HC Deb 24 March 1948 vol 448 cc3290-305
Mr. Younger

I beg to move, in page 15, line 27, after "election," to insert: or otherwise of the rules contained in either of the said Schedules. Subsection (2) provides that an election will not be voided merely because there is a minor breach of the rules on the part of an official. This Amendment will cover cases where there is a minor breach of the rules by an elector. It seems desirable that the same consideration should apply to a minor breach by an elector as apply already to a minor breach by an official.

Mr. Hogg

May we have a little more information on this? What is meant, for instance, by the phrase: No substantial miscarriage in the conduct of the election"? It seems to me that these words might have a sinister and undesirable meaning in this connection. We understand, of course, in another type of case the phrase no substantial miscarriage of justice Is it seriously to be said that no Parliamentary election shall be declared invalid by reason of any act or omission on the part of the returning officer or any other person in breach of his official duty in connection with the election simply if it appears that the result of the election would be the same? That is most undesirable. It may well be desirable to declare elections invalid if there has been, by persons in a highly responsible position, a deliberate breach of the rules. It seems to be desirable in such cases that an election might be held again, and a penalty indicted for a deliberate or corrupt breach.

We must consider, even, that there ought to be a re-running of the election, notwithstanding that a tribunal might think that the particular breach has not altered the result of the election. It is, in my belief, important in such cases not merely that substantial justice should be done but that it should be beyond question apparent that substantial justice is done in these matters and that elections are run in accordance with the rules. I would like to know why the Under-Secretary has used this precise turn of phrase and what meaning exactly he attaches to it.

Mr. Pritt

I agree very largely with what the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg) has said. One will see that these words really cover what he wants because there are two requirements. The first is that there shall be no substantial miscarriage of the conduct of the election and the next is that the result is not affected. All the things he has described with characteristic indignation would, I should think, appeal to a tribunal as a substantial miscarriage. In that case, this saving Clause would not save anybody or anything. I should have thought that the hon. Member would already have got what he wanted.

7.30 a.m.

Mr. Hogg

It is very kind of the hon. and learned Member to assist me in this way, but I would have been very much more grateful for an authoritative explanation from the Government of what these words really mean. We are not concerned with what the hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith (Mr. Pritt) thinks would be the meaning attached by a tribunal to the phrase substantial miscarriage in the conduct of an election. We are interested, first of all in the meaning which the words really have, and secondly in the meaning which the Government intend them to have. I am not impressed with the hon. and learned Member's explanation in the least and, as a matter of fact, I do not think it is the right one. I cannot attach to the words substantial miscarriage in the conduct of the election a meaning substantially different from the phrase substantial miscarriage of justice which we know in another connection. If the meaning of the phrase is the same, I cannot see that substantial miscarriage in the conduct of an election necessarily differs very much from the significant phrase which is used in the Clause, that the result of the election was not affected. I should prefer to hear the Government's view on the matter, despite the great legal authority of the hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith.

Mr. H. Strauss

I think that what the Government intend is something very like what the hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith (Mr. Pritt) has said, but I cannot think that the word "miscarriage…" is the right word. In fact, I very much doubt if the words miscarriage" in the conduct of the election mean anything at all. I have a suspicion that what the Government meant was "misconduct." I hope the Home Secretary or the Attorney-General will consider this question. Although I feel certain that the Government do intend a dual requirement, as stated by the hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith, and that a dual requirement would be the right thing, I cannot think that the word "miscarriage" satisfies the requirement in the first part of the Subsection.

Mr. Younger

I am advised that than is by no means a new phrase, and that it is one that is quite well known in election law. I should have thought that it was a matter which we should not interpret any further in uacuo. It is essentially the type of phrase which has to be interpreted by the law in the light of all circumstances. I should also think that the phrase substantial miscarriage in the conduct of the election did signify something different from the result of the election not being affected, and that there is in fact quite clearly a dual requirement here. To make any more precise what that meaning is than appears from these words seems to me impossible, except in the light of the facts of a particular case as they come before a tribunal.

Mr. H. Strauss

Can the Minister point out a precedent in a similar Act of Parliament, and the fact that it has been judicially construed? I agree that, if it has occurred in a similar passage and has been judicially construed, it may be valuable to adhere to the words. In the absence of that, I should have thought the words were extremely odd.

