HC Deb 14 March 1946 vol 420 cc1391-400

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Joseph Henderson.]

9.18 p.m.

Major Bruce (Portsmouth, North)

One of the uncertainties that has lain over the previous Debates on the Service Estimates and, indeed, over the Debates which ensued on the issue of the Defence White Paper, was the whole question of our commitments under the United Nations Charter. All the way through those Debates, on both sides of the House, uncertainty was expressed as to exactly the extent of our commitments, in terms of Navy, Army and Air Force, to the United Nations organisation under Article 43 of the Charter. Indeed, at the present time this becomes a matter of pressing-importance because, until the precise extent of our commitments to the United Nations organisation is known, we shall not be able with any certainty to assess exactly what manpower we shall have available for industry. It will be remembered that under Article 43 of the Charter, which we ratified in this House: All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. It was not, therefore, surprising that on 26th January last, discussion on the best means of arriving at the conclusion of the special agreement, referred to in Article 43 of the Charter, occupied a prominent place on the agenda. Those who have been privileged to read the Journal will know that Item 10, that is, the one which refers to these discussions, was ruled by the President as one that concerned the Military Staff Committee, and the President submitted to the Council that they might not feel it desirable that they should deal with Item 10, that is, that they should defer it until a later date when the Military Staff Committee, possibly, had met. Therefore, it is quite clear that the Military Staff Committee, as such, occupies an important position indeed in regard to the determination of the various military commitments of those Powers composing the United Nations.

I was relieved, as I believe Members of the House were, when the Undersecretary of State for Air, speaking on 12th March, said: … in spite of all the difficulties and the dark side of the world situation which faces us, and which no one wishes to overlook, the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations organisation has met He continued: …" the Committee has at any rate founded itself." [OFFICAL REPORT, 12th March, 1946; Vol. 420, c. 1067.] Under Article 47 of the Charter of the United Nations it was agreed that There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament. In the second paragraph of that Article its constitution was defined in these words: The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. That, I think, shows that the Military Staff Committee has a special function to perform in relation to the Security Council, and the matters I desire to place before the House tonight are, broadly speaking, the considerations as to whether the Military Staff Committee, in its existing form and existing organisation, is adequate to discharge the functions which have been laid down. Before we can determine this, we have to define with precision those functions of the Security Council itself which necessitate any kind of military advice. So we find, under Article 24 of the Charter, that the functions of the Security Council are laid down as follow: In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. I have not time to read out the other Articles which elaborate that general principle on which the Security Council works. The House will remember that under Article 26 the Security Council is required to formulate plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. Under Article 39 it is required to determine any threats to the peace. Under Article 106 it is required to decide as and when a state has been reached when it can assume its full responsibilities from the Big Five. Under Article 46 it is required to make plans for the application of armed force. Under Article 54 it is required to be kept fully informed of activities undertaken' or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security. Under Article 43, as I have said, it is required to negotiate agreements for the supply of forces, assistance and facilities by members of the United Nations. Finally, under Article 42, it is laid down that, where necessary, it is required to order direct action by demonstrations, blockade or other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the United Nations. All these matters, all these duties, which are laid upon the Security Council, are ones which definitely require, at some point or other, either on a temporary or a continuous basis, the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. It will be noted that in Article 28 it is laid down: The Security Council shall be so organised as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organisation. The Military Staff Committee is required, in paragraph I of Article 47, which I have already read out to the House, to advise and assist the Security Council on all those matters to which I have referred, and which are specific amplifications of its general functions. The Military Staff Committee has a further specific responsibility imposed upon it by paragraph 3 of Article 47 for the strategic direction of any Armed Forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Now, the making of plans under Article 46 necessitates the establishment of a permanent Military Staff Committee on an integrated basis involving the possible use of land, sea and air forces agreed to be provided by members under Article 43. It will necessitate, first of all, the provision of military intelligence covering all countries, the furnishing of scientific advice, particularly as regards new methods of warfare, and the provision of economic intelligence as a logical extension of what was formerly regarded in its more narrow sense as military intelligence. The making of plans is a continuous process. It is a process which staffs all over the world are making the whole of the time, if they are doing their work properly. So far as the United Nations organisation is concerned, such planning will obviously have to be made on the basis of forces available to the United Nations as agreed in Article 43 and, on the other hand, also on the basis of the forces available to any one nation, or group of nations, which in the opinion of the Security Council, are likely either singly or in a combination, to be used against a member or group of members.

