HC Deb 06 June 1951 vol 488 cc1012-9
The Minister of Defence (Mr. Shinwell)

With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a further statement on the course of operations in Korea.

The position on 2nd May, when I made my last statement, was that the first phase of the Chinese spring counter-offensive had been halted north of Seoul. The skill and courage displayed by the British 29th Brigade and the British Commonwealth 27th Brigade played a major part in breaking up the massive Chinese attacks against the United Nations western and central corps, and in enabling these two corps to withdraw in safety. The magnificent action fought by the 1st battalion the Gloucestershire Regiment at this critical period was decisive in preventing a major enemy break-through and ensured the safety of our whole force in the west.

It may be appropriate at this stage of my statement to give the House further information about this action, and also some details of the fortunes of the other units in the British 29th Brigade of which the Gloucesters form a part. The 29th Brigade, with the Belgian Battalion under command, was disposed on a wide front just south of the Imjin river guarding the approaches to Seoul. The Belgian Battalion was on the right, the 1st Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusiliers in the centre and the 1st Battalion the Gloucestershire Regiment on the left. The 1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles was in reserve.

The battle opened on the night of Sunday, 22nd April, when the Chinese began a series of attacks across the shallow Imjin river in brilliant moonlight. The heaviest attacks fell on the Gloucesters and the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. The Belgians were cut off, but were able to withdraw around the right flank into Brigade reserve. One company of the Royal Ulster Rifles was brought up to stabilise the position. Throughout Monday night all battalions were subjected to heavy and prolonged attacks in which both sides suffered severe casualties.

By daylight on the morning of Tuesday, 24th April, the Gloucesters, to whom were attached C Troop of 170th Independent Mortar Battery of the Royal Artillery, had become cut off from the rest of the Brigade. Later that morning a Battalion of the Philippines Combat Team supported by a troop of Centurion tanks of the 8th Hussars, attempted to reach the Gloucesters. When within about 1½ miles of the Gloucesters' position the leading tank of the relief column caught fire and blocked the road and the remainder of the force was compelled to withdraw.

Early on Wednesday, 25th April, a tank force from the American reserve brigade attempted to relieve the isolated battalion but failed to get through. On the same morning the 29th Brigade were ordered to withdraw. The withdrawal of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and the Belgians was largely successful. The Royal Ulster Rifles, however, got into difficulties and retired to the east.

Meanwhile Lieut.-Colonel Carne, commanding the Gloucesters, split his battalion into three groups with instructions that each group should attempt to infiltrate back to our own lines. Hon. Members will by now have heard that Peking Radio has announced that Colonel Carne and about 100 officers and men are prisoners in Chinese hands.

For their action, 1st Battalion the Gloucestershire Regiment, and C Troop of 170th Independent Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery, received a Presidential Citation. I would like to read to the House the concluding sentences of the Citation which shows how this fine exploit appeared in American eyes: The 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment and Troop C 170th Independent Mortar Battery displayed such gallantry, determination, and esprit de corps in accomplishing their mission under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions as to set them apart and above other units participating in the same battle. Their sustained brilliance in battle, their resoluteness, and extraordinary heroism are in keeping with the finest traditions of the renowned military forces of the British Commonwealth, and reflect unsurpassed credit on these courageous soldiers and their homeland. During the first week in May the enemy pulled back their forces to a distance of some 10 to 15 miles along the entire front in order to regroup and re-equip for the second phase of their counter-offensive. The 8th Army reacted vigorously by patrolling forward in order to maintain contact with the enemy and by the middle of May had reached a line running a few miles south of the 38th Parallel in the west and a few miles north of it in the east. Thus a "buffer" had been constituted in front of the main defensive positions.

The Chinese attacked again on the morning of 17th May, and two main thrusts developed—one against an American Division in the west, and the other against an American Division and a South Korean Corps in the east. The attack in the west faded out on 18th May and on the morning of 20th May the two more westerly American Corps seized the initiative and advanced northwards toward the Imjin River.

In the eastern sector, the Chinese attempt at a major break through met with greater success as a result of the partial collapse of three South Korean divisions, whose positions were over-run. The serious situation which thus developed was only saved from further deterioration by a determined stand by American, French, and Dutch units. Eventually, an American reserve division arrived and the situation was restored.

On 23rd May, 8th Army resumed the offensive along the entire front. Our rapidly moving forces were able to create road blocks behind the retreating Chinese, and in this way large numbers of prisoners fell into our hands. United Nations air forces were also able to take heavy toll of the enemy who, in his haste to retreat moved in daylight as well as by night.

By about 28th May, it became clear that the enemy had suffered a major defeat. Enemy casualties for May were officially estimated at about 200,000. By 1st June, however, enemy resistance had increased everywhere, particularly in the centre on the approaches to Chorwon and Kumhwa, which are important supply bases about which the enemy is very sensitive. The House will recall that it was from these bases that the enemy launched his previous offensives.

The 29th British Brigade and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade—which relieved 27th Brigade—are again in the line in the western sector, while the 25th Canadian Brigade is well to the fore in the centre. Each Brigade is playing its full part in current operations. During these operations, the Army have suffered only relatively light casualties; and while I naturally deplore them, I think that in view of the scale of the operations we must feel relief that they have not been heavier.

Throughout the month, His Majesty's Naval Forces and the Sunderland squadron of the Royal Air Force have continued their successful operations on an intensive scale. There have been no casualties in the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force.

