§ The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Anderson)When I addressed the Committee on 4th November and asked for a further Vote of Credit for £1,250,000,000, making £4,250,000,000 in all to that date, I said the new Vote would probably carry us on to about the middle of February. That forecast still appears likely to prove fairly accurate, and, accordingly, I have now to ask the Committee to vote a further sum to meet our requirements for the remainder of the financial year. In accordance with the procedure which has been adopted, with the assent of the Committee, in previous 568 war years, I may point out, I am, at the same time, asking for a separate Vote of £1,000,000,000 on account of the provision which will be necessary in the new financial year which begins on 1st April. At this stage, it is, as the Committee will understand, extremely difficult to estimate precisely what our expenditure is likely to amount to in the remaining period of the year. During recent weeks, our total war expenditure has averaged a daily rate of a little over £13,250,000, of which about £11,000,000 per day is on fighting and supply services and £2,250,000 a day on miscellaneous war services. These figures are, in fact, almost the same as those which I gave to the Committee on the occasion of the last Vote of Credit in November. Experience, however, has led us to expect some slight increase in the flow of expenditure in the closing period of the financial year.
A further point arises on this last Vote of Credit for the year. For technical reasons, with which I need not trouble the Committee, the actual expenditure chargeable to the accounts of a particular year does not necessarily agree exactly with the amount of cash issued from the Exchequer during the course of the year. Cash may be issued in any year which, for the time being, merely augments the large working balances which many Departments must keep in present circumstances, and expenditure out of that balance may have to be covered by a Vote of the subsequent year. For that reason, I must allow some margin in this final Supplementary Estimate. It is, in fact, quite probable that the final Exchequer account may show cash drawings on Vote of Credit account approximating very closely to the figures of £4,900,000,000 included by my predecessor in his Budget statement last April, but, allowing a margin for the reason which I have mentioned and for unforeseen contingencies, I should like to have Votes for £5,000,000,000 for the whole year. The total for the present Supplementary Estimate has, therefore, been fixed at £750,000,000.
The Committee will no doubt have noticed that, on this occasion, the estimates before them show a small but important and significant addition to the rather long description of the purpose for which these periodical Votes of Credit are required. In technical language, the ambit of the Vote is being enlarged by the 569 insertion in line 9 of the Supplementary Vote of the words:
For relief and rehabilitation in areas brought under the control of any of the United Nations.This change marks a new phase of the war—a phase which, while quite distinct in character from the military activities which must necessarily precede it is, nevertheless, dependent upon and bound up with those military activities, and is an essential part of the great and complex task which confronts this country and our Allies of liberating and restoring the conquered and oppressed countries of the world and of destroying the forces of aggression. The Committee would, no doubt, like me to give some account of recent developments in regard to this important work to be undertaken in the wake of the liberating armies.As the Committee may recall, an agreement was signed in the White House at Washington by representatives of the United Nations on 9th November last, setting up the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, under a constitution which has been published as Command Paper 6491. On the next day, the Council of U.N.R.R.A., which I may, perhaps, conveniently term this new administration, met for the first time at Atlantic City. The Council completed its session on 1st December, having, in the short space of some three weeks, passed a formidable number of Resolutions outlining the policies and methods of administration to be followed by U.N.R.R.A. and the means of financing its operation. The Resolutions of the Council have been published as Command Paper 6497. I think the Committee will be impressed by the comprehensive character of the work done at this first Council of U.N.R.R.A., and I would draw particular attention to the speed with which it worked and the evidence which it thus gave of an urgent desire to get on with its task. The achievement of this Council was, I think, made possible by the long preliminary work which has been done, mainly, of course, in Washington and London, starting with the meeting of the Allied Governments at St. James's Palace in September, 1941. It was clear, however, at Atlantic City, that preparatory work on the subject of relief had engaged the attention of other Governments as well as those of the United States and the United Kingdom, 570 and the Council at Atlantic City was not least remarkable for the demonstration it gave of co-operation in a common purpose between all the United Nations. There were, naturally, some conflicting views and some conflicting interests, but there was a common desire to design a United Nations machine of the kind that would best perform the work that had to be done.
In an early session, the Council elected Mr. Herbert H. Lehman to be Director-General of U.N.R.R.A. On behalf of His Majesty's Government, I should like to take this opportunity of expressing our pleasure that Mr. Lehman's services are available for this work and of assuring him of our closest co-operation in carrying it out. The Committee will have noticed with interest that my hon. Friend the Junior Member for Oxford University (Sir A. Salter) has accepted Mr. Lehman's invitation to act as his senior deputy in the headquarters of the Administration in Washington. The hon. Member brings great qualities and much relevant experience to the task. His Majesty's Government have also been pleased to make available the services of an able and well-tried officer, Sir Frederick Leith Ross, who is to have a post as Director-General for Europe. The United Kingdom representative on the Council at Atlantic City was the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the present Minister of Food (Mr. Llewellin). The happy results of the Council's work were largely due to the part he played, assisted by Sir Frederick Leith Ross, who was his deputy, and the representatives of the London Departments and the Missions in Washington. I would like to mention also the work of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-war Requirements, which played a very great part in collaboration with the Dominions and the United States in preparing the ground, both for the Council's meeting at Atlantic City and the subsequent work of relief itself.
§ Captain Bernays (Bristol, North)I am not quite clear about that. Is Mr. Lehman to sever all connection with the United States administration? Will he be an international civil servant?
§ Sir J. AndersonAll these officers I mentioned will be international, and will be answerable to the Council of 571 U.N.R.R.A.—an international body. I shall make only the briefest reference to the Atlantic City resolutions, and the work of U.N.R.R.A. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State will be ready, later in the Debate, to deal with the subject in greater detail. I would only say that U.N.R.R.A. must take its place in the whole complex of Anglo-American and United Nations supply machinery which has been developed in the course of the war. In particular, the Atlantic City resolutions fully recognise the need that U.N.R.R.A. should avoid overlapping with the work of the Combined boards and with the machinery for consultation between the nations associated with those boards. Some such machinery must, certainly, be kept in existence, if we are to avoid a scramble for supplies and an inflation of prices, which common sense and experience alike condemn.
The particular task of U.N.R.R.A., in association with other agencies, will fall under two heads: First, it will have to see to the provision of essential imports and services required for those territories which cannot, for the time being, whether through lack of finance or lack of shipping, provide for themselves: Second, it will have to see that the common interests of all nations, in the re-establishment of all distressed areas, is not defeated by allotting supplies to territories in the fortunate possession of resources in finance and shipping to an extent incompatible with the maintenance of a reasonable standard elsewhere. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, I am primarily concerned with the first of these functions. At Atlantic City the United States Delegation, whose head, Mr. Dean Acheson, was elected chairman of the first Council and whose very great personal success in that capacity ensured the success of the whole session, put forward the proposal embodied in what is called the Financial Plan in the Council's resolutions. This plan provides that the basis of the contributions to the work in hand should be that each of the United sand Associated Nations whose home territory has not been overrun, should contribute, in all, a sum equal to one per cent. of one year's national income. There is necessarily a qualification to this proposal. Just as in Income Tax, a higher rate is charged on the higher levels of income, so, in this field, the poorer countries may 572 be unable, without disproportionate sacrifice, to contribute at the same rate as the richer countries. Regard should be had, of course, not only to comparative wealth, but to the burden already shouldered by contributing governments. Accordingly, the Council will recommend to all member governments, whose home territories have not been overrun, a contribution of one per cent. of their national income, recognising that there are cases in which this recommendation may conflict with particular demands arising from the continuance of the war or may be excessively burdensome because of special circumstances and where, therefore, some departure from the contribution recommended may be appropriate. The other side of the problem is the determination of the territories which are to benefit by the contribution.
§ Mr. Palmer (Winchester)How will the national income be calculated?
§ Sir J. AndersonI will refer to that later. The other side of the problem is the determination of the territories which are to benefit by the contributions. On this the Financial Plan recommended at Atlantic City wisely refrained from laying down particular rules and leaves the decision to a small committee, which will settle the use of the funds available as the work proceeds. We should naturally expect that, as time goes on, the territories in need of assistance will be starting up their own economic life and their exports and will, gradually, be able to reduce their dependence on outside help.
The Financial Plan does, however, make certain broad statements. It lays down that the policy of U.N.R.R.A. shall be that an applicant government shall not be required to assume the burden of an enduring foreign exchange debt for the procurement of relief and of rehabilitation supplies and services; and, in the determination of whether a territory is in a position to pay, its foreign exchange assets and its sources of foreign exchange shall be taken into account and due consideration shall be given to its need of foreign exchange for other purposes. The object of U.N.R.R.A. has been defined as, "to help the countries to help themselves." Those who cannot pay for what they need will be helped until they can. The countries which are in a position to pay will, of course, be expected to do so and, in particular, payment for supplies 573 that may be made available to ex-enemy territories must constitute a claim of high priority on the territories in question. I come now to the contribution which the United Kingdom is to make to this work.
§ Dr. Haden Guest (Islington, North)I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that the nations and territories which have been overrun by the enemy are not to be asked to make a contribution. In Command Paper 6497—a copy of which I have in my hand—on page 34, it is stated, among other things, that Belgium is asked to make a contribution of one per cent. of the national income. Would the right hon. Gentleman explain what these figures mean, in order to avoid any misunderstanding?
§ Sir AndersonI shall deal with that point later. I think that my hon. Friend is not distinguishing between expenditure on relief, and expenditure on administration. The countries which have been overrun are being asked, not to make a one per cent. national income contribution—I will come to that point later—but to make a contribution to administrative expenses.
§ Sir J. AndersonAs I said, I now come to the contribution which the United Kingdom is to make to this work. In the last Budget White Paper our national income for the calendar year, 1942, was estimated at £7,384,000,000. On the best estimate that we can make at this time, there has been some increase in the national income and for the year ended 30th June, 1943, the one per cent. figure may be put at a round £76,000,000 to £77,000,000. His Majesty's Government propose that we should take the round figure of £80,000,000 as the contribution of this country for this purpose of relief and rehabilitation.
