§ 1.38 p.m.
§ Professor Savory (Queen's University of Belfast)On 9th April, 1940, at 4 o'clock in the morning, the German Ambassador at Copenhagen woke up the Foreign Secretary and told him that the Germans had evidence that British troops and British Air Forces were about to occupy bases in Denmark and therefore it had been necessary for the Germans to occupy the country. He pointed to the sky above which was black with the German bombers and informed him that resistance was altogether hopeless. His Excellency the Foreign Minister replied that they had no evidence whatsoever of any invasion or any intention on the part of the British authorities to occupy any bases in Denmark.
The Danish troops had already started an heroic resistance in Jutland, and on the square in front of the Royal Palace the Life Guards had begun a very bold attack. There is no doubt that, led by their gallant commander-in-chief, they would have fought to the last man in exactly the same way as the Swiss Guard on 10th August, 1792, were prepared to defend the Palace of the Tuileries, but the King was determined to put an end to this useless bloodshed. The case was absolutely hopeless, and in spite of the wishes of the commander-in-chief he gave 818 an order to the Life Guards to give up the hopeless struggle.
The Danish Government drew up a formal protest in which they repudiated the so-called information that the country was about to be occupied by British troops and that the Germans had come in to defend it. The German troops, who everywhere advanced into Jutland and occupied the islands, told the inhabitants—and Danes have informed me that the German soldiers genuinely believed it—"We have come to protect you against the British." The soldiers had been told this by their officers and with usual German gullibility they took it all in.
The Danes had a non-aggression pact with the Germans which had been signed just before war broke out, and on 1st September, 1939, the Danish Government had issued a proclamation of neutrality which they were absolutely determined to preserve. For five years the Danish people carried on an heroic resistance. They were largely aided by British parachutists who landed with munitions of all kinds, and the sabotage of German factories reached large dimensions.
The German military authorities behaved in Denmark, and I think this should be known in this country, in exactly the same way as did the German troops in France. The Gestapo carried out murders of individual Danish citizens who were thought to be opposed to the German occupation, and when they had seized representatives, as they thought, of the Resistance Movement they tortured them in exactly the same way as the French had been tortured. I have myself this Summer spoken to four very distinguished Danish gentlemen who I must say very reluctantly described to me, when I insisted, the appalling and unmentionable tortures to which they were subjected by the Germans.
The consequence was that when the news was announced through the B.B.C. on 5th May, 1945, that the Germans had capitulated in Holland, in North-East Germany and in Denmark, the rejoicing throughout the country was unbounded. The leaders of the Resistance Movement came out of their hiding and in uniforms which had been put on one side advanced in lorries to occupy all strategic points. A Coalition Government was appointed consisting not merely of politicians but 819 also of leaders of the Resistance Movement.
The German occupation cost Denmark, on the very lowest estimate reckoned in pounds sterling, £550 million—a staggering sum for such a small country consisting of not more than four million inhabitants. It would have been perfectly possible and would have been fully justifiable had Denmark, having suffered this unprovoked attack, advanced with her troops and occupied the whole of Schleswig down to the ancient border of the Eider. They would have only been doing what the French did when in that glorious year of 1918 their troops advanced and re-occupied Alsace and Lorraine. Let it be remembered that this Prussian occupation of Schleswig had lasted only six more years than the Prussian occupation of Alsace and Lorraine. I am perfectly certain that had the Danes taken that action, as they might most properly have done, it would have been welcomed by all public opinion in this country, throughout the Continent of Europe and in the United States of America.
The Germans are always thought to have made the most skilful and most wonderful plans, to have thought out everything beforehand, but there was one error in their calculations. They forgot to carry away with them the instruments of torture which they had used in the Danish camps. Large numbers of these are there and are to be seen today in the museum at Sonderborg. Looking at them, I could only recall the medieval instruments of torture which I had seen in the Castle of Nuremberg. There was just this difference: the Germans had added further refinements to the tortures employed during the Middle Ages.
