HC Deb 04 August 1947 vol 441 cc1253-62

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Mr. R. J. Taylor.)

6.16 a.m.

Mr. Longden (Birmingham, Deritend)

I am sorry at prolonging this stormy sitting, but I believe that this matter is of extreme and world importance. It is vital not only to our trade and commerce, important as those are, but also to world peace, and certainly to local national sovereignty. It has been announced that there has been a "cease fire" and an armistice, but that to me does not mean that this trouble is to be ended soon. Certainly the Eastern peoples, including the Indonesians, are not going to remain in the leading-strings of Dutch imperialism. Had our Government here three or four weeks ago adopted the attitude of last week the final aggressive attack by the Dutch on the Indonesians would never have taken place.

I am not a new convert to that attitude, and there are matters which I think ought to be recorded for future use. On 9th July I asked that this Question should be put on the Order Paper: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if his attention had been called to the serious clash between the Dutch Government and the Indonesian Republic, and in view of Britain's past relationship and commitments to both these countries if he will offer mediation.

That Question was rejected, and I think something might have come of it had the Foreign Secretary faced up to the situation then. The assumption in replies given to me by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for War in December. February and March, was that we had no responsibility. Yet, even on 28th July, the "Daily Herald" was writing this in regard to the unhappy situation: It was British troops who originally received the Japanese surrender in Java"— and I stress this— and it was with the help of British mediation that an apparently satisfactory agreement was made implementing Dominion status.

That I think was a correct statement from the "Daily Herald." Here is what the Foreign Secretary said at the Table of this House on 23rd July: Ever since December, 1945, when the political adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander in South-East Asia was authorised to bring the parties together, we have continued our efforts to this end "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd July, 1947; Vol. 440, c. 12118—

through Lords Inverchapel and Killearn, and latterly through our Governor-Generals there. What has happened is that both the Indonesians and the British have been openly snubbed, and if they were snubbed then, they will certainly be snubbed tomorrow when the Indonesians will continue to fight for their rightful independence. We lost blood and wealth in eliminating the Japanese from these islands, and then we receive this snub. Even on 24th July, after the approach of our own Minister, quite clearly, we have this from Dr. Beel, the Dutch Prime Minister: Arbitration must be ruled out.

That is pretty rich after the cost to this country and to the Indonesians arising from these attacks. It is "hands off," I suppose, for them, until, as now, the Dutch have commandeered enough territory and strategic positions to bargain just as they wish in spite of all the armistices and "cease fire" orders under the sun. All that comes after the Cheribon Agreement, or the Linggadjati Agreement, as it is now called.

To summarise the position—the Dutch Navy has been blockading these islands; it has been arresting British and American trading ships; it has been denying commerce to the local people to sell sugar, tea, fats, rice, rubber, tin and many other useful commodities which the world and we ourselves would gladly receive in trade. It has caused considerable distress and anxiety and unemployment and waste in the Indonesian States, as the facts easily prove. All who subscribe to this imperialism of the Dutch and their policy are guilty—all of them. The breakdown between the two countries came as a result of more reasons than were mentioned last week by the Foreign Minister. It was not only the infamous joint police suggestion from the Dutch side, but it was the structure of the States themselves: it was the denial to the Indonesians of the right to be represented in foreign affairs; it was the Dutch Governor-General's presiding over the States' Council; it was the Dutch hand-picked representatives from Borneo who were to represent the backward peoples of Borneo on the Legislative Council of the Indonesian States.

It was rightly Britain's task under U.N.O. to liquidate the Japanese. They did that with the gallant help of the partisans. Now those partisans are having to fight for their own life, independence and sovereignty. I think it is right to say that neither U.N.O. nor Britain had a duty to train Dutch troops in this country and provide all manner of arms—lethal tools for the Dutch only. Ten thousand officers and men were trained in Britain in 1946, and also there are piles of American munitions in Singapore and Malaya with which to supply the Dutch, but not the Indonesians. Why should the Indonesians not have their own troops and munitions? If there were a ha'p'orth of justice they would have. Much less was it our duty as British to stand here without interfering, in face of the fact that the Dutch were using Japanese troops as spearheads against these people fighting for national freedom. I could quote here quite a number of telegrams. In one case, after one battle, some 55 Japanese were found dead on the field.

This is what is happening in spite of our sacrifices. Added to all that, I have said so baldly, it seems to me that these telegrams sent by our Foreign Minister are calculated to maintain the status quo in that part of the world. We look at the map and see Britain, Holland and America splashed all over these tremendous islands, in which Britain could be lost, territorially speaking. They seem intent to command between them the rest of the world. Otherwise, why do we favour the Dutch against these militarily weaker people, the Indonesians. These Indonesians are are behind their leaders. Dr. Sjahrir, the ex-Premier, belongs to the outside world. The present Premier, Dr. Sjarifuddin is fighting inside his country. The President, Dr. Sukarno, begs U.N.O. to do something, as it is now belatedly doing.