Those plans will have to be made on the basis of estimated war potentials. They will also have to be made on the basis of all the intelligence factors in regard to weapon development, and bearing in mind the likely suddenness of future wars, particularly if any future wars are likely to be of an atomic character. The making of plans is but one responsibility of the Military Staff Committee. The remaining ones, which have been detailed already, are such as to involve the services of a full time permanent Military Staff. Upon that I have come to the following conclusions, which 1 ask the House to accept. For the purpose of advising and assisting the Security Council within the provisions of Article 47 of the Charter, and of fulfilling the specific responsibili-vices of a full-time permanent Military Staff Committee, consisting of the permanent members of the Security Council, is utterly inadequate. The second conclusion which I commend to the House is that any committee, or other body, appointed to advise and assist the Security Council must, in fact, function continuously, and should be in a position to advise the Secretary-General.

I would like to turn to the composition of the Military Staff Committee. The House will recall that, under paragraph 2 of Article 47, the composition of the Military Staff Committee was laid down to be that of the Chiefs of Staff of the various countries concerned, and I feel, therefore, that we should bear in mind what are the specific responsibilities which the Governments of these Chiefs of Staff actually have already in relation to the Charter. For example, each country belonging to the United Nations is required to give to the United Nations every assistance required in any action it takes, and each member of the United Nations is required to determine the armed forces and assistance facilities which it is prepared to make available to the United Nations. Under Article 43. it is required to make those forces, in fact, available, and, under Article 45, these countries are required to hold national air force contingents immediately available, and, under Article 26— probably a very important one as the years pass— each of these Governments of the United Nations is required to regulate their armaments within any system established for the purposes of this regulation.

In addition, the Governments subscribing to the United Nations Charter have the following freedoms of action within the provisions of the Charter. Under Article 51, every country has the right to self-defence. Under Article 52, it has the right to conclude regional agreements consistent with the purposes and provisions of the Charter. Under Article 107, it has the right of action against any enemy state in the Second World War. Under Article 106, it has the right, pending determination of agreements under Article 43, to participation, in the case of the Big Five, in inter-Governmental agreements for the maintenance of peace. Under each of these obligations, and under each of these rights and freedoms, the Chiefs of Staff of the various countries concerned already have their own personal individual and professional responsibilities to the Governments of their own nations. In fact, the prime function of a Chief of Staff is to advise his Government as regards defence, which in modern times clearly includes attack as a means of defence, and must envisage the possibility of war, guided by the political situation as determined by the Government or by military intelligence, or both, with other signatories to the Charter, including those belonging to the Security Council.

Plans prepared under the guidance of the Chiefs of Staff include plans of Governments with whom their own Government is on friendly terms, and may involve plans of defence, and, therefore, of attack, against other members of the Security Council. and the responsibilities of a member of the Military Staff Committee, in his duties on disarmament questions, might come in conflict with his responsibility to his own Government on the duty of self-defence, and his advice to the Military Staff Committee must, to some extent, be coloured by this consideration.

I invite the House to consider the undoubted conclusion which arises from that — that the future organisation of an international force, to which I think hon. Members on all sides of the House are, in one way or another committed, will inevitably need an International General Staff. The other conclusion which I ask the House to consider is that the proposed constitution of the Chief of Staff Com- mittee makes it completely unworkable by reason of the conflict of interests involved. If it can be shown that the Military Staff Committee, in its existing functions, with its existing organisation and its existing composition, is, for all practical purposes, unworkable, I feel that we have to consider what steps we can take in order to bring the position more into conformity with the ideas which I think hon. Members on all sides of the House have in mind.

I suggest to the House that we should put forward the following recommendations. Firstly, that a Permanent Military Staff should be established under the control of the Security Council and with advisory functions to the Secretary-General. It will be remembered that under Article 99 of the Charter the Secretary-General has the responsibility for determining the existence of a breach of the peace. Under conditions of atomic warfare, I should imagine it would be extremely difficult in some instances, to determine the existence of a threat to the peace without some kind of military advice. I think therefore, the Military Staff Committee ought to be in a position to advise the Secretary-General on this point.

A second recommendation to which I invite consideration is that such a Military Staff Committee should function continuously and should be able at all times to advise the Security Council which, under Article 28, is itself required to function continuously. My third recommendation is that it should consist of Army, Air Force and Navy personnel drawn from all Services of the United Nations, and that the persons composing the new Military Staff Committee in the United Nations' control should be required to renounce their nationalities, as in the case of the Secretary-General, and become the paid servants of the United-Nations. I feel that if our own Government would take some steps to lay broadly similar recommendations before the Security Council or General Assembly, we should find that the institution of an international General Staff, in place of what I consider to be an unworkable Military Staff Committee in its present form, would be one of the greatest factors, not only in determining our correct obligations to all countries of the United Nations under Article 43, but in being, in themselves, a foundation of the international force which we know must come into existence sooner or later, and which would prove to be one of the corner stones in the establishment of world peace.

