§ Mr. J. S. C. Reid
I beg to move, in page 36, line 8, at the end, to insert:by reason of his failure properly to provide the services which he has undertaken.Before it can be properly decided what is the right tribunal to decide any issue, the issue must be known. Under the Bill at present it is not too clear what the issue is in this connection, and it is still less clear after what the right hon. Gentleman said in Committee. Clause 42 deals with a tribunal which has to decide whether medical practitioners, chemists, dental practitioners and opticians, ought to continue to belong to the national service, or whether they should be refused a continuation of their contracts. Quite rightly, I think, the Minister provides that, in the first instance, that question should go to a tribunal. Somebody has to inquire into it. Provided there is another step beyond the tribunal—and I think we are both agreed there should be some other step—it does not much matter that we should define too narrowly the precise nature of the case before the tribunal. But it does matter very much that we should define the ultimate criterion of judgment when we come to the last stage, and when we come to the question who is to decide at that stage. There are two obviously different points of view.
It may be said, on the one hand, that no doctor, optician, or other servant of the public is to be deprived of his place in the scheme unless something has been proved against him. It may be said, on the other hand, as the Minister said in one speech, that it is so essential for the Minister to have full responsibility for the proper services of the community that he is to be entitled to dispense with the services of anybody in whom he has no confidence, whether or not anything definite has been proved against that person. Those are two quite different lines of approach, and it is of vital importance for the doctors to know what is to be the ground on which they can be turned out of this service. As the service becomes more important and more nearly approaches a 100 per cent. service, turning out of the service means professional death, because they can never practise their art outside the service if everyone is inside it. Accordingly, if the Minister's anticipations are right, to deprive any 1972 doctor of his place in the public service is, in fact, to say that he can never exercise his medical skill again, and that' if he is to make any living at all, it must be as an unskilled labourer or something of that kind, or at least in some job which does not require any of the skill which he has spent his life acquiring.
This is, accordingly, a most important issue for the doctors, and we must have a definition of that to which they are to be subjected. What causes me some doubt is what the Minister said in the course of the proceedings on 26th June, and I should like to ask him which of the pronouncements he then made he now agrees with, because plainly they cannot all stand? In column 770 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of the Committee, the right hon. Gentleman said:What we are discussing here is, whether a person who has contracted to carry out certain duties carries them out satisfactorily to reasonable people.That must mean, whether he has been proved to have carried out any of his duties unsatisfactorily, and that I would accept as right. He then goes on, in col. 772:Whether a doctor has carried out his job in a proper way to the satisfaction of the lay and professional people involved.—again an investigation into a question of fact, a question regarding past actions on the part of the doctor, have they or have they not been right? That again I accept as correct. But when we go a little further down that column, we come to quite a different conception, and I hope the Minister will now disclaim it, because he says:Parliament imposes upon the Minister an obligation to provide a service.This is where he begins to go wrong:Under the Amendment, the courts will decide the instrument through which he will give the service.We said "No," and the Minister replied:Certainly. That is exactly what the effect will be… The local executive decides that a man is a bad influence.I hope the Minister did not mean what he said. The local executive is to decide nothing of the kind. The local executive has to decide whether a man has fallen short in certain specific respects. What worries me is that it would be perfectly possible, under the form of words in the Bill, for a doctor to be dismissed by the 1973 Minister merely because the Minister thought he was a bad influence, without anything having been proved. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will expound what he now says, though I am afraid he will not, because he goes on to say:Then the High Court judge may say that he is a good instrument.A high court judge, in our conception, would not have to consider that.
§ Mr. Reid
And I quoted it as showing that the right hon. Gentleman has the wrong view, in this part of his speech, about the essential nature of the issue which will go before the tribunal, because he would not have used those words if he had the right view about it. Then he goes on with a somewhat alarmingly authoritarian expression:But we cannot admit that the courts should interpret whether the doctor has, in fact, been a good servant to the people."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee C, 26th June, 1946; C. 770, 772 and 774.]I do not want to use words which would offend the right hon. Gentleman, but that is a somewhat more authoritarian line of approach than we are accustomed to in this country. I do not want to get involved in questions of phraseology; let us come down to a definite question, which I hope the right hon. Gentleman will answer: Is a doctor to be turned out because something definite has been proved against him with regard to his past actions, or is he to be turned out because his superior has no confidence in him without anything having been proved against him? That is the point, and it is in order to get that point cleared up that we have put down this Amendment. If the right hon. Gentleman will say that he agrees with the first half of my question, that will be very relevant to the next discussion of what the ultimate tribunal will be, and it would lead, I think, to his acceptance of the Amendment, because the Amendment would make clear what seems 1974 to us to be somewhat obscure at the moment. At any rate, whether the right hon. Gentleman accepts the Amendment or not, if he accepts the principle we shall be pretty well satisfied; but if he will not keep the door open, if he insists that he can turn, or somebody on his behalf can turn, a doctor off the list into the wilderness, without any proof of his having committed some error in the past in his actions as a doctor under the scheme, then we must resist to the uttermost.
I hope, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to say, that what he first said upstairs was right, and that what he said in the second place was wrong. I was left in a state of considerable apprehension at the end. I am bound to say that I thought that the right hon. Gentleman really had it in mind to keep power to turn a doctor off the scheme because he was not a good servant of the people, in his view—because he had no confidence in him — without having proved, to the satisfaction of somebody inquiring into the matter, that he had committed some fault.
§ Mr. Bevan
My relations with the right hon. and learned Gentleman on this Bill have so far been reasonably cordial, but I am bound to say that, as the discussion on the Report stage continues, he appears to mistake the House of Commons for a court. He raises the most arid distinctions: he tries to find the most microscopic crevices, and he tries to construct upon them an edifice of argument—if one can construct an edifice on a crevice. But that is precisely what he is doing, and his edifice of argument continually collapses into the crevices. He has attempted to create a distinction, which does not exist at all, because I used the words "bad servant" and because I used the words "bad influence." What is wrong with them? What does the right hon. and learned Gentleman really mean? A doctor is appointed. Before the doctor can be removed, something has to be proved against him. It is not enough for the Minister to dislike the colour of his hair.
§ Mr. Bevan
There never was anything wrong with it. It is the right hon. and learned Gentleman who has created these difficulties. What the right hon. and learned Gentleman is attempting to try to do is to develop a line of argument which can be expanded when we come to the next Amendment. That is really what the right hon. and learned Gentleman is up to. I can give him a categorical assurance. First, I cannot accept the Amendment. What it says is:by reason of his failure properly to provide the services which he has undertaken.What has the doctor undertaken? Service as a doctor. That is what he has undertaken. The point here is not his failure to be a doctor. It is his failure to be a servant, as well as a doctor that matters. He may not be tending his patients properly, although he may be a good doctor. There are all kinds of reasons that may make him a very bad person to employ. The tribunal must take all these things into account. But they must always be concrete reasons; they must always be particular; they must always be capable of ponderable description; otherwise the Minister could remove a doctor on suspicion. That would be quite wrong. But there was never any such intention. Therefore, it seems to me that the language of the Clause is the best kind of language to be used in these circumstances. It says if his continuance on the listwould be prejudicial to the efficiency of the services in question.That, surely, establishes the whole case. I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will accept that, because it is certainly specific, and then perhaps we can get on to the other Amendment in which he desires to fasten his teeth.