The Germans behaved in Denmark in a way no less cruel and barbarous than the way they behaved in France or in any country which they had invaded. But the Danes did not re-occupy their ancient territory—and I must once again emphasise that this territory of Schleswig is purely and wholly Danish; the Danish occupation goes back to A.D. 811. At Rendsburg on the frontier on the Eider was an ancient stone, a photograph of which I have here. When the country was occupied by the Prussians, this ancient stone was taken down from the gate of Rendsburg on the frontier on 820 the Eider and placed where it now is, in the arsenal in Copenhagen. It bears the inscription, Eidora Romani terminus imperii, or translated "The Eider is the boundary of the Holy Roman Empire," or "The Eider is the boundary of Germany." One can only look upon that stone with reverence and I am thankful it has been preserved today in the arsenal at Copenhagen.
Let us never forget that it was in 1864 that Bismarck seized upon a pretext for the invasion of the country. Lord Palmerston had certainly allowed it to be understood that the British Government would intervene because he held that we were still bound by the Treaty of 1720 made between George I and the King of Denmark, of which the original is still in the Foreign Office. Under this famous Treaty Great Britain guaranteed that Schleswig should always be a part of Denmark. Lord Palmerston unfortunately failed in his efforts to induce Napoleon III to intervene. Napoleon III was at that time seriously preoccupied with the disastrous expedition to Mexico. He refused, a fatal blunder on his part, and Bismarck called the bluff of Palmerston. Bismarck knew that England would not fight alone. But that bluff of Palmerston was attacked in the House of Commons by Disraeli in a famous speech which is well worth reading in HANSARD. The result was that Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, won a vote of confidence by only 18 votes, and only then because he introduced statements showing the prosperity of Great Britain under his regime which had nothing whatever to do with the question under discussion.
The Danes cannot forget that unfortunate episode. Lord Palmerston, who saw well into the future, stated in the House of Commons that the pretext of Bismarck that he was coming to support the claim to the Danish throne of the Prince of Augustenburg was false. Palmerston said that Bismarck was aiming to get the harbour of Kiel. Now we have the published memoirs of Bismarck. There we find it avowed that the Prince of Augustenburg was only a pretext and that Bismarck's real object was to seize the great port of Kiel and lay the foundation of the German Navy. So soon as he had accomplished his object he threw over the Prince, saying that he found the Prince's claim was not justified and that 821 the real sovereign was Christian, who, in accordance with the Treaty of London, 1852, had been made King of Denmark.
One thing that Lord Palmerston had fought for, before he died in 1865 within two days of the age of 81, was taken up by Napoleon III, who insisted that in the Treaty of Prague the famous Fifth Article should be inserted, in accordance with which a plebiscite should be held in North Schleswig. The people were to be asked to decide whether they would be reunited once more to the mother country of Denmark. That Clause was never carried out. This was the famous broken treaty which rankles so bitterly in the minds of the Danish people today. What was the policy of Prussia? It was, first of all, to bring in German colonists and to compel the Danes to evacuate their lands. Secondly, and above all, it was to suppress the use of the Danish language. The Danish schools were abolished. Danish could not be spoken either in church or in school, or at any public lecture. A lady was singing in her own private drawing room a Danish song. The weather was very warm, so she opened the window, and this beautiful song was heard in the street. A policeman immediately came in and said: "This is no longer a private singing. This is a public demonstration," and he arrested her and carried her off to the police station for having broken the law by singing Danish in public. That was the oppression to which these noble people of Schleswig were subjected.
I was taken in Copenhagen to see a picture by a well-known artist, Madame Mehru. I have a photograph of it here. It represents a mother taking out of a chest a Danish flag which had been hidden carefully away there. It is the middle of the night, and she has come to show it to her son, a Dane who had been conscripted into the Prussian Army and forced, against his will, to fight for Prussia. The mother is represented as saying to this boy: "Remember that this Dannebrog, this Danish flag, and you, are one and the same thing. Never forget, even though you are fighting under the Prussian flag, that you are born a Dane and will ever remain a Dane, devoted to your country and to the Danish language." I wish that a public subscription could be raised to purchase this beautiful picture and present it to the 822 people of South Schleswig and to the beautiful Duborg School at Flensborg.
