§ 25. Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenportasked the Secretary of State for War if he will state the number of National Service men included in the latest casualties in Korea, giving the figures of those wounded and missing, respectively; how many in each group of such casualties were boys of 18 and 19 years of age, respectively; and how much collective training these latter groups had had in the war theatre.
§ The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Wyatt)Up to 14th May, 1951, 30 National Service officers and men had been killed or had died of wounds. One hundred and eight had been wounded and 116 had become missing or prisoners of war. None of these casualties was 18 years of age as National Service men are not sent to Korea until they are 19 years old. Twenty-four of the National Service men aged 19 were killed, 83 were wounded and 92 were missing or prisoners of war. There was very little collective training in Korea. In the case of the 27th Infantry Brigade, this was because of 18 its immediate engagement in operations in the Pusan bridgehead. In the case of 29th Infantry Brigade Group, it was due to the time taken to move up the lines of communication, during which it was engaged in anti-guerilla tasks and because of the intervention of the Chinese. Both Brigades had intensive collective training before they went to Korea.
§ Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-DavenportAre reinforcements now getting proper collective training, and will every effort be made in future to see that these men get collective training and battle practice before meeting the enemy?
§ Mr. WyattNational Service men get five to six weeks collective training in the United Kingdom prior to embarkation. The 27th Infantry Brigade had intensive collective training in Hong Kong, on ground very similar to Korea, before they went to Korea.
§ Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-DavenportBut do they get any battle training? Do they go to battle schools? Cannot the hon. Gentleman answer?
§ 34. Mr. Dribergasked the Secretary of State for War if he will make a statement on the circumstances in which several soldiers from Korea, returning to the United Kingdom on compassionate leave, were recently delayed in Singapore, so that in one case the journey home from Korea took nearly three weeks; and what priority for such passengers his Department has secured from the British Overseas Airways Corporation.
§ Mr. WyattI am not aware of any urgent compassionate cases having been held longer than four days at Singapore. War Office instructions are that such cases should be returned to the United Kingdom by the quickest possible means. All priorities were abolished in 1948. B.O.A.C. provide seats on aircraft for urgent compassionate cases at the first available opportunity, but it is impossible for the Corporation to take off fare paying passengers who have often booked and paid for their passage weeks in advance.
§ Mr. DribergSince it is not suggested that the whole of the delay took place in Singapore, but at other points en route as well, will my hon. Friend look further into the circumstances of the case referred to in the first part of the Question? 19 If he finds that these delays are getting worse, will he consider trying to reinstitute priorities?
§ Mr. WyattI saw references in the Press recently to several cases of delay. All these are now being investigated by the War Office.
§ 36. Mr. Mott-Radclyffeasked the Secretary of State for War for what period or periods, since their original disembarkation in Korea, the 27th and 29th Brigades, respectively, have spent in a rest area.
§ Mr. Wyatt27th Brigade arrived in Korea on 29th August, 1950, and handed over to 28th Brigade on 25th April, 1951. During this period they spent 60 days in reserve. 29th Infantry Brigade Group arrived in Korea on 3rd November, 1950. Until recently it had spent 84 days in reserve, with the exception of 45 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, which has on several occasions operated in support of American and South Korean troops, and has spent only 21 days in reserve.
§ Mr. Mott-RadclyffeCan the hon. Gentleman say whether these periods spent in forward areas have been abnormally long?
§ 37. Sir J. Lucasasked the Secretary of State for War if he is aware that the United States of America make a special combat allowance to troops in Korea, and that Australia waives income tax demands on troops engaged there; and if he will state what concessions are allowed by his Department to British troops in that theatre.
§ Mr. WyattI am aware of these facts. The British pay code, however, takes account of the fact that officers and men serve a substantial proportion of their service overseas and pay Income Tax at United Kingdom rates whether they are serving at home or abroad.
§ Sir J. LucasIs it not rather unfortunate that we should treat our troops less generously than the Allies treat theirs, and would not the Minister try to reconsider the matter?
§ Mr. WyattI should point out that normally troops from the United States 20 and Australia do not serve abroad and, in consequence, their pay codes are constructed on rather different lines.
§ Brigadier HeadIs the hon. Gentleman aware that one of the sources of complaint is that the N.A.A.F.I. are charging Hong Kong prices but the troops do not receive Hong Kong allowances?
§ Miss BurtonIs my hon. Friend aware that there is great disquiet among our troops in Korea and that it is caused because the N.A.A.F.I. charge Hong Kong prices and the men receive no allowance to meet the higher charges? If I send some correspondence relating to the matter, will my learned Friend look into it again?
§ Mr. Emrys HughesIs not the biggest complaint of these soldiers that they cannot buy their cigarettes at home?
§ Mr. WyattNo request has been made to the War Office by the Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Forces that a local overseas allowance should be paid in Korea.
§ Mr. LowIs it not the facts of the case that matter and not the request of officers who, in many cases, may not be able to make requests but have to answer a questionnaire specially designed by the War Office?
§ Mr. WyattI think it is the normal practice to accept the representations of the Commander-in-Chief on the spot.
§ Brigadier HeadIs it not even better practice to foresee these difficulties and to do something about them?
§ Mr. WyattWe must assume that the Commander-in-Chief on the spot knows the true facts of the position better even than hon. Members opposite.