§ Sir H. Morris-Jones
The right hon. Gentleman was very hard on my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hillhead (Mr. J. S. C. Reid). My right hon. and learned Friend and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North Croydon (Mr. Willink) are doing very valuable service on this Bill, for the medical profession. If they find any possible loophole or any injustice which may arise, they are also doing good service to the Opposition.
§ Sir H. Morris-Jones
I wish to take the right hon. Gentleman up on one sentence he used. He said that the penalty here may not be against a medical man as a doctor, but as a servant. The right hon. Gentleman has repeatedly said, in the House and outside, that medical men are not the servants of the State under this Bill.
§ Mr. Bevan
May I put the hon. Member in the correct posture? I am not claiming that I have the right, because that is a matter for the General Medical Council, to pass judgment upon a doctor as a doctor. A doctor is not only a doctor, but he is a servant of the National Health Service. In that Service he has to render certain services, and if he falls short of what is required, he is not a proper servant, and is therefore liable to be removed. Does not the hon. Member agree with that?
§ Sir H. Morris-Jones
I only wanted to be clear, because the right hon. Gentleman made public a statement that the doctor is not a servant of the State.
§ Mr. C. Williams
Having listened to what the right hon. Gentleman has said, and got a fair understanding of what he wants, which is to be able to deal with a doctor if he is inefficient, not in a medical sense but in the sense that he may not be attending a reasonable number of patients, or if his behaviour is bad, I can agree with the right hon. Gentleman up to that point. I am not a lawyer, nor have I had the training of arguing with lawyers—I am innocent of the law—but it seems to me that these words—by reason of his failure properly to provide the services which he has undertaken—would make it clear that a doctor has an obligation to carry out the various things which are necessary. I should have thought that these words would have 1977 strengthened the Bill and that the right hon. Gentleman, instead of having little quarrels with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hillhead (Mr. J. S. C. Reid), would have said, "This is an excellent Amendment which carries out what I wish." The whole of his arguments bore that out. It appears to me that he made an argument in favour of the Amendment, which was almost better than the arguments of my right hon. and learned Friend in proposing it. Between the two of them, they have convinced me that it is a most excellent Amendment. I realise what a little butter, now and then, to the Opposition can do, and so I ask, Would it not be wise on this occasion for the right hon. Gentleman to accept the Amendment? It would strengthen his Bill, and he could say, "Look what I have done, I have accepted this very fine Amendment, excellent in every way; it strengthens the Bill and the Bill is much better than it was before." I will make him a present of that suggestion. I feel quite sure that, even if he does not accept the Amendment here, it will be accepted in another place. I am much indebted to him for making it clear to me that this, at any rate, is a first class Amendment.
§ 8.45 p.m.
§ Mr. J. S. C. Reid
I think it is rather unusual for the right hon. Gentleman to agree in principle and then to give no reason for rejecting the Amendment. It seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman ought to accept the Amendment, because he has accepted, I think, the view that notice of particulars of specific charges of things done or left undone by the doctor will be given before the hearing takes place before the tribunal.
§ Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne)
On a point of Order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I thought we were on the Report stage. Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman entitled to make a second speech?
§ Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Hubert Beaumont)
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is entitled to make a second speech as the mover of the Amendment.
§ Mr. Reid
I believe that the right hon. Gentleman has assured us that notice of particulars of specific charges of things done or left undone will be given to the accused doctor in advance of the hearing before the tribunal. I believe that he intended to assure us that the ordinary rule with regard to the onus or proof will apply, and the doctor will not be dismissed from the service unless these charges, or some of them, have been proved against him as a matter of fact. On the footing that that belief of mine is well founded, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Mr. Bevan
I beg to move, in page 36, line 20, at the end, to insert:(4) An appeal shall lie to the Minister from any direction of the Tribunal under the last foregoing Subsection, and the Minister may confirm or revoke that direction.When this matter was discussed in Committee a very extraordinary situation arose. An Amendment was proposed to leave out "appeal to the Minister" in the case of a dismissal of a doctor, and to insert "a High Court judge." The first necessity was to remove from the Bill the words "appeal to the Minister." Owing to one of the unfortunate by-products of all-night Sittings, some of my hon. Friends were not there, and hon. Members opposite who had not devoted themselves with the same assiduity to the Business of the House, were able to attend the Committee looking very fresh and conspiratorial.
§ Mr. Linstead
Will the right hon. Gentleman add the third ingredient, which was, I believe, that a certain transfer of votes took place?
§ Mr. Bevan
No, the Minister could not frustrate the Committee. I would not dare. As I said, the Committee frustrated 1979 itself by then refusing to insert the words "appeal to the High Court" so that the total result of the Committee's labours was to deprive the doctors of one of their remedies. That is the situation as it stands at the present time, and I am moving to re-insert the words "appeal to the Minister." This is a matter of some importance and I wish to ask the indulgence of the House whilst I develop the argument which lies behind the Amendment I am moving.
The Minister and the doctor, or rather the executive council and the doctor, are, in some respects, in employee and employer relationship, and it would be perfectly proper in accordance with constitutional precedents and certainly it would be perfectly proper by the principles which the party opposite have always defended, if the employer could dismiss the employee without any redress at all by the employee. That has always been the position. Indeed, it is because individuals, professional and otherwise, were liable to be dismissed at the caprice of their employer without any redress that trade unions and professional organisations came into being. They were for the protection of the individual and both exist more freely and more powerfully at the present time than they ever did and they operate normally for the protection of the individual citizen. That protection still exists for the individual, whoever he may be. In establishing this great service it seemed to me that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for doctors who are removed from that service to obtain a livelihood outside, and that special protection should be given to the individual against any possibility of injustice.
Let me describe, concretely, the kind of protection the doctor would receive under the scheme, if this Amendment were carried. In the first place, there would be a medical sub-committee of the local executive council, consisting as to 50 per cent, of professional representatives. A complaint is made against a general practitioner. That complaint is first examined and reported upon by that sub-committee of the executive council. I know that is not in the Bill, but that is how, in practice, it will work out, and will be determined by Regulation. I have said a great deal of this in Committee, as Members will see if they look up 1980 HANSARD. So, there is the original scrutiny. Then the executive council consider the complaint. That council consists, again, as to 50 per cent. of their membership, of professional persons almost all—with the exception of dentists and chemists—doctors, members of his own profession. Eight would be representatives of the local health authority, experienced persons, and four appointed by the Minister. A semi-professional body would first consider the allegations against the doctor. We will suppose that that body have decided that the allegations are well founded, and that the doctor should be removed from the list. The doctor then has the right of appeal to the tribunal. This is an entirely original advance; it does not exist now at all.
At the moment the doctor has only the right of appeal against the local committee straight to the Minister. In no other profession is there this tribunal. I interpose the tribunal between myself and the local executive because it seems to me that the local executive council might, for one reason and another, be prejudiced. The doctor might be an awkward person; he might have all kinds of idiosyncrasies. Therefore, it seemed to me that before the appeal came to the Minister there ought to be a review of the circumstances, more objectively, by the national tribunal. The chairman of the tribunal would be a legal person appointed by the Lord Chancellor, not a dentist or a doctor, as the case may be, but another person. The doctor would be able to put his witnesses before that council to be cross-examined, to give evidence in person, and employ all the panoply of a legal tribunal. If the tribunal decided that the local executive were correct in their decisions the doctor has a further appeal, to the Minister, who will then institute an inquiry. Remember that we are not discussing the doctor as a doctor. Let me eliminate from Members' minds all thought about the General Medical Council. We are not discussing that at all. We are discussing what we discussed in the previous Amendment. That being so, is there any possibility of injustice being done to a doctor after that microscopic examination?