Under the Atlantic City resolutions, our share of the administrative expenditure on U.N.R.R.A. will be taken out of our general contributions. There will, of course, be an administrative budget by means of which the establishment and other administrative charges will be scrutinised and controlled. There will also be an allocation of the approved administrative budget among the member countries. By this arrangement, those 574 countries whose home territories have been overrun and who will, therefore, not be making a general contribution—and this is the point that my hon. and gallant Friend was talking about—will still have a basis for a contribution to the administrative expenses. But those countries which are making a general contribution are not required to pay their share of administrative expenses separately or in addition to their general contribution. This arrangement has the convenience of avoiding asking the legislatures for two separate appropriations for the same general purpose. The Council of U.N.R.R.A. at Atlantic City approved an administrative budget of 10,000,000 dollars for the thirteen months to the end of the calendar year, 1944. Having regard to the scope of the work in prospect, I think this figure is moderate and reasonable. The details of the relationship between U.N.R.R.A. and the military authorities during the first period of liberation are not yet clear. This period, must, to some extent, be one of improvised arrangements and nothing must be allowed to interfere with the main object, which is the advance of our arms. We recognise that during this period relief to the civil population will have to be administered at first by the civil affairs staff of the Commander in the field. We realise, therefore, that the burden of a measure of relief may fall on us which, in practice, may turn out to be in addition to our £80,000,000.
The question may be raised, whether the contributions recommended at Atlantic City will amount to a total sufficient for the job. No definite answer can, of course, be given to that question. There are uncertainties about what will be the state of the territories concerned when hostilities cease, and there are uncertainties about the availability of supplies and shipping to meet their needs at a level which we would wish to see them attain. All that can be said is that the contributions proposed should see us a very long way towards the completion of the task. U.N.R.R.A. is not the only organisation which we hope to see the United Nations establish. Its scope, as I have outlined it, is large and difficult indeed but it leaves a great deal still to be worked out. It does not, for example, cover the wider field of reconstruction, and it could hardly set out to be a body to deal with the future 575 economic life of Europe or the Far East But it has a task to perform which, if left undone, would make impossible the further work which the nations together have still to tackle, and I hope the Committee will support His Majesty's Government in the contribution which they propose to make, and the co-operation which they have offered, to U.N.R.R.A.
The Committee will understand that, from the nature of the case, it is at present impossible to estimate in advance how much we shall have to contribute in any given period. Further, the provision of the goods and services which we are under obligation to supply to U.N.R.R.A. will, in most cases, be inextricably bound up with the provision of similar supplies for war purposes. For these reasons, the Vote of Credit provides the natural and convenient and, in fact, the only practicable source for the provision of the necessary funds. I shall be ready to inform Parliament, from time to time, of the current total of our contributions.
§ Mr. Greenwood (Wakefield)I am very glad we are having this Debate because it is one of fundamental importance. It is high time that Parliament gave its mind to some of the issues involved and assured itself of the progress that is actually being made. I should like to carry history back a little further than the conference at Atlantic City, for we are apt to forget the part that we played in the earlier days in thinking out plans to deal with relief and rehabilitation. It was on 12th June, 1941, on the initiative of the British Government, that the Allies were brought together at St. James's Palace and attended in full strength under the chairmanship of the British Prime Minister. They then unanimously passed a resolution, Part (3) of which I will read to the Committee:
That the only true basis of enduring peace is the willing co-operation of free peoples in a world, in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security; and that it is their intention to work together, and with other free peoples, both in war and peace to this end."——words which have the ringing tones of the Atlantic Charter, which was signed by the President of the United States and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister of Great Britain, two short months later. I mention this to show that two and a half years ago, on the initiative of His 576 Majesty's Government, the Allies were beginning to consider, broadly, the shape of things to come. At that time Britain had decided, without looking for the aid of Allies who were not then in the field, to march along that particular path and had definitely in mind these questions of relief and rehabilitation. On 24th September, 1941, a further inter-Allied conference was held at St. James's Palace arising out of the previous conference. It carried matters somewhat further. At that conference my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary presided; the U.S.S.R. which, by that time was in the war, was represented by its then Ambassador and a unanimous resolution was passed by the Allied Powers present—which included most of them. They agreed:The resolution went on in greater detail to deal with the question of food stuffs, raw materials, and articles of prime necessity, reprovisioning, and the beginning of the re-development of the released territories. A speech in support of the resolution was made by M. Maisky—no longer here—who said:
- "(1) That it is their common aim to secure that supplies of food, raw materials and articles of prime necessity should be made available for the post-war needs of the countries liberated from Nazi oppression.
- (2) That while each of the Allied Governments and authorities will be primarily responsible for making provision for the economic needs of its own peoples, their respective plans should be co-ordinated in a spirit of inter-allied collaboration, for the successful achievement of the common aim."
Attributing great importance to the equitable use of all material resources and foodstuffs in the post-war period, the Soviet Government believes that the most imperative and most pressing task of to-day is the correct allocation of all the economic resources and war supplies with a view to an early liberation of all the European peoples now oppressed by Hitlerite slavery.That, I think, was the general tone of that conference. I now wish to draw the attention of the Committee to the opening statement made at that conference, by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. He said:As the Allied representatives will have realised from the note inviting them to this meeting, a certain amount of preliminary work has been accomplished preparatory to this further meeting to-day, to which I am very happy, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to welcome the representatives of the Dominions and of our Allies.A great deal of work was done under the direction of Sir Frederick Leith Ross to 577 whom my right hon. Friend paid perfectly adequate tribute and whose qualities I, when in office, fully appreciated. I mention these facts to emphasise that Great Britain undertook great responsibilities for post-war relief even before we had firm assurances that other great Powers, not then involved in the war, would come to our assistance. I emphasise that because we cannot escape these moral responsibilities by clothing ourselves with the mantle of lethargy. At long last, towards the end of November, the first session of the Council of U.N.R.R.A. met. I am afraid that we have to use the term "U.N.R.R.A."; it is a monstrosity, but if the organisation does the right, thing, we will forgive its name. The conclusions reached represent, I think, one of the most important documents yet issued on post-war matters. It devises machinery which, if wholeheartedly and generously operated, will deal with the gigantic problem with which we shall be faced at the end of the war. May I remind the Committee that the year after the Armistice of 1918, was a year of shocking mess and muddle in dealing with the immediate post-war situation? The problems which will confront us after the defeat of Germany will be colossal even as compared with the situation, difficult though it was, after the Armistice of 1918.Starvation is rampant over the greater part of occupied Europe to-day, and the situation will not improve. It will grow worse. Increasing debility, lowered resistance to disease, epidemics of typhus and a growing amount of tuberculosis—all these things will become more dangerous because of the large-scale forced migration which has taken place. The International Labour Organisation put the figure at 17,500,000 and I imagine that to-day 20,000,000 people have been driven from their homes and countries, and that a great many of them have become disease-carriers. At the end of the war they will wish to return to their own countries. That, in itself, is a piece of ordered migration on a scale hitherto unknown in human history. Scientific migration was introduced in this war by Adolf Hitler. We need—equally scientifically and rather more humanely—to reverse that process, and that presents us with problems on a very, very large scale. I do not need to continue to paint a gloomy picture of what Europe will look 578 like when the good day comes, but it is clear that we shall be faced with a problem of extraordinary complexity and magnitude. I think U.N.R.R.A. has taken a very broad view of the tasks which lie before it. They fall, broadly, into two categories, which are given in the report under four heads. There is "Relief Supplies," the urgent satisfaction of primary human needs for food, clothing, footwear, medical attention and shelter and there is "Relief Services," without which these simple elementary human needs cannot be satisfied. Then there are the wider group of problems classified under, "Rehabilitation, Supplies and Services," which covers such things as fertilisers, equipment machinery and spare parts, and the Rehabilitation of Public Utilities," such as power, water, gas, and the like, without which the rehabilitation is clearly impracticable.
Relief must, inevitably, pass into the rehabilitation stage. In fact, the transition will become automatic and unnoticeable. Relief means, I suppose, in a very broad sense, physical sustenance, physical recovery of people and rehabilitation means the beginning of economic revival and recovery. I do not think that our responsibilities can end there and there was nothing said by the Chancellor of the Exchequer which would indicate that that was the view of His Majesty's Government. We have had this document which, as I have said, is of first-class importance and a very noteworthy publication. But we have had other conclusions. In the autumn of 1942, in New York, the I.L.O. delivered itself of important principles concerning action to be taken when the opportunity arises and the Hot Springs Conference last year adumbrated a long-term policy for ensuring freedom from starvation in the world. All this is to the good. But we need now to clothe those statements of general principle with a fuller meaning, to apply them to practical plans. Further, I think it is clear that the methods which we adopt for dealing with relief, and the policy we follow in dealing particularly with rehabilitation, will very largely determine the course that future long-term reconstruction will take.
That brings me to a point which I think is of importance and which should be made to-day. You cannot, in practice, draw a line between the satisfaction of the most urgent human needs of people when 579 they are liberated, the steps that are to be taken to provide them with raw materials, plant, equipment and so on to enable them to begin their own lives, and the broader plans envisaged in the United Nations' declarations, such as those contained in the Atlantic Charter. We are agreed on principle. There is an extraordinary degree of unanimity in the world. Nations whose histories are even blacker than ours in many fields, have shown what high motives they now possess in their whole-hearted support of the Atlantic Charter. But we are yet far from having concerted plans of action. The Chancellor could not be expected to-day to deal in any detail with the organisation of personnel of U.N.R.R.A., but it is important that we should know. We have been told of two of its leading representatives—the Director-General over there and Sir Frederick Leith Ross in Europe. But are the doctors ready? Have you your specialists for the restoration of the sanitary services? Have you your transport experts? Have you behind the international governmental machine all your executive staffs ready and your advisers, who ought to be advising now, so that when the end of the war comes we shall be able to act quickly?
I have mentioned the I.L.O. Conference. Another is to be held in a few months' time and I hope something more practical will come from it than the statement of principles enunciated 18 months ago. It is true that not such a long time has elapsed since the Hot Springs Conference but we ought to be working hard on the initiation of a long-term programme which must overlap with the rehabilitation programme. The future of Lend-Lease is involved. Clause 7 of that agreement, in my view, could be the most far-reaching economic understanding ever undertaken between any nations, if properly and fully applied.
My anxiety and doubt concern the speed with which we are working in these matters. Some of my friends in the factories were given another sermon yesterday by my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Aircraft Production, who asked them to work a little harder and dangled before them a picture of a Britain free from war at the end of the year. If that were to happen—and we all hope it may—I would ask, Is this organisation 580 ready to take over? I realise the part that must be played by the military authorities, so long as any country is potentially a battle area, but once the war is won, once the Allied Governments here go back to their own countries, will they have behind them the personnel and material, with which to make the earliest possible effort to relieve their people of their miseries? It took us about four years to get final Allied direction in the war. That came out of the Teheran Conference. We cannot wait for four years after the end of the war before we get complete Allied action and strategy and the means of operating it. These matters are urgent. It is the general view that when the crack does come in the West it will come quickly. We should be on the way to losing all the things we hope to win from this war if there were any inordinate delay and muddle on the Continent of Europe while people with all hope gone were dying like flies from starvation, as they undoubtedly will, unless prompt measures are taken. That is a situation which nobody in this Committee can contemplate with any equanimity. If that happened we should have been untrue to our friendships, untrue to ourselves and unfaithful to those people on the Continent who have suffered so much.