9.38 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. McNeil)

I am more than indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Portsmouth (Major Bruce) for his courtesy in presenting me with a copy of his most closely argued memorandum. I admit I am indebted, because it is a complex and difficult subject. Perhaps I might be permitted to quote a part of Article 47 which my hon. and gallant Friend did not. I do not mean that there was anything sinister in that, but, for the purposes of my argument, it is well to see the end of the Article. I will read from where he left off: Any member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The questions relating to the command of such Forces shall be worked out subsequently. The Military Staff Committee with the authorisation of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies may establish regional sub-committees. Whatever deficiencies this Staff Committee has— and I will admit, without reservation, that it plainly has some— it has already worked, and my hon. and gallant Friend referred to that, but I wanted to make it plain from the quotation which I read that the Staff Committee is, by definition, a subsidiary body. However important it is, it must always be considered as subsidiary to the Security Council. It comprises a machine with which we are all familiar in this House, where you have the Council making policy and the Military Staff Committee supplying the military technical advice on which the policy is implemented.

I think my hon. and gallant Friend was under a misconception when he laboured the necessity for continuous action, and he seemed to infer that that was not possible under the existing scheme. By definition, to which I have already alluded, the Military Staff Committee is designed to function continuously. Like any of the other commissions or councils— for example,

the Social and Economic Council — it is continuously in session. To secure this, it is staffed by permanent representatives of the chiefs of staff of the five Powers, and they will be used alongside the Security Council at the headquarters of the United Nations. Admittedly, the Military Staff Committee, like a great deal else in the Charter system, does not provide a complete and perfect international system. But I suggest to my hon. and gallant Friend that, like every international instrument, it was a compromise. It was the greatest common denominator which we and some of the other nations were able to secure from the 51 States which go to make up the United Nations. It should also be admitted that the security provisions of the Charter, which give each of the five great Powers two things — permanent membership of the Security Council, and a right of veto on all sanctions or enforcement action — were based upon the assumption, which His Majesty's Government will, at all times, strive to sustain, that there would be continued unity of purpose between the five Great Powers, in peace as there was in war, and that if it came to hostilities among the Great Powers, there was a high probability that the organisation of the United Nations would break down. At any rate, whether we like it or not, and however much we would like to escape from it, that is the assumption which is inherent in the organisation of the Security Council.

My hon. and gallant Friend referred to that. His logic is as acceptable as his desire to perfect that state of affairs, but, from the point of view of practical politics, that is the maximum which we or any other nation have been able to grab from the international situation. On the assumption of unanimity among the five Great Powers, the provision made in the Charter for the Military Staff Committee was cohesive and logical, and plainly the Committee should be perfectly capable of helping the Security Council, in planning action and making other provisions to which my hon. and gallant Friend referred, to take collective action against a breach of the peace by any other State. My hon. and gallant Friend's suggestion of an entirely independent and genuinely denationalised Military Staff Committee postulates a very different political organisation of the United Nations from that which is laid down in the Charter. In fact, a supernational Military Staff Committee such as he contemplates could come about only as the result of the establishment of a super-national world government. It is a design for which many people wait, to which my right hon. Friend has already paid a tribute, and for which he has expressed his desire and anxiety; but I think one would place events in the wrong order if one tried to organise the Security Council on those lines before one had achieved a political organisation at the top from which that would flow.

I suggest, therefore, that the better policy is to go ahead with the existing machinery that is laid down in the Charter, and not at this stage to attempt to make the changes in the Charter which, leaving other things apart, would need to be made before my hon. and gallant Friend's suggestion would work. We must endeavour to make a success of the existing machinery. I hope the day will come when nations will surrender their sovereignty and make this organisation possible in the Security Council and in other permanent organisations. But, while admitting all its deficiencies, I think we have a right to contend that this is a distinct advance on any scheme that we previously had within our hands. For instance, we had not any comparable instrument behind the old League of Nations. With the deficiencies of the old League of Nations, this is a great step forward, resting, I believe, upon this assumption that there is harmonious action between the five Great Powers, and everyone, of course, with every emphasis that he can command, hopes that that assumption will not be destroyed. I am sorry, therefore, that I have to reject my hon. and gallant Friend's proposals with the oldest and nastiest of replies, that they are not practical politics; but I would like to say to the House that I am greatly indebted to my hon. Friend for the candour, the force and the optimism with which he argued his proposals.

It being Twelve Minutes to Ten o'Clock, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order, as modified for this Session by the Order made upon 16th August.