Clause 14.—(PROVISIONS AS TO LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT, 1927.) (Hansard, 20 June 1951)

§ The Attorney-General
I beg to move, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."
This looks a formidable Amendment, but it really does very little. It is designed to deal with the situation that may arise under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927. Very briefly, as it stands at present the provisions with regard to the renewal of the tenancies of shops cannot operate when the tenant has made application for compensation for goodwill under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927; but, of course, under the provisions of that Act three months may elapse before it can be ascertained whether the landlord, an application of that sort having been made, offers alternative accommodation to the tenant.
As the Bill at present stands, when an application has been made by the tenant for compensation and a landlord has, in response, offered alternative accommodation, the tenancy of the shop premises cannot be continued under this Act. As the 1927 Act is worded some three months may have to elapse before it can be known with certainty whether the landlord is going to make such an offer of alternative accommodation.
What this Amendment does is to provide in effect what is to happen during the three months of uncertainty while the landlord still has the right to offer alternative accommodation to the tenant. It therefore makes a very slight change in the Bill as it stands at present, and cures a defect which was overlooked in its drafting.

§ Mr. Powell
Perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman would clear up one point which relates to paragraph (c) of this Amendment. The doubt arises in my mind that possibly this necessity for allowing time for a claim to elapse before the application under the Bill can be heard may result, in effect, in lengthening the tenancy by giving an extension to that extent of the existing tenancy or of the tenancy which has just expired. The question I ask is: Does this Amendment have the effect of increasing the protection afforded by Clause 11?

§ The Attorney-General
With permission, perhaps I might say that I do not think it does. It postpones the application. The total period is the two-year period prescribed in the Bill as it stands.

§ Mr. Manningham-Buller
I am not quite sure that I follow that. We are now dealing with Part II, which concerns shops. It is not a question of automatic extension for two years. Under the previous Clause it is, I think, a question of extension pending the making of the application. What I am a little concerned about, as I think is my hon. Friend, is the possibility that paragraph (c) may be abused; that an application can be made and, if there is no claim for compensation made with it, the application shall not be heard before the expiration of that time, and it is provided that until the application is heard the applicant shall remain in occupation.
Under that, will it not be possible for a person seeking to take undue advantage of this Measure to extend the occupation of the premises? If that is one possible result, it would appear to be a slight defect in this part of the Bill. We should like to know whether that is so.

§ The Attorney-General
With the leave of the House, I think that I should qualify what I said before by saying that it might result in a three weeks' extension of the tenancy, which the tenant of the shop premises can obtain. On the other hand, there is no alternative but to provide some machinery for what is to happen during the lapsing period in which there is uncertainty as to whether the landlord proposes to exercise his remedy or not. There is that slight extension. Nevertheless, if we do not make the change the present Clause would not be workable, because we should not know what should happen during the period of uncertainty.