If I emphasised at the beginning of my speech the part that we took in initiating these plans—in which I had some little part—it was to impress upon the Government that, in taking that responsibility in their hands first, without waiting for the richer nations to come to their assistance, they undertook a responsibility which they can never evade. Nor do I wish, for a moment, to believe that they would desire to evade it. But one feels that there is not developing in Government circles here, and in the international field, that sense of urgency, which is so vital if we are to be prepared for the peace, on a scale infinitely greater than the scale on which we were prepared for war. I should hope, therefore, that we may hear something about how far we are getting concrete and practical plans worked out; whether we are putting our eye on the men and women who can be called upon to carry out the task so as to reassure not only this country but the overrun peoples of Europe, soon to be liberated I hope, that we are working hard and that, when the day of military liberation comes, it will 581 be the dawn of a newer and fuller liberation.
§ Captain Bernays (Bristol, North)I have one complaint against the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—an unusual one in this House—that it was too short. I should like to hear more of the working of U.N.R.R.A. than he has found it possible to give us at this stage. It is clear from what he said that in U.N.R.R.A. is a vital piece of planning, in which the British Government proposes to play its fullest part. I fully agree with the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, on the need for urgency in this matter. The occupied countries are in the position of a man who has undergone a prolonged operation without an anaesthetic. They are torn, bleeding and exhausted and immediate relief will be a matter of the greatest urgency. But it is clear that the plans proposed now are a great advance on anything that was attempted after the last war. There was no Debate of this kind while that war was going on at all. Nothing was done until November, 1918, and then it took three months before any organisation was set up. In 1918 the relief organised was the business of the Big Four—the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy—and now it is to be the common responsibility of all nations.
I think the most important difference of all is that in 1918 the machinery of rationing was scrapped, and now I understand the existing control boards are to be maintained and so extended that they will meet the needs of the war in the Far East and also the needs of the aftermath of war in Europe. U.N.R.R.A., as I understand it, is in no sense in competition with the Control Board. It is, in fact, one of the chief customers of the Control Board. I was delighted to hear from the Chancellor that Mr. Lehman is to be in no sense a member of the United States administration. I think it is very important that it should be made quite clear that the Director-General, the Deputy Director-General and all associated with U.N.R.R.A. are in a real sense international civil servants. The problems that they will have to face are immense. It is not merely a question of transportation and distribution. I believe the most formidable will be that of supply.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood) asked 582 about doctors and medical supplies. I should like to ask, Have you the food and where is it coming from? Large estimates have been made of the food that will be required, but it must inevitably be to a great extent a matter of guesswork. We cannot possibly know the extent of the scarcity in Europe—it may be exaggerated—and we cannot knout the extent to which the Nazi beast, as he staggers backwards, will destroy stocks and the resources of production, but clearly the demand for food will be very great. Food is the most important of all factors. You can improvise shelter and clothes but there is no substitute for food. I think the ugly fact exists that there are no bulging corn bins in Europe. To-day we are being asked to vote large sums of money, but what is more important is how that money will be spent and how the necessary food will be obtained with that money. Where is it to come from? Our stocks are low. I understand that it was only with considerably difficulty that the Control Board was able to balance the food budget of 1943 and it had to dip extensively into reserves, and it would appear that no great help can come from existing granaries. Nor can any great help come from increased production if the present drain on man power for the Armed Forces, particularly in the Dominions, has to be maintained. The main source of this food would appear to be a continuance of the present restrictions on consumption and, if our rationing system in consequence of U.N.R.R.A. has to be maintained after the war in all its severity, I think the Government should take its courage in both hands and say so at an early date.
This question of the restriction of consumption of food for starving Europe raises political questions, not merely in this country but in America and in the Dominions, of the highest importance. I think it is common ground that British consumption has been reduced to the edge of risk and I do not believe it will be possible to reduce it further without impairing our war effort, and we have to remember that, in addition to the problem of a starving Europe, we shall still have the war in the Far East on our hands at the same time. There is no doubt that a section of our people at any rate are expecting, after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, an increase of rations. Will they be willing to forgo that increase? I believe that, if the situation is fully explained 583 to them early they will accept a policy of no increased rations after the war. Great Britain is a generous-minded nation and fully realises that the sacrifices that we have been called upon to make are not a hundredth part of what has been exacted from the slave driven nations. I have been very much impressed by the response of the average man in the Army to the conception that we should not go back to our pre-war consumption until the bulk of Europe had been rescued from its present plight. I believe that the country will cheerfully accept the maintenance of existing standards of consumption, but with three important provisos. Firstly, the present standard of rationing must be maintained only for a limited and a clearly defined period. I believe we should, if possible, give an early hope, say in six months' time after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, of a substantial increase in rationing.
§ Miss Rathbone (Combined English Universities)Is not that rather inconsistent with what the hon. and gallant Gentleman said a short time ago as to the enormous suffering of the European countries and the willingness of our people to go on making sacrifices? If they know that the feeding of these liberated countries depends on us, does he suppose that it will enable us to increase our rations in six months?
§ Captain BernaysI do not know if it will be six months or nine. It will not be too easy to get this policy across to the country and to commend it to our constituents. There is already a section of the Press agitating for an immediate return to pre-war consumption. We have to face up to this serious political problem, and that is what I am trying to do. It may be six or nine months or a year, but our people should be able to see some end to severities of the existing rationing system. Also I think it must be understood that the food made available by the continuance of our restrictions should be for all Europe. I was very glad to hear the Chancellor emphasise that there was to be no discrimination between the paying and the non-paying countries. Just as in this country food has not followed money, so relief in Europe must not follow dollar balances. I firmly believe that, as far as relief is concerned, there must be no ideological division of Europe 584 into countries that we like and countries that we do not like. The provision of food must not in any sense be allowed to become a form of political blackmail. All must have equal access to the food that is available.
I would add this, although I know that I am about to advance into a minefield. Our difficulties in securing the acceptance of continued restrictions of consumption in this country would be substantially eased if we could have an assurance that the United States and the Dominions were preparing to make similar sacrifices. We have changed our diet and checked our consumption to an extent that is not comparable with the countries across the Atlantic, and I think the question will be asked whether this disparity of consumption should continue in the months after the war. I have noted one or two speeches of official and unofficial spokesmen in this country and in America suggesting that, in spite of U.N.R.R.A., there will be an immediate return to the standards of pre-war consumption on the conclusion of hostilities. Such a situation whereby we maintained our rationing system in all its severity while America and the Dominions returned to their pre-war levels of consumption would not be easily understood in this country. I think it is right that someone who holds no official position should suggest in all friendliness that the corollary of a policy of pooled resources should be a policy of pooled sacrifices. I believe that the nations composing U.N.R.R.A. have made a fine start. There seems to me a new note to-day in Allied conferences. There seems to be a feeling nowadays that conclusions must be more positive than they have hitherto been and that those conclusions must be followed up by action if the world is to be redeemed from darkness. In that spirit the conference at Atlantic City began its task and the example it has set may well be decisive for the future.
§ Dr. Haden Guest (Islington, North)I am glad that we are having this Debate at the present time. It is unfortunate, however, that the resolutions passed at the recent conference of U.N.R.R.A. in the United States have been made available to Members of the House only during the last few days. With all the diligence in the world it has not been possible for Members to acquaint themselves fully with 585 and to digest this formidable document Cmd. 6497. I say this because, while welcoming the Debate, we must take it that this is only a preliminary discussion and that we shall require to explore this matter much further and more fully at a fairly early date. The organisation that is being set up by U.N.R.R.A. and the work to be performed by it, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood) said, while it is not dealing with the economic reconstruction in the world which will be necessary after the war, is at any rate laying the economic foundations for that reconstruction. That is a task of first importance for all people in the world.
I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to certain considerations with regard to the constitution of U.N.R.R.A. It is governed by the meetings of all its members which are to be held not less than twice a year, but its effective government is in the hands of a council with a central committee, consisting of representatives of China, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., which exercises powers, international in scope, as great as, in some cases perhaps even greater than, those of any individual government. It is, in fact, a body of the very first importance as regards both the power which it wields and its responsibilities. The central committee will be the body which exercises a large part of that power because, according to the document recently published, it will have the power of making policy decisions of an emergency nature. Everyone who has applied his mind to the immediate problems which are certain to arise after the war knows that inevitably a large number of them will be emergency problems. Therefore, it is the central committee which will make the policy decisions. I do not object to that. I think that it is desirable it should be so, but it makes it much more necessary that we should have in this House and in the governing assembly of every constituent country of U.N.R.R.A. a clear conception of the policy which is to guide the administration.
If we cast our minds back, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield did, to the way in which this organisation orginated, we remember that it originated from meetings of the representatives of the United Nations which took place in St. James's Palace in 1941, the first in June 586 and the second in September of that year, and that these two meetings passed resolutions binding the United Nations to act together. At the second of the meetings the Soviet Union made a declaration of adherence—a matter of great importance. I think that His Majesty's Government might take into consideration the question whether it would not be desirable for them to press now for a third meeting of the representatives of all the United Nations in order to survey the whole field of world policy of which this instrument of U.N.R.R.A. is carrying out one of the sections, but not the only one. We should also be informed in this House, by the issue of a White Paper, how far the work of U.N.R.R.A. has already gone.
