Mr. J. P. L. Thomas(by Private Notice) asked the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty whether his attention has been drawn to a recent statement in the official Russian journal "Red Fleet" concerning a British convoy to Archangel in June, 1942, and whether he has any statement to make.
§ The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. John Dugdale)Yes, Sir. My noble Friend has read the account published in "The Times" with considerable feeling. This account appears to impugn, not merely the naval tactics of the convoy, but also the courage of the British and American seamen who took part in it. I think Members will wish to have the facts as to the convoy in question and the Admiralty has prepared an account, which also deals with the particular charges made in the" Red Fleet" article; as this account is 1778 somewhat long, I will, with the permission of the House, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I would add that, as the responsibility for organisation and protection of the Northern convoys was undertaken by the Admiralty, since our Russian Allies had not the means to carry out this task themselves, the conclusions reached by the Admiralty as to the conduct of these operations should be accepted as authoritative. This particular convoy, carried out in the most critical period of the war at sea, was admittedly one of the least fortunate Not all operations of war are successful, but we have a right to expect that the efforts of the Royal Navy in the common cause should not be decried. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear. hear."]
I think it right to remind the House once again what were in fact the achievements of our Northern convoys Between 1941 and 1945, 75 convoys crossed the Northern seas to and from Russia. In these, £308 million worth of military equipment and £120 million worth or other material was sent from Britain to Russia. The equipment included over 5,000 tanks, over 7,000 aircraft, and more than 450 million rounds of ammunition. All of these were in addition to the great quantities of material delivered on American account. Over the whole period 92.6 per cent. of the material despatched was safely delivered to the Soviet Government.
In all, 40 convoys were run to Russia during the war, some without loss, and some, like this one, at a very considerable cost, but the work was never interrupted. As M. Maisky said:
The Russian convoys are a Northern Saga of heroism, bravery, and endurance. This Saga will live for ever, not only in the hearts of your people, but also in the hearts of the Soviet people, who rightly see in it one of the most striking expression of collaboration between the Allied Governments, without which our common victory would have been impossible.
Mr. ThomasMay I thank the hon. Gentleman and ask him if he will take steps to see that his answer receives the greatest possible publicity, not only in the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy, but among those thousands of men who are now demobilised from these Services, so that they may have the reply to the "Red Fleet," in this monstrous attack upon their courage?
§ Mr. DugdaleCertainly, Sir. I hope the answer will receive the maximum possible publicity in this country; also, I hope that the editor of the "Red Fleet" will give it as much publicity as he gave the original statement.
§ Captain MarsdenWill the Minister add to his statement the number of British men from the Navy, Air Force and Merchant Navy who lost their lives in taking these much-needed supplies to our hard-pressed Ally, Russia?
§ Mr. ChurchillAnd also, in that account, will the Minister give the number of men who lost their hands and feet through frostbite and who are in a frightful condition of deprivation for the rest of their lives?
§ Mr. DugdaleYes, Sir. I think it may be of interest to the House to know that our shipping losses included 57 ships sunk out of the 755 that sailed, and many men were lost in them.
§ Air-Commodore HarveyWill the hon. Gentleman consider broadcasting the details of this statement, so that it shall be made known all over the world and not only in this country?
§ Mr. DugdaleCertainly.
§ Mr. ThurtleHas my hon. Friend any hope that this statement which he has just made to the House in vindication of the honour of British seamen, is likely to get wide publicity in Russia?
§ Mr. DugdaleThat is a question which, quite obviously, I am not competent to answer. I can only say that I hope it will.
§ Following is the Account referred to in the answer:
§ Over a period of 3½ years the operations of sending supplies to Russia by sea through Arctic waters, bordered on one side by ice and the other by an enemy controlled coastline, can only be described as outstandingly successful. Out of 775 ships laden with supplies for Russia which sailed in one or other of the many convoys, 718 or 92.6 per cent. arrived safely. This, in spite of the fact that enemy submarines, shore based aircraft and surface ships could, and did, attack at almost any point along the 2,000 miles of route and our own ships were operating at long distances from their bases. Ice was always a hazard, and during many months of 1780 the year so restricted the sea room that diversion to evade or mislead the enemy was virtually impossible; the enemy must know our route within narrow limits, and the convoy had to be fought through.
§ The particular convoy of 37 ships was run in especially hazardous conditions since extended daylight at this time of year favoured attack by surface forces, and the Germans had four heavy units available in their Northern bases. Nevertheless, the importance of getting war supplies through to our Allies was held to justify the risk, and in any event there was a returning convoy to be brought home at the same time. Like every other convoy, this one had to pass through waters where enemy submarines were known to be in wait and aircraft on reconnaissance. The Admiralty fully realised these dangers, and in this operation the escort, which included cruisers, was stronger than on any previous occasion, and the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, was at sea with a supporting force which included in its responsibility the safety of the home-bound convoy. In its early stages attacks by aircraft and submarine were successfully fought off with only regligible casualties, but when the Eastbound convoy was south of Spitz-bergen these attacks were intensified and certain ships were disabled. Further, reconnaissance which had been hampered by weather conditions, now reported that the enemy heavy units had left their bases, and attack on one or both the convoys by these ships became reasonably certain.
§ It would have been inviting disaster to deprive the main portion of the convoy of its escorts to "stand by" the disabled ships or to desert the ships, leaving their crews to the mercy of the Arctic. The only course, therefore, was to take off the crews and sink the ships. For several hours, the Eastbound convoy proceeded on its way, but when it had reached a position due North of the North Cape an attack by enemy surface ships seemed imminent. By this time, the convoy was too far to the Eastward for the Commander-in-Chief's supporting force to give it close support, so the Admiralty ordered the convoy to scatter on the night of July 4th, and the cruisers and destroyers to withdraw in order to form a balanced striking force to divert the enemy. This is the recognised form of defence in such extreme circumstances.
1781§ In the event, the action of the escort and the scattering of the convoy achieved its primary object, and the enemy heavy ships withdrew, and thereby the convoy avoided annihilation. Subsequently, the "Tirpitz" and "Scheer" were reported at sea by a Russian submarine which attacked and later this report was confirmed by reconnaissance and by one of our own submarines, with the "Hipper" added to the force, but the withdrawal cannot be attributed to damage sustained in the attack by the Russian submarine since no damage was inflicted. Unfortunately, although the convoy avoided annihilation, it suffered severely, almost as severely as some of the convoys which were fought through to Malta.