The Temporary Chairman (Mr. Wells)

I suggest that it might be convenient if any further discussion on this point were taken on the Clause. It might also be a little more appropriate.

Mr. Astor

With respect, Mr. Wells, similar points have been raised on other Clauses, and we have had no answer at all to them. Suppose this Clause is carried. We shall then have a sentence which, as regards pure English, is probably as appalling as anything one could find, and as regards intelligibility is almost unfathomable. The Home Secretary was challenged on this matter by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Perth and Kinross (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) on the construction of these Clauses and the English in the Bill. I would merely make this one point: I cannot believe that if the Clause has something to say it cannot say it in more reasonable and intelligent English than is done in this case.

The Temporary Chairman

The hon. Gentleman's remark is directed more to the wording of the Clause than to the Amendment.

Mr. Astor

Except that the Amendment makes it more complicated.

Mr. Marlowe

I shall direct what I have to say entirely to the Amendment and I shall not keep the Committee long. This requires further explanation, because so far as the hon. Gentleman gave any explanation, it was the wrong one. He said, in effect, that as the Clause stood without the Amendment it overlooked minor breaches affecting the returning officers, and he thought it applied to electors as well. It is a quite pardonable thing for the hon. Gentleman to do at this time of the morning, but I believe that he spoke from the wrong brief. What this Clause did before the Amendment came in was to overlook breaches of any official duty. What the Amendment is, in effect, doing is adding forgiveness not only in cases of breaches of official duty but also breaches of the rules of the Third Schedule. That is rather a different thing from what the hon. Gentleman said when he gave his explanation. In those circumstances, would the hon. Gentleman amplify what he said about the Amendment?

Mr. Younger

I cannot agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman's view. It is perfectly true the phrase "any other person" means a person other than the returning officer in a case of a breach of an official duty, but it can only refer to someone on official duty. The purpose of this Amendment, as I made quite clear, is to bring in breaches by persons who have no official duty, because they are not officials.

Mr. Pickthorn

I am sleepy, and I thought I Clause, but I am beaten here: in breach of his official duly with the election. That is still the same person; the Amendment has not imported any new person into it by saying: or otherwise of the rules contained in either of the said Schedules. I am quite willing to be convinced. It is a matter on which I am not an expert. I cannot see that any new persons are imported into the ambit of the Clause by the words proposed to be added. There is something here which none of us has understood—or the Under-Secretary has read the wrong page of his brief. We ought to have some explanation.

Mr. Astor

Is it asking too much from the Under-Secretary to request him to reconsider this matter in terms of drafting? No one in the Committee, as far as I can see, can apprehend what it is about, and if we are taking this matter seriously it should be taken back, redrafted and made intelligible. Let us forget the merits of its English, but let us make it intelligible.

The Attorney-General (Sir Hartley Shawcross)

I do not know whether I can provide any assistance. I confess that it seems reasonably clear to me. The source of the provision is the Ballot Act of 1872 and it really imports no new principle whatever into our electoral law.

The Amendment which has just been moved by my hon. Friend appears clearly to mean, if members will read it with a little care, that Subsection (2), as amended, will provide for two distinct classes of case. It will provide, first of all, for any act or omission by the returning officer or any other person in breach of his official duty in connection with the election. Then it will provide or otherwise of any other breach. by anybody. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Certainly, we do not specify by whom the breach is to be and it must therefore be a breach by anybody under a duty imposed by any of the rules contained in either of the Schedules. That seems to be the effect of it. Hon. Members say "No," but I find it quite impossible to give any other construction to this Amendment and I am quite able to give it that construction. As that appears to be the only one possible, that would seem to me to be the right construction. [An HON. MEMBER: It does not mean anything."] It is possible it does mean nothing, but the presumption is that the words do mean some-thing. If they mean something they must mean what I venture to suggest to the Committee.