Questions have been put in the Debate as to what staff is available. I would remind the House, however, that relief and rehabilitation work has already been carried out in certain countries for some considerable time. There has been such work in the Middle East, Syria and Lebanon, and in North Africa too. It is going on at the present moment in Southern Italy. It is important that we should be able to profit by the experience of these countries. I was informed by the hon. and gallant Member for Carlisle (Sir E. Spears), who has an important position in the Middle East, that he has been able to arrange in the countries with which he is concerned for an extension of agricultural production on a large scale. In North Africa, I understand, there have been extensive harvests fairly recently and food production in both the Middle East and North Africa has much improved. The situation in Italy is of a different kind. It is of a more serious kind and shows the difficulties with which we shall be faced. There is a country in which our Army and the civil authorities behind the Army are in control. There are, as we know from recent reports, great food difficulties and a raging typhus epidemic which is difficult to control, but which has, fortunately, not spread to the Armed Forces. Although we are in control of that area—and I do not underrate the difficulties of dealing with the civilian population—we have not been able to deal as we could have wished with the food situation. There are serious shortages and a grave typhus epidemic. The situation in Italy is precisely the kind of situation which will arise in other parts of Europe. I therefore suggest that it would be of the 587 greatest assistance to the House and of value as a matter of general information if we could have a White Paper dealing with the experience of relief up to date, and perhaps embodying the complicated matters and resolutions dealt with in 90 pages of this document Cmd. 6497. This is a document that ought to be understood, and it needs a certain amount of White Paper explanation in order to put a coating on the pill, to use a medical symbol.
No one has mentioned that arrangements have already been made for a considerable recruitment of voluntary staff. I hope that we shall hear from the right hon. Gentleman who will reply something of the large number of voluntary societies which are taking part in preparing themselves to undertake work in connection with U.N.R.R.A. as soon as their services are needed. They range from the British Red Cross Society and the Friends' Ambulance Unit to various smaller organisations, but there are a considerable number of organisations and I believe that many people are undergoing training. Perhaps we may hear something about them which will be helpful. While referring to the question of voluntary organisations and volunteer helpers, may I express the hope, which I find it needful to express after trying in an inadequate time to digest this document, that we shall avoid in our policy too much organisation. After the last war we had, in dealing with relief and rehabilitation, perhaps too little organisation. I am rather afraid that after this war we may tie ourselves up in an organisation which is too rigid. I hope that there will be given the opportunity for the voluntary organisations, under proper supervision and after proper selection, to have a rather freer hand than some of the wording of this document suggests.
Another matter of very great importance concerns medical staffs for this work. I do not know where medical staff is to be obtained. At the present moment we could not recruit a very large number of people from this country for medical relief work on the Continent because they are not available, but a very large number of medical staff will be required in connection with the war in the Far East when the war switches from Europe, in all its intensity. There will always be some 588 shortage of doctors from this country, but there is another way of looking at it. As soon as we have got into occupied Europe, many doctors belonging to the countries there will be available to give us very considerable help and no doubt they will be willing to co-operate. My own experience after the last war of this kind of work in Hungary, Austria, Poland and elsewhere was that doctors and hospital organisations in those countries were very ready to co-operate and gave their very excellent services very freely indeed. I do not think that the doctor difficulty will be insuperable and I believe that we shall be able to control epidemics, but I hope that what is going on in Italy will lead to a little better organisation than apparently exists.
After the provision of food by relief shipments, and the provision of medical, nursing and sanitary staff, the most important thing will be the rehabilitation of agriculture. We shall have to concentrate on the production of cereals. There will not be enough proteins, and fats will be very short. There will definitely be sufficient vitamins for all persons in Europe if proper use is made of the supplies. The situation after this war will therefore not be so serious in this respect as after the last war, when a great deal of suffering was caused by a deficiency of vitamins.
I hope that this Debate will bring from the right hon. Gentleman who is to reply a great flood of light and information on this subject. It seems to me that we shall not get all the light and leading, that we might otherwise have got from the House itself until we have a White Paper digesting the whole subject. It is literally impossible for anyone, however closely in touch with what is going on behind the scenes, to get a complete picture of the work at the present time. We want to know what the requirements in Europe are, in detail, and there is no reason why we should not be told those things, although there was reason some time ago. We want to know who the people are who are to do the work, both in the United States and in this country. The point was raised as to what is to be the status of ex-Governor Lehman, who is to be chief Director. The reply that he is to be an international civil servant is excellent, but he is to be under the authority of a Council which has not met since 1941.
589 I suggest that it is time that this Council met again, and at such a meeting no doubt the Government of the United States might take the opportunity of making a statement similar to that which was made by the Government of the Soviet Union at the meeting in September, 1941. I suggest that that meeting might take place nearer to the scene of operations than the United States. It might take place in St. James's Palace in London again. I hope that we shall have an assurance about the publication of a White Paper. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman will be able to say anything about a further conference of representatives of the United Nations, but I know that the matter is very much in the hearts and minds of many people most closely associated with this work, in order that such a conference might give a lead to the world and reconcile people to sacrifices, with regard to rations and in other ways, which I believe they will have to undertake. They will take it better and more easily from a great international pronouncement than from a statement issued in this country, however great the authority may be. If the statement is made on behalf of the United Nations, the whole world will know that it has been considered by a World Council whose recommendations will probably have more effect than anything we can say in this Committee.
§ Mr. Palmer (Winchester)I am glad that the last speaker drew attention to the need for making people realise the responsibilities and the sacrifices which will have to be undertaken after the war. I welcome this Debate because it is one occasion for helping in that direction. To-day we are getting our first taste of this practical task, which will have to be undertaken, not only in Europe, but, later, in the Far East as well. It is not merely a question of voting some £80,000,000, but also of recognising that we are undertaking specific responsibilities abroad of a kind of which we have not thought very much so far in this country, being preoccupied with the war and with questions of domestic reconstruction. In his opening speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer told us something of the work of U.N.R.R.A. and its intermediate position, which I understand it occupies, between military operations on the one hand and long-term reconstruction on the other. I have no doubt that it is very difficult to draw any but a 590 rather wavy line on either side of its functions, but because of that fact it is important to try to define its scope and its relation to military operations on the one side and to long-term reconstruction on the other.
The Report, on the length of which the hon. Member has just commented, is a very impressive and comprehensive document, and it lays down several principles for relief and rehabilitation which will commend themselves universally to this Committee. As I understand it, U.N.R.R.A. cannot go into operation in any foreign territory after this has been liberated except by the consent, either of the military commander, or, as the case may be, of some recognised national authority. No doubt, as different countries are liberated, they will have different attitudes towards the scope and the nature of any relief they may require through the agency of U.N.R.R.A. In the event of any national authority, the recognised national authority, inviting the assistance of U.N.R.R.A. it is laid down as being desirable, I am glad to note, that the national authority, or Government, should, itself, as far as possible, be responsible for distributing the relief. Two important conditions are laid down in respect to that matter, and I am sure we wish to underline them very much. The first is that any supplies shall be granted, only on condition that efficient measures of price control and rationing are maintained, in the country concerned. The second is that there shall be no question of discrimination of grounds of race, creed, or political party, in the distribution of supplies. I am sure that this Committee will do well to endorse those two principles. I will go a step further. In the case where a national authority, or Government, is the distributing agency, any supplies which come from U.N.R.R.A. should be safeguarded as to their distribution so as to make it absolutely certain that those two vital principles are not violated.
I would like to add one or two other principles as well, as worthy to be considered in this respect. We have here 44 nations making an experiment in practical co-operation. Theirs is a strictly practical job, but it can be wrecked, if political questions or issues creep in. I trust that everything possible will be done to avoid such a calamity. I welcome the suggestions made in the Report for recruitment 591 and training—I hope early recruitment and rapid training—of a really high quality international Civil Service, as part of their machinery.
Now I come to the question of cost. I have no doubt that the people of this country will be most anxious to vote the £80,000,000 required, but it is not merely a question of money but also of supplies and manpower. When one of my hon. and gallant Friends talked about food, he mentioned only one aspect of the various shortages with which we shall later be faced and which any relief given under U.N.R.R.A. can only accentuate. I have no doubt that the most generous support will be given to all measures proposed for these purposes, on this condition, that the House and the country are convinced that they are administered with true economy, by which I do not mean cheese-paring or grudging, but getting the maximum possible return for all money, supplies and personnel devoted to these purposes. Obviously, there are grave limitations. Supplies and shipping will be short, because we expect still to be pursuing the major war in the Far East at the time when we are undertaking this relief work in Europe. Great demands will be made for skilled and high-quality man-power in this work, and no doubt those demands will have to be pressed against the demand for such people in many other walks of life, either in the Services or in civilian employment related to the war effort. I should like to ask my right hon. Friend whether he is satisfied that U.N.R.R.A. will have sufficient influence to acquire, not large quantities of personnel but sufficient quantities of the highly-skilled personnel, who will be required, whether in the field of welfare, relief, health, or agriculture, or whatever it may be.
I was very glad that the Chancellor of the Exchequer underlined that U.N.R.R.A.'s position is that of helping other people to help themselves. That was very well expressed as one of the principles underlying U.N.R.R.A. in the Report itself, where it says that the relief service
should be designed to help people to help themselves.This applies not merely to welfare services but to others which are in view. 592 Within the limits of supplies and manpower and so forth, we want to ensure, as far as we possibly can—I am sure that other nations think the same in this respect—that the arrival of the United Nations in countries at present occupied will really mean lifting a curse from the shoulders of the peoples concerned. We want them to feel that the difference is a real thing; but I want to emphasise and underline that I think it would be fatal in the long run, either to raise false hopes, hopes higher than are justified by the supplies and the personnel available, or to press on unwilling publics, offers of assistance in forms which they do not require. The key to all this, to economy, to getting things right and understood, to getting results, is careful advanced planning and organisation. This has to be, I suppose, as highly developed as if we were planning a major military operation.There seem to me to be three aspects of this planning. You have to determine the needs as far as you can estimate them, you have to determine how far you can meet those needs and in what order of priorities, and you have to set up the most efficient organisation to administer the whole thing. As far as needs are concerned, a great deal of work and examination have to be done in many different directions, country by country. You have to try to determine, as far as you can, what stocks of food or consumption goods are available, what raw materials, what industrial plant for making relief goods, what is the condition of agriculture, what transport is available for relief purposes, what is the state of health as regards deficiency diseases, epidemics and so on. There is the question of population transfers and their distribution in Germany and elsewhere. You may have to make some estimate of requirements of administrative personnel for local government. For it may be that in some territories the Germans, as part of their scorched earth policy, will take the local administrators of towns and villages with them and we may have to improvise something to replace them. You have to study the existing system of German controls in occupied territories, because, if they are suddenly removed and you do not understand what has been going on previously you may easily get into difficulties.