The doctor would still have certain rights of appeal to the court. He could appeal on any one of three grounds, or all three together. First, that the procedure laid down for his trial had not properly been carried out; second, that 1981 one of the tribunals had exceeded their powers; and, third, that the principles of natural justice had been violated. There is no inhibition against appearing before the court, because we are not dealing with a State servant; we are dealing with a person who is in contract with a local executive. I have examined all the schemes which have been published, and to which Members opposite have been a party, and I find that the scheme provided under the Bill gives more protection than any scheme which I have seen.
In no scheme and in no White Paper was a tribunal ever suggested. A tribunal is an invention of my own for the purpose of protecting the doctor against any possible injustice. What is being suggested by hon. Members opposite? The suggestion—it is a most novel one—is that instead of the doctor appealing to the Minister, he should have the right to appeal to a judge of the High Court. I submit that this would be putting the judiciary in a queer relationship with the Legislature. How can a judge of the High Court better decide than the executive council whether a doctor has been an efficient servant of the service? How can he decide that? What particular merit has a High Court judge over these persons with all their experience?
§ 9.0. p.m.
§ Squadron-Leader Fleming (Manchester, Withington)
If the matter came before a High Court judge, would it not be a question of fact?
§ Mr. Bevan
A question of law, and indeed, the evaluation of the facts is a matter that only persons with experience of the service could do. The evaluation of the actual quantitative arraignment of the facts is something that the High Court judge can do better than most people, because he is accustomed to weighing evidence; but the qualitative significance of those facts in the health service is a matter which only those who know the health service can do. Otherwise, one would be elevating the position of a High Court judge to a ridiculous eminence. Let me develop the argument still further. The demand that a High Court judge should be the protection of the doctor, instead of what I have described, is based upon the contention that if a doctor is denied employment within the National Health Service, it is practically a sentence of professional death. Therefore, 1982 it is argued, the punishment is so severe that we ought to provide for the utmost protection against the possibility of injustice—which, indeed, I claim is provided in the scheme. But if the High Court judge is to decide the matter, where does the responsibility of Parliament come in? Parliament places upon the Minister of Health the responsibility for providing a health service. It provides the Minister with the instruments through which that service is to be given, but if one of the instruments is to be selected by the High Court judge, where does Parliament come in? Let me give an illustration. Suppose that a doctor was dismissed for negligence by the local executive council; suppose that the tribunal had upheld the dismissal——
§ Mr. Bevan
I have already described that—why does not the hon. and learned Member hang on to the meaning? Suppose that the doctor appeals to the High Court judge against the decision of the tribunal and the High Court judge, in his wisdom or otherwise, decides that the man is to be restored to the list, and suppose that, a week afterwards, a child dies in circumstances clearly pointing to negligence by the doctor, and a Question is put on the Order Paper of the House of Commons to the Minister of Health; what would be the Minister's reply? It would be: "I did not appoint the doctor; it was the High Court judge." That would be an utterly absurd and ridiculous situation. It would be putting the judiciary in a relationship which the British constitution never intended. Let me develop the argument still further. As hon. Members will remember, in the Standing Committee I attached the greatest possible importance to this. The argument of hon. Members opposite has been that, as the State gets its hands more and more upon industry and more and more citizens become employees of the State, it is necessary that the citizens should be protected against the actions of the State. I entirely agree. But who is to protect them? The judiciary? [An HON. MEMBER: "Yes."] Then the hon. Member is trying to get the British judiciary into the absurd position of the American Supreme Court it would become supreme above the legislature. It would not only interpret the law, but select the instrument for the legislature.
§ Mr. Bevan
That is the absurdity into which hon. Members opposite have landed themselves because, as usual, they have followed the headlines of the newspapers and have not followed the principles of the case. There is far more in this. If hon. Members opposite argue that, the State having become entirely monopolistic in respect of the medical profession, the courts must therefore decide whether a person should be dismissed from this service, why do they not apply this to every private monopoly?
§ Mr. Bevan
They would not do it because in that case they would have to appoint over a thousand judges. Let me take any private monopoly in the country, the provincial newspapers, for example. If a person is dismissed from that monopoly, is it not a sentence of professional death? I have never heard hon. Members opposite suggest that no person should be dismissed from his employment for inefficiency unless he has the right of appeal to a High Court judge, nor did I see any signs of indignation on the part of hon. Members opposite that the miners should be arbitrarily dismissed. Why should not the miners have an appeal to a High Court judge? That is what I said upstairs when I talked about the judicial sabotage of Socialist legislation, and it is exactly what I meant. In other words, the courts of the land would become industrial tribunals arbitrating between employers and employees. That is the situation into which hon. Members opposite would lead us.
I warn hon. Members opposite that they will not receive thanks from the medical profession; the medical profession do not want this and they have not quarrelled so far with the procedure contained in this Bill for their protection. Indeed, it is far better than what they have now. I am bound to tell the House that it would be impossible for a Minister of the Crown to accept from the House of Commons responsibility for the efficiency of a service if all the employees in that service were able to appeal to the courts. Industrial discipline would entirely break down in such circumstances, and, therefore. I must resist the principle of appeal to the High Court and must insist upon the 1984 Amendment. I am bound to reject the absurd, false, and superficial principles lying behind the contention of hon. Members opposite.
§ Mr. Deputy-Speaker
I should inform the House that the next Amendment, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Carmarthen (Mr. Hopkin Morris)—in page 36, line 20, at the end, to insert:(4) Any person aggrieved by a direction of the Tribunal either under the preceding subsection or under Subsection (7) of this Section may within one month after the date on which notice is given to him by the Tribunal of their direction appeal against the direction in manner provided by Rules of Court to the High Court, and in any such appeal the High Court may make such order or give such direction in the matter as it thinks fit "—has not been selected, but it may be discussed at the same time as the present Amendment.
§ Mr. Hopkin Morris (Carmarthen)
I listened to the right hon. Gentleman discussing the defeat of his proposals with regard to the first part of this Clause, and while his claim that this was due to all-night Sittings was partly true, I feel that he should have gone further and have said that it was defeated because those of us who opposed this Clause were supported by Members of his own party.
§ Mr. Morris
That is true, but what the right hon. Gentleman did not say was that on the Amendment to insert the appeal to the High Court one thing was clearly demonstrated by the Minister himself—his influence, powerfully and firmly exercised. Fortunately, his name comes high in the alphabet so that he was one of the first to vote, and I think it was a good exercise in party discipline to hear him say "No" on that occasion in Committee, which at once brought to heel all the voters who supported the Amendment. I do not think they changed their minds. [HON. MEMBERS: "We will see."] Yes, we will see. I want to know in what way the Minister's arguments were directed to the Amendment. What does the Amendment seek to do? The right hon. Gentleman spoke about there first of all being an inquiry by the executive council. No inquiry on the part of the executive council is provided for in the Bill.
