HC Deb 22 March 1951 vol 485 cc2673-82

4.35 p.m.

Mr. J. Langford-Holt (Shrewsbury)

As the last topic which we shall discuss before the Easter Recess, I want to raise the question of the crossing of the 38th Parallel by United Nations troops. I can only express regret that such a short time is left for us to consider this matter. I shall be as quick as I can in order to enable such hon. Members as may wish to intervene to do so. First, I should like to make clear that I do not propose to discuss the correctness or wrongness of United Nations troops crossing the 38th Parallel. I should, however, like to be assured that the United States Government and all members of the United Nations are clear about what their objectives are in Korea.

I suppose the main point is the United Nations recommendation of 7th October last which said: The General Assembly recommends that all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea. That was on 7th October last. In January there was a further recommendation, and on 30th January the United Nations Assembly passed the following resolution: The General Assembly affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression; and affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about the cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means. That is the second version of the policy.

At the end of November the Lord Privy Seal, who was then Foreign Secretary, said that it was for the United States Government to ensure that no military action which had political implications should be taken without appropriate conversations with other Governments. That was the third edition, if I may so call it, of the policy. As recently as 12th February, in the House, the Prime Minister said: … the 38th Parallel ought not to be crossed again until there have been full consultations with the United Nations. …"— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th February, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 62.] Like other hon. Members, I have been able to read in the Press recently that meetings are going on in Washington between ourselves, the Americans and other members of the United Nations who have troops in Korea. I believe that meetings take place twice weekly. Are those conversations the consultations which the Prime Minister and the former Foreign Secretary had in mind when they made those two statements? With all these varying editions of the strategic policy, added to which we have statements by General Ridgeway and General MacArthur, all differing in some small way, the only result is to confuse the whole issue.

I am not arguing the merits of either case. For what it is worth, my view is that we should advance to such an area where we can hold a defensive position in depth, and that we should remain in that position until our political objectives have been achieved. The military events which have been taking place in Korea in the last two months have made this debate more significant than I ever anticipated it would be. It is today receiving publicity, as it did yesterday, in all the newspapers, and it is likely to do so until such time as we can be quite clear as to exactly what it is intended that we shall do.

I do not think we can help remembering what happened last October, when we ourselves found that we had arrived at a position before we knew exactly where we were going. Our objective, as I think the whole House will agree, is that, first and foremost, we want peace. We want peace by negotiation, for that is the best type of peace. We want a peace which will safeguard the rights and freedoms of an independent Korea. I believe that we must state these aims, our specific strategic aims and objectives in Korea, quite clearly, and I will explain why.

First, I believe that this is a matter not merely for ourselves and the United States, and not merely for ourselves and the other Governments of the United Nations. I think we all remember that the Preamble to the United Nations Charter begins— We, the peoples of the United Nations"— rather than— We, the Governments of the United Nations"— Our intentions should be made amply clear to these people.

Second, I think the Chinese Government might wrongly, but not unnaturally, make the assumption that we are going to advance again as far as the Yalu River and the Manchurian frontier. It would be a wrong assumption, but not an unnatural one, on their part. I think that, probably, the Chinese Government feel about Manchuria almost as the French feel and have felt for many years about their Western frontier with Germany. There have been in history four invasions of China, and every one has come from Manchuria. I think that, if we and the United Nations were to make a declaration as to exactly how far it is our intention to proceed, it would force the Chinese into showing their hand to the extent that they would have to indicate by actions and words whether their policy is one of securing their own safety or whether it is one of Communising the whole of the Korean Peninsula.

The wealth of Manchuria, which is so closely bound up with the wealth of China, was, of course, built up by the Japanese very largely out of the natural resources which it possesses. Russia's policy has been to take away Manchuria from the power and control of General Chiang Kai-shek and his Government, but I do not feel that it would be Russia's policy to place that power into the hands of another Government which might at any time become a rival Power in the Far East.

China, we heard from the Minister of Defence yesterday, has suffered very large losses. He spoke of 36,000 in six days. China must know—and this is my main theme—that her integrity and her territory will remain untouched. Russia would, no doubt, like to see her reach the southern tip and finish by pushing us into the sea. So, once again, whatever one thinks and whatever time one considers it, one cannot help reaching the same conclusion that we must, in the interests of ourselves and our Allies, and in the interests, ultimately, of world peace, declare our intentions, and we may then hope to get, sooner rather than later, that peace for which we all hope.

