HC Deb 04 April 1950 vol 473 cc1150-60

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Popplewell.]

10.40 p.m.

Mr. Driberg (Maldon)

There is, I gather, a prospect that we shall, shortly after the Easter Recess, have a further foreign affairs Debate devoted to the subject of Asia and the Far East, and South-East Asia in particular. I hope it is the case; certainly it ought to be, because it may well be argued that that part of the world at the present time is more important than Europe. Since that is probably to be so, I shall try during this brief period tonight to devote myself to what is in some ways the most tragic and is now potentially the most dangerous of the secondary conflicts that arose after the end of the war in the Far East in 1945, with particular reference to the recent recognition by His Majesty's Government of the régime of Bao Dai in Indo-China.

We were involved in this, as in Indonesia and in some other parts of South-East Asia, partly because it was our troops who, under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, went in to liberate prisoners of war. From the moment of our arrival there this problem—a problem, as in Burma and Indonesia, of emergent nationalism—was handled, I am afraid, with less than wisdom by the French, especially by the French locally in Saigon. I regret to have to say this about our allies and neighbours, for whom we have so warm a regard, but it is none the less true that it was the French who, at a moment of great tension in Saigon, double-crossed the British Commander on the spot and started the shooting war.

It is the French who have obstinately refused to realise that, of all the imperialist régimes in Asia, theirs in Indo-China is the most hated and the most deservedly hated—corrupt and backward as it was, and administered by men 90 per cent. of whom sided with Vichy during the war and the occupation. It is the French who not long ago restored the Emperor Bao Dai, apparently at the instigation of the Americans, a man of whom one may say, in pity rather than with opprobrium, that he is "a reed shaken by the wind," a man who as late as 7th March, 1945, was speaking in terms of moving affection of the French and saying of France that her destiny was "intimately tied to that of our country"; but who, just four days later, when the Japanese forces had brushed aside the Vichy administration, proclaimed that the Empire of Annam had denounced the Franco-Annamite protectorate and would" collaborate with all its strength with Japan."

This is, then, the puppet Emperor whom we have just recognised. On 13th March my hon. Friend the Minister of State, said that the Foreign Secretary was satisfied that the status of this régime justifies the action taken."—[OFFICLAL REPORT, 13th March, 1950; Vol. 472, c. 747] That is, of course, the main point at issue. If the Foreign Secretary is really so satisfied, he must be one of the very few people in this country or in Asia who are. I will just quote one opinion from among many that could be cited from responsible commentators, the editorial in the "Manchester Guardian" which said: It can hardly be denied that Viet-Nam at least does not satisfy the legal conditions on the fulfilment of which the recognition of a new régime is normally made to rest. The "Manchester Guardian" further added that the recognition of Bao Dai may have done lasting harm to East-West understanding. I believe and fear that that may be true, although I hope that it is not.

No doubt this decision was regarded as a conventional move in the cold war against Communism. If so, it was a singularly inept move. It was obviously calculated, as we now see, first, to drive Ho Chi Minh, the Nationalist leader, more closely into alliance with the victorious Chinese Communists, whose help he would not have welcomed so eagerly if there had been a wise and progressive policy during the last five years. Secondly, it was calculated to strengthen still further Ho Chi Minh's influence with the mass of the Annamese people; for, let me emphasise, the overwhelming majority of the people, although they are not pro-Communist, are bitterly and intransigently anti-French.

The testimony of every impartial observer on the spot—of Indian diplomatic representatives, of every responsible correspondent from the West, from "The Times" and the "Observer" and the "New York Herald-Tribune" and from French Conservative newspapers themselves—is that Bao Dai would not last for a single day if the French forces were withdrawn. It is the opinion of these people on the spot that we have recognised a Government which controls less than one-third of its nominal territory, and is supported by far fewer than one-third of the people who live there.