This state of affairs has continued right up into the 20th century. After the war of 1914–18, the Allies recognised that it could not continue and so a plebiscite was held. Schleswig was divided into three zones. In the Northern zone the vote showed a majority of 75 per cent. in favour of Denmark. Consequently, Northern Schleswig was restored to the mother country. Unfortunately, in the middle zone, owing to intimidation and immense pressure by the Germans and the threat that if the country were to vote Danish the shipyards and the factories would be closed down and the owners would migrate to Germany, the vote in that zone went against Denmark.
Most unfortunately of all, by a last-minute decision of the Big Four, the vote in the third zone was suppressed altogether. Had there been a vote in the third zone, the German officials would undoubtedly have been removed and the pressure on the second zone would have ceased to exist. I am sure, and I have been convinced by crossing the country from end to end and from East to West and right away to the Frisian Islands and talking to the people, that if today a vote were taken, at least in the second zone, there would be an overwhelming majority in favour of Denmark.
The Danes have shown exemplary moderation. Instead of advancing, as I have suggested they might, to occupy the whole country, they have made a very moderate request. I have here words which I have taken from the Danish White Book and which consist of a communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador, dated 19th October, 1946. This is the very modest Danish demand to the British authorities who were in occupation of the country and were responsible to a very large extent:
In continuation of the recommendations which have been made in the past by the Danish Government on the subject of an administrative separation of Slesvig from Holstein, the Danish Government desire to emphasise that in an administratively unified Slesvig-Holstein South Slesvig, as the smaller part, will find itself in a weak condition as compared with the greater Holstein. Only in a South Slesvig which forms an independent administrative unit without German organs common to Holstein and South Slesvig, and without any status of subordination to German authorities in Holstein, 823 will the Danish-minded population have a prospect of making themselves felt in political representation and so be able to safeguard their existence themselves. In this matter the Danish Government would refer to their Memoranda of December 15th, 1945, January 21st, 1946, and to the verbal representations which have been made both to the British Minister at Copenhagen and through the Danish Minister in London to the British Foreign Office.For reasons which the Under-Secretary will no doubt explain to the House, this very modest request of the Danish Government was not accepted. They have adopted an entirely different policy. Their idea has been to place Schleswig under the German administration in Holstein and form a united Land, a united region, called Schleswig-Holstein, ignoring the fact that these two countries have in all history been entirely separate except during the 80 years of Prussian administration when the two countries were formed by Prussia into a province of Prussia called Schleswig-Holstein.This is contrary to the entire sentiment of the Danish people. I pay grateful acknowledgment to the efforts made by the British authorities, by the Regional Commissioner, to bring about an agreement called the Kiel Declaration in accordance with which it should be possible to grant certain rights to the Danish population. In Kiel I was handed a German copy of the text, but I had to apply to the Foreign Office for the English text and I am grateful to the Minister for having supplied me with this text from which I can quote to this House if necessary.
On paper this Kiel agreement is admirable. I discussed it with the Danish-minded population, and I think that we should express our gratitude to Mr. Asbury, the Regional Commissioner, and to Mr. De Haviland, his assistant, for their efforts in this respect. However, I am sorry to say of this Kiel agreement, which gives great advantages to the Danish population and promises them the use of their language and various other most important privileges, that even though the ink on it is scarcely dry, it is not being carried out. The Kiel agreement was approved by the Diet or the Landtag on 26th September of this year, but during the last fortnight, according to the information and the complaints which I have received and which I feel 824 it my duty to bring before this House, the Councils of Kreis Flensburg and Kreis Husum, having Christian Democratic Union majorities, have resolved not to accept the Kiel agreement. The same resolution has been made by the Christian Democratic Union Party of the county council of Eiderstedt and Stapelholm.
In Eiderstedt the council of the Christian Democratic Union held a meeting attended by members of the Kreistag as well as by the German Landrat. This meeting ended with the passing of protests against the Kiel agreement in which it is recommended to vote only for such candidates as declare that the Kiel agreement should be null and void. That is to say, at the next county elections this party will only support candidates who declare the Kiel agreement to be null and void. I am sorry to weary the House with these details which are taken at random from the huge mass of information which I have received.