593 I believe that a great deal of the very big undertaking of obtaining information as to future needs and demands has been done over a period by the Inter-Allied Committee. I believe that Committee has worked admirably and is keeping its estimates up to date and is showing a real spirit of co-operation as between its members in relation to these questions. I am sure that that spirit of co-operation which has been shown in the Inter-Allied Committee over this period will be carried forward into the work of U.N.R.R.A. itself. On the other side, there is the question of procurements and distribution, I was very glad indeed that the Chancellor underlined the necessity for getting estimates for overall requirements for relief work and putting them up to the responsible inter-Governmental agencies which are concerned. That is the only possible principle by which you can get a fair distribution as between the different countries concerned, whether they are capable of paying for supplies or not. Otherwise, you will get what the Chancellor described as a scramble for supplies and inflation of prices. It is only by adequate preliminary work of the kind I have described, that these overall requirements can be procured from the agencies concerned.
As regards distribution, the Report does make detailed proposals over the whole field. May I congratulate my right hon. Friend and his colleagues at the Conference on the very valuable feat performed in procuring such a Report, which appears to have thought of practically everything? Quite clearly the Conference was concerned to avoid the delays and ineffectiveness which took place in 1918 and 1919 and I think that we must all be very glad that my right hon. Friend the junior Burgess for Oxford University (Sir A. Salter) is to play such a prominent part in this organisation. It so happens, as I have no doubt hon. Members know, that he wrote an interesting book after the last war on Allied shipping control and described the successive stages leading to delay in 1918 and early 1919. In that book, referring to the Supreme Economic Council which was finally set up in February, 1919, he says:
This Council, restricted to one not clearly separable part of the many economic problems facing the Allies, without the assistance of a staff accustomed to work together and without either the uniting force of the war or the tradition 594 of actual action which that force had given to the war organisations, proved ineffective.That was the third shot at getting an organisation. U.N.R.R.A. is an attempt to avoid these pitfalls, but I should like to feel certain in my mind that now this organisation is in process of being set up, in accordance with the principles and aims laid down in the Report, it is to have, a sufficient status with Government Departments and with inter-Governmental agencies, that it is to have sufficient leverage, as it were, with the bodies who will be concerned to assist it, really to play the effective part we all hope it is going to play.I do not want to go over the whole field of the proposals laid down in the Report. That would take a very long time. But there is one aspect of them to which I would like to draw attention. That is the question of the repatriation of displaced persons. Attention has been drawn to the question of food, as being the most difficult and most important. One does not want to enter into competition with other people on what is the most important thing, but no one can possibly regard this question of the repatriation of displaced persons without something of the apprehension and anxiety about the the nature of the problem, which is displayed in the pages of the Report itself. The Report draws attention to three main types of danger: the possibility of uncontrolled and uncontrollable mass movements, the possibility of epidemics not only in Germany but amongst persons as they are in transit through other countries to their homes, and finally bringing epidemics back home with them.
Then there are the dangers that political issues, political party feelings, may obstruct or make more difficult repatriation of the kind we would like to see. Now the responsibility of U.N.R.R.A. for this question of displaced persons as far as I understand the Report is limited to their repatriation and relief. It refuses to take any responsibility for their future employment. I think I am right in my interpretation of the Report. I appreciate that U.N.R.R.A. must restrict the scope of its activities in this respect but one is bound to ask oneself how U.N.R.R.A. can do an effective job in relation to displaced persons unless it is in the closest possible contact with those persons who will be responsible for employment and long term 595 reconstruction. After all, what has happened to Europe's economy during the war? It has been completely subservient to the aim of feeding the German war machine. It is not merely a question of having to transfer populations, of there being taxes and levies and confiscations on a large scale; but a large part of the industrial and agricultural production of Europe has been sold to a single consumer, Germany at war, and that single consumer, Germany at war, will disappear overnight quite suddenly. Obviously, you cannot unwind the European economy in a moment, but if it is not taken in hand speedily, it will inevitably collapse into chaos, so that U.N.R.R.A. must, inevitably, have the closest possible relations with those authorities, whether they are national authorities or international authorities, who are responsible for planning long-term reconstruction and carrying them out in the shape of practical policy.
One word about relief in ex-enemy territories, and, of course, more particularly in Germany. No doubt this is a subject which will arouse violent antagonism, more particularly if supplies to Germany mean greater shortages over here or in occupied territories. That is a perfectly intelligible and natural point of view. I do not approach this question with any idea of being kind to the German people. I think we should approach it solely from the standpoint of the conditions which will have to be enjoyed by the armies of occupation. That is to say it does not seem to me that we can possibly ask the armies of occupation to live in a country which is ridden with famine, disease and anarchy. I would quote a sentence from Doctor Temperley's history of the Peace Conference. Referring to 1919 he says:
It may safely be said that it was largely owing to the efforts of the British military authorities and the excellent information they possessed as to the real state of Germany, that food was sent into Germany as early as April (1919)—probably just in time to save the country from anarchy and possibly Europe from a serious catastrophe.It was the British military authorities who assisted last time. I want to be sure that we bear this danger in mind this time. Commonsense would surely forbid us to allow motives of revenge, however intelligible, to add to our already very great difficulties.596 May I say one thing about the organisation of U.N.R.R.A.? The organisation, as shown in the Report, is very impressive and very comprehensive. It must be exceedingly difficult to translate the desires and policies of 44 nations into a practical, working machine. The actual machine itself consists of a Council, a Central Committee and some ten Committees and sub-Committees in addition. If that organisation is not to be unwieldy, and I daresay it is not possible to reduce it further, the key obviously lies with the powers enjoyed by the Central Committee, who can take much quicker decisions than the Council, and the Director-General and his staff.
The powers are important, but it seems to me that almost more important is the manner in which those powers are exercised. I compared this organisation with the preparation for a military operation, but it is more than that. You must have among those persons the qualities not merely for conducting a military operation but also for handling all sorts of persons. I am sure the House welcomes the good start which has been made in setting up this organisation. No doubt, my right hon. Friend and his colleagues are now in the throes of translating the aims and the principles into a practical working machine. This is a great task, and I am sure the House will wish them well in its performance.
§ Mr. Horabin (Cornwall, Northern)I found myself in full agreement with the emphasis which a previous speaker placed upon the importance of food in relation to relief. Not long ago the Minister of Reconstruction told us that we should be faced after this war with a world shortage of food. As I see it, one of the principal objects of U.N.R.R.A. must be to spread that deficiency as thinly as possible over the whole world and not to allow any particular peoples or races to suffer. That must be their function until agricultural production once more gets into its stride. I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend talk about the shocking muddle which arose in 1918. It gives me great satisfaction to realise that U.N.R.R.A. is planning to prevent Europe and the other liberated territories, as one of our leading economists at that time put it, "starving and disintegrating before, our eyes." Here, at least, we have, I think, learnt one of the lessons of the 597 last war. The Versailles Treaty contained no provision whatever for the economic rehabilitation of Europe. Yet here today U.N.R.R.A. is setting to work, before final victory, to plan the organisation that is necessary for relief and rehabilitation. At the Atlantic City Conference the United Nations faced fairly and squarely the vital issues of relief, and to a large extent the vital issues of rehabilitation. They set up the machinery for carrying out that work, and for allocating the financial and material burdens. Also they have agreed, at any rate, upon the basic principles of distribution. I certainly welcome, as I am sure my hon. Friends do, the statement which was made in more than one of the resolutions that relief would not be used as a political weapon. We welcome, too, the fact that there is to be no discrimination in distribution on account of race, creed or political beliefs. That to us is fundamental. But if this fundamental principle is to be carried out, U.N.R.R.A. must put into each of the territories, as it is liberated, a representative of strong character and integrity.
There seems to me to be in the Resolutions rather an over-emphasis on national sovereignty and the authority of the Government in each of the liberated areas within its own territory. I think it is too much to hope that none of these Governments will want to discriminate against defenceless sections of the populations who again come under their control. In this insistence upon national sovereignty, the United Nations have unfortunately failed to learn one of the lessons of the last war. Let me give an example. If relief is to be carried out, as envisaged by the United Nations, through U.N.R.R.A., tremendous supplies will have to be transported here and there throughout Europe, through territories under different national sovereignties. Those tremendous supplies will not be transported efficiently and effectively unless steps are taken to bring the European transport system under a unified control. We all know what happened after the last war, as a result of the fact that transport in Europe was not under unified control. It led to great delays in certain territories. As a result of the way the United Nations have faced up to this question, before we have achieved final victory, there is still time to put this right, and I hope that the British Government will set an example in trying to get 598 the Governments of these territories at present occupied, to work out a more co-operative and unified economic system for Europe.
I now turn to a point which was touched upon by the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Palmer). One of the greatest defects in the policies reached at Atlantic City related to treatment of enemy territory. The fundamental defect of the Treaty of Versailles, I think, was that Germany was not only subjected, quite rightly, to the strongest possible military discipline, but also to impossible economic disabilities. That was a disaster to the German people. I think it was an even greater disaster to the people of Europe and ourselves. It was, in fact, a great disaster for the whole world. If I remember rightly, our leaders in this country in the early stages of the war made it clear that while they were determined to impose on the German nation at the end of this war the strongest military disabilities, in the words of the Leader of the House, the economic conditions imposed would be such as to give the Germans a chance to live. From the information in my possession—and I hope it is right—the British Government sought to carry out that policy at Atlantic City. They proposed that enemy territories should pay for relief to the fullest extent possible. That, in my view, was a wise and statesmanlike proposal, and it is to be regretted that the Conference decided otherwise: that enemy territories should pay in full. That means, as I understand it, that, however restricted their resources may be, they must pay in full.
I feel that on this vital point the Atlantic City Conference departed from the very wise principle laid down in some of the earlier resolutions, that the scale of relief should be dictated by need. I suggest that in our own interests and in the interests of the people of Europe, quite apart from the German people, and, indeed, in the interest of all the peoples throughout the world, that principle should apply to enemy territories as well. I hope that the hatreds and the unreason which are always bred of war are not once again going to lead the nations of Europe into actions which will sow the seeds of the next war. So far no irretrievable step has been taken, but this decision to make enemy territories pay in full for their relief is a step in the wrong direction. I hope that the British 599 Government will point out to these Governments of liberated Europe that the German people will not be able to restore all loot, to pay for the war in full and at the same time to have their industries restricted. That way lies disaster.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer also made it clear that the functions of U.N.R.R.A. were limited to the relief and rehabilitation that are necessary to prevent starvation and disease in Europe immediately after the war. Its job is not to reconstruct either Europe or the world. Nevertheless, its task is a vital prerequisite to the work of reconstruction. I hope that the Governments of the United Nations, led by the British Government, are paying attention to those far greater tasks that will face us when the period of reconstruction comes. At the Hot Springs Conference and in the organisation that sprang out of it they have made a very valuable contribution to the big task of reconstruction. The Chancellor of the Exchequer appealed to this House to support the Government to the full in this great task. If the Government set out to perform the tasks of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction with energy and drive, they will, I am sure, have the full support of every single one of us.