§ Mr. Morris
Whether they examine the matter or not, there is nothing in the Bill which in any way provides for anything in the nature of an inquiry or trial by the executive council. If the executive council thinks there should be a trial it must report the facts to the tribunal. The first stage of a trial is taken by the tribunal and not by the executive council. Let we show the importance of this point. The Minister spoke of an appeal from the executive council to the tribunal and then from the tribunal to the Minister. There are no such appeals. There is one appeal only; from the tribunal, as it stands, to the Minister. There is no appeal in any sense of the word from the executive council, which has held no proper inquiry. Therefore, there can be no appeal. There is merely a report of the facts from the executive council to the tribunal.
The first inquiry is before the tribunal. Suppose the tribunal decides that a doctor should be removed from either one list or a whole number of lists. The statement made by the right hon. Gentleman was that we are not dealing with doctors at large, from the standpoint of the General Medical Council, but from the point of view of the service. I agree, but is it to be doubted that it is a very serious professional matter to a doctor that his name should be removed from a list? What is the position? Suppose a doctor is dismissed. What is the right reserved to him? Is there anything wrong that that doctor should bring an action for wrongful dismissal before the High Court in the ordinary way?
The right hon. Gentleman said, perhaps rightly, that he is affording greater protection in the Bill than has hitherto been afforded or contemplated in these cases. That is really no defence. The practice has grown up in recent years of excluding the courts and reserving the right to Ministers alone. That has been a steadily growing practice, among all parties alike. As I listened to the right hon. Gentleman I thought he ought to be 1986 the last to defend the old Baconian position in this country. I should have thought that he would not defend that position. He represents a progressive side in the House, defending what? Something which is really a sixteenth century position in its modern form. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Oh, yes.
In the last resort the Minister is the employer. What will happen as a result of the Bill? Partly as the result of war legislation we have had, as we had before, a tendency among Government Departments to exclude the courts of law, with the result that the liberty of the subject is seriously affected. This is not merely a legal point but a matter of the right of the subject.
Let me give an instance of what I mean. I take the Military Service Act. A provision was made therein that a man could, if he chose, be a conscientious objector. Tribunals were set up to try the issue whether he was a genuine conscientious objector or not, but a provision in the Act made the final appeal that to the appeal tribunal and the courts were completely excluded. What was the result?
§ 9.15 p.m.
§ Mr. Morris
They were not lawyers in the appeal tribunal. In the original tribunal, yes. The result would not bear examination. There were a number of tribunals throughout the country, and the decisions of the tribunals on points of law varied considerably from one to another. There was no security that the law was interpreted in one part of the country as in another. As a result of that, it was a matter of luck what happened to the appellant before the appeal tribunal. If there had been an appeal to the courts on points of law, there would have been direction to the tribunals and the liberty of the subject would have been safeguarded. The right hon. Gentleman is running away on a false path when he says that it is putting the judiciary above Parliament. It does not. The powers of the judiciary would be given under this Bill. It is a great pity that the right hon. Gentleman could not see his way to accept this Amendment. It is not a question of whether a man 1987 should be restored, but of giving a direction. The issue before the High Court would be, if the doctor chooses, to determine whether he was wrongfully dismissed or not——
§ Mr. Morris
And are the right hon. Gentleman and his Department afraid to put that issue before the court?
§ Mr. Morris
That is the argument of the prerogative of the Executive. There was the old issue of the prerogative of the Crown——
§ Mr. Morris
That was the issue between Coke and Bacon. Now we are getting a new doctrine—the prerogative of the Executive. I hope the House will divide, and I hope to get some support in the interest of the freedom of the subject from the other side of the House, because it is of as much interest to hon. Members opposite as to hon. Members on this side.
§ Mr. Marlowe
The speech of the right hon. Gentleman discloses that divergence of approach to this problem which distinguishes those who are for and those who are against this Amendment. It is clear that we who are in favour of giving the appeal to a court, are looking at it as a disciplinary code, whereas the right hon. Gentleman is concerned only with administrative action. That is all that is actuating the right hon. Gentleman's mind. He is trying to think of the way in which he can facilitate the duties which he has to discharge under this Bill. But although he referred to the possibilities of sentence of professional death, he had no regard to the actualities involved in the action which he may take under this Bill. He fell back on the well-known political trick of destroying a case which was never made against him. The right hon. Gentleman said, "If we do this, what about the miners?" We said nothing 1988 about the miners, and there is no question of miners. Here we are dealing with doctors, who have been, to use the Minister's own words, put under sentence of professional death by the tribunal." What the right hon. Gentleman is doing is to deny them the right of appeal to a court of law. That, I well understand, is within the right hon. Gentleman's conception of the way in which things should be run in this country today.
§ Mr. Marlowe
Curiously enough, the right hon. Gentleman has just forestalled me. I was coming to that. It is perhaps interesting to follow the argument of the right hon. Gentleman to its logical conclusion. If one follows that up to the ease he put, which was that of a doctor who had been negligent, his appeal is allowed, and he continues in practice—of course, it is a well known trick of hon. Gentlemen opposite to fall back on the pathetic case of the child dying. But let him have his case. I am giving the right hon. Gentleman his case at its best. He asks, who would be responsible? He is saying that the Minister would be held responsible.
§ Mr. Marlowe
Under his own system, he would be held responsible. That is what I am putting to the right hon. Gentleman. On his own argument it will be his responsibility if the child dies. He pursued this argument by asking: "Who would have been responsible for the appointment of the doctor?" and he said, "Well, the court would have been responsible for the appointment of the doctor." That was the right hon. Gentleman's argument. Let me put to him the case of a man who is convicted of murder, who appeals to the court of criminal appeal, and whose appeal is allowed. Within a few days, perhaps, he goes out and commits another murder. On the right hon. Gentleman's argument the persons 1989 responsible for that murder are the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal. That is the logical consequence of the right hon. Gentleman's argument. That is the very case he made. He has said, if you let this man℄—
§ Mr. Marlowe
I have no idea what contracts of murder the right hon. Gentleman has entered into. I am trying to deal quite seriously with the argument he made, that if you let this man go to a court, it will be held responsible for the appointment. That is fairly summarising his case, and he put it on the basis that ii an appeal was allowed by a court, it would be the court, or the appellate jurisdiction, which appointed the doctor. That is the way he was putting it. I think it is not unfair to draw the parallel of a person convicted of murder in those circumstances going out and committing another murder. It is precisely the same argument. The right hon. Gentleman also said—and I take him up on this point—that under the Bill as it stands, doctors are being put in a better position than they are in now. That is not true. A recent case has shown that a doctor has been in the position to go to the High Court and get redress from a wrong decision of the first tribunal.
§ Mr. Bevan
If the hon. and learned Gentleman will permit me to say so, he ought not to confuse the two issues. In that case we have made a clear distinction —I do not know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman was in, but if he was in he should have followed it—between the disciplines of the General Medical Council over the doctor as a doctor—that is for unprofessional conduct—and the disciplines necessary over the service provided by the doctor within the service. Therefore, to raise the case he has mentioned, is obviously done with a view to importing prejudice into the case. It is no argument.
§ Mr. Marlowe
The right hon. Gentleman says there is a clear distinction. I dis- 1990 agree. I say there is not a clear distinction. The mere fact that I have been exciting the right hon. Gentleman to spring to his feet at least three or four times shows that he himself is not very happy about this Clause.
§ Mr. Bevan indicated dissent.