The same line is taken by the county council of Husum refusing the Danish group a proportionate representation on the most important sub-committees of the county council, in spite of the wording of the Kiel agreement. The Kiel agreement lays down that there shall be representation in committees such as we have in this House, where Mr. Speaker sees that all parties are proportionately represented. That was stated clearly in the Kiel agreement. But what has taken place? This county council refuses the Danish-minded population proportionate representation in these most important committees of the county council in spite of the wording of the agreement.
The local council of Sonder Brarup in the county of Schleswig has refused to allow the Danish Youth and Sports Association to use the public sports grounds. It restricts the public sports grounds, which are maintained by county council rates, to the German Sports Associations and refuses to allow the Danish children, because they attend the Danish school, to make use of them. In Friedrichs-Stadt the children from the Danish school are not admitted to the public athletic hall though the parents of the Danish children have to pay their share for the maintenance of the hall. This, again, is clearly against the exact terms of the Kiel agreement.
825 I venture to say that if this line is followed all over South Schleswig, the Kiel agreement will not be enforced anywhere in the country except perhaps in the town of Flensburg. This proves, as the Danish Government have suggested in the memoranda which I read, that the only real security for freedom in South Schleswig can be obtained by separating South Schleswig from Holstein and giving the South Schleswig population a decisive vote in their own councils. I have said it before in this House and hon. Members laughed at me, but the analogy is perfectly true and exact. One can no more govern Schleswig from German Kid than one could govern Ulster from Dublin.
This very disagreeable situation is largely aggravated by the overcrowding of the South Schleswig area by the enormous influx of refugees. The Danish Minister in London wrote to the British Foreign Secretary as far back as 27th September, 1945—and again I take this from the Danish White Book—that:
The overcrowding of the South Slesvig area with refugees who generally are imbued with an extreme German national sentiment will, if it becomes of a lasting character, eliminate the special characteristics of the South Slesvig population. It will also reduce to insignificance and jeopardise the continued existence of the Danish-minded element of the population in South Slesvig which, ever since the forced cession of that country to Germany in 1864—in spite of lasting suppression—have fought to preserve its Danishness. From simply humanitarian motives, and from the point of view of the sympathy that all Danes must feel for this minority, it is to be desired that a possibility be vouchsafed to the Danish element for a safe national and cultural development of their own way of life.I abbreviate this despatch, but would make this further quotation:I venture on behalf of my Government earnestly to submit that South Slesvig should to the widest possible extent be spared the influx of more refugees. Likewise, it is particularly desired that those who have already been taken to this area should not be placed in such a position as to gain an opportunity to assimilate themselves into the population, and that they should have no opportunity of gaining influence over the administration of the district or upon that of the separate municipalities, be it by means of the franchise or eligibility for the municipal or county councils or in any other way.On Tuesday, as I was informed by telegram from Copenhagen—I put a Question in this House and got no reply—the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs received the Norwegian Ambas- 826 sador, the Swedish Ambassador, and Icelandic Minister, who represented to him that the danger of the enormous increase in these refugees was a danger not merely to Denmark, and threatening not merely the frontier of Denmark, but the frontiers of the whole of Scandinavia. The Governments of those countries, in their Note to the Foreign Secretary, which has not been published in this country, though I received a Flensburg newspaper this morning and found it summarised there, deem it urgent that South Schleswig, should be relieved of an intolerable burden, and they maintained that the refugees in South Schleswig constituted a danger, not only for the southern frontier of Denmark, but for the southern frontiers of Scandinavia.What is the extent of this influx of refugees? I have here a very important plan which I should like to hand over to the Under-Secretary of State later. It shows what is the percentage in the various Laender in West Germany and it has been very carefully prepared. From it, I find that whereas in Schleswig-Holstein the percentage of refugees as compared with the native population is 81, in Nieder Sachsen it is only 53 per cent., in Bavaria 30 per cent. and in Nord-Rhein-Westfalen 10 per cent., and in Bremen, which is in the American zone, it is only 6 per cent. Very well, then, the people are surely entitled to complain of the excessive number of refugees in their country, as compared with the rest of the British and American zones.