4.44 p.m.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu (Brigg)

I am sure that everybody in the House will feel very grateful to the hon. Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt), whether we all agree with him or not, for having raised this exceedingly important subject in the very few minutes left to us before we make this place a desert, in spite of the presence of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill).

Many months ago, North Korea was condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations, though I must say that I agreed with that decision and still agree with it, in spite of the known fact, as it is now, that there was very considerable provocation on the part of South Korea. It followed from that condemnation that it was the right of the United Nations, indeed, their duty, to counteract that aggression in accordance with both military and political requirements.

I concede at once that military requirements suggest that the United Nations' Forces should occupy Northern Korea at least as far as what is commonly known as the "waist"; but I submit most earnestly to my hon. Friend the Minister of State that, in spite of these military requirements, the political requirements of the situation are entirely different. In fact, they dictate a totally different line of approach.

We have now to consider, not only the possibility of a settlement with North Korea, but one also with China. Again, I submit most earnestly that the very best way in which we could possibly go about this policy of attaining a settlement with China as well as with North Korea would be by making a declaration now, as the hon. Member for Shrewsbury has just said, making quite clear our position, and by making a gesture of good will to the Chinese people and Government.

I submit that by far the best way of making that gesture of good will and of giving them that assurance now is by making a declaration that, pending the successful conclusion of negotiations, we will not cross the 38th Parallel. I do not even go so far as the hon. Member for Shrewsbury in saying that we should proceed to the waist. I want to stress most particularly to my hon. Friend the Minister of State that it should be the 38th Parallel. One of the reasons we should declare now that we will not cross the 38th Parallel is that such a declaration would remove the last shred of justification, if there ever was any, in the Chinese mind for branding us as aggressors for our action in Korea.

Indeed, the very fact that the 38th Parallel is such an indefensible line from the military point of view would add enormous weight to the gesture if we said now that we would not cross that line. On the other hand, if we say now that we will not go beyond the waist, might not the Chinese people and Government be tempted to think that this is because it is inexpedient militarily to do so? If they believe it is inexpedient now, and that that is the reason why we are not going beyond the waist, may they not also be tempted to suspect that if, subsequently, it becomes militarily expedient to cross the waist, we shall do so? If that be the case, then, indeed, the whole point of our gesture, and certainly its effectiveness, would be lost.

Having said that, may I add that both military and political requirements make it necessary that if and when we make that gesture, as I hope we shall, we should also announce that we will not tolerate the movement of any troops from the North in such a way as to indicate that they intend effectively to penetrate the South, because that would obviously be a renewed aggression. If such a movement of troops were observed, then obviously this House and the United Nations would be entirely justified in giving carte blanche to the military authorities, and in telling them that they must at least incapacitate that enemy from embarking on further aggression.

4.50 p.m.

The Minister of State (Mr. Younger)

If I have the leave of the House to speak again, I shall in the very few minutes available try to say as much as I can about this very important topic. I am afraid that, as was the case with our previous discussion, the time is altogether inadequate to cover it as I should have liked. In the course of recent statements, the Prime Minister, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and I myself, in reply to various Parliamentary Questions, have tried to give such assurances as it has been practicable to give about the intentions of the United Nations forces in this respect.

My right hon. Friend said on one occasion—on the 12th February—that it had been argued that the 38th Parallel should not be crossed again until there had been full consultations and he assured the House that there were full consultations in progress. He pointed out some time ago that the 38th Parallel is not, as indeed has just been said, a military line or, indeed, anything other than an imaginary line on the map. I shall try to elaborate on some of the answers given on those occasions. The House will see that I am still subject, as I was on previous occasions, to the difficulty that, so long as there are military operations in progress, I must stop short of giving our opposing generals a present of the tactical and strategical intentions of our forces.

The aims of the United Nations in Korea have been set out in various resolutions which are well known to the House, and I shall not take up time by referring to them in detail; but I should just like to say that the broad objective of an independent, unified, democratic Government in Korea, which was referred to in the 7th October resolution, actually amounted to little more than a re-statement of the aims which had been declared at various times from the Cairo Declaration onwards—at the Conference of the Great Powers in Cairo and Potsdam, and then later in the United Nations' resolutions. The United Nations are pursuing those aims by two methods concurrently, first by attempts to get a cease-fire and subsequent negotiations through the efforts of the Good Offices Committee which was set up under the January resolution.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton (Brixton)

Have the Good Offices Committee met yet?

Mr. Younger

The Good Offices Committee have been at work for several weeks. That is the first method by which we are trying to tackle this problem. Secondly, we are concurrently doing it by military resistance to aggression in Korea. These two methods are, of course, interlocking, and we must not pursue one of them in such a way as to frustrate the other one.

