NEW CLAUSE.—(Amendment al principal Act, s. 151.) (Hansard, 9 July 1948)

§ Mr. Weitzman (Stoke Newington)
I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."
This new Clause seeks to put into effect a point which I raised during the Debate 786 on the Second Reading of the Bill. The Clause is divided into two parts. The Committee will be aware that under Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the principal Act, there are provisions dealing with the fencing of dangerous machinery. Generally speaking, where there are workpeople engaged in a factory or workshop and there is any dangerous machine on which the workmen are engaged, or which is in close proximity to the workmen, there are provisions ensuring the fencing and the maintenance of that fencing. If anyone suffers an accident, he has the remedy of an action for damages for breach of a statutory duty.
Under Section 151 of the Act, there is a very wide definition of the term "factory." I draw attention first of all to this fact, because it is the governing factor with regard to the first part of this new Clause. In the case of Weston v London County Council a young boy was engaged on a dangerous machine and suffered a severe injury. It was sought to show that the provisions of the Factories Act ought to apply, but the court held that the premises in which the accident occurred were not a factory, and in those circumstances the boy was unable to recover damages. I respectfully suggest that where it is the intention of the legislators in cases of this kind that workpeople engaged on dangerous machines should be protected, all the more it ought to be to protect students or persons engaged on dangerous machines who are not employed in working upon them, but are perhaps instructing or receiving instruction in regard to the use of those machines.
I, therefore, suggest that the definition in Section 151 of the term "factory," which is very wide and in many cases covers premises which obviously are not factories in the real sense of the term, might be extended in such a way that any place or institution where there are persons engaged in instructing or in being instructed in the use of machinery ought to come within the definition "factory." In order to complete the picture, I have added an Amendment in regard to the use of the words: "employed or working" as used in Section 14 of the Act. In the discussion of these cases, some criticism was made of the fact that it may be said that the other provisions of the Factories Act ought to apply. I am not suggesting that here. I am merely saying that 787 obviously dangerous machines ought to be protected in all these cases. Therefore, I respectfully submit that the definition of the term "factory" should be extended to cover a case of that kind.
The second part of the new Clause arises out of the case of Wood v. London County Council. In that case, someone suffered an injury in the kitchen of an institution. In the court of first instance, it was argued that the premises in question—a kitchen of a mental institution—did come within the term factory as defined in Section 151 of the Act, and Mr. Justice Tucker, as he then was, the trial judge, held that to be the law. That decision was reversed in the court of appeal, and there would appear to be some measure of doubt in that direction as to the true meaning of the word "factory." I suggest that here again it would obviously be a commonsense measure to say that where there is dangerous machinery of any kind in premises described in the second part of the new Clause, it would be wise and proper to see that the provisions in regard to the fencing of dangerous machines should be applied.