The Danish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking as lately as 18th October in the Lower House of the Danish Parliament, said this:
The number of refugees in Western Germany is 8 million, and of these, 1,172,000 are in Schleswig-Holstein, and, in South Schleswig alone, 275,000.I am quoting the Danish Foreign Minister, who ought to know the facts.No other part of Western Germany has proportionately so many refugees as Schleswig-Holstein, and the population has increased since 1939 by 70 per cent., whereas the average increase in the British and American zones is only 22 per cent. In every room in every house in Schleswig-Holstein there is an average of 2.33 persons, whereas the average in the British and American zones is only 1.94. Between April and June of this year 17,356 fresh refugees have moved into Schleswig-Holstein.827 According to the "Heimat Zeitung," of the 27th October, a German language newspaper which is published in Flensburg, whole families are crossing every night into South Schleswig over the heath where they hide during the day. A member of the county council said in Flensburg that the influx of new refugees is so great that the number of refugees is far greater than it was last year. He added:We are no longer in a position to receive refugees in a way worthy of humanity. We are powerless as regards these conditions so long as this stream of refugees continues.If I may, I would like to quote from the despatch of the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs on 19th October, 1946, in which he used these words:An overpopulated South Slesvig cannot but cause an undesirable and dangerous state of tension at the frontier. It is a vital Danish interest to seek to avoid such a development. The future security of Denmark will essentially depend upon a cessation of the refugee pressure in the frontier areas.I asked to be shown the homes of the refugees, and I visited them both in Flensburg and on one of the islands, and this is what I saw. Tumble-down houses, which the municipality of Flensburg would like to have pulled down long ago, since they go back about 300 years. I climbed staircase after staircase into these wretched rooms, in which the appalling overcrowding is something indescribable. I can understand why there is no gas and no electricity, but is it not deplorable that there should be no water, which has to be carried in pails from a public well up these endless stairs?Again, I visited the refugee camp in Flensburg, which is on a beautiful site lying along that glorious and exquisitely lovely gulf of Flensburg. I must say that I have the greatest sympathy for these people. I spoke to many of them, and I remember asking one woman where she came from. She told me that she had come from Pomerania, and, when I asked her why she had left Pomerania, she told me this:
In the middle of the night, the Russians arrived at my house. I had a very nice home, with 100 acres of land. I had it well stocked, with many cattle, pigs and chickens, and everything you could wish for. The Russians came in the middle of the night and without any warning; they turned me out of my house, and refused to allow me 828 to take any of my possessions with me. I have drifted along from camp to camp, and at last I arrived in Flensburg.I am certain that that woman was telling me the truth, and, although I am not a man of a very sensitive disposition, when I heard that story I could not prevent the tears from coming into my eyes. That is the state of affairs in South Schleswig today.However much we may sympathise with these German refugees, what are the conditions which this influx has brought about? They have been given the vote. What is the result? The Danish municipalities which have always had a Danish majority have now been completely out-voted and a German majority has been elected in their place. Germans have never before in their whole existence had anything to do with Schleswig. The Germans have poured in from East Prussia and these Germans—the most Nazi of all Germans—have been given the vote and have out-voted the native population.
I drove over to Schleswig specially to investigate the circumstances on the spot, and there I interviewed a gentleman—Herman Klausen—who not only represents the town of Schleswig in the Diet but is also the national representative in the Federal Parliament at Bonn. He had been for many years mayor of Schleswig. A more fair-minded and just administrator could not possibly be imagined. He spoke with extraordinary fairness and moderation. What did he tell me? He said that Schleswig is purely Danish. Every house is Danish, all the surrounding farms are Danish and the street names are Danish. The Danish municipality had been ousted, and he was dismissed from his office of mayor—and the mayor is always a prominent official in Germany. Why? On account of the fact that these German refugees had been given the vote provided they had been three months in the country, the Danish majority which was 80 per cent., has now become a minority of 25 per cent. and the municipality has passed under German control, with the result that every effort has been made to import German officials and to get rid of the native Danish officials—and this in spite of the recently signed Kiel agreement.