In view, however, of the questions raised about this point, I intend to look into it between now and Report stage. If necessary, we will make it abundantly clear that what is contemplated by this Subsection, as I have said, are breaches by the returning officer and his officers and breaches of duties imposed upon electors under the various rules set out in the two Schedules. If there is any doubt, we will make it quite clear that is what the Subsection contemplates. I looked at it as soon as the Committee drew attention to it. The actual words in the original Statute have not been used, but we have given exactly the same meaning. Section 13 of the 1872 Act says: No election shall be declared invalid by reason of non-compliance with the rules contained in the First Schedule of the Act or any mistake in the use of the forms in the Second Schedule, if it appears to the tribunal, having cognisance of the question that the election was conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the body of the Act, and such non-compliance and mistake did not affect the result of the election. That is what my hon. Friend had in mind when he translated the phrase we have used as meaning something which did not, in substance, affect the result of the election. The tribunal will have to look at the facts of each case. This Clause is not dealing with corrupt practices. Those arise under subsequent Clauses which we will have to consider. It deals with breaches of rules of procedure —how to fold ballot papers and so on—contained in the Schedules.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

Does it cover any sort of breach of duty?

The Attorney-General

You have to look at the Schedule to find that out. It will be seen that the Schedules impose a large number of duties on different persons. If any of these duties are neglected by any of these persons, a question will arise, which the tribunal will have to consider.

Mr. H. Strauss

Can the Attorney-General cite a precedent for "miscarriage" as here used?

7.45 a.m.

The Attorney-General

I would not like to attempt to do that with regard to electoral law. Quite frankly, and speaking without the book, I do not think that there is a precedent in electoral law, but there is, of course, precedent in other branches of the law. The hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg) mentioned one.

Mr. H. Strauss

Miscarriage of justice?

The Attorney-General

Yes, miscarriage of justice. I realise that the words here are not miscarriage of justice. I have read the Clause and I appreciate that point. I was asked whether the word "miscarriage" had been used before, meaning that the proper conduct of proceedings had not been pursued. The word "miscarriage" has been used in the Criminal Appeal Act, and it means here substantially what it means under that Act.

Amendment agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

Mr. Hogg

When I raised the point before, the Under-Secretary endeavoured to allay my suspicions by telling me that the phrase to which I had taken objection was one which had appeared in an earlier Statute, and that he could give a definite assurance that it had been judicially construed. It now appears that neither of those propositions about it is true. The phrase is new. It has to be introduced into this Clause in place of another phrase which appears to me to have been admirably clear before. We have had no explanation whatever from the Attorney-General why an ambiguous phrase should have been introduced in place of a phrase which was admirably clear. I want to know why we cannot go back to the clear language which was used before, instead of this miserable English which we are asked to use now, and which I believe is a purely false analogy from the phrase in the Criminal Appeal Act.

I am not at all clear in my own mind that the Clause as amended does not contain ambiguities and difficulties not suspected by the Government. We began with a Clause which was designed to meet irregularities by officials and others in the conduct of their official duty. We were then told that the Clause must apply, to electors as well. The result has been that, as amended, the Clause now applies to electors the language which was originally designed to be appropriate to officials. I am not at all sure that in doing that we have not succeeded in widening the Clause beyond the scope that we would like it to have.

I should like to have from the Under-Secretary a little more precision as to the kind of cases which this Clause is intended to cover in relation to electors. It is all very well to tell the Committee that we cannot give any undertaking at all as to what this Clause will mean in practice, and that we must wait for the tribunals to construe it, as tribunals will, without considering the intention of the Government but only looking at the nature of the words. We are entitled to a little more than that. The Under-Secretary should explain, especially with regard to electors, the kind of irregularity which will not invalidate an election, and the kind of irregularity which, but for this Clause, would have invalidated an election. I was not impressed by what the learned Attorney-General told us, namely, that this Clause was designed to cover mistakes in the ballot paper.

I do not believe for a moment that had it not been for this Clause it would have been possible for a whole election to be invalidated. I want the Under-Secretary to explain what would have invalidated a whole election but for this Clause, but will not invalidate an election, now that we are going to pass this Clause. I wish he would not ask us to be content with a set of circumstances which he cannot envisage arising, and with his statement that the courts will apply a set of words which we cannot understand, in a way which will be considered satisfactory.

Mr. Astor

A Clause consisting of Subsections, which in turn have numerous paragraphs, which again have numerous sub-paragraphs, and which goes through practically half of the alphabet, is very difficult to follow. We find ourselves faced with sentences so long and clumsy that by the time one has read to the end of them one has forgotten what was stated at the beginning. I would like at least to have the right hon. Gentleman's sympathy in this matter, perhaps even more than that of the learned Attorney-General, who, because of his profession, will be prejudiced in these matters. Perhaps he will bear in mind that the Committee, with the best will in the world, has been puzzled by these sentences. I would urge him to carry sympathy even to the point of making the sentences shorter, their construction more simple, and the phraseology clearer.