§ Mr. G. Strauss (Lambeth, North)The hon. Member for North Cornwall (Mr. Horabin) has expressed views with which I am so much in agreement, and has done so so ably, that he has relieved me of the necessity of making one or two points that I had in mind, which, doubtless, will be a relief to this Committee. But there are one or two things that I want to say about U.N.R.R.A. Every hon. Member, and everybody with any political mind in the country, is, I think, delighted with the steps which have been taken in bringing about this Conference in the United States, and is grateful for the tremendous amount of work done in order to produce the results which are shown in the White Paper that we have before us. I would like to thank the Ministers responsible for producing in such extended form a report of the resolutions which were passed at that Conference, thereby putting us in possession of so much vital information. It is clear that the duties and responsibilities of the U.N.R.R.A. will be enormous. Its task will be infinitely greater than anything which faced any 600 relief organisation at the end of the last war. It will require a tremendous organisation, great imagination, and a large, first-class body of personnel, and it will have to conduct its work in such a way as to earn the respect both of the liberated nations and the supplying nations.
Its work will be extremely important, not only because of the immediate relief which U.N.R.R.A. will bring to millions of people in Europe, but because on the success of U.N.R.R.A. will, in my view, largely depend the success of the United Nations in establishing a contented and prosperous Europe on a permanent basis. There will be widespread hatred and bitterness throughout Europe when the war is over, and if for months after the hour of liberation the people of Europe feel that they are not receiving adequate relief to their physical sufferings it will be very difficult to establish in their minds confidence in the good will of the United Nations, and a final peace settlement based on good will will be infinitely more difficult. The situation in Europe to-day, in regard to food and many other things, is extraordinarily bad, and we must envisage the fact that when the war is over it is likely to be infinitely worse. There will be the disintegration of the central authority in Germany, enormous devastation, and the disruption of railway transport on a far greater scale than exists to-day. The task, therefore, will be a colossal one.
Some calculations have already been made as to the amount of food which will be required by the peoples of Europe during the first six months after the war. The Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Committee, after a most careful survey, said that the minimum requirements, without building up any stocks whatsoever, will be 45,855,000 tons of food, seeds, fuel, clothing and other raw materials, and that in order to transport these necessary goods, 23,500,000 tons of shipping will be needed. The provision of such shipping and the provision of these materials and the organisation required are going to be stupendous, and that takes no account whatever of the shipping that will be required for the war in the Far East or for the transport of troops, or for bringing our Service men back to this country.
601 It is quite abvious that if this work is to be carried out with any success, and if it is to achieve anything worth while, there is bound to be a continuation of rationing in some form or other in this country when the war is over, and, on top of that, U.N.R.R.A. will have to deal with the enormous problem of refugees scattered throughout Europe. Because of the importance of its task and the degree to which its success will affect the final reconstruction of Europe it is our duty to consider its organisation, its personnel and its Resolutions with very great care. The Resolutions, which are set out in the White Paper, are, in my view, admirable ones. They express admirable sentiments, and they are couched in admirable language.
There are, however, some aspects of the organisation, as set out in the White Paper and its declarations, which give me cause for some anxiety and which, I think, must be watched. One is the extent of the rehabilitation envisaged in the Resolutions which, to my mind, limits the actions of U.N.R.R.A. to an undesirable degree. It is perfectly true, as everybody has said, that U.N.R.R.A. cannot be the instrument by which Europe is to be reconstructed. But, nevertheless, it is the instrument which is going to produce not only the necessary food and shelter, but will see that the transport system is functioning properly, that agriculture gets going again, that seeds are provided, and that the public utilities are in operation. It is quite impossible to separate the work to be done by U.N.R.R.A. in the matter of rehabilitation and setting life going again from the first steps of reconstruction.
Resolution 12, paragraph 11, states that the task of rehabilitation must not be considered as the beginning of reconstruction, for "it is co-terminous with relief." It really all depends on how that principle is carried out in practice. It may be all right, or it may not, but I fear that there may be pressure from certain quarters to curtail the rehabilitation activities of U.N.R.R.A. unnecessarily. That would be a very great pity indeed, and I hope, therefore, that the Government will encourage U.N.R.R.A. to do what it can to set the peoples of Europe on their feet again.
There is the serious problem, which was dealt with at some length by hon. 602 Members, and which I do not want to go over again, in regard to the provision that enemy or ex-enemy countries should have to pay to the full for the ministration of relief in their areas. I do not know how that will be interpreted. In connection with the payment for goods provided under U.N.R.R.A. in the countries where it may operate, I want to put this point. The success of this scheme, which envisages that the goods to be provided will not be given to the populations, but will be sold to them, depends very much indeed on the wisdom of the United Nations in fixing proper rates of exchange in the countries where U.N.R.R.A. will operate. We have had the experience of Italy, where a rate of exchange was fixed which very many people, maybe most people, felt to be far too high, with the result that the Italian currency was devalued to an extent which was quite out of keeping with the relevant standards. There has been inflation in Italy, and the goods which have been provided for the Italians under A.M.G.O.T., instead of being sold, as they well might have been, have had, in fact, almost to be given away by this country and the United States, which is a ridiculous situation. I would emphasise that if the provision of goods under U.N.R.R.A. on a paid basis is to be carried out, every care will have to be taken to see that the rates of exchange are properly fixed.
There are two more points which I want to make in this connection. Although the operations of U.N.R.R.A. are nominally in the hands of the Council of U.N.R.R.A. representing 44 associated nations, in point of fact control remains very largely in the hands of the combined Boards, which are under the control of this country, the United States and, to some extent, Canada. It is those Boards which will have to provide the material and any nation which requires relief may by-pass the Council of U.N.R.R.A. and approach these combined Boards direct. Whatever the view of the Director of U.N.R.R.A. may be, these combined Boards under Anglo-American control can be approached direct to provide food or other materials required, and there is nothing to stop those Boards supplying goods, whatever the views of the Director-General may be. That set-up seems to me to be wholly undesirable.
§ The Minister of Food (Colonel Llewellin)I would like to make it clear to the hon. Member that that is not quite the position. The provision is made that the combined Boards, before making any allocation, shall receive the Director-General's comments on what the countries concerned are to pay. Those Boards are working under the instructions of the United States Government and our own, and, of course, the policy is that because a country can pay it is not going to get preference over a country that cannot pay. The Director-General is not, in fact, going to be by-passed.
§ Mr. StraussI am very glad to hear that, for, as it is set out in the document, while the combined Boards apply to the Director-General for his comments they are not bound to accept them, and they could, if they wanted to, ignore his comments. But if we are definitely told that the combined Boards will, in point of fact, accept his comments, then my point is fully met. I am very glad to hear that declaration from the right hon. Gentleman. My last point is this, and it is a very serious one. Comment has been made by previous speakers that one of the important things about U.N.R.R.A. is that there will be no political discrimination and, indeed, the Resolutions do say quite clearly that there will be no political discrimination whatsoever. Resolution 7 says:
Relief and rehabilitation shall at no time be used as a political weapon, and no discrimination shall be made because of caste, creed or belief.But, nevertheless, there is, in fact, ample opportunity for such discrimination. Relief could be entirely refused in areas under the control of administrators who are not approved by the Governments represented on the Council. That, in my view, is a danger which we shall have to watch very carefully indeed. We all remember the experiences at the end of the last war, when the provision of food was used as a most effective political weapon by the victors. Indeed, there is no weapon more effective. The organisation or government which is in charge of the food waiting to be distributed to millions of starving people in a particular area is in an all-powerful position and can effect such political pressure as it desires. At the end of the last war relief was used most definitely as a political weapon and, in my 604 view, wholly harmfully. We must be perfectly certain that that does not happen again.May I show how, in the scheme as drawn up, with all the safeguards and the good intentions of everybody involved, discrimination would be perfectly possible? To start with, U.N.R.R.A. can only operate with the permission of the military commander in a certain area. There may be an area in, shall we say, a Balkan country, where a popular Left Government are in virtual control of the administration, but where the situation may not be entirely stable. Such a popular Left Government may be anxious to establish their authority and able to do so as soon as the country is settled and if there is food available for the people in the area. It may be that the military commander, responsible to the Government which employ him may declare that the country is not settled enough for U.N.R.R.A. to operate and therefore no relief can go to that country. By denying U.N.R.R.A. the opportunity to operate in such an area the military commander, acting may be on behalf of his Government, could, if he wanted to, use the political weapon of food relief to upset a popular Government. I am not suggesting that that is going to happen, but it did happen at the end of the last war, and we must be certain it is not going to happen again.
What I am trying to point out is that, in spite of the Resolutions passed by the Council of U.N.R.R.A., the scheme is such that a position as outlined above might happen in one or two instances. I can give other examples. The Resolutions lay it down that the administration of relief must go through the local authorities, which I think everyone will agree is perfectly correct, but there may be more than one local authority. There may be some local authorities who owe their allegiance to a refugee Government. It may be a reactionary refugee Government. There may be rival local authorities which have been set up by irredentist movements in the local population and which would probably be, under the circumstances, revolutionary organisations. There may be two local authorities through whom relief should be administered. Somebody has got to decide which one will administer the relief and divide up the food, and, in point of fact, be the 605 organisation which will be in virtual control of the area. The Government, or U.N.R.R.A., could show discrimination in that matter in deciding which local authority shall be the appointed agent, thus exercising very powerful political control. I may have a "bee in my bonnet" about the danger of relief being used as a political weapon, but I believe it is a really serious danger. It is such an easy weapon to use, because it does not involve armed force. It may be that it would not raise Questions in the House or popular feeling in the country, because nobody would know much about it. It is a mean weapon to use. It is an all powerful weapon to use amongst these people—the distribution of relief in a time of great starvation, shortage and misery—and those using it could, if they wanted to, exercise decisive political control in any area in Europe where they happened to be.
I would much rather have seen the relief organisation set up and run by an authority not responsible to Government at all. I would have preferred to have some organisation such as the Red Cross, shall we say, responsible for this work, but this is not practical politics. The work is going to be done by the Government, and therefore I suggest that it is our responsibility, in the first place, to see that it is efficiently run and, secondly, that this Government plays no part in using this organisation of relief to the starving people of Europe as a political weapon in order to establish Governments in Europe of the political direction which they may desire. I am sure the House of Commons will play its full part in supporting U.N.R.R.A. and in providing the money necessary to make it the efficient organisation which we all want it to be, because there is no doubt at all that the shape and temper of Europe in the future will, to a considerable degree, depend on the speed and efficiency and impartiality with which U.N.R.R.A. will conduct its operations.