In fact, Bao Dai can hardly get anyone to join his Government, or to stay in it. He cannot even persuade his prewar Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem to join it—Ngo Dinh Diem who is the outstanding leader of the two million Catholics in Viet Nam. That is an interesting point: hon. Members should not, if I may say so, run away with the idea that this is a simple conflict of the Communists versus the rest. The Viet Nam Catholics, too, like the rest of the people, are overwhelmingly in support of the movement and the administration led by Ho Chi Minh; or, at the very least—and this applies to the three bishops there, since the Vatican recognition—they are "neutral against" Bao Dai. As I have said, Ngo Dinh Diem, the former Prime Minister, refused a year ago to enter the Cabinet, and is still steadily refusing to do so. Less than two weeks ago three Ministers in Bao Dai's Government resigned, and as recently as 30th March—last Thursday—the Prime Minister, unable to fill these vacancies issued a most extraordinary decree, taking power to "requisition" potential Ministers or civil servants for the public service. So unpopular in the country and in Saigon itself is this régime, which can indeed be said to be regarded by the overwhelming majority of the people as a kind of quisling régime.

I would like to refer my hon. Friend to an extremely interesting and, I think, fair and objective article last Saturday in the European edition of the "New York Herald-Tribune," which, I have no doubt, he studies as devoutly as the rest of us, by their Saigon correspondent. He says: During the past month I have spent here I have often had occasion to compare this régime to the ill-fated Chiang Kai-shek Government in China. The conclusion is nearly inescapable that, in all but one respect, the Bao Dai Government is probably weaker than Chiang's was, say, at the close of 1947 when the latter had perhaps already lost the Chinese civil war. It has less popular support, less tradition of authority, a lower percentage of the nation's good men working for it, and less heart for the struggle. … The only respect in which Bao Dai's Government is clearly stronger is that it is protected by French troops and guided by French administrators. But this strength is probably also a fatal weakness—it seems most unlikely that Bao Dai can ever be popular while French troops are on Viet Namese soil. That is the situation and that, by all reputable and impartial testimony, is the régime which we have now recognised in a manner strangely incongruous with our very sensible recognition of the Chinese Communist régime. At least that was a recognition of an existing fact, which this is not.

Meanwhile, the economic reconstruction and welfare of this unhappy country are neglected—except, indeed, in that very large section of it controlled by Ho Chi Minh, who has set up what appears to be quite an advanced and flourishing Socialist welfare state. The Emperor is tiger-hunting at his mountain reserve three hundred miles away from Saigon. The French demand more practical assistance from ourselves and the Americans, since it is estimated that it would take them half-a-million men and 165,000,000 dollars to secure victory, and the French have already, unfortunately, lost 30,000 men killed in this colonial war and are spending £150,000,000 a year upon it. The State Department wonders how many dollars it can send. Our friends in the Commonwealth in Asia are aghast and dismayed by our folly in recognising Bao Dai. Ho Chi Minh has arms factories on the outskirts of Saigon; he can shell American warships in Saigon harbour; and thousands of his supporters can demonstrate in the very streets of Saigon itself. Not that this is any token of freedom of speech, for they get shot down and killed when they do so; but it shows how far Bao Dai is from having any kind of popular support even in the cities, where his régime is said to be strongest.

This, in fact, is the hottest sector of the cold war. This is not primarily a war between the French and the Nationalists or the Communists. It is a war between the Americans and the Russians, and we ought not to get drawn into it any further. I hope my hon. Friend can, at least, assure us that no British troops will in any circumstances be sent to Indo-China. I suppose I cannot ask him to unrecognise a régime that we have so recently recognised; but I hope, at least, that the Foreign Office may be beginning to learn from this perilous and bloody fiasco in Saigon that the whole of our policy in Asia needs re-thinking out integrally, anew, afresh, and that it was the most lamentable of errors to allow ourselves to be deceived by our just admiration and affection for our French allies into recognising this gimcrack, bogus, cellophane-wrapped gang of their financiers' feeblest stooges.

10.54 p.m.