Colonel Hutchison

These words, such as "superficial miscarriage," give so much trouble. Since the Attorney-General has promised to look into the whole of this Clause again, would it not get him out of the difficulty if he omitted the words altogether? Surely the purpose of the Clause is that the result of an election shall not be affected. That seems to be a perfectly straightforward issue, an issue upon which the tribunal would want to satisfy itself. If the tribunal has satisfied itself upon that point, why cloud the issue by bringing in "misconduct," or "miscarriage," or similar words? I suggest that there should be an examination of that aspect when the rest of the Clause is examined.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan

It is well-known that the average Englishman is a past-master at ruining his own beautiful language. In Scotland we speak much better English than is spoken in England. I would like to know whether the Secretary of State for Scotland, or the Lord Advocate or his predecessor, were consulted about the wording of this Clause. The Clause is to apply to Scotland, but if this Clause were given to any sheriff or to any sheriff-substitute in Scotland, he would laugh and say that it was absolute rubbish. An Act of 1872 was handed to the learned Attorney-General, but he had to change its language to this fatuous "miscarriage" business. Why change the language of 1872, when the people still spoke English, to this beastly nonsense which we are discussing today? Let us have English which people can understand.

I am a great admirer of the legal profession, though I am glad to say that so far I have not got into their clutches, and I hope I shall not. To lawyers these things may be simple, but it is not the lawyers with whom we are concerned. They make a good thing out of it. I number among my hon. and learned Friends some distinguished lawyers, but I still say that laws are not made for the benefit of lawyers. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Perhaps I should say that they should not be made for the benefit of lawyers. When we have an old law of 1872 which reads perfectly simply, let us use it when we want to express the same thing. I hope that the Attorney-General has consulted the Lord Advocate and the Secretary of State for Scotland. I hope he will say that in his wildest dreams he has never thought that this English should go forth to Scotland and that he should expect it to be worked upon.

Mr. Astor

I would point out that the Attorney-General was at some pains to explain what he thought this meant. It took him some time to do that. Something must be wrong with a Clause which is so short and upon which the Attorney-General had to spend such a time in endeavouring to explain to a Committee of intelligent people what he believes it means. That in itself is a case for the Government to agree that the Clause should be re-drafted. We do not blame the man who drafted the words. I wish that the Home Secretary would break his silence on this point and express his opinion on the matter.

The Attorney-General

I have already said that I will look into the language of this Clause again. I must confess that I have a good deal of sympathy with what has been said by hon. Members opposite. I will satisfy myself that there really is some good and adequate reason for the departure that we have made from the language of the Act of 1872. We will look into the matter and satisfy ourselves that it really is necessary to use a different form of words.

On the question of the purpose of the words, the position is clear. Under Subsection (1) it is provided that elections must be conducted in accordance with rules laid down in the Schedule. That was also provided in the Act of 1872. If, prima facie an election was not conducted in accordance with all those rules, including the rule which provides that one must fold a ballot paper, the election might be held invalid. Obviously, we must avoid such an absurd result. In order to do that we have adopted this form of words. It would not be possible for me to attempt to anticipate what view a particular tribunal might take of a breach of a particular rule. That is a matter which the tribunal would decide on the merits of the case.

Under the Clause as it is framed—and, I think, under the corresponding Section of the Act of 1872—the tribunal would be likely to consider, in relation to any particular breach of rule—whether it was by the returning officer or an official, or by an elector—whether that breach was likely to have led to some different result in the election. If they came to the conclusion that the breach of the rule was some technical matter which, although it ought not to have taken place, could not conceivably have affected the result of the election, then they would operate under the provisions of Subsection (2). They would not declare the election invalid by reason only of that breach.

Mr. J. S. C. Reid

It seems obvious after this discussion that there will have to be some redrafting of this provision. The Attorney-General has had two shots at it. He may have convinced himself, he may have convinced some of us, but I am afraid that he has not clarified the minds of all present.

The Attorney-General

I could not hope to do that, could I?

Mr. Reid

The purpose of a Bill is to be intelligible to the King's subjects, and not merely to persons who have had long experience in these matters. Surely it would be very much better, rather than that this argument should proceed further, that the right hon. Gentleman should withdraw this Amendment and reconsider the matter?