This town of Schleswig is typical of the rest of the country and I am informed 829 that at the present moment the only two municipalities which still have a Danish majority are Flensburg and Riesum. It is easy to understand that the local population say that they can no longer be governed from Kiel. Kiel sends word to Flensburg: "You have to receive these refugees." The mayor says, "We have no room for them." They are, however, obliged to obey the order received from Kiel. These Danish-minded people are convinced that, given local control, they could solve this problem of refugees as the Danish Government did themselves.
In Denmark, 200,000 refugees poured in from Germany and lived in Denmark, saying that they were the guests of the King of Denmark. They went into the shops and seized everything on which they could lay their hands—these uninvited guests of the King of Denmark. The Danes have solved that problem. They have got out of Denmark the overwhelming majority of these refugees and the Danish-minded population in Schleswig assured me that, given local administration they would solve this problem. But they have a suspicion—I will not say whether it is well-founded or not because I do not wish to express an opinion, but it is the unanimous belief of the people of Schleswig that the Kiel Government are not as anxious as they should be to get rid of these German refugees. They rather like the idea—so they say—of this German population outvoting the Danish inhabitants. I will not say whether this suspicion is well-founded or not. All I will say is that it is the universal belief of these Danish-minded people in Schleswig.
I do, therefore, plead with His Majesty's Government to adopt the well-founded suggestion made by the Danish Government to give this purely Danish land autonomy and self-administration. That is a very moderate wish. I do implore His Majesty's Government to give it further consideration. If this Kiel agreement is being violated today, what is going to happen when the British troops have been withdrawn and there is no longer any security whatsoever that the Kiel agreement will be carried out? The Danes believe that it will be a dead letter just like the Fifth Article of the Treaty of Prague, which I have quoted, and which was never put into force in spite of the solemn promise of Prussia that a plebis- 830 cite would be held in the northern part of Schleswig. I go further and say that while for the moment the people would be satisfied with an administration independent of Kiel, I believe that something further is needed.
We might take as a precedent the Clause in the Treaty of Versailles which gave the territory of the Saar the right after 15 years to hold a plebiscite and enact in making our final treaty with Germany that after 15 years there shall be a plebiscite for Schleswig. Fifteen years would bring us to the year 1964. How better could we commemorate the centenary of the forcible occupation against all international law of Schleswig than by holding a plebiscite in accordance with which I firmly believe that the people would vote for reunion with Denmark from which they were separated solely by violence.
May I, in conclusion, express two wishes? May I live to see the day when the ancient prophecy will be fulfilled and the King of Denmark on his white horse will advance into South Schleswig and occupy the country just as his noble and heroic father did in 1920, when on his white horse he entered North Schleswig and reunited North Schleswig to the mother country.
My second wish is this: May I live to see the day when the famous lion of Isted which was put up by the Danes to commemorate their great victory over the Prussians, but which, when the Prussians advanced in 1864, was removed by them and carried off to Berlin will be restored to its ancient site. I am thankful to say that the Americans, when they occupied that district of Berlin, discovered this lion and gave it as a present to the King of Denmark. May I express this second hope, that once more this famous lion of Isted, which I saw recently in the arsenal in Copenhagen, will recline in the cemetery at Flensburg where once more it will commemorate the death of the heroic Danish soldiers who fought to defend their country against the Prussian invader. When I walked over that battlefield, I could not refrain from plucking a bouquet of heather to take home to my wife as a memory of the glorious victory of these noble Danes of Isted. May the lion which commemorates that victory once more recline in its own place in the cemetery of Flensburg above the graves of the heroic dead.
§ 2.31 p.m.
§ The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Mayhew)The House cannot complain that the hon. Gentleman has treated this subject in any cursory manner, or that the historic introduction to the subject which he gave was in any way skimped or inadequate. What I have to ask myself is how much of the very lengthy speech we have heard touches on questions which are the responsibility of His Majesty's Government. If I may so say, I agree with the hon. Gentleman's views on the onslaught of Napoleon III on Mexico; I never liked it; I do not like it now; but whether it is for me now to answer for these ancient wrongs I am not so clear. I also agree with him about the Treaty of Prague. I think it was a great error of Palmerston not to have made more specific the articles to which the hon. Gentleman referred.
