command in the Atlantic should go to an American admiral, I thought it a pity, because I thought that we knew most about the reception end, as I have called it. I would have preferred at that time to have had the Supreme Command in the Atlantic for Britain, and would have welcomed the Americans in the Mediterranean, because it was very desirable that they should intervene in force and with a fleet there. However, the right hon. Gentleman had his way. When I went to Washington, it was already settled. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Yes. I had to deal with a matter which had been effectively decided, but arrangements were made then, which I described in the House in as much detail as was possible, which did secure the effective control of the reception end of the Atlantic, and that we have now. That was all as a result of modifications agreed to then.

Meanwhile time has passed, and two years is a long time in this world. Meanwhile the United States, I am delighted to say, have sent a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean. It is very remarkable that in spite of that they should still have been willing to accord to us—they and the other Powers concerned—what is undoubtedly the Mediterranean Command so that we have, as I have tried to point out, not only effective control of the reception end of the Atlantic but responsibility for the through routes in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Shinwell

May I ask whether the right hon. Gentelman is aware that, apart from certain complications in this scheme that require to be explained away and no doubt will be explained in the course of subsequent debates, we are satisfied with the appointment of a British admiral in the Mediterranean? Is the right hon. Gentleman also aware that, as regards the reception end, the Iberian end, we never accepted the American view and always resisted their claim to control it? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of that?

The Prime Minister

I am aware of that. When I talk of the reception end, I am not speaking only of the Iberian sector. I am speaking also of the entire Western approaches to the English Channel and all of the spheres which are open in the North.

Mr. Shinwell

We never gave those away.

The Prime Minister

With regard to all of this, very practical working arrangements have been made which satisfy the dignity of the nations concerned and, which is far more important, will enable the Admiralty to make their contribution as effectively as before.

Captain Ryder

What is to be the relationship between the Commander of the American 6th Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who both look to the same Supreme Commander and work in adjacent areas? What is to be their relationship in the event of combined operations?

The Prime Minister

I expect they will help each other, but I think that if my hon. and gallant Friend reads the answer, he will see that that is effectively provided for.

Mr. John Hynd

Is the Prime Minister aware that this was already announced in the Sunday Press at the beginning of this week? In those circumstances, can he explain why he declined to make a statement yesterday?

The Prime Minister

I think that my time-table ought to start from the formal decisions of N.A.T.O. rather than from casual paragraphs in the Sunday newspapers.

Brigadier Clarke

Is my right hon. Friend aware of the great satisfaction which his statement will give both in the country and in the Royal Navy?