Mr. Wyatt (Birmingham, Aston)

I do not want to detain the House long because I know the Minister will want to make a full reply to the remarkable case unfolded by my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg), a case which was at any rate wholly convincing on the recognition of Bao Dai being a mistake as far as ordinary international practice is concerned. I think it was also a very bad mistake from our point of view, because our record in that part of the world has been so very excellent since the end of the war. It is because we have cleanly stood by nationalist movements in South-East Asia that Britain's prestige in South-East Asia today is higher than ever before, and it is because of that reason that we, more than any other Western Power, are able to exercise a democratic influence in South-East Asia.

Everyone in South-East Asia knows that the Bao Dai régime is not a régime which has any sort of control over the country it purports to rule. Everybody knows that it is the tail-end of a very long, sordid French imperialist adventure which should never have been started but which has been running since the end of the war. It was a pity to endorse that kind of adventure in Indo-China when we did not endorse the Dutch adventure in Indonesia. In fact, our record in Indonesia was quite the opposite of this sort of thing and it makes many millions of people in South-East Asia wonder if we have really been sincere about our treatment of them since the end of the war.

Nor is it the best way of stopping Communism. I do not share my hon. Friend's view that Ho Chi Minh may not be quite as bad as the French paint him. I believe he is a Communist and he is probably in close contact with the Chinese Communists. I think it is going to be extremely difficult from now on in Indo-China because of his connection with the Chinese Communists. But to set up a puppet régime in the country to oppose him is really to play the Russian game. This is the sort of thing the Russians have done behind what we call the Iron Curtain—the anti-democratic practice of setting up a régime against the will of the people there.

Now that we have made this mistake, the only thing we can do is to make the best of a bad job. I think our best course now, having done this, would be to press the French to make it a genuine independence because we have undertaken the recognition of a country which is not independent. Of course, it is not independent; it does not even begin to be independent. It does not control either its Army or a great part of its own domestic legislation; nor does it control its foreign affairs. If we have been gulled by the French into recognising this country, we had better see that it becomes independent. I hope the Foreign Office will use our considerable influence in that part of the world to see that it really does become independent.

They might begin by suggesting to the French that the head of the new State should be allowed to live in the Governor's House, at present occupied, I believe, by the French Governor. If, in this process of increasing independence, the Bao Dai Government were to fall, that would be just too bad. If the Bao Dai régime is so weak and so lacks popular support that it cannot stand up without French support, then some time it must fall, because the French cannot keep their troops there indefinitely: they cannot afford to. We will not stop Communism in that part of the world by propping up this backward-looking régime, when everyone else in that area is going in a different direction.

This miserable story of French Indo-China is the great illustration of the correctness of our attitude towards Burma. These people who say that the situation in Burma is not satisfactory forget that if we had done the same as the French in Indo-China, the situation in Burma today would be one hundred times worse. We are now being called upon to endorse a French mistake in Indo-China. If we are to be pilloried for our decision in South-East Asia, we have the right to insist that the French conform to our sort of policy in South-East Asia.

11.0 p.m.

The Minister of State (Mr. Younger)

My hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) has indeed painted an exceedingly black picture of what is going on in Indo-China. I expected he would, and of course all of us are worried about the situation there. Indeed, we are worried about the situation not only there, but in many parts of South-East Asia. I would not dissent from my hon. Friend when he says—I cannot remember his exact words—that this is perhaps, of all the areas in South-East Asia, the most critical.

Therefore, I make no complaint about his having shown what we all feel—a serious sense of anxiety about what is happening. Nevertheless, I think that, particularly at the end of his remarks he used rather intemperate language. He was only painting one side of the picture. After all, in any area where there are civil disorders involving violence, by picking out suitable examples, one can always make it appear that what is in fact going on only in limited areas and to a limited extent is quite general. My hon. Friend omitted the other side of the picture.

As regards the future development, that is to say, the possibility of rapid establishment of the régime which is now in force there, and of which the head is the Emperor Bao Dai, there are, of course, varied opinions. Only one side of those opinions was referred to by my hon. Friend, but I can assure him that there have been many responsible and well-informed persons visiting Indo-China and inquiring into the situation there who do not by any means share the entirely uniformly gloomy point of view he takes. Representatives of ours, representatives of the United States and other persons with no other interest but that of discovering what is the truth, have come back painting, if not an optimistic picture, a very much less pessimistic picture than that painted by my hon. Friend.

