Clause 14.—(OFFENCES.) (Hansard, 25 May 1949)

§ The Attorney-General
I beg to move, in page 14, line 18, to leave out "three," and to insert "four."
The purpose of this Amendment is to enable persons who are charged with offences under this Clause to go to trial by jury if they so desire.

§ The Attorney-General
I beg to move, in page 14, line 18, to leave out from "both," to the end of line 19.
I suggest that it would be to the convenience of the Committee if we also discussed the Amendment, in line 25 at the end, to insert: (3) A county court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any action brought to recover the loss sustained by the legal aid fund by reason of the failure of a person seeking or receiving legal aid or advice to comply with any such regulations as aforesaid, or by reason of a false statement or false representation made by such a person in furnishing information for the purposes of this Part of this Act, notwithstanding that the claim in the action is for a greater amount than that allowed under section forty of the County Courts Act, 1934. Under this Clause, a person who wilfully makes a false statement is liable to fine or imprisonment by the court before which he is tried in respect of that statement. In Committee I accepted, perhaps too hastily, an Amendment providing that in addition to that criminal penalty such a person should repay to the legal aid fund the whole amount of the net liability which that fund had occurred on his account, and that amount should be recoverable in the same court before which the man had been convicted of making the false statement. On consideration, we came to the conclusion that that was too harsh a penalty for the circumstances envisaged here. I think that the hon. and learned Member for 1363 Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller), who moved the Amendment in Committee, will probably agree with the view we have taken about the matter.
The Clause as it stands, following the Amendment in Committee, might result in this: that a man may have to repay to the legal aid fund moneys it had expended or expenses it had incurred on his behalf quite irrespective of the false statement, and, indeed, quite possibly before the false statement had ever been made. An appropriate principle it seems to me is the principle which applies ordinarily in this field of law, that the person who makes a false and fraudulent statement should pay the damages which that statement caused to someone else, which in this case is the legal aid fund. It may be that a false statement, although it would be an offence under this Clause, would not cause damage to the legal aid fund and would not lead the Law Society to take any action, or incur any expenses, which it would not otherwise have taken. In such a case, to require the assisted litigant to repay the whole amount of the liability would really be an undisguised punishment imposed over and above the criminal punishment provided by the Clause.
Accordingly, we thought it proper to table the present Amendment, which will substitute what is in fact the ordinary rule where false or fraudulent statements are made; that if the legal aid fund incurs any loss by reason of the false statement which the assisted litigant has made, then it may recover it and the court will determine how much the amount of that loss following upon the false statement actually is. In order to ensure the matter may be dealt with expeditiously and cheaply, because in this case, ex hypothesi, the person assisted will have no means because he will have been an assisted litigant, we have proposed the matter should be within the jurisdiction of the county court. In most cases it would in any event fall within the jurisdiction of the county court, but there may be some cases where costs have been incurred which would otherwise just fall outside the county court's jurisdiction and would have to go to a higher court. We thought it better for all these cases to go to the county court so that they can be dealt with at the minimum expense and as quickly as may be.

§ Mr. Manningham-Buller
I think that this Amendment is an improvement to the Bill, although I must admit that the words we are now moving to leave out are the words I moved to put in during the Committee stage. I think the Committee accepted the principle behind the words that now appear in the Bill which we are going to leave out, and that in substance this Amendment says in greater length and with greater accuracy what it was we were trying to achieve by the Amendment in Committee.
I have only two points to raise in regard to the Amendment, and that is that, in addition to giving a right of recovery for any loss that may fall on the legal aid fund by reason of a false statement or false representation made by the person seeking or who has obtained legal aid, there is a right of recovery of any loss sustained by reason of failure to comply with any regulations as aforesaid. I am not quite certain whether the wording of the first part of the Amendment is adequate to give the Law Society, who presumably will be the plaintiffs, a right of action in respect of a breach of any one of those regulations. I do not think there is any need to say more on that point, because it is obviously the intention that the Law Society should have that right of action. I merely refer to it so that the right hon. and learned Gentleman may have an opportunity of considering the wording to see whether the point is adequately covered.
I recognise the force of the argument for saying that the county court should have jurisdiction in this matter even though the amount may exceed the amount within its normal jurisdiction. There are, of course, arguments in favour of adopting that in this particular instance, although I would not be inclined to assume that the assisted litigant who has obtained legal aid by false representation may, because he has received assistance, be impoverished. The false statement may be one about his means. He may have possessed considerable wealth and the loss sustained by the legal aid fund may be due to his having made false representation in regard to his means. I think it would be convenient if this matter should be determined in the county court, and for these reasons I support both these Amendments.