§ Mr. Marlowe
Perhaps, after that, the right hon. Gentleman will leave me alone to deal with him. It becomes more and more apparent, as the discussion on these matters goes forward, that the right hon. Gentleman has very little regard for the decision of a court of law. I fully appreciate that the ultimate intention of the right hon. Gentleman, not only in the matter of this Bill but probably in the whole of his policy, is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts altogether. I have no doubt that he is working in that direction in this Bill, It is not without significance to note that the right hon. Gentleman—perhaps in the hurry of the moment—when he asked whether it would be right to permit a person who had been before the tribunal, used the words, "to run away and appeal to the court." Let me tell the right hon. Gentleman that people who go to the courts of law in this country are not running away "at all, but are seeking redress in the courts provided for them. They are going to the proper tribunals provided for their protection. That very phrase disclosed the divergence of opinion between those of us who believe in the administration of justice through the courts of law, and those who, like the right hon. Gentleman, do not believe in the administration of justice in that way, but in administration by Government Department. That is what the right hon. Gentleman is doing by the Clause. He is denying the right of appeal to those who have been virtually convicted by a court. Why does the right hon. Gentleman do that? He does it, as he does everything in this Bill, because it is administratively convenient. I wish to take the opportunity of warning the House that it will be a very sad day for this country when the liberty of the subject is subject to administrative convenience.
§ Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester)
The hon. and learned Members for Brighton (Mr. Marlowe) and Carmarthen (Mr. Hopkin Morris) are both ornaments of 1991 their profession, but although they have introduced into this Debate an element of doubt about the liberty of the subject and the right of going to the law courts, I am perfectly sure they know very well that that is not involved in this issue at all. Under the Clause as it stands it depends purely on representations made by a certain body. Those representations are to go to the tribunal, and it is that tribunal which will hear the facts concerning the representations made. That is the vital point. The evidence as to the conduct of any doctor which will justify his removal, will be evidence of fact, and evidence of fact only, coming before that tribunal. The idea of introducing the right of appeal in cases of that kind is absolutely nugatory, and can only be done for the purpose of making lawsuits. The one thing that the court of appeal cannot do is to interfere with findings on fact. [Laughter.] The right hon. Gentleman cannot dismiss that by a guffaw. That is the actual position. No court of appeal will interfere with findings on facts derived from the evidence that has been given by witnesses before the tribunal. It is the tribunal that has the witnesses before it, not the court of appeal.
§ Mr. Marlowe
Is not the hon. and learned Member confusing an appeal from a county court with an appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal?
§ Mr. Speaker
It seems to me that we are getting into an interesting discussion between lawyers, but I suggest to the House that we should stick to the Amendment.
§ Mr. Turner-Samuels
With respect, Sir, may I say that the Amendment in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Carmarthen directs itself specifically to the question of an appeal to the High Court. Therefore, it is relevant to point out that no appeal to a High Court from a tribunal, on fact, will achieve the purpose the two hon. and learned Members have in mind. All I am saying is that no appeal court will, in those circumstances, reverse the findings of fact by a tribunal, and unless that power is conferred in all cases of appeal, then the appeal becomes otiose, and has nothing whatever to do with the liberty of the subject. In my submission, in a case of this kind, where 1992 the matter in issue is one of the conduct of a doctor, which is something known by the locality, and is represented to the tribunal in the locality, it must be obvious to anyone with commonsense that they are the proper body to deal with it.
§ 9.30 p.m.
§ Mr. Turner-Samuels
If there should be some doubt about the matter, then there can be an appeal to the Minister, who can look into the matter fully. If there is any question of law, he has his advisers, and the matter can be dealt with in that way. That is the practical direct way of dealing with this matter, and I suggest to the House that the Amendment should L e supported.
§ Mr. Linstead
I am sorry to have to repeat to the House an argument which I used upstairs in Committee, but it has not yet been put forward in this discussion, and it is worthy of consideration. If we accept, at its full strength, the argument which the Minister used, it will have been observed that he: based his case on rather airily abolishing the General Medical Council with a flourish of his hand. The time may come when the Minister will be in a position to do that but that time has not yet come. I seriously suggest that the difficulty in which the Minister will find himself is this: At the moment, he bases his case on the argument that one can differentiate between a professional offence, in respect of which the proper court is the General Medical Council, and an offence committed as a servant, in respect of which the proper court is the tribunal and other machinery provided under this Bill. I submit that it will be practically impossible, in 75 per cent. of the cases at any rate, to differentiate between these two.
Let us take a practical case that might very well arise. A doctor refuses to respond to a call to go out urgently to visit a patient. Is that a professional offence? I would say, "Certainly it is," and it is the sort of professional offence 1993 of which the General Medical Council have taken account time after time. But clearly it is also an offence in respect of the doctor's terms of service under this Act. It is idle for the Minister to say that in that sort of case one can easily differentiate as to the line of complaint to be followed. The patient may choose to complain to the local executive council, in which case by various stages the appeal finally goes, under the Bill as it now stands, to the Minister. But it is equally possible that the patient desiring to complain may choose to complain to the General Medical Council, in respect of what he regards as a professional offence, and what I am quite certain the General Medical Council would regard as a professional offence. Then, if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the General Medical Council, it is open to him to go to the High Court.
§ Mr. Linstead
With great respect, it is open to him. At any rate, there are a number of people who have succeeded in taking their appeal to the High Court. If hon. Members choose to take another Act, there is the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933, which provides disciplinary machinery for chemists, and quite clearly the appeal goes to the High Court which can re-hear a case. In the case of dentists, similarly, the appeal can go to the High Court. The case which I make in favour of this Amendment is that when y, have two channels of complaint, both equally available to the person who is making the complaint, one of them finishing in the High Court and the other in the Minister, we have a thoroughly unsatisfactory state of affairs. It is something which is quite out of balance and entirely dependent upon the choice of those two roads as to which is the final court of appeal. In those circumstances, I say the only tidy and just way of arranging the channel of complaint is to make those two roads lead to one place, namely, the High Court, so that ultimately whichever road happens to be chosen by the complainant, the result is the same and the case goes to the High Court for decision.
§ Dr. Morgan
I am very sorry indeed that I shall have to vote against the Government or abstain from voting on this issue if it goes to a Division. I do not want to do that because I want this Bill very badly. I agree with every aspect 1994 of the Bill except this issue. I know of nothing in the Labour Party policy—I have been a Member of the Labour Party and the Fabian Society since I went to university in Glasgow in 1904—which tells me that an aggrieved person tried by a lower court should not have the right of every citizen to appeal to the High Court with trained judges accustomed to the sifting and proper adjudication of evidence. This Clause gives the Minister, through his tribunal, power—[Interruption]. I do not know whether the doctor is sanguineous or not, but I do not like the particular term which the Minister used because it is a repartee which can be thrown to and fro. It is a boomerang. I do not want to refer to red blood corpuscles. This tribunal can decide whether a doctor should be excluded if he breaks his contract or if he does not give good national service. I agree that some doctors might not be doing their job on certain occasions, just in the same way as some Ministers. I have known some Ministers in the past who have not done their job. I know men in other professions who frequently break their contracts and do not seem to be doing their job properly.