8.0 a.m.

The Attorney-General

If the right hon. and learned Gentleman would allow me, I think we are now on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

Mr. Reid

I am afraid that it is difficult at this time of the morning to keep abreast of the proceedings. If that is so, we must have been nodding.

Mr. N. Macpherson

I have a small suggestion to make. The word "miscarriage" has caused a great deal of trouble and I am about to suggest that what is really meant is that there is no substantial irregularity affecting the result of the election. I give that to the Committee for what it is worth, and I hope the learned Attorney-General will take steps to clarify the position.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan

May I ask a question, and have a direct answer? Were the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Lord Advocate consulted about this, and did they agree?

The Temporary Chairman (Mr. W. Wells)

The Question is, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

Mr. H. Strauss rose——

The Temporary Chairman

Order. I put the Question——

Hon. Members

No.

The Temporary Chairman

Hon. Members will kindly allow me to continue my explanation. I put the Question before I saw any hon. Member on his feet.

Sir John Mellor (Sutton Coldfield)

On a point of Order, Mr. Wells. You said that you put the Question before you saw any Member on his feet; but, with respect, you were looking at your Order Paper the whole time, and it would have been impossible for you to see anybody.

Mr. Hogg

Surely the test is this, Mr. Wells. It is not a question of whether the Question was read out and put before you saw Members rise, but whether the voices were collected. That has not been done.

The Temporary Chairman

The hon. Member is quite inaccurate. I did put the Question, and I did collect the voices.

Hon. Members

No.

The Temporary Chairman

I can only reaffirm what I have said.

Mr. J. S. C. Reid

On a point of Order. We are surely entitled to an opportunity to vote against Clause 12 if we so desire? It was impossible for us to determine what you were saying, and it was impossible for you to determine what we were saying. I heard hon. Members shouting "No" when, perhaps, they thought you were putting the Question. To put the Question in those circumstances, and then to say that the Ayes have it and that it was never challenged, is a little bit difficult even at this hour.

The Temporary Chairman

I am sorry, but after putting the Question, I heard Members calling "Aye" and "No," and I could only come to one conclusion—that hon. Members appreciated that I was putting the Question.

Commander Galbraith

You said you heard Members calling "Aye" and "No," Mr. Wells. If you heard the Ayes from one side and the Noes from the other, surely it would be a question of a division. I was sitting here the whole time when you were on your feet, and I was shouting "No" as hard as I could.

Mr. John Paton (Norwich)

On a point of Order. Is it in accordance with the rules of procedure of this House for hon. Members of the Opposition to attempt to bully the Chair?

The Temporary Chairman

I do not think that is a point of Order. After the point of Order which the hon. Gentleman put to me, I should have called a Divi-

