§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. James Stuart.]
§ 11.8 a.m.
§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill)The present stage of the war is dour and hard, and the fighting must be expected on all fronts to increase in scale and in intensity. We believe that we are in the last lap, but this is a race in which failure to exert the fullest effort to the end may protract that end to periods almost unendurable to those who now have the race in their hands after struggling so far. The enemy has two hopes. The first is that by lengthening the struggle he may wear down our resolution; the second, and more important, hope is that division will arise between the three great Powers by whom he is assailed, and whose continued union spells his doom. His hope is that there will be some rift in this alliance; that the Russians may go this way, the British and Americans that; that quarrels may arise about the Balkans or the Baltic, about Poland or Hungary, which he hopes will impair the union of our councils and, consequently, the symmetry and momentum of our converging advance. There is the enemy's great hope. It is to deprive that hope of all foundation and reality that our efforts must ceaselessly be bent.
You would not expect three great Powers, so differently circumstanced as Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia, not to have many different views about the treatment of the various and numerous countries into which their victorious arms have carried them. The marvel is that all has hitherto been kept so solid, sure and sound between us all. But this process does not arise of itself. It needs constant care and attention. Moreover, there are those problems of distance, occasion and personalities which I have so often mentioned to the House, and which make it extremely difficult to bring the heads of the three principal Allies together in one place at one time. I have, therefore, not hesitated to travel 491 from court to court like a wandering minstrel, always with the same song to sing—or the same set of songs.
The meeting at Moscow was the sequel to Quebec. At Quebec the President and I felt very much the absence of Russia. At Moscow Marshal Stalin and I were deeply conscious that the President was not with us, although in this case the American observer, Mr. Averell Harriman, the accomplished Ambassador of the United States, made us feel at all times the presence of the great Republic. There was a special reason for our dual conference at Quebec. The British and American Fighting Forces are intermingled in the lines of battle as the fighting men of two countries have never been intermingled before. Fighting men have never before mingled so closely and so easily. We must meet; we must discuss.
As to Russia, Great Britain has many problems in Eastern Europe to solve in common with Russia, and practical issues arise on all these from day to day. We must disperse misunderstandings and forestall them before they occur. We must have practical policies to deal with day to day emergencies, and, of course, we must carry with us at every stage the Government of the United States. I am satisfied that the results achieved on this occasion at Moscow have been highly satisfactory. But I am quite sure that no final result can be attained until the heads of the three Governments have met again together, as I earnestly trust they may do before this year is at its end. After all, the future of the world depends upon the united action in the next few years of our three countries. Other countries may be associated, but the future depends upon the union of the three most powerful Allies. If that fails, all fails: if that succeeds, a broad future for all nations may be assured. I am very glad to inform the House that our relations with Soviet Russia were never more close, intimate and cordial than they are at the present time. Never before have we been able to reach so high a degree of frank and friendly discussions of the most delicate and often potentially vexatious topics as we have done at this meeting from which I have returned, and about which I thought it would be only respectful to the House to make some short statement.
492 Where we could not agree, we understood the grounds for each other's disagreement and each other's point of view, but, over a very wide area, an astonishingly wide area considering all the different angles from which we approached these topics, we found ourselves in full agreement. Of course, it goes without saying that we were united in prosecuting the war against Hitlerite Germany to absolute victory, and in using the last and every resource of our strength and energy in combination for that purpose. Let all hope die in German breasts that there will be the slightest division or weakening among the forces which are closing in upon them, and will crush the life out of their resistance.
Upon the tangled question of the Balkans, where there are Black Sea interests and Mediterranean interests to be considered, we were able to reach complete agreement. I do not feel that there is any immediate danger of our combined war effort being weakened by divergences of policy or of doctrine in Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and, beyond the Balkans, Hungary. We have reached a very good working agreement about all these countries, singly and in combination, with the object of concentrating all their efforts, and concerting them with ours against the common foe, and of providing, as far as possible, for a peaceful settlement after the war is over. We are, in fact, acting jointly, Russia and Britain, in our relations with both the Royal Yugoslav Government headed by Dr. Subasic and with Marshal Tito, and we have invited them to come together for the common cause, as they had already agreed to do at the conference which I held with them both at Naples. How much better that there should be a joint Anglo-Russian policy in this disturbed and very complex area, than that one side should be backing one set of ideas, and the other the opposite. That is a most pernicious state of affairs to grow up in any country, as it may easily spread to corresponding differences between the great Powers themselves.