Take the case of a doctor making two, three or four mistakes. Under this Clause that doctor, by the decision of the tribunal, will be excluded from the list in which he practices and also from any other list from which any executive council wishes to keep him. I suggest that in these cases the aggrieved person should be allowed to have the right, which every common citizen should have, of appealing to a higher court. It is only the aggrieved person who thinks he has a very good case who will appeal. He would he better off to go before an experienced judge accustomed to weighing evidence over a period of years. I think that where a man's professional livelihood is involved, no progressive Government should refuse that man the right of appeal against a decision which he feels is unjust. He appeals from the judgment of the tribunal, if the tribunal has decided that he has not the professional proficiency necessary in order to remain on any list in his district. [Interruption.] Well, he can go to the Minister, too. If I am wrong, I will sit down, but I have been attending to this Bill for a long time. I have devoted my life to the policy of the Labour Party with regard to this Health Bill. I have 1995 been doing it for a considerable number of years—even before the present Minister came into Parliament—and I think I have a right to speak on this subject. As the matter stands, with regard to an aggrieved doctor, a decision against whom has been made that he cannot remain on his list, or on any other list devised by the executive council, I am going to stand up for my principles, and say that that man, in my view, should have the right to appeal to a higher court.
§ Mr. Willink
It is obvious that this is an issue of first-class importance and one on which the Minister himself feels strongly. Indeed, it is the fact that, in the Committee, the argument appeared to go against him, with the result that the right hon. Gentleman was placed in a somewhat difficult position. In order to make clear what I understand the position to be, in contrast to the observations which the Minister has made, both in speeches and observations across the Floor of the House, may I say what I believe is the issue which we are discussing? This arises in respect of the disqualification of practitioners. I heard an observation thrown out that anybody can go to the courts. This is a question of the procedure under which practitioners may be disqualified, and the whole question will be——
§ Mr. Willink
It is so ambiguous. I say that I am using it in the meaning which it has in the Bill, and not in the sense of what is done by the General Medical Council. The right hon. Gentleman hardly has the right to interrupt me when I am using the word which he himself uses in his own Bill and in this very Clause. The marginal note to this Clause is:Disqualification of practitioners.and what is meant there is the prohibition of inclusion either in a particular list of doctors or of any list of doctors in the 1996 general medical service. The question we are discussing is what is to be the procedure when a medical practitioner, who has undertaken to provide a general medical service—I again use the wording of the Bill—has a complaint made against him with regard to that undertaking and the performance of those services. On the previous Amendment, the Minister told us that any such medical practitioner, before he could be disqualified in that sense, would be entitled to notice of the charges made against him—charges of omission or commission.
May I now interpose an observation or two about the most fallacious and erroneous remarks made by the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels)? We are here considering an Amendment by the right hon. Gentleman introducing an appeal, and the hon. and learned Gentleman thought it right to rise, on his responsibility, no doubt, both as a Member of this House and as one of His Majesty's Counsel, and tell the House that any right of appeal was perfectly nugatory or otiose, and that on the Minister's Amendment to introduce an appeal. It was apparently intended to be an argument—that is the only sense I can give it, though it is not much sense—that an appeal to the Minister would be useful, but that an appeal to the court would be useless.
§ Mr. Turner-Samuels
The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows very well that it was nothing of the sort. I was talking to the proposed Amendment in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Carmarthen (Mr. Hopkin Morris) and was not referring in any way to the proposed appeal to the Minister. Indeed, I made it one of my arguments that there was an appeal to the Minister, and the right hon. and learned Member for North Croydon (Mr. Willink) must have heard me say so.
§ Mr. Willink
I think the Minister must be more and more confused because the whole question is whether there will be an appeal to the Minister. The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester says that there is one already, but I would comment on his observation that the Court of Appeal cannot interfere with a decision of fact. I do not think there is another member of the legal profession who would make such an astounding observation. Another 1997 observation was that these appeals would be delightfully local—where there would, no doubt, be local prejudice. That is entirely erroneous. There is no provision that hearings shall be local; there is one central tribunal and no provision for it to go on circuit.
I did not know that hon. Gentlemen opposite disliked novel situations. They are here creating a novel situation with regard to the whole of this profession, and the question we are considering is what are to be the rights of general practitioners who, some hon. Gentlemen opposite hope, will attend as soon as possible to 100 per cent. of the population to the exclusion of private practice to the maximum possible extent. In what circumstances and by what machinery are they to be taken off any or every list? How can the proceedings arise? Any person may make representations to the tribunal, which will consist of one lawyer, barrister or solicitor in the chair, one person selected by the Minister, and one professional gentleman out of a panel of professional people. That tribunal may make a grievous mistake with regard to the evidence and may order that a medical practitioner shall no longer appear on any list in the whole country. What are to be that practitioner's rights in those circumstances?
We say that when procedure of that sort is adopted, with a court of first instance which is two-thirds non-legal and untrained in the law of evidence, there ought to be an appeal to a court of law. How is the Minister going to hear those appeals? [HON. MEMBERS: "Where is he now?"] He has gone away while we are discussing this important point. The Minister quite rightly said that, in a sense, we are discussing on this Amendment what we were discussing on the last Amendment. He did not complain of that fact, and, consequently, we are discussing a matter concerning issues which will come before such a tribunal and the apellant tribunal, whatever it may be—the Minister or the judge—and those are now going to be issues of fact.
They are going to be issues, not whether the Minister dislikes the doctor, nor whether he has the wrong political views, but whether, in fact, he has been guilty of omissions or commissions in breach of his undertaking to render general medical service. What is the first objection of the Minister? The Minister says, "These doctors are the instruments of this service, 1998 and I cannot take responsibility for there remaining in the service doctors whom the High Court judge has decided have not been guilty of any breach of their undertakings." Let me expose the extraordinary character of that argument, because the Minister is prepared to keep as instruments in his service doctors of whom that has been found by the Tribunal. The Minister himself cannot launch an appeal to himself from the Tribunal. If the Tribunal has dismissed the charges the Minister has to keep the doctor, hut he says he is not willing to keep the doctor if the doctor is acquitted by a High Court judge. Was there ever such an amazing argument? How ridiculous becomes this fanciful story of the poor little child who dies a fortnight after the doctor has been acquitted of the charges that have been made against him.
Then the Minister went on to say that a High Court judge could not decide the issue. Those were his words. The right hon. Gentleman said, there being substantial charges made against the doctor, a High Court judge could not decide the issue whether the doctor had failed to give the service which he had promised to give, but that the Tribunal could so decide. The issue is exactly the same for each, and it amazed me to hear the Minister say that this tribunal could decide the issue, but that the High Court judge could not. I simply could not believe my ears when I heard that observation.
§ Mr. Willink
I can still hardly believe my ears when I hear that interruption. The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that nothing that I did proceeded beyond the stage of a White Paper which described itself as an outline of the service. Matters of procedure of this kind, of course, had not been considered in detail; and, if I had not ever thought of an appeal to a tribunal, is that a relevant matter when we are discussing what the appeal should be in this Bill? A more irrelevant observation or interruption I have never heard.
May I now go on to the Minister's next-point? The Minister said that if there was 1999 an appeal to the High Court judge from this tribunal, that would mean that the judiciary was overriding the Legislature. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Carmarthen (Mr. Morris) answered that point most satisfactorily. The true position is that Parliament, in enacting statutes, should not make provisions which will allow the Executive to get rid of its instruments, when getting rid of them will bring ruin upon them. It is the responsibility of Parliament to Ensure that the judiciary in the future, as in the past, should control the Executive in proper cases. My definition of "proper cases" for present purposes would be "in all cases where there is a justiciable issue "—namely, an issue of fact triable by a tribunal. I was also surprised that the Minister, some of whose phrases we
§ admire, repeated a phrase that he used in the course of the Committee stage—a phrase which I thought he would like to forget—namely, that this would be judicial sabotage of Socialist legislation. The whole question here is, there being an issue whether or not a doctor has fulfilled his contract, which issue has been brought before a tribunal, two-thirds of which is lay and untrained, either by an executive council or any other person, whether that doctor is to have a right of appeal to the court or merely to somebody appointed by the Minister, for all we know equally untrained. We say that it is wrong, and we shall divide on this Amendment.