Mr. Hollis (Devizes)

Can we be quite clear about this, that while it is the object of the United Nations to obtain a unified Korea, we do not want the division of the country into two to be permanent?

Mr. Younger

That has never been admitted by the United Nations as a permanent suggestion. It was never mentioned or thought of as being so, at Potsdam or Cairo, or subsequently by the United Nations in their resolutions of 1947, 1948, and 1949, or since the crisis in 1950; and they still consider Korea to be one country—though the means by which we achieve that unification are, of course, another matter.

As I say, these two methods are interlocking. With regard to the suggestion that was made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Brigg (Mr. E. L. Mallalieu) that we should stick blindly to the 38th Parallel, we might well prejudice the military resistance to aggression if we were to force the field commander on the spot to conform rigidly to a totally imaginary line which has no significance of any kind, except, as I say, as a line upon the map, and we have to be very careful in any declaration we make not to prejudice our own troops.

It is in face of these considerations that we have to consider the crossing of the 38th Parallel. It is our view that the United Nations commander cannot reasonably be rigidly bound in a tactical sense, as was suggested by my hon. Friend. A general advance into North Korea would, of course, be an act with political as well as military significance, and on that, as we have already stated, agreement has been reached that there shall be no such advance without full consultation between the Governments.

Those consultations take the form referred to by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Shrewsbury—the twice-weekly meetings of the representatives of all the Powers concerned in the operations, and, of course, in addition to that, a great many diplomatic exchanges. I think it is relevant to point out that the decisions we are now discussing are not ones which are set out in the resolutions. They are decisions as to how those resolutions should be implemented. Therefore, it seems quite appropriate from a practical point of view that those decisions should be taken among those members of the United Nations who have actually accepted the responsibility for carrying out the appropriate resolutions—that is to say, by those who are contributing to the United Nations' efforts in Korea.

I know that many people feel that we ought to say—and, indeed, my hon. Friend has suggested this—just how far the United Nations' Forces propose to go. There is talk of making a gesture, but I should think that the time for such a precise indication would be more appropriately given when the Chinese in particular have afforded some indication of their willingness to reach a peaceful settlement. I can say, however, that we are now considering, with all other Governments concerned, whether it would be desirable to make a further statement on the aims of the United Nations' Forces in Korea. I very much hope that this can be done notwithstanding the security conditions, which, we are all well aware, must be taken into account before any such statement can be made. There must be the fullest consultation with all those contributing to the effort, and also with the Good Offices Committee, whose efforts are of very great importance to us at the present time.

Some reference was made by the hon. Member for Shrewsbury to the various statements emanating from generals and other people. I know that various of my hon. Friends have also been concerned at an article written by Mr. Allen on the subject of Korea. Some people take it to be a semi-official statement of United States policy. I am assured that that is not the case. That gentleman is a journalist and, no doubt, for all I know, a very good one, but he is not in any sense an official spokesman. If he was expressing anything other than his own opinion, it was the opinion of some Americans and there are many different sections of American opinion, which hold diverse views on this as upon all other subjects.

Mr. Driberg (Maldon)

One point in that article was that the British Government had been informed of the supposed project of a major invasion of China with American and Chinese Nationalist troops. Could my hon. Friend say whether there is any truth in that at all?

Mr. Younger

There is no truth in that at all. I was not proposing to refer to that, because that does not relate to the 38th Parallel, which was the subject chosen for this debate. It relates to another important aspect of the Far Eastern problem, but there is absolutely no truth in that at all. I have no reason to believe that that is a project of anyone in authority in the United States. It is certainly not the policy of anyone here.

I entirely agree with the way in which the hon. Member for Shrewsbury started this debate and expressed the objectives of the United Nations in Korea. These may not be his actual words, but what he said was to the effect that we want to secure by peaceful means conditions in which the Korean people can settle their own destiny and be free and independent.

We have no other aims than those which have already been declared in the United Nations' resolution, and several times during the course of the General Assembly in New York I said that United Nations' troops will not remain in Korea for one moment longer than is necessary for them to achieve our purpose there. That purpose is to seek, first of all, a peaceful method of negotiation. It requires two to negotiate, and we are still waiting. Military action is a necessity which has been forced upon us by aggression. So long as compulsion continues, we shall not shirk military measures, but we are anxious that they should be terminated at the earliest possible moment.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at One Minute to Five o'clock, till Tuesday, 3rd April, pursuant to the Resolution of the House yesterday.