§ Mr. Boothby (Aberdeen, East)I am sure that members of the Committee on all sides will agree with my hon. Friend who has just sat down, that nobody wants to see U.N.R.R.A. made into an instrument of political policy; and I am quite sure that we shall have a satisfactory assurance from the Government on that score. The object of U.N.R.R.A., as the Chancellor pointed out in his very lucid 606 opening speech to-day, is to help the countries of Europe to help themselves; and I do not think we shall discriminate between countries from the political point of view. The Chancellor has proposed a large sum of money. £80,000,000, even in these days, is not to be sneezed at. I think the policy we are now asked to embark upon will have wide and deep effects on our general economic policy. There is one specific point on which I would like to ask for an assurance. I hope the precedent of A.M.G.O.T. will not be followed with regard to the appointment of officers, and that they will not be recruited on a specific medical standard of health, or required to be military officers. I hope we shall draw on the best civil advice available, wherever we can get it, and not rely on a purely military organisation. Nobody knows better than the right hon. Gentleman what valuable and experienced people we have had in India, some of whom may be in this country, with tremendous experience in such matters as famine relief. I feel there may be, perhaps, a pool of retired civil servants from which we could draw to the advantage of this country and U.N.R.R.A.
That being said, I think it should be pointed out that U.N.R.R.A., though it is of vital importance, is not, necessarily, going to be very popular. On the one hand, the Americans suspect that it may be turned into an enormous European Public Works Policy, financed by them. On the other hand, the Russians fear that it may be used as a political instrument to secure the business interests of this country and the United States. Equally, I do not know that the word relief will sound very pleasantly in the ears of many European Governments. Nobody likes to be relieved if they can possibly help it. So I think we shall be under an illusion if we think that U.N.R.R.A. is going to be universally acclaimed as a kind of universal aunt by all the nations of Europe, with the full approval of the United States and Russia. Essentially, this U.N.R.R.A. is a Red Cross policy, designed to meet a particular emergency, and I think it must therefore be of a limited and temporary character. One of the leading Soviet newspapers the other days said:
The widening of the framework of the activities of U.N.R.R.A. can only result in failure of its work.I therefore think we must recognise that 607 U.N.R.R.A. by itself has a limited purpose.There is a saying in a well-known cookery book, "First catch your hare." I am sure the Minister of Food will agree that, if we are going to administer U.N.R.R.A. successfully, we must remember that we cannot feed starving populations on paper currency, or even on gold; and I hope we shall hear to-morrow of some of the steps that are being taken by the Government to grow the food and catch the fish which will be required in order to feed the starving populations of Europe The second thing to realise is that U.N.R.R.A. cannot possibly stand alone as the sole contribution of the United States to the economic rehabilitation of liberated Europe—even in the middle of war, and certainly not in the first phase after the war. Like patriotism, U.N.R.R.A. is not enough. It cannot, in my submission, be separated from commercial policy or long term development. On the contrary, it must be related to these if it is to survive itself for more than the briefest period, and if it is to do any lasting good. In short, you cannot disassociate U.N.R.R.A. from the general economic policy of the United Nations; for if you try to do so it will be ineffective and meaningless. In my submission, U.N.R.R.A. should be fitted in as an integral part of the general international economic policy of the United Nations. Do not let us forget that the German New Economic Order for Europe, deplorable as we may think it, is well known in Europe. What is our general economic policy for Europe? We do not know; but we want to know, and I think Europe wants to know. All we have been told to date is that discussions have been going on with the United States about currency, and that we are to provide the measure of relief now proposed by the Chancellor. So far as currency is concerned, we have not been very successful up to date because there is common agreement that the sterling-lira rate was wrongly fixed. I believe there has been immense hoarding in the South of Italy as the result of this sterling-lira rate; and I believe it has cost the taxpayers of this country more than it should have done, because we have had to export a good deal of food to feed the people of southern Italy, which should be a self-supporting country. Inflation 608 always induces hoarding. The Government will at any rate agree with me that this problem of the rate at which the sterling exchange should be fixed, in relation to the currencies of the countries that are liberated, should be very carefully watched; and that we should never hesitate to alter the rate should it appear to be necessary, in the light of experience.
I think it is, in some ways, unfortunate that this problem of international economic recovery, and particularly the rehabilitation of Europe, should have been tackled primarily and in the first instance by way of relief, and from the standpoint of currency; because I do not believe we shall ever get very far down that road. We tried it in 1933 and came to sad grief. Why? Because currency stabilisation can only be achieved on the basis of a durable peace, an expansionist economic policy deliberately pursued by the leading industrial countries, a sound commercial policy, and a constructive international investment policy. We are not yet in sight of any of these. It would, in my view, be folly to dish out money from U.N.R.R.A. to the countries of Europe, and at the same time to saddle them with incalculable debts to some international fund, whatever the terms in which these debts are expressed. Nevertheless, I am sure the Minister will agree that we have got to take immediate and vigorous action along more than one line to revive economic life and stimulate commercial activity, not only in Europe but in the world; and that we ought to be thinking about the action we are going to take now. This will involve something more than mere relief. It involves a Plan.
I want to suggest to the Committee that it is not going to be easy to plan any efficient or effective machinery in order to revive Europe, or indeed the world, unless the major countries which participate in that plan are agreed about the pursuit of an internal policy of economic expansion. By that I mean, quite simply, that, as long as human needs remain unsatisfied, the solution of the economic problem should be sought by expanding demand rather than by contracting supply; by clothing these human needs with effective demand in the form of adequate purchasing power. This is fundamental, and I think we ought to be talking about it now. By itself, 609 U.N.R.R.A., merely by spending a certain limited quantity of money, cannot possibly hope to fill the bill; and, unless it is succeeded by, or rather developed into, an international scheme for long-term investment in countries which stand in need of reconstruction or development or rehabilitation, it will bring no more than a momentary alleviation of actual suffering and want. It will not touch the real problem of world recovery.
I want now to say a word on the subject of machinery. I hope, and I think that hope is shared in many parts of the House, that U.N.R.R.A. will develop before long into a Supreme Economic Council of the United Nations to co-ordinate the activities of the various authorities which will have to be set up to meet the emergency situations which will successively arise after the war; or rather that a Supreme Economic Council will be superimposed upon it. Because I believe the worst mistake that we made after the last war was to abolish the Supreme Economic Council in Paris, and substitute for it a purely political League of Nations.
I believe that under this Supreme Economic Council three authorities are absolutely essential at the very start: first of all the U.N.R.R.A. organisation itself, for an immediate red-cross policy of relief for the stricken nations of Europe; secondly, an International Investment Board for long-term reconstruction in countries devastated by the war, and also for the development of backward countries; and thirdly, an international Commodity Board of the kind envisaged by my right hon. Friend at the Hot Springs Conference. Without this last, I cannot see how U.N.R.R.A. itself can hope to discharge its function, which is not in the end going to be the dishing out of paper pounds or even of gold, but the provision of food and raw materials for the suffering peoples of Europe. The job of an International Commodity Board, which I should hope would very soon be set up under the auspices of a Supreme Council, should be threefold: first of all, to stimulate production by long-term bulk purchases, which is the only way to stimulate production; secondly, to store and distribute certain basic raw materials; and thirdly, to act as a buffer in the commodity markets, with the object of stabilising world commodity prices. Until these various authorities are established and 610 functioning successfully, it is waste of time even to think of anything in the nature of a multilateral clearing union.
It is necessary now to distinguish very sharply between the immediate activities of U.N.R.R.A., which comprise short-term relief; trade, which is the mutually advantageous exchange of goods between various countries; and development, which involves the long-term utilisation by the devastated, backward or deficit countries of the world of the cumulative surpluses of the creditor countries. Do not let us over lose sight of the fact that the essential character of trade—and it is upon the revival of trade that the recovery of Europe ultimately depends—is an act of barter; and I do not see why we should be afraid of that word.
You cannot blow up the world twice in a generation, and with it an economic system which has prevailed for a century, and then expect to go on exactly where you left off. You have to start again right from the beginning, and rebuild your world economy on sound principles and foundations, which will meet the requirements of a new era. It is no use shirking the difficulties merely by pretending they do not exist. Let us begin at the beginning, and the first thing of all is relief. The next step is, I believe, bilateral agreements; which, in turn, would gradually be expanded into regional economic organisations. These bilateral agreements will take the form of arrangements between specific countries to take payment for their respective exports in one another's currency; supplemented by long-term purchase contracts in respect of certain basic commodities. With our great internal market in this country, we are in a strong position to negotiate them; but they will involve both exchange control, and control over imports.
The next thing would be the extension of these bilateral agreements into regional agreements, involving multilateral trade between various groups of countries. I hope—and this definitely concerns U.N.R.R.A.—that not only in respect of our own Empire, but also in respect of Western Europe, where our prestige will be high after the war is over, and where our financial services and experience will he required, we shall seek by every means in our power to develop these regional economic units. The United States of America and the U.S.S.R. are bound, in 611 any event, to pursue a policy of economic regionalism. You cannot avoid this. It is logical, reasonable and desirable that we should do the same, in the company of those countries with economic objectives similar to our own. At all costs we must not go back to the system which prevailed before the war, under which every country sought to increase its export surplus at the expense of its neighbours—in other words, to export its own unemployment.
Bilateral trade is the only answer to international illiquidity. International illiquidity before the war was caused mainly by the refusal of the world's greatest creditor nation to accept payment for its current surpluses in any other token than gold, or to relend them to the deficit nations. We are going to co-operate with the United States on the Council of U.N.R.R.A.; but we have no assurance at all that the United States will alter its fundamental economic policy in this respect. In these circumstances, we should be mad to tie ourselves up in any rigid world currency scheme.