§ Question put, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill."
§ The House divided: Ayes, 296; Noes, 129.2003
|Division No. 269.]||AYES.||[9.56 p.m.|
|Adams, Richard (Balham)||Corbet, Mrs. F. K. (Camb'well, N.W.)||Greenwood, Rt. Hon. A. (Wakefield)|
|Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)||Corlett, Dr. J.||Greenwood, A. W. J. (Heywood)|
|Allighan, Garry||Corvedale, Viscount||Grenfell, D. R.|
|Alpass, J. H.||Crawley, A.||Grey, C. F.|
|Anderson, A (Motherwell)||Crossman, R. H. S.||Grierson, E.|
|Anderson, F. (Whitehaven)||Daggar, G.||Griffiths, D. (Rother Valley)|
|Attewell, H. C.||Daines, P.||Griffiths, Rt. Hon. J. (Llanelly)|
|Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.||Davies, Ernest (Enfield)||Griffiths, W. D. (Moss Side)|
|Austin, H. L.||Davies, Harold (Leek)||Guest, Dr. L. Haden|
|Awbery, S. S.||Davies, Haydn (St. Pancras, S.W.)||Gunter, Capt, R. J.|
|Ayles, W. H.||Davies, R. J. (Westhoughton)||Guy, W. H.|
|Ayrton Gould, Mrs. B.||Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)||Haire, Flt.-Lieut. J (Wycombe)|
|Bacon, Miss A.||Deer, G.||Hale, Leslie|
|Baird, Capt. J.||Delargy, Captain H. J.||Hardy, E. A.|
|Balfour, A.||Diamond J.||Harrison, J.|
|Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J.||Dobbie, W.||Hastings, Dr. Somerville|
|Barstow, P. G.||Dodds, M. N.||Haworth, J.|
|Barton, C.||Donovan. T.||Henderson, A. (Kingswinford)|
|Battley, J. R.||Driberg, T. E. N.||Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick)|
|Bechervaise, A. E.||Dugdale, J. (W. Bromwich)||Harbison, Miss M.|
|Berry, H.||Dumpleton, C. W.||Hewitson, Capt. M.|
|Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)||Durbin, E. F. M.||Hobson, C. R.|
|Bing, G. H. C.||Dye, S,||Holman, P.|
|Blackburn, A. R.||Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.||Holmes, H. E. (Hemsworth)|
|Blyton, W. R.||Edwards, Rt. Hon. Sir C. (Bedwellty)||Horabin, T. L.|
|Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton)||Edwards, John (Blackburn)||House, G.|
|Braddock, Mrs. E. M. (L'p'l, Exch'ge)||Edwards. N. (Caerphilly)||Hoy, J.|
|Braddock, T. (Mitcham)||Edwards. W. J. (Whitechapel)||Hubbard, T.|
|Brook, D. (Halifax)||Evans, John (Ogmore)||Hudson, J. H. (Ealing, W.)|
|Brooks, T. J. (Rothwell)||Evans, S. N. (Wednesbury)||Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)|
|Brown, George (Belper)||Ewart, R.||Hughes, H. D. (W'lverh'plon, W.)|
|Brown, T. J. (Ince)||Fairburst F.||Hutchinson, H. L. (Rusholme)|
|Bruce, Maj. D. W. T.||Farthing, W. J.||Hynd, H. (Hackney, C.)|
|Buchanan, G.||Fletcher, E. G. M. (Islington, E.)||Irving, W. J-|
|Burden, T. W.||Follick, M.||Janner, B.|
|Burke, W. A.||Foot, M M.||Jeger, G. (Winchester)|
|Butler, H. W (Hackney, S.)||Forman, J. C.||Jeger, Dr. S. W. (St. Pancras, S.E.)|
|Callaghan, James||Foster, W (Wigan)||John, W.|
|Chamberlain, R. A.||Fraser, T. (Hamilton)||Jones, D. T. (Hartlepools)|
|Champion. A. J.||Freeman Maj. J. (Watford)||Jones, J. H. (Bolton)|
|Chater, D.||Freeman Peter (Newport)||Jones, P. Asterley (Hitchin)|
|Chetwynd, Capt. G. R,||Gaitskell H. T. N.||Keenan, W.|
|Cluse, W. S.||Ganley, Mrs. C. S.||Kendall, W. D.|
|Cobb, F. A.||Gibbins, J.||Kenyan, C.|
|Cocks, F. S.||Gibson, C. W.||Key, C. W.|
|Collick, P.||Gilzean, A.||King, E. M.|
|Collindridge, F.||Glanville J. E. (Consett)||Kinghorn, Sqn.-Ldr. E.|
|Collins, V. J.||Gooch, E. G.||Kinley, J.|
|Comyns, Dr. L.||Goodrich, H. E.||Kirby, B. Y.|
|Cook, T. F.||Gordon-Walker, P. C.||Kirkwood, D|
|Lang, G.||Orbach, M.||Stross, Dr. B.|
|Lavers, S.||Paget, R. T.||Stubbs, A. E.|
|Lawson, Rt. Hon. J. J.||Paling, Rt. Hon. Wilfred (Wentworth)||Summerskill, Dr. Edith|
|Lee, F. (Hulme)||Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)||Swingler, S.|
|Lee, Miss J. (Cannock)||Palmer, A. M. F.||Taylor, H. B. (Mansfield)|
|Levy, B. W||Pargiter, G. A.||Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)|
|Lewis, A. W. J. (Upton)||Parker, J.||Taylor, Dr. S. (Barnet)|
|Lewis, J. (Bolton)||Parkin, B. T.||Thomas, Ivor (Keighley)|
|Lewis, T. (Southampton)||Paton, Mrs. F. (Rushcliffe)||Thomas, I. O. (Wrekin)|
|Lindgren, G. S.||Paton, J. (Norwich)||Thorneycroft, Harry (Clayton)|
|Logan, D. G.||Pearson, A.||Timmons, J.|
|McAdam, W.||Peart, Capt. T. F.||Titterington, M. F.|
|McAllister, G.||Perrins, W.||Tolley, L.|
|McEntee, V. La T.||Platts-Milts, J. F. F.||Tomhnson, Rt. Hon. G.|
|McGhee, H. G.||Poole, Major Cecil (Lichfield)||Turner-Samuels, M.|
|McGovern, J.||Popplewell, E.||Ungoed-Thomas, L.|
|Mack, J. D.||Portor, E. (Warrington)||Usborne, Henry|
|McKay, J. (Wallsend)||Porter, G. (Leeds)||Vernon, Maj. W. F.|
|Mackay, R. W. G. (Hull. N.W.)||Price, M. Philips||Viant, S. P.|
|Maclean, N, (Govan)||Pritt, D. N||Walkden, E.|
|McLeavy, F.||Pryde, D. J.||Walker, G. H|
|MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)||Pursey, Cmdr. H.||Wallace, G. D. (Chislehurst)|
|Macpherson T. (Romford)||Randall, H. E.||Wallace, H. W. (Walthamstow, E.)|
|Mamwaring, W. H.||Ranger, J.||Warbey, W. N.|
|Mallalieu, J P W.||Rankin, J.||Walkins, T. E.|
