§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Captain McEwen.]
§ 6.1 p.m.
§ Captain Cunningham-Reid (St. Marylebone)There is one thing upon which the majority of the people of the world are agreed upon, and that is that Germany must never again be able to plunge the world into war. But just how we are 1650 to achieve that desirable objective is anybody's guess. There are plans and suggestions by the score for its attainment; they range from mass sterilisation to mass education, but none of these can guarantee success. Some feel that there can be only one absolutely certain way of preventing Germany from making war on mankind again, and that is to annihilate every German. Although many people would readily agree to that drastic solution it cannot be advanced as a civilised or practical proposition. Yet there is a practically certain method whereby Germans can be made war impotent, without calling upon the firing squads and without unduly disturbing the tender susceptibilities of the most fervid humanitarians.
In a sentence, it is the absorption of Germany by its neighbouring States. This is something entirely different from, and much more feasible than, the plan for carving up Germany into a lot of small German States. The defect of that carving up plan is that the geographical expression, Germany, is merely divided into a number of small components. So long as you have that situation you have the ever-present danger of "unification moves," with their potent appeal to Germanism.
The mistake many are inclined to make is in believing that a common language is an affinity that binds people. What about the American Wars of Independence, or our relationship with Southern Ireland? Germany, in spite of Goebbels' slogans and Hitler's rantings, is not, and never has been, "one folk and one State," except in the pursuit of war. The antagonism of the Northern and Southern Germans is classical. Early on, the various tribes of Germans were brought together by warlike activities, in the course of which one group—the Prussians—acquired supreme command. These Prussians—and not so long ago—in the face of all protests, transformed the geographical term, "Germany," into a political, concept. This political unification was developed by Bismarck and carried to its peak of fanaticism by Hitler and his gang.
Clearly then splitting up Germany into separate German States is no solution. Neither is the idealistic suggestion that the German people can be re-educated by "foreigners." The Germans recently 1651 found to their cost that they were unable to do that to the vanquished French though they tried their best. The only people who could re-educate the various German groups into a new way of life are those who live on the present perimeter of Germany, who already have much in common with their German neighbours, because of the economic, geographical, climatic and other factors which condition them all. Therefore it is suggested that those nations that lie on Germany's border should be allocated the adjacent German territory, which would give them the essential authority for the necessary "education." To show how all this is feasible I have had a special map prepared by experts, and I should be very pleased to give a copy to any hon. Member who would like to have one. The proposed frontiers, as shown on this map, have been arrived at after careful consideration of such human factors as tastes, religion, temperament, culture, habits and such like—the same language has been a secondary consideration.
Under this plan the absorbed peoples, hitherto German, would not become Stateless. They would form part and parcel of the nation within whose borders their former land was now merged, and within a generation or two, as has been so often shown in history, what with deaths and inter-marriages, they would lose their identity as a separate people. Yet they would not be controlled, re-educated and absorbed by hosts with whom they had nothing in common, as would be the case if the British, Americans or Russians were to attempt to do any such thing. Quite the contrary. They would have found a better way of life, with people not fundamentally different from themselves but politically dedicated to democratic principles and so able to guide them away from the false gods of dictatorships. The new grouping would be biologically, economically and ethnographically compatible. Look at the position to-day. It is well 1652 known that the food, architecture and costumes of the Bavarians are hardly distinguishable from those of their Austrian neighbours.
The austere Protestant culture of North Germany is almost identical with that of the Danes, and the similarity of geographical surroundings gives them the same philosophies and foods. I think that having the same tastes in food is important because we so often find that those who appreciate, for example, steak and onions, get on very well together, in the same way as do those who habitually enjoy goulash, or macaroni, or, for that matter, hot-dogs. Coming from food to glass, I merely want to point out as another example of what I am attempting to demonstrate, that the great glass industries of Central Europe and the people who work in them, are similar in Saxony and Bohemia. One could amplify these examples ad libitum.
Thus, starting from the belief that the continued existence of Germany, whole or sub-divided into German States, as a political unity is undesirable, we see that there are very strong biological and ethnological reasons for absorbing the present Germany into her neighbouring States. There are few valid historical arguments against such a course. Economic considerations may give rise to some minor objections, but the most potent problem to be faced is that some of Germany's neighbours may be reluctant to have parts of the Reich plus their inhabitants thrust upon them. In 1918, nations were anxious to have the size of their countries increased, but to-day in some instances, I have no doubt that there are nations that would have to be persuaded to do this. But it would be their duty as their contribution to the maintenance of European security.
§ Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and, 40 Members not being present, the House was adjourned at a Quarter after Six o'Clock till To-morrow.