HC Deb 15 October 1946 vol 427 cc773-6
29. Mr. Thurtle

asked the Secretary of State for War if he is yet in a position to make a statement on the allegations at court martial proceedings in June last to the effect that the commanding officer in Burma had authorised the imposition of flogging, and other punishments not sanctioned by Parliament.

Mr. Bellenger

As the House will wish for a full and detailed statement, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Thurtle

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the officer charged in this case successfully pleaded condonation by his superior officer, and will he make clear that the will of Parliament must prevail in these matters, and that no officer, however high his rank, is entitled to ignore the Army Act?

Mr. Bellenger

Yes, Sir. I find no fault with the point of view expressed in that supplementary question. The only thing I can say is that war is a very desperate occasion, and that is the only excuse, if such is needed, that I have to offer for a departure from the literal interpretation of King's Regulations.

Mr. Scollan

Are we to understand that the right hon. Gentleman is justifying flogging being introduced by some officers because there is a war on?

Mr. Bellenger

No, Sir, I am not; but I ask that my hon Friend should read my reply in detail.

Mr. Thurtle

Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that Parliament has always been very jealous of its right to protect the private soldier?

Mr. Bellenger

Yes, Sir.

Mr. Berry

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the excuse he has put forward certainly was not accepted by the Allies vis-à-vis the Germans?

Following is the statement:

As the House knows, an officer was recently tried by general court martial for ordering a roan in his unit to be flogged. The accused, at his trial, submitted a plea in bar of trial on the grounds that his action had been condoned by his superiors. Evidence was produced to show that when the late General Wingate formed the Long Penetration Groups he issued detailed instructions relating to the maintenance of discipline during operations. These instructions were drawn up as the general considered that the conditions in which the operations took place were so exceptional that a special code was essential. In particular he laid down that such offences as sleeping whilst a sentry and stealing rations were punishable by flogging. In the recent trial, therefore, the action of the accused officer was held to have been condoned by his superior officers and his plea in bar of trial was allowed.

I have considered with great care what further action should be taken in this matter. By instituting a system of punishment at variance with the Army Act and King's Regulations, General Wingate undoubtedly exceeded his powers. The House knows, of course, that this gallant and distinguished officer met his death in the midst of the operations he was conducting. It remained for me to consider to what extent his successor should properly be brought to account for acquiescing in a system of punishment which was contrary to law.

The conditions in which these Long Penetration Groups operated were without parallel in military history. The columns were launched on foot through the enemy and operated deep inside the enemy lines. They were maintained entirely by air, their supplies being dropped by parachute. The force commander visited the individual columns by air as opportunity offered and air strips could be made. Otherwise communications were maintained by wireless in a complicated code at specific times of the day.

It follows that each column operated as a separate entity, was cut off from the outside world and other columns by great distances, and lived dangerously for periods extending over many weeks. Although, in many places, the local population was friendly, the fact remained that these columns had to be careful not to trade upon the good nature of the inhabitants owing to the inevitable reprisals which would be bound to follow should the Japanese be aware of any help being given in any particular area. The campaign, therefore, was waged in indescribable discomfort, in which the force was permanently isolated, and in which the slightest mistake or lack of vigilance would jeopardise the safety of the whole column.

It is not unnatural that in these circumstances General Wingate should have considered whether the kind of punishments allowed by law would suit or indeed could be applied in the exceptional conditions in which his force was to operate. Each column commander had the power to convene a field general court-martial which could award such punishments as imprisonment, detention, forfeiture of pay and field punishment. He could himself award the punishments of detention, forfeiture of pay and field punishment summarily, subject to the soldier being given the power of election of trial by court-martial. But in so far as these punishments could be applied at all they would have been less exacting than the hardships suffered daily by all members of the columns. The system of summary punishment which was devised was known throughout the force, was generally accepted by the men under command and was inflicted only with the consent of the culprit.

The House should appreciate that General Wingate's successor was in India when he was called upon to take over command on the general's death When he arrived the campaign was in full swing. I think it will be agreed that, although he inherited and became responsible for the orders of his predecessor, he could not reasonably be expected to turn his eyes from his main task which was to harass the Japanese within their lines. Communications were such that in any event it would have been impracticable for detailed orders on discipline to be issued if the campaign was to proceed.

I have therefore concluded that no useful purpose will be served in pursuing the question of the responsibility of individuals for what took place.