|Mann, Mrs. J.||Rees-Williams, D. R.||Watson, W. M.|
|Manning, C. (Camberwell, N.)||Reeves, J.||Weitzman, D.|
|Manning, Mrs. L. (Epping)||Reid, T. (Swindon)||Wells, P. L. (Faversham)|
|Marquand, H. A.||Rhodes, H.||Wells, W. T. (Walsall)|
|Marshall F. (Brightside)||Richards, R.||Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.|
|Mathers, G.||Ridealgh, Mrs. M.||Wigg, Colonel G. E.|
|Mayhew, C. P.||Robens, A.||Wilcock, Group-Capt. C. A. B.|
|Medland, H. M.||Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire)||Wilkes, L.|
|Messer, F.||Robertson, J. J. (Berwick)||Willey, F. T. (Sunderland)|
|Mikardo, Ian||Sargood, R.||Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)|
|Millington, Wing-Comdr. E. R.||Scott-Elliot, W.||Williams, J. L. (Kelvingrove)|
|Monslow, W.||Shackleton, Wing-Cdr. E. A. A.||Williamson, T.|
|Moody, A. S.||Sharp, Lt.-Col. G. M.||Willis, E.|
|Morley, R.||Shawcross, C. N. (Widnes)||Wills, Mrs. E. A.|
|Morris, P. (Swansea, W.)||Shurmer, P.||Wilson, J. H.|
|Mort, D. L.||Simmons, C. J.||Wise, Major F. J.|
|Murray, J. D.||Skinnard. F. W.||Woodburn, A|
|Nally, W.||Smith, C. (Colchester)||Woods, G. S.|
|Naylor, T. E,||Smith, Ellis (Stoke)||Wyatt, Maj. VI.|
|Neal, H. (Claycross)||Smith, S. H. (Hull, S.W.)||Yates, V. F.|
|Nichol, Mrs. M. E. (Bradford, N.)||Smith, T. (Normanton)||Zilliacus, K.|
|Nicholls. H. R. (Stratford)||Snow, Capt. J. W|
|Noel-Buxton, Lady||Sorensen, R. W.||TELLERS FOR THE AYES:|
|O'Brien, T.||Sparks, J. A.||Captain Michael Stewart and|
|Oldfield, W. H.||Stamford, W.||Mr. Hannan.|
|Baldwin, A. E.||Glyn, Sir R.||Maclay, Hon. J. S.|
|Barlow, Sir J.||Gomme-Duncan, Col. A. G.||Maclean, Brig. F. H. R. (Lancaster)|
|Beamish, Maj. T. V. H.||Grimston, R. V.||MacLeod, Capt. J.|
|Beechman, N. A.||Hannon, Sir P. (Moseley)||Macpherson, Maj. N. (Dumfries)|
|Boles, Lt.-Col. D. C. (Wells)||Hare, Hn. J. H. (Woodb'ge)||Maitland, Comdr. J. W.|
|Bossom, A. C.||Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir C||Manningham-Buller, R. E.|
|Bowen, R.||Henderson, John (Cathcart)||Marlowe, A. A. H.|
|Bower, N.||Hinchingbrooke, Viscount||Marples, A. E.|
|Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.||Hogg, Hon. Q.||Marshall, D. (Bodmin)|
|Byers, Lt.-Col. F.||Holmes, Sir J. Stanley (Harwich)||Marshall, S. H. (Sutton)|
|Carson, E.||Hope, Lord J.||Medlicott, F.|
|Challen, C.||Howard, Hon. A,||Mellor Sir J.|
|Clarke, Col. R. S.||Hutchison, Lt.-Cm. Clark (E'b'rgh W.)||Molson, A H E.|
|Clifton-Brown, Lt.-Col. G.||Hutchison, Col. J. R. (Glasgow, C.)||Morris, Hopkin (Carmarthen)|
|Corbett, Lieut.-Col. U. (Ludlow)||Jarvis, Sir J.||Morris-Jones, Sir H.|
|Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F C.||Jeffreys, General Sir G.||Morrison, Rt. Hn. W. S. (Cirencester)|
|Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.||Jennings, R.||Mullan, Lieut. C. H.|
|Crowder, Capt. John E.||Keeling, E. H.||Neven-Spence, Sir B|
|Cuthbert, W. N.||Kerr, Sir J. Graham||Orr-Ewing, I. L.|
|Davidson, Viscountess||Lambert, Hon. G.||Osborne, C.|
|Davies, Clement (Montgomery)||Langford-Holt, J.||Peto, Brig. C. H. M|
|Dodds-Parker, A. D.||Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.||Pickthorn, K.|
|Dower, Lt.-Col. A. V. G. (Penrith)||Lennox-Boyd, A. T.||Poole, O. B. S. (Oswestry)|
|Dower, E. L. G. (Caithness)||Lindsay, K. M. (Comb'd Eng. Univ.)||Prescott, Stanley|
|Drayson, Capt. G. B.||Linstead, H. N.||Prior-Palmer, Brig. O.|
|Fleming, Sqn-Ldr. E. L||Lipson, D. L.||Raikes, H. V.|
|Fox, Sqn.-Ldr. Sir G||Lloyd, Maj. Guy (Renfrew, E.)||Reid, Rt. Hon. J. S. C. (Hillhead)|
|Fraser, Maj. H. C. P. (Stone)||Lloyd, Selwyn (Wirral)||Roberts, Emrys (Merioneth)|
|Gage, C.||Lucas-Tooth, Sir H.||Roberts, Maj. P. G. (Ecclesall)|
|Galbraith, Cmdr. T. D.||MacDonald Sir M. (Inverness)||Roberts, W. (Cumberland, N.)|
|George, Lady M. Lloyd (Anglesey)||Mackeson, Brig. H. R.||Robinson, Wing-Comdr. Roland|
|Glossop, C. W. H.||McKie, J. H. (Galloway)||Sanderson, Sir F.|
|Scott, Lard W.||Sutcliffe, H.||White, Sir D. (Fareham)|
|Shephard, S (Newark)||Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)||White, J. B. (Canterbury)|
|Shepherd, W. S. (Bucklow)||Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (P'dd'tn, S.)||Williams, C. (Torquay)|
|Smiles, Lt.-Col. Sir W.||Teeling, William||Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)|
|Smith, E. P. (Ashford)||Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.||Willink, Rt. Hon. H. U.|
|Smithers, Sir W||Thorp, Lt.-Col. R. A. F.||Willoughby de Eresby, Lord|
|Snadden, W M.||Turton, R. H.||Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl|
|Spearman, A. C. M.||Vane, W. M. F.||York, C|
|Spence, H. R.||Wadsworth, G.||Young, Sir A. S. L. (Partick)|
|Strauss, H. G. (English Universities)||Wakefield, Sir W. W|
|Stuart, Rt. Hon. J. (Moray)||Ward, Hon. G. R.||TELLERS FOR THE NOES:|
|Studholme, H. G.||Wheatley, Colonel M. J||Commander Agnew and|
Question put, and agreed to.
§ Amendment agreed to.
§ Further Amendment made: In page 38, line 5, after "Tribunal," insert "or the Minister."—[Mr. Key.]