Our earnest hope and bounden duty is so to conduct our policy that these small countries do not slip from the great war effort into internal feuds of extreme bitterness. We have, as I say, invited them to come together to form a united Government for the purpose of carrying on the war until the country itself can 493 pronounce. All this is, of course, only a guide for the handling of matters from day to day, but it is so much easier to enter into arrangements by conversation than by telegram and diplomatic correspondence, however carefully phrased and however lengthily expressed, or however patiently the discussions may be conducted. Face to face, difficulties which appear really insuperable at a distance are very often removed altogether from our path. But these workaday arrangements must be looked upon as a temporary expedient to meet the emergency, and all permanent arrangements await the presence of the United States, who have been kept constantly informed of what was going forward. Everything will eventually come to review at some future conference, or at an armistice or peace table.
There were, of course, a good many serious military questions discussed. I had with me the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Ismay and other officers acquainted with the conduct of the whole of our military affairs and strategy, and we also had the advantage of the assistance, not only of the American Ambassador, but of the very able United States technical representative, General Deane. All these discussions were part of the process of carrying out and following up the great decisions taken nearly a year ago at Teheran, which, I think, without exaggeration may be said to have altered the face of the world war. But, naturally, I could not say anything about these discussions or decisions, except that I found them very good, and, indeed, the best that could be devised to lift the cruel scourge of war from Europe at the earliest possible moment.
The most urgent and burning question was of course that of Poland, and, here again, I speak words of hope, of hope reinforced by confidence. To abandon hope in this matter would, indeed, be to surrender to despair. In this sphere there are two crucial issues. The first is the question of the Eastern frontier of Poland with Russia and the Curzon Line, as it is called, and the new territories to be added to Poland in the North and in the West. That is the first issue. The second is the relation of the Polish Government with the Lublin National Liberation Committee. On these two points, apart from many subsidiary and ancillary points, we held a 494 series of conferences with both parties. We saw them together and we saw them separately, and, of course, we were in constant discussion with the heads of the Soviet Government. I had several very long talks with Marshal Stalin, and the Foreign Secretary was every day working on these and cognate matters with Monsieur Molotov. Two or three times we all four met together without anyone else but the interpreters being present.
I wish I could tell the House that we had reached a solution of these problems. It is certainly not for want of trying. I am quite sure however, that we have got a great deal nearer to the solution of both. I hope Monsieur Mikolajczyk will soon return to Moscow, and it will be a great disappointment to all the sincere friends of Poland, if a good arrangement cannot be made which will enable him to form a Polish Government on Polish soil—a Government recognised by all the great Powers concerned, and indeed by all those Governments of the United Nations which now recognise only the Polish Government in London. Although I do not underrate the difficulties which remain, it is a comfort to feel that Britain and Soviet Russia, and I do not doubt the United States, are all firmly agreed in the re-creation of a strong, free, independent, sovereign Poland loyal to the Allies and friendly to her great neighbour and liberator, Russia. Speaking more particularly for His Majesty's Government it is our persevering and constant aim that the Polish people, after their suffering and vicissitudes, shall find in Europe an abiding home and resting place, which, though it may not entirely coincide or correspond with the pre-war frontiers of Poland, will, nevertheless, be adequate for the needs of the Polish nation and not inferior in character and quality, taking the picture as a whole, to what they previously possessed.
These are critical days and it would be a great pity if time were wasted in indecision or in protracted negotiation. If the Polish Government had taken the advice we tended them at the beginning of this year, the additional complication produced by the formation of the Polish National Committee of Liberation at Lublin would not have arisen, and anything like a prolonged delay in the settlement can only have the effect of increasing the division between Poles in Poland 495 and also of hampering the common action which the Poles, the Russians and the rest of the Allies are taking against Germany. Therefore, as I say, I hope that no time will be lost in continuing these discussions and pressing them to an effective conclusion.