The situation at present is that the Chinese and North Korean armies have been considerably disorganised. General Van Fleet's timely counter-offensive, brilliantly executed by troops of fine fighting quality undoubtedly took the enemy by surprise and threw him off balance. He has suffered heavily, and the fact that his troops are surrendering more willingly than heretofore and are abandoning large quantities of equipment, may be an indication that the morale and will to resist of at least the forward troops is wavering. Nevertheless, I would remind the House that there is no evidence that the huge Chinese manpower potential has been to any great extent affected, and it would be most unwise to assume that the enemy is permanently crippled. We should be thankful for the success which has attended our arms so far, and we should look forward with hope and cautious optimism.

Mr. Bellenger

As it would now appear that the enemy have been driven out of South Korea, is there any likelihood, in order to avoid what I might call a seesaw campaign, of formulating more static defences, particularly in the nature of large-scale minefields, to contain the enemy, so that we do not have what appears to be a constant succession of attempted breaks through which apparently are nearly successful?

Mr. Shinwell

We must have confidence in the commanders on the spot, who no doubt are taking all necessary precautions.

Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite

Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether His Majesty's representative in Peking is being granted proper facilities for access to our men who are prisoners in Chinese hands, and whether we are likely to receive a list of names at an early date?

Mr. Shinwell

I have no information on the first part of the question. As regards the second part, I made inquiries only the other day when this statement was being prepared. So far we have no names in our possession other than the name of Colonel Carne.

Mr. Rankin

Is it not true that the United Nations Commander in the Far East has stated that a position of military stalemate has been achieved in Central Korea and that that opinion has been substantiated by the Chiefs of Staff in America? Can my right hon. Friend say whether or not any steps are contemplated which might break that military stalemate other than by military means?

Mr. Shinwell

Naturally we are anxious to ensure that our desire for negotiations—I speak for the United Nations—in order to bring this affair to an end should meet with a ready response from the Peking Government; but in the absence of any desire on the part of the Peking Government to respond to our suggestion that there should be a negotiation, there can be no question of stalemate. We must defeat the forces of aggression.

Brigadier Peto

The Minister said that the Peking authorities had stated that 100 officers and men were prisoners of war. Is not this an opportunity to ask them to receive a delegate from the Red Cross, or to accept some other method of identification?

Mr. Shinwell

I shall certainly make inquiries.

Brigadier Thorp

Can the right hon. Gentleman give the number of casualties suffered by the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, and can he assure the House that there are sufficient reserves to keep that battalion and other battalions up to establishment?

Mr. Shinwell

The House will understand that I was furnishing all the information that I have in my possession about the battle in the month of May. I have given some figures of casualties in earlier statements. I have not got the actual figures showing the casualties in the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, but I have reason to believe that they are not very heavy.

Mr. Emrys Hughes

Can the Minister give any information on the statement made by the Reconstruction Officer of the United Nations in Korea that there have been one million civilian casualties and that there are three million refugees on the roads? When will he say something about that? [HON. MEMBERS: "Who caused it all?"] The bombers.

Mr. Shinwell

When an act of aggression is committed, those who are responsible for perpetrating that act of aggression should think of the consequences.

Mr. Hughes

The one million civilians did not cause it.

Mr. Duncan Sandys

I wish to ask a question which might be of legal importance. Can the Minister say whether the Chinese Government have stated that they officially hold our men as prisoners of war of China or whether the men are held by the North Korean authorities?

Mr. Shinwell

The trouble is that we have no official information other than reports that emanate from Peking Radio. Naturally we are anxious to get official information, and every attempt is being made to obtain it.

Mr. Sandys

Did Peking Radio say that they were being held by China or by North Korea?

Mr. Shinwell

I should not care to say. This is a somewhat complicated matter.

Mr. Gammans

The Minister said that at the moment he could not give the casualties of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. Can he give the total casualties of the British Commonwealth Forces and, if possible, of the United Nations Forces as a whole?

Mr. Shinwell

I have not got the information beside me, but if the hon. Gentleman will put down a Question, I will endeavour to give him a full answer.

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport

The right hon. Gentleman ought to have it.

Mr. Driberg

Has not the Secretary of State for War already answered a number of Questions in this House on the subject of prisoners and the Red Cross, and did he not say recently that the Chinese Red Cross Society were possibly going to act on behalf of the International Red Cross as forwarding agents, and so on? Can he say whether there has been any development on those lines?

Mr. Shinwell

I understand that no such official information has been furnished to the House, but we shall certainly endeavour to get it.

Mr. Alport

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the inevitable difficulties facing the commander of the Independent Brigade in Korea owing to the continued absence of divisional headquarters, and can he say when divisional headquarters will be in being in Korea, and whether they will be accompanied by full-scale supporting units?

Mr. Shinwell

The divisional headquarters are being assembled now, and we hope will be ready by next month.

Mr. Churchill

If the British representative in Peking cannot even get the names of the 100 British prisoners of war in the control of the Government to which he is accredited, what actually are the duties which he is able to discharge and what is the continued value which should be attached to his presence there?

Mr. Shinwell

As to the responsibility of our representative in Peking, that is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I would not know what the actual position is, but on the general question which I expect is in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman, namely, what information we can get about our men who are in the hands of the Chinese and the North Koreans, I shall certainly do everything I can to get the information.

Major Guy Lloyd

Is it the Government's view that the Chinese Government are our enemies or not?

Mr. Shinwell

I think we must each draw our own conclusions.

Mr. Spence

Can the right hon. Gentleman say through what channels details of Chinese prisoners in our hands are sent to China, and whether that channel could be used in reverse?

Mr. Shinwell

I will certainly look at that.