§ Professor SavoryPalmerston was dead then.
§ Mr. MayhewI think I am correct in saying that he negotiated the Prague agreement, and I am not now prepared to defend even Palmerston's ghost.
Let me say immediately that we should consider to what extent the hon. Gentleman is speaking for the Danish minority and to what extent perhaps he should have made clear that he was expressing, views held by the Danish Government. It would have been possible, listening to him, to suppose that many of the very wild and extravagant ideas which he put forward were ideas held by the Danish Government. It would, I know, be an embarrassment, both to them and to other countries, if that were suggested, and I know the hon. Gentleman would not wish to press that point.
There were four points in the speech to which I think I can reply. First, the minority rights of the Danish-minded people; secondly, the possible separation of the administration of South Schleswig from that of Holstein; thirdly, the plebiscite; and fourthly, the vitally important and grave problem of the refugees. If I can say something briefly about those four points I think I shall have taken out of the hon. Gentleman's speech those parts to which it is possible for a Government spokesman to reply.
832 First, the question of the protection of minority rights. Thanks largely to the direct intervention of the British Government and to advice they have given to the German authorities, very considerable rights and privileges belong to the Danish - minded minority in South Schleswig. I do not think that is denied by the Danish-minded minority themselves; the rights they have been granted in the Kiel Agreement are considered sufficient by them. What anxieties there are, if there are anxieties, consist in the safeguarding of those rights and their maintenance rather than in the actual rights themselves. The minority rights in general are guaranteed by the basic law in Germany—a basic law which can be changed only with the consent of the occupying authority. That is the first safeguard.
They now have this declaration, ratified by the South Schleswig Land Government and by the British in September last, which takes large steps forward in the implementation of the basic principles of the basic law. The provisions are that there shall be no restriction on the joining of Danish-minded associations; that their children can speak and be taught Danish; that there shall be no disabilities on their entry into the public services; and that there shall be broadcasting facilities for the Danish-minded minority. Special provisions are made for complaints about breaches or infringements of the agreement. I should say that as far as formal guarantees go no one could ask for better; and I know of minorities who could ask for as much and get a great improvement on the present state of affairs.
What matters now is the spirit in which this agreement is implemented. Here I must say about the hon. Gentleman's speech that its tone and its lack of balance in presentation are, in my view, not helpful to the future success of the working of this agreement. What we need on both sides is patience and good will in carrying out this agreement. What is needed, therefore, is undoubtedly some restraint on both sides and the capacity to see the difficulties; and I cannot help feeling that in this difficult situation, which requires patience and good will on both sides, it is not helpful to stir up the emotions by undoubtedly political and one-sided statements such as we have just heard.
§ Professor SavoryI did everything I could to pour oil on the troubled waters during the whole of my visit to South Schleswig and Denmark.
§ Mr. MayhewWell, the waters are not very troubled, and in my view the oil was not particularly soothing. I should have thought it would have been more helpful to have urged the necessity for the Germans to understand the undoubted rights of the Danish minority, and for the Danish minority to realise that certain schemes—such as the one for separate administration, which the hon. Gentleman put forward—are wholly impracticable.
The question of a separate administration has been referred to several times, but I think it is impracticable. In the first place, there is the size of the area concerned. In any case, there are fewer than half a million permanent inhabitants in that area, and Schleswig-Holstein as a whole is already the smallest Land in the whole of Western Germany. To make it into a separate administration would be a political anomaly.
Moreover, it is not economically viable; its industry is tiny—only 10 per cent. of Schleswig-Holstein as a whole; it raises only 25–35 per cent. of the taxation of that Land as a whole; it has only a fraction of the share of the inter-zonal trade of Schleswig-Holstein; and to impose on the German Governmental structure a system in which we do not believe ourselves would, it seems to me, be most unlikely, to succeed.