I told the House on 28th September of my hope that the re-organisation of the French Consultative Assembly on a more representative basis would make it possible for His Majesty's Government, at an early date, to recognise the then French Administration as the Provisional Government of France. The Assembly has now, in fact, been enlarged and strengthened by the addition of many fresh representatives of both the resistance organisations in France, and the old Parliamentary groups. It constitutes as representative a body as it is possible to bring together in the difficult circumstances obtaining to-day in France, and it will be holding its first session in Paris in a few days' time. This development was closely followed by a further step towards the restoration of normal conditions of government in France. The Civil Affairs Agreement concluded by France with Great Britain and the United States last August, after long and patient exertions by the Foreign Secretary, provided for the division of the country into a Forward Zone, in which the supreme Allied Commander would exercise certain overriding powers of control considered necessary for the conduct of military operations, and an Interior Zone, where the conduct of, and responsibility for, the administration would be entirely a matter for the French authorities. For obvious reasons at the beginning, when for those anxious weeks we stood with our backs to the sea a few miles from the beaches, the whole of France had to be in the forward zone; but as the tide of battle moved up to and beyond France's Eastern frontier, General Eisenhower, working in the closest and most friendly co-operation with the French civil and military authorities, found he could safely hand over his special powers, except in the areas immediately behind the battle zone, and he felt that these authorities had shown themselves fully capable of undertaking the grave responsibilities which fall to the Government of any country on which a vast modern army on active service has to be based.
496 The French Administration was, accordingly, able to announce on 20th October that, with the concurrence of the Allied High Command, it had established an Interior Zone comprising the larger part of France, including Paris. This marked the final stage of transformation of the Committee of National Liberation into a Government, exercising provisionally all the powers of the Government of France, and a Government accepted as such by the people of France in their entirety. The way was thus clear for the formal recognition of the Committee as the Provisional Government, and His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris was accordingly instructed, on 23rd October, to inform the French Minister for Foregn Affairs of the decision of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in the Union of South Africa and in New Zealand to accord such recognition. A similar communication was made by the Canadian Government, through the Canadian Ambassador in Paris, and by the Commonwealth Government, through the French representative at Canberra. The United States and Soviet Governments, with whom we had acted throughout in the closest agreements and concert in this matter, were taking similar and simultaneous action.
Some critics have asked: Why should this step not have been taken earlier? The reason is very simple. The British and American Armies had something to do with the liberation of France, and the British and United States Governments had, therefore, a responsibility at this particular moment for making sure that the French Government, emerging in part from their military action, would be acceptable to France as a whole, and would not appear to be imposed upon the country from without. It is not for us to choose the Government or rulers of France but at this particular juncture, for that very reason, we had a very special responsibility. I have been myself for some weeks past satisfied not only that the present French Government, under General de Gaulle, commands the full assent of the vast majority of the French people, but that it is the only Government which can possibly discharge the very heavy burdens which are being cast upon it, and the only Government which can enable France to gather its strength in the interval which must elapse before the constitutional and parliamentary pro- 497 cesses, which it has declared its purpose to reinstate, can again resume their normal functions. I also made it clear in my speech on 2nd August, that France can by no means be excluded from the discussions of the principal Allies dealing with the problems of the Rhine and of Germany. This act of recognition may, therefore, be regarded as a symbol of France's re-emergence from four dark years of terrible and woeful experience and as heralding a period in which she will resume her rightful and historic role upon the world's stage.
As I said these remarks would be in the nature of a supplement to the statement I made some time ago, I have but one other subject to mention and it is one which will cause universal rejoicing. I mean the liberation of Athens and a large part of Greece. I was able, when I visited Italy six or seven weeks ago, to arrange with General Wilson, after very careful discussion, for the necessary measures to be set in train which would enable the Royal Greek Government of Monsieur Papandreou to return to Athens at the earliest possible moment, and as a preliminary to this, I advised that Government to move from Cairo to Caserta, where they would be in the closest touch with the Commander-in-Chief. I think the arrangements were extremely well made by General Wilson, and to him we entrusted the watching for the exact moment to intervene. He found that moment with very happy discretion, so that hardly any loss of life occurred and no damage has been done to the immortal capital, which is dear to the hearts of so many nations throughout the world.