Mr. Wyatt

Recently?

Mr. Younger

Yes, very recently indeed.

Mr. Driberg

If my hon. Friend is referring to Dr. Jessup, does he recall that when Dr. Jessup talked the Siamese into recognition, the Siamese Foreign Minister resigned?

Mr. Younger

I am not going to speak of Dr. Jessup's relations with Siam. He is only one of the persons who took a very much more balanced view of the situation than is apparently taken by my hon. Friend. My hon. Friend said in one part of his speech that we appeared to have recognised this régime—again, I am not quoting his exact words—on grounds quite contrary to normal international practice. I maintain exactly the reverse, and the first point I want to make is that on the grounds of the status which we are satisfied that this régime does in fact enjoy and of the extent of the control which it in fact exercises, it was normal international practice—I put it no higher than that—to grant recognition.

The fact is that Viet Nam was recognised as an associate State of the French: Union by us early this year. That was as a result primarily of an agreement between President Auriol and Bao Dai in March, 1949, and of subsequent agreements in December, 1949. I would point out that similar agreements granting similar status were entered into in respect not only of Viet Nam but of the other States, Laos and Cambodia. In neither of those cases, so far as I am aware, has there been any criticism. Of course, one can distinguish between those States and the State of Viet Nam on the ground that there is civil trouble going on in Viet Nam; but from the point of view of their status and of the degree of independence which they enjoy, there can, I think, be no substantial distinction made. Therefore, so far as their status is concerned, I think we are quite justified in having accorded recognition.

There were very long negotiations preceding the grant of recognition, and the States are now independent members of the French Union. If I have time, I will say a word on what that implies. It does not imply Dominion status in our sense of the word, but it implies a very great advance upon their previous position as French Protectorates which were internationally recognised as such. We have recognised their new status, and I think that we are doing no more than is implied by the term. We are not by any means alone in this. I think that there are now 19 States, including ourselves, who have granted recognition and among them are many members of the British Commonwealth.

Mr. A. Fenner Brockway (Eton and Slough)

What about India?

Mr. Younger

It was said that our Asian friends were aghast. That is intemperate language. They have not themselves recognised the State, but is the hon. Gentleman aware that when the admission of the Indo-Chinese régime to the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East came up at Singapore the line taken by our Indian friends was extremely moderate? It is true that they wished to have both parties—the Viet Minh and the Bao Dai régimes—accepted, but they did not suggest on that occasion that the régime of Viet Nam was not worthy of being admitted to the Economic Commission. That hardly suggests the extreme view attributed to them in that Matter by my hon. Friend.

As regards the factual position, I do not know where my hon. Friend gets the figure that only one-third of the country is under the Bao Dai régime. My information is that it controls a great deal more than that. It is quite clear that this is the only settled form of régime at all. Although there may be considerable areas, largely in the less inhabited parts of the country, which are within the control of Viet Minh, we are quite unable to say it is a largely developed welfare state. We do not know of any State in existence. We know that there are areas where a guerilla organisation exists with presumably some kind of civil organisation which enables life to go on.

But supposing we wished to consider the recognition of Viet Minh, we have no knowledge of where we should find it, of what sort of administration it possesses, And it has, as far as we know, no capital city. For that reason, if for no other, I am on safe ground in saying that although there may be an area not controlled by Bao Dai, he has no other rival who has any claim whatever to recognition.

Mr. Wyatt

Would the régime stand up if the French withdrew?

Mr. Younger

I do not quarrel with the remark of my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) that we should press the French to develop the present state of considerable independence into a state of full independence. We believe that the French fully recognise this, and as far as our recognition can be taken to endorse one form of policy against another—and I am not suggesting that it should, since it is a question of recognition of fact—it is an endorsement of recent French action in granting this very great advance in constitutional independence. We should like to see that process developed as rapidly as possible.

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'Clock and the Debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at Ten Minutes past Eleven o'Clock.