Nor do I agree that such a scheme is necessarily supported by the majority of even the Danish-minded people in the area. I think that to set up such a governmental structure would probably be regarded with hostility and suspicion by other Laender Governments, and would be economically wrong and politically very unwise. That deals with the second point.
We now come to the much more important point, on which I felt far more sympathy with the point of view of the hon. Gentleman—the question of refugees in this area. Undoubtedly, this is still a very grave problem. We quite understand the fears of the Danish Government that in the future it may constitute a serious threat to the frontier. I do not quarrel with the map which I understand 834 the hon. Gentleman will be so good as to show me after this Debate. I have not checked the figures, but it is true that on percentage the population of Schleswig-Holstein is bearing far more than its share of the refugee problem in Germany.
However, let me make clear once again that, whereas the inflow of refugees over the inter-zonal frontier forming part of the international relations of the German Government is a matter for His Majesty's Government, the distribution of refugees within the German Federal Government area is now no longer reserved to us, and is not a responsibility of His Majesty's Government. That does not, of course, mean to say that we shall not help the German authorities in any way we can with this grave problem. We shall certainly do so.
The Federal Government is at the moment, I understand, considering additional measures to meet this problem, including the redistribution within the next two years of 600,000 of the refugees, half of whom will come from Schleswig-Holstein. That would, if successful, as the hon. Gentleman will appreciate, make a great difference and be a great improvement. However, I agree that the problem is very serious. I think the hon. Gentleman may agree that in the past the British Government have played a very active part in this. We discussed it fully and frankly with the Danish Government. We had a conference under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, my colleague, the Joint Under-Secretary of State, and as a result some measure of alleviation was achieved. Some transfer to the French zone, in particular, has been achieved. That transfer will go on.
The refugee problem in Germany as a whole is, of course, an appalling problem. There are 8 million refugees in Western Germany, so that the Schleswig-Holstein problem, grave though it is, is only part of the tremendous Western Germany problem, and the redistribution of these unfortunate refugees, which in any case is linked with the demand for labour and the housing situation all over Germany, is not something which can be done immediately; it is a stubborn problem which must be tackled with zeal but on which we cannot expect early and dramatic success.
Those, I hope, are the hon. Gentleman's three points. There was a fourth point 835 which the hon. Member raised—that about a plebiscite. He quoted a demand of the Danish Government, a request to our Ambassador, but that was in 1946. The hon. Gentleman did not take the story on from there.
§ Professor SavoryI did not quote any request of the Danish Government in this respect. I quoted only the request for local autonomy.
§ Mr. MayhewOn the question of a plebiscite, we asked the Danish Government if they wished to exert themselves to secure frontier rectification, coupled with or separate from the question of a plebiscite, and, for reasons which the House will appreciate, they replied to us that they were not concerned with frontier rectification and that they made no claim for a plebiscite. That, I think, is a very material point when we consider the arguments advanced by the hon. Member.
§ Mr. Gammans (Hornsey)Would the hon. Gentleman say what he means when he refers to the remarks of my hon. Friend—when he says that my hon. Friend was not entirely supported by the pro-Danish elements in the area? What does that mean? Will the Under-Secretary tell the House what representation he has received from the Danish Government or from other Scandinavian Governments?
§ Mr. MayhewThe first point was on the confident assurances which we were given by the hon. Member for Queen's University that he had the support—the unanimous support, I think he said—of the Danish-minded population in the area for a separate administration. Whereas I cannot make any exact statement on that, I merely question it. I doubt it. It may be that not even a majority would support the hon. Member on this question, but I will not press the point because, obviously, it is a doubtful quantity. On the question of representation and the reference which the hon. Member for Queen's University made to an approach to the Foreign Secretary by some Ambassadors from some Scandinavian countries, I am afraid there is nothing I can say on that at the present time.
§ Mr. GammansDid they make representation?
§ Mr. MayhewI understand there were conversations on this problem—the 836 refugee problem—but I am not in a position to make a statement on it. I have done my best to cover the four points which the hon. Member for Queen's University raised and to give some account of the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards them.