Vivid and moving accounts have appeared in the Press of the decisive events which have recently taken place, and of the fervid welcome which our Forces received throughout Greece, and above all in Athens. When we were driven out of Greece in 1941 amid so much bloodshed and disaster, with the loss of over 30,000 men, we promised to return, and the Greek people never lost faith in that promise, nor abandoned their belief in final victory. Sir, we have returned and our pledge has been redeemed. The lawful Greek Government sit in Athens. Very soon the Greek Brigade which has distinguished itself in the fighting at Rimini on the Italian front, helping to drive the Germans out of Italy, will return with honour to its native land. The tide 498 of war has rolled far to the Northward in Greece. Behind the British troops, the organisation of U.N.R.R.A., in which the United States plays so great a part, is already moving to the scene. Ships have been loaded for many weeks past, and the much-needed supplies of food for the sorely-tried Greek population will soon be in process of active distribution if, indeed, that process has not begun already. We are going to do our best to assist in stabilising the Greek currency which has been a special mark of sabotage by the Germans, and highly competent officials from the Treasury are already on their way to Athens, where the Foreign Secretary is at the present time, and where he is remaining, according to my latest information, until he can confer with them and with the Greek Government on this subject.
We are doing our best in every way to bring Greece back to normal. Though, of course, we are actively aiding the Greeks in every sphere to recover from the horrible injuries inflicted on them by the Germans, and are thus adding another chapter to the story of the friendship between our countries, we do not seek to become the arbiters of their affairs. Our wish and policy is that when normal conditions of tranquillity have been restored throughout the country, the Greek people shall make, in perfect freedom, their decision as to the form of government under which they desire to live. Pending such a decision, we naturally preserve our relations with the Greek Royal House and with the existing constitutional Government, and we regard them as the authority to whom we are bound by the alliance made at the time of the attack upon Greece in 1941. Meanwhile, I appeal to all Greeks of every party and of every group—and there is no lack of parties or of groups—to set national unity above all other causes, to cleanse their country of the remaining German forces, to destroy and capture the last of the miscreants who have treated them with indescribable cruelty, and, finally, to join hands to rebuild the strength and reduce the suffering of their famous and cherished land.
§ 11. 39 a.m.
§ Major Lloyd (Renfrew, Eastern)I have no desire to take up the time of the House, but I would be grateful to the Prime Minister if he could see his way to 499 answer two or three questions, which, in my judgment, very many people in this country would be grateful to have answered. I realise—none better—the extremely delicate nature of the subject of Russo-Polish relations, and I do not want, and I do not think anybody in the House wants, to say one word that could possibly do anything but smooth those relations. Might I ask the Prime Minister if it is still the Government's policy and wish, as previously expressed on several occasions, to defer the decisions on all territorial and boundary questions between Russia and Poland until after the cessation of hostilities? Could he also say whether the British Government are in general sympathy with the desire of the Polish Government for specific and joint guarantees from Great Britain and the other great Powers—Russia and the United States of America—in support of Poland's continued independence and completely sovereign State after the war? I would much appreciate an answer from the Prime Minister, and I assure him that the questions are not asked in any sense of causing awkwardness or controversy.
§ The Prime MinisterWith regard to the first question, we should welcome a solution between the parties themselves, an agreement that would bring the whole matter to the Peace Conference in a form most helpful and favourable to all concerned, and also tide us over the difficult and potentially tragic period through which we are passing. With regard to the guarantee of the three Great Powers, it is certainly to be hoped that the three great Powers will guarantee the independent sovereign free Poland which will emerge from any arrangement which is made now, and ratified at the Peace Conference. As far as the Soviet Government are concerned, I understand that that will be their fixed intention, and I have not hesitated to say that His Majesty's Government will certainly conform to and themselves join in such a guarantee. It is not for me to speak of the affairs of the United States of America.