§ Mr. Janner (Leicester, West)
May I ask the Minister if he will be good enough to consider this as an important amendment in so far as the provisions of the Factories Act are concerned, because it deals with two exceptionally interesting and, in my view, exceptionally urgent matters. The hon. Member for Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman), in a very lucid speech, has already indicated that there have been two cases in respect of these particular matters. I would like to deal a little more specifically with the cases in question.
The first case—Weston v. London County Council—was the case of a technical institute which was conducted by a municipal or public authority, the London County Council, for the training and instruction of pupils in work which involved the use of dangerous machines, and it was held that it was not within the general definition of a factory under Section 151 of the Factories Act, 1937, nor included among the premises specified in that Section, nor did Subsection (9) have the effect of bringing such an institution within the definition of a factory. It was stated in that case that 788 those who receive instruction in a technical institute are employed neither by those who own nor by those who teach in it and are not engaged in any process for or incidental to any of the purposes set out in Section 151 (1) whether by way of trade or purpose of gain or otherwise. During the course of that case, an extraordinary statement was made by the learned judge. He said: I am certainly not going to say that those engaged in teaching the use of these dangerous machines"— I repeat dangerous— are bound to obey the code as laid down in the Factories Acts or under it with reference to guards as if I did so instruction might be seriously hampered, if not stopped altogether. I submit that was a very serious statement to have been made because it declares quite categorically, in the first instance, that dangerous machines were being used and at the same time the implication is that the person who is working on those machines, because he happens to be either an instructor or a person who is learning, ought not to have similar protection to a workman who may even be a very skilled workman indeed. If there is need to protect the skilled workman, as there certainly is, by having a provision which gives him recourse to a statutory right of compensation in the event of the machinery not being guarded, surely a person who is learning and a person who is being instructed ought to be placed in a similar position. The whole intention of the Act is to provide that a workman has to do nothing further than to prove that the machinery was not properly protected, and so on, under the various Sections to which this amendment now refers when an accident causing him injury occurs, in order to have a statutory right of compensation.
As the matter stands at present, it would appear that a person being trained in a technical college or school or some similar institution is not so protected. If that is the case, I submit we ought, having the experience we have had under the Act since 1937, to include some new provision which would enable an injured student of that nature to be protected and to have the right of claiming damages or compensation in the event of the machine on which he was working not being properly protected. We do not ask for anything more than that in this new Clause. 789 In the course of these cases it was suggested that if we were going to bring technical colleges and similar institutions within the provisions of the Factories Act, the whole of the other provisions would apply to them, such as hours of work, etc. We do not ask that the whole of the other terms of the Factories Acts should apply to cases of this description, but we say that in this type of case the person should be protected to the extent that the machine on which he is working shall be properly guarded and that the provisions of Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Factories Act as they stand at present should apply for the benefit of a student or person employed in an institution of that sort.
3.0 p.m.
The other case to which my hon. Friend referred is also a very interesting one, and I should like to bring it more closely to the attention of the Committee. In that case, a kitchenmaid was employed by the defendant, a public authority. She was mincing meat with an electrically-operated mincing machine in the kitchen of a hospital. The mincemeat was intended for consumption on the premises by the patients and/or the staff of the hospital. Her hand was caught in the machine and she was injured. It was held that the kitchen was not a factory within the provisions of Section 151 (1) of the Factories Act, nor within Subsection (9). Some of my hon. Friends will have read what the junior Burgess for Oxford University (Sir A. Herbert) has to say about "acts of God" when judges differ from each other. If I remember aright, the definition given by one of the authorities is: That an act of God is an extraordinary circumstance which cannot be foreseen and which cannot be guarded against. One learned judge came to the definite conclusion that this was a factory within the meaning of the terms of the Factory Act.
But then the case went to the Court of Appeal and other learned judges came to the conclusion that he was wrong. How anyone can have two points of view as to what we pass in this House is beyond my comprehension, and certainly if such a thing happens it might be considered as an act of God within the definition I have given. But be that as it may, we have to put things into their true perspective in which we want them understood. 790 Here is a learned judge who thought that Parliament, in its wisdom, came to the conclusion that a case of this nature should come within the provisions of the Act. We have to put the other three judges right if they are wrong or, if they are right, we have to put ourselves right by seeing that the Act is made clear in so far as our intentions in this respect are concerned. I ask my right hon. Friend to say it is not unreasonable that a person working under the conditions I have described should also receive the protection which is afforded to others who work under the provisions of the Act. This is a very important matter, because it affects a very large number of people, and I ask my right hon. Friend to say it is not unreasonable at this stage to amend the Act to provide for cases of this description.

§ Mr. Isaacs
My hon. Friend the Member for West Leicester (Mr. Janner) asked me to say whether I thought something was reasonable or not. I think it is a little unreasonable to extend the scope of the Act to cover something which is completely outside it. The main point I would make is what I said on Second Reading, that the question of strengthening the law as to the safety of persons employed in premises where the Factories Act or the Coal Mines Act do not apply has been referred to a committee. We should await their report before embarking on legislation. We do not want to infringe on what they are doing, or bring the factory regulations into a wider sphere. This Clause, if accepted, would extend the provision of the Act to technical schools and similar institutions. We should not know where we were if we were required to send factory inspectors to inspect small plants that might be working in public institutions. It would be wrong to apply Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. They would not apply to safeguarding of prime movers or transmission machinery, but only to other dangerous parts of the machinery.
Who are the persons on whom the duties would be imposed? Who would be responsible? The machinery might be in a school or college. Who is responsible there? What authority have the managers or teachers over those engaged or employed in such a place, such as an employer has over his employees in a factory? They would not have the same 791 power over a pupil in a technical school as an employer has to impose discipline on a workman who does not fall into line. There is also the question of what steps should be taken to enforce these provisions. I say nothing about the merits of the case. Apparently there is some grievance that should be remedied, but we feel it would be remedied best by bringing it within the scope of any legislation that is bound to emerge from the committee of inquiry which will look into the question of injuries and controls outside factories.

§ Mr. Elwyn Jones (Plaistow)
Can my right hon. Friend say when this committee was appointed, and when its report is expected?

§ Mr. Weitzman
Can we have an assurance that the point raised today will be referred to the committee, so that it can deal with it in a proper way?

§ Mr. Janner
The Minister referred to the difficulty about the "responsible person." Subsection (9) of Section 151 says: Any premises belonging to or in the occupation of … any municipal or other public authority shall not be deemed not to be a factory. … If he will re-examine that, he might find it possible to do something now, without waiting for the report of the committee.

§ Mr. Isaacs
I cannot give that undertaking. Not only is it a question of extending the scope of the regulations to cover places outside factories, but there are other blemishes in the proposed Clause. The committee is examining this question, and this matter will come up from its own point of view. In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Plaistow (Mr. Elwyn Jones), I cannot say exactly when the committee was appointed, and I would not like to prophesy when its report will be received.

§ Mr. Elwyn Jones
I was afraid that it might be one of the perennial committees, the appointment of which is never certain and the conclusion of which is never determined.

§ Mr. Weitzman
In view of the wide assurance given by my right hon. Friend, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.