After much blood and wealth has been wasted, the trades unions and the progressive world, are behind the Indonesians. The maritime transport groups in Holland are protesting and beginning to strike. Even during the British occupation of Indonesia, there were officers and men of the Dutch army who refused to embark for these islands, proving that what we now say has been the attitude of these gallant men in Holland. In Australia and New Zealand, dockers and railwaymen refused to handle Dutch goods and now the leaders of Pakistan and India are up against the violent situation which exists in that part of the world. After all the blood that has been spent, this is what we are now experiencing. It is good to work through the Security Council and to stop the training, and supply of munitions, late as it is. It is good to threaten sanctions, but I believe that we want to apply sanctions and see to it that the Dutch do not proceed with these despicable aggressions on a group of peaceful peoples fighting for bread and independence. That is why I agree with Molotov's statement. We may disagree with many things, but this we can agree with. I believe Molotov was right when, at the meeting of the Security Council, he said that we ought to ask both sides to withdraw to their original borders, pending a just settlement. We do not want the Dutch commanding the situation as otherwise they would be. My last word is that I have never supported the imperialism of my own country and I would not support my country in backing the imperialism of any other country.

6.29 a.m.

Mr. Mikardo (Reading)

I have only one minute in which to put a specific question to the Minister. The Secretary of State is directly responsible for the action of His Majesty's representatives at the Security Council. Everyone in this House and everyone throughout the world appreciated—was almost thrilled—the success which the Security Council had in ordering the cessation of hostilities and having that order obeyed. The success it had showed that it could impose discipline for peace on two peoples at war. The question I want to ask my hon. Friend is this. Why was it, when the motion came before the Security Council that the Council should order the cessation of hostilities, that the British delegate did not vote on the motion? Why was it the British delegate abstained? I ask the question particularly because this motion was sponsored by two of our Dominions, Australia and the new Dominion of India. I would have expected, after all the speeches we have heard from the Front Bench deploring the fighting and the protestations about using our best efforts to mediate to prevent fighting, to find the British delegate first in the voting list in favour of the cessation of hostilities.

6.31 a.m.

Mr. Driberg (Maldon)

Like the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Mikardo) I feel it is highly regrettable that Great Britain should have abandoned the initiative which we had had in the United Nations Security Council, and that we should seem to have lagged behind India and Australia in the fullest possible support for the United Nations. I only want to ask my hon. Friend two specific questions. First, are we still allowing Dutch troops to be trained in this country? The Foreign Secretary was not quite clear in his answer on that point last week. He seemed to indicate that Dutch troops are still being trained here. He added, that we told the Dutch that we did not intend them to be sent to take part in a colonial war in Indonesia, but what security can there possibly be that they will not be sent there after they have left this country when they are completely under the control of the Netherlands Government? In this connection, my hon. Friend himself, getting on for a year ago, said that almost all the Dutch troops in this country would be out by November last.

The second specific question is this: Can he give an assurance that there is no truth whatsoever in the detailed and rather disquieting story which appeared in the "News Chronicle" from a reputable correspondent, Mr. Solon, at The Hague, to the effect that the Dutch Government misled Dutch labour and the trade union movement into supporting this colonial venture by assuring them that the British and American Governments approved of the Dutch Government's action? I am not asking whether the British and the American Governments did in fact approve the Dutch Government's action. I know he would deny that and I hope rightly. But I want an assurance that the Dutch Government did not use such a story to mislead the Dutch labour and trade union movement.

6.40 a.m.

Mr. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Mayhew)

It is something of a privilege to make a concluding speech as our August Bank Holiday draws to a close. I am sure we all feel much refreshed by the day of relaxation and rest, though it seems to have been too much for hon. Members on the benches opposite. The main charge I have to answer, I think, is that we have been backing Dutch imperialism and that we have backed and favoured the Dutch. I want to begin by saying straight out that there is absolutely no evidence for this and nothing has been said or suggested in my view to confirm it. From the beginning our whole effort has been to try and get the two sides together to prevent hostilities in Indonesia. I need not go back to the long attempts to mediate which were undertaken by Mr. Dening, Lord Inverchapel and Lord Killearn, and thereafter to the work of Mr. Mitchieson, Consul-General in Batavia, in connection with the negotiations of the Linggadjati Agreement. The work done by these four men has been highly praised by both sides, Indonesians and Dutch, and both sides of the House will agree that that is something of which we can be proud.