Division No. 120.] AYES. [8.4 a.m.
Adams, Richard (Balham) Hale, Leslie Poole, Cecil (Lichfield)
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe) Hamilton, Lt.-Col. R Porter, G. (Leeds)
Alpass, J. H. Hannan, W. (Maryhill) Pritt, D. N.
Attewell, H. C. Hardman, D. R. Randall, H. E.
Austin, H. Lewis Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick) Ranger, J.
Ayrton Gould, Mrs B. Herbison, Miss M. Reeves, J.
Bacon, Miss A. Holman, P. Reid, T. (Swindon)
Battley, J. R. House, G. Royle, C.
Bechervaise, A. E. Hudson, J. H. (Ealing, W.) Shackleton, E. A. A.
Berry, H Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.) Sharp, Granville
Beswick, F. Hynd, H. (Hackney, C.) Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir H. (St. Helens)
Bing, G. H. C. Janner, B. Silverman, J. (Erdington)
Binns, J. Jeger, G (Winchester) Simmons, C. J
Blackburn, A. R. Jones, D. T. (Hartlepools) Sorensen, R. W.
Boardman, H. Jones, Elwyn (Plaistow) Soskice, Sir Frank
Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton) Jones, P. Asterley (Hitchin) Sparks, J. A.
Braddock, Mrs. E. M. (L'pl, Exch'ge) Keenan, W. Steele, T.
Braddock, T. (Mitcham) Kendall, W. D. Symonds, A. L.
Brown, T J. (Ince) Kenyon, C. Taylor, H. B. (Mansfield)
Bruce, Major D. W. T. Lee, Mist J. (Cannock) Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)
Butler, H W (Hackney, S.) Levy, B. W Thomas, D. E. (Aberdare)
Byers, Frank Lewis, A. W. J. (Upton) Thomas, I. O. (Wrekin)
Champion, A. J. Lindgren, G. S. Thomas, George (Cardiff)
Collindridge, F. Lipton, Lt.-Col. M. Thurtle, Ernest
Corbet, Mrs. F. K. (Camb'well, N.W.) Longden, F. Tiffany, S.
Crossman, R. H. S. McGhee, H. G. Tolley, L.
Daggar, G, McLeavy, F. Vernon, Major W. F.
Daines, P. Manning, Mrs. L. (Epping) Wadsworth, G.
Dalton, Rt. Hon. H. Mellish, R. J Watkins, T. E.
Davies, Edward (Burslem) Middleton, Mrs. L. Weitzman, D.
Davies, Harold (Leek) Mikardo, Ian Wells, P, L. (Faversham)
Davies, Haydn (St. Pancras, S.W.) Monslow, W. West, D. G.
de Freitas, Geoffrey Morgan, Dr. H. B. Wheatley, Rt. Hn. J. T. (Edinb'gh, E.)
Dodds, N. N. Morris, P. (Swansea, W.) Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.
Dumpleton, C. W. Moyle, A. Wilkes, L.
Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C. Nally, W Wilkins, W. A.
Evans, A (Islington, W.) Neal, H. (Claycross) Willey, F. T. (Sunderland)
Evans, John (Ogmore) Nichol, Mrs. M. E. (Bradford, N.) Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)
Evans, S. N. (Wednesbury) Nicholls, H. R. (Stratford) Williams, D J. (Neath)
Farthing, W. J Noel-Baker, Capt. F, E. (Brentford) Williams. J. L. (Kelvingrove)
Fernyhough, E. Orbach, M. Williams, R W. (Wigan)
Field, Captain W J. Palmer, A. M. F. Williams, W. R. (Heston)
Foot, M. M. Pargiter, G. A Willis, E.
Forman, J. C. Paton, Mrs. F. (Rushcliffe) Wills, Mrs. E. A.
Gonley, Mrs. C. S Paton, J. (Norwich) Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
George, Lady M. Lloyd (Anglesey) Pearson, A. Yates, V. F.
Gibson, C. W. Peart, Thomas F. Younger, Hon. Kenneth
Gilzean, A. Perrins, W.
Gunter, R. J Piratin, P. TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Guy, W. H Platts-Mills, J. F. F. Mr. Snow and
Mr. George Wallace.
NOES.
Agnew, Cmdr. P. G. Drayson, G. B. Macpherson, N. (Dumfries)
Amory, D. Heathcoal Drewe, C. Manningham-Buller, R. E.
Astor, Hon. M. Fox, Sir G Marlowe, A. A. H.
Beamish, Maj. T. V. H. Gage, C. Medlicott, Brigadier F.
Bossom, A. C. Galbraith, Cmdr. T. D. Meltor, Sir J
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. Gomme Duncan, Col. A Mullan, Lt. C. H.
Butcher, H. W. Grimston, R. V. Noble, Comdr. A. H. P
Challen, C. Hogg, Hon. Q Odey, G. W.
Channon, H. Hutchison, Col. J. R. (Glasgow, C.) Peake, Rt. Hon. O.
Clifton-Brown, Lt.-Col. G. Keeling, E. H. Peto, Brig. C. H. M
Cooper-Key, E. M. Lloyd, Selwyn (Wirral) Prescott, Stanley
Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon H. F. C. Lucas-Tooth, Sir H. Reid, Rt. Hon. J. S. C. (Hillhead)
Cuthbert, W. N. McKie, J H. (Galloway) Roberts, Peter (Ecclesall)

sion. That is quite a different point to the other points put to me, and I should be willing to put the Question again for that purpose.

Question put, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 148; Noes, 47.

Robinson, Roland Studholme, H. G. TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Spence, H. R. Touche, G. C Major Conant and
Stoddart-Scott, Col. M. Wheatley, Col. M. J. (Dorset, E.J Major Ramsay.
Strauss, H. G. (English Universities) Willoughby de Eresby, Lord

Committee report Progress; to sit again this day.