When the negotiations for the implementation of the agreement reached that critical stage in June last we indicated to the Dutch Government our readiness once again to exercise our good offices, and I was not clear as to the intention of the hon. Member for Deritend (Mr. Longden; when he said that we should have behaved three or four weeks ago as we had behaved then. He complained of lack of foresight or a change of policy. We have made constant offers to mediate and to perform other good offices, and the idea that we have been hanging back will not hold water. Our persistence in making these offers was not always by any means well received by the Dutch Government. Notwithstanding this on 21st July, when hostilities broke out, we again offered our services, and although the Dutch took note of this they declined our offer and we therefore asked the American Government to participate in a joint effort. This mediation came to nothing. Although no formal reply was received by the United States Government we were given to understand that our offer was not appropriate at that time.

In those circumstances, when they knew our negotiations had come to nothing, Australia and India referred this question to the Security Council. On Ist August it was known to the Security Council that the Netherlands Government had received and accepted an offer of mediation from the United States Government, and the Council then passed a resolution calling upon the parties, first, to cease hostilities forthwith, secondly, to settle their dispute through arbitration by peaceful means and thirdly to keep the Council informed of the progress of the settlement. We welcome any steps calculated to put an end once and for all to the hostilities. Our view has always been that the method of achieving Indonesian independence within the framework of the Linggadajati Agreement is one to be settled by the Dutch and Indonesians. Nor do we contest the claim of the Dutch that this is a matter of internal jurisdiction while the United States of Indonesia are only envisaged as coming into being on the Ist of January, 1949; but the fact that hostilities have broken out there, having widespread repercussions outside Indonesia, does constitute a situation which the Security Council have felt it necessary to consider.

On the point raised by the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Mikardo) as to why the British representative did not support the resolution of the Security Council, our aims are and were the same as the aims of the Australian and Indian Governments—to get effective Security Council action to stop hostilities immediately. The United States resolution, which was the one that was passed, was designed to avoid difficulties which might arise through action under Article 39 of the Charter; for example, juridical questions about domestic jurisdiction involving the exact status of the Indonesian republic. We felt that the resolution did not have this effect, since it prejudged the legal issue by suggesting that Article 2 (7), precluding the Council from interfering in domestic affairs, did not apply in the present case. Our position, which was made clear in the Security Council, was not that there was any difference in objective—everyone knew that there was not, and the sincerity of the British representatives was clearly shown by the history of the action we had taken—but was a difference of view on the wording of the resolution and the procedure involved.

I do not agree that it was in any way a loss of initiative. On the contrary. In the last week, as in many previous weeks, we have taken the initiative, by ourselves, to get a satisfactory solution. The hon. Member for Deritend wanted us to apply sanctions even now, I imagine, after the "Cease fire" has been ordered by the Dutch Government. Whatever may be said for trying sanctions at other stages of a dispute, I think that to apply them at a time like the present would be unthinkable. The second thing I was asked about was the demand that troops should be withdrawn to the frontiers from which they started. Now that the Dutch have accepted the offer of mediation by the United States Government—an offer which is open to the Indonesians to accept, but their view has not yet been made clear—and negotiations seem to be imminent, I do not think I should make a statement about this matter, which will undoubtedly come up later. I do not think, therefore, that I can give a straight answer to the hon. Member on that point.

Arms and training constitute an important question. It goes back to our wartime arrangements with the Netherlands Government. When the war was on we made arrangements to train, equip and organise the Dutch forces to fight with us against the Germans, and also to take part in the German occupation. Since that time we have undertaken definite obligations to supply certain equipment to the Dutch in Europe. It would be very serious for us to repudiate this agreement, and would need careful consideration. Meanwhile, we have forbidden the export from Europe of all arms which might be used in the Far East. We have forbidden all supplies from the Far East, and on 16th June we warned the Dutch Government that if hostilities did break out this would be the course of action to which we should be forced. On the question of training, we have stopped all training facilities in the Far East. Of the training here, I can only say that the few troops over here cannot possibly have any effect on the outcome.

In conclusion, we are not in the least on the defensive over this. We have a clear conscience about the action we have taken in regard to the dispute. More than that, we are proud of the part that Britain has played in it from the beginning—the part our troops played in the early days, and the part our negotiators have played since. The troops did magnificently, rescuing hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war and internees, and have been praised highly by both sides. Our negotiations and our negotiators, too, have received the highest praise for their tact and patience and objectivity. We have been criticised, I know. Most of the criticism—not all of it, by any means, but most of the criticism—has come from Communist sources. But we have nothing for which to apologise. We think we can be proud of the job Britain has done in this problem. For the future, we are, of course, very glad to have seen from recent reports that the Dutch have ordered the "cease fire." We hope that a solution will be reached by the mediators, and that that solution will be lasting and final; and we believe that, when that solution is reached, it will have been helped forward very greatly by the part we have played in Indonesia during these past months.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at a Quarter to Seven o'Clock a.m.