In conclusion, may I make an urgent plea to His Majesty's Government to concentrate upon functional economic organisation after the war? In that respect we can all welcome U.N.R.R.A. It is an excellent example, and a very good start. It leaves the essentials of national sovereignty untouched. An hon. Member behind spoke about national sovereignty in very disparaging terms. Whatever theoretical views we may hold about national sovereignty, I believe we are not going to get rid of it as easily as all that. Whatever our own views as a nation may be, the views of other countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States, may be very different; and they will, I think, be very reluctant to deprive themselves of national sovereignty, especially in the political sphere. The greatest advantage of U.N.R.R.A. is that it leaves that aspect of national sovereignty untouched. It also avoids those elaborate paper constitutions and declarations which proved such a snare and a delusion during the inter-war period, and particularly when the covenant of the League of Nations was drafted. It tackles at least one of the post-war economic problems as a practical issue in a practical way. Modern 612 productive capacity imposes its own limitations. If we let it get out of hand, it can bring chaos. It must therefore be controlled. What is our ultimate goal? What is the ultimate goal of U.N.R.R.A., and of the United Nations? Freedom from want, and full employment, in a free society. That is the difficult, absorbing and exciting task which confornts us. The more we make our international organisations like U.N.R.R.A. and the International Commodity Board and the International Investment Board coextensive with actual practical activities, the more we develop the social and economic scope as against the purely political scope of international authority, the greater our success will be. Do not let us bite off more than we can chew and try and jump into world economic authority before we have succeeded in establishing local and regional authorities. Functional organisation, and the development of balanced regional economic units must be our first international objective; and the necessary foundation of any wider world economic order.
§ Mr. Hammersley (Willesden, East)I do not propose to deal in anything like the comprehensive way with this matter as has been done by my hon. Friend the Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby). Though I appreciate most of what he has said there is perhaps a little flaw in the argument. He has indicated to us that bilateral agreement is the foundation upon which economic world organisation in the future should be keyed. If bilateral schemes are formulated we might be forced to some kind of restriction in our international economic organisations. Would it not be better to talk first not about bilateralism but about the necessity for world economic expansive policies and advocate the adoption by all nations of expansive internal economic policies rather than possible limitation by way of bilateralism?
I would like to say a word of welcome to the proposal that the Government have put forward in respect to U.N.R.R.A. It is appreciated that U.N.R.R.A. plan is only one of a number of international experiments in co-operation which we shall have to achieve if we are going to get the kind of world for which we are all seeking. I cannot examine the proposals of U.N.R.R.A. in any detail because in common with about 999,999 613 people out of every million one is very ignorant of what really is taking place. I would like to make a plea for less secrecy in these discussions which must take place before propositions are brought on to the floor of the House of Commons. In America they do these things rather more successfully. They have a system of organised leakage. If these matters were discussed and considered by persons who are interested and whose opinion is perhaps of some value before the plans achieved the state at which they come to the floor of the House of Commons, the House of Commons has either to accept or reject proposals presented to them, and the House of Commons would not think of rejecting measures of this kind without very much better knowledge.
We are guided in arriving at a judgment by considering some of the fruits of policies of this character. Several hon. Members have pointed out that one of the few places in which we can see the fruits of this international co-operation—though not precisely in the form of U.N.R.R.A.—is in southern Italy. There there is a tremendous amount of hardship which, in the opinion of many well-informed people, is unnecessary. The fixing of the rate of exchange at a very high figure has been noted by more than one Member. When one reflects that the amount of protein to which the American soldier is entitled in one day is more than the amount of protein the Italian people have in 30 days, international collaboration is not particularly successful. It must be remembered that in these measures of collaboration we in this country are involved and have to bear the odium for decisions for which we are not ourselves primarily responsible. It would be advisable if the Government could find better avenues for letting the House of Commons and the country know a little more about these proposals before they are finally settled than is at present the case.
Undoubtedly it should go out from the House of Commons and the country that we consider that the restoration of Europe is our primary duty and that we are prepared to play our part in international co-operation which we believe is the only practical way. We are willing and anxious to make our proper contribution, and a contribution of £80,000,000 is a very considerable one. One's mind is brought to consider how that £80,000,000 614 can be dealt with, bearing in mind that the relief that we want to give is food and material; it is not cash.
It seems to me essential, if we are to be able effectively to provide these means of payment that every one of the great countries of the world should pursue its own proper internal policy, an internal policy of full employment. If we achieve that, then we may be able to achieve means of payment which are indeed international, whether in the form of Bancor or some other international unit of the currency plans which are now being considered. If policies of full employment are not pursued in, say, the United States of America, and the United States of America thinks it is possible to export its unemployment, then we shall indeed be forced on to the policy of bilateralism which my hon. Friend has dealt with—we shall be forced in self-interest and, in fact, in the interest of the entire world, to agree to the formation of sterling block and we may find ourselves indulging in a competitive currency system arranged through bilateral treaties—a system which, in the end, will not, in my judgment, be for the greatest advantage of the world. America has got to face up to these facts. We cannot have international co-operation without America pursuing an internal policy which is in line with international co-operation. America has the ability, the wealth, and the power, and now America has got the opportunity. We, in this country, say we are willing to co-operate but we look to America to take advantage of that opportunity and then we will play our part.
§ Mr. BoothbyMay I interrupt for one moment? It is only to say that I was at pains to point out in my speech that it was only in the absence of some assurance that the United States would pursue an expansionist policy that we should be obliged to fall back on bilateralism.
§ Mr. HammersleyI agree entirely, but it is desirable to say that the policy we would pursue of first choice is the policy of international collaboration, and it is only if we are forced to a policy of bilateralism that we shall adopt that policy not because we want to but because we have to do so.
§ Miss Rathbone (Combined English Universities)I want to draw attention quite briefly to two or three points which have 615 not yet been dealt with in this Debate. They chiefly regard that function of U.N.R.R.A. which concerns the maintenance and repatriation of displaced persons. That is a very valuable and important provision and the size of that function alone which faces U.N.R.R.A. is shown in the estimate occurring somewhere in the White Paper that there will be tens of millions of displaced persons who will have to be considered at the end of the war. There is one thing that makes me a little anxious, and it is the treatment of that point in the White Paper. Perhaps it is natural, because it is a United Nations administration, but to my mind the whole tone of it is a little too much in nationalistic terms, as though it had been thinking almost exclusively of nationals of the United Nations and had been almost obliged to apologise for considering anybody else—for example, on page 74 in paragraph 11, where they refer almost timidly to the question of whether they shall help the return to their homes of displaced persons of enemy or ex-enemy nationality.
That presents particular difficulties, and they go on to hint that they may probably only be considering whether the person of ex-enemy or enemy nationality needed to be removed in cases where persons of United Nations nationality wanted to take over the homes from which the others were to be repatriated. I hope it will not be forgotten that there are large numbers of persons of enemy nationality or Stateless who are not of enemy sympathies and, in the same spirit which dictates that provision that U.N.R.R.A. shall not be influenced in giving relief by considerations of race or creed, these people should not be under this disadvantage because their origin is that of the enemy. For example, in some of the present enemy-occupied countries which U.N.R.R.A. will be dealing with as soon as they are liberated, there are large numbers of ex-German or Austrian Jews many of whom are now Stateless. There may also be persons belonging to neutral countries who will require to be repatriated and meantime maintained, I suggest that the test should be not so much the nationality of the displaced persons but whether their displacement is due to their own fault, or whether they are the victims of the persecuting and enemy nations, and in that case I think 616 they deserve as much attention as the nationals of the United Nations.
Then, again, in dealing with the question of health they speak at the top of page 13 of the need for close co-operation with the National Health authorities with a view to preventing and controlling any epidemics which may be expected to arise in the course of the repatriation of large groups of displaced persons. Here again, I would recall to the Committee the fact that in these countries there are enormous concentration camps used mainly for Jews, partly for political persons, where the internees have been subjected to almost complete starvation. There are also many labour camps of the same kind where health conditions will need to receive the closest possible attention not only to prevent epidemics, but before there can be a question of removing those people to places of permanent settlement. Here again I only want to make the point that the main test should be the need of the displaced person and not his national origin.
There is another point concerning displaced persons. The White Paper seems to assume nearly throughout that the displaced persons with whom we have to deal will be repatriable, but there are vast numbers of refugees and displaced persons who will not be able to be repatriated, and it would be a cruelty to force them to return when they would not willingly do so. I am glad to know that throughout this and other documents it is implied that persons cannot be forced to return to their countries of origin against their will and there will undoubtedly be very large numbers who will feel it to be impossible because their former countries have no associations for them but horror. Take the question of the Jews from Poland. Would they want to go back to a place which is one vast mortuary, where their wives and children and parents have been done to death? Or persons from Germany, who may feel the same thing has happened to their families, and where anti-Semitism is so deep-rooted that they would never willingly return.
It is quite understandable that the question of non-repatriables is not dealt with here because we have learned from other documents that the settlement of non-repatriables is going to be mainly the job of the inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees. I therefore refer to it only for 617 this reason, that in the public mind and in the official mind there is some tendency to belittle the importance of the problem of the non-repatriables. Owing to the large numbers there are bound to be, this problem is not only of post-war importance but of present importance because one of the few chances of rescuing those who are still under Nazi persecution is of getting them into neutral countries, and it is going to be more difficult to get neutral countries to accept them if they feel that they are not going to get rid of them after the war. Therefore, those neutral countries ought to have speedy assurance as to what is going to happen to those who cannot be repatriated. They are now assured of ample machinery for dealing with the repatriables through U.N.R.R.A.
Although the Burmuda Conference long preceded the Hot Spring Conference, and still longer the conference at Atlantic City, we are still awaiting full discussion of the proceedings of the inter-Governmental Committee to which the whole matter was then referred and we have not voted our share of the money towards the administrative costs. I hope that a Debate on that subject will not be much longer delayed—it is a matter for the Leader of the House—and we should like to know what is the interlocking machinery, the liaison between the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees and the U.N.R.R.A. It is quite clear that their functions are going to be closely interlocked. In many cases it will be impossible beforehand to know who comes under which Committee, and which are repatriable and which are not repatriable. Therefore, those two Committees should be in constant touch and it is going to be difficult if one functions in the United States and one here in London.
Finally, I have this to say. Several speakers have referred to the fact that the enormous task to be dealt with by U.N.R.R.A. will entail some continuance of war sacrifices for ourselves, rationing will have to go on longer, and we shall have to do without food and clothing and fuel which are needed for the purposes of U.N.R.R.A. I am sure that is going to be so, and I would beg that all the human facts which lie behind this White Paper—which is full of facts of great interest to those already interested but so presented as to make for outsiders one of the dullest White Papers I have ever read—should 618 be brought home to the public by talks over the radio in this country and abroad so that people may realise the agony which Europe is enduring from hunger, from cold, and from fear. I believe that would have an admirable effect on the war effort and on the effort to save food and prevent waste. I would end with a very homely illustration. I was talking only the other day to a school mistress who said that at her girls' school she spoke to her class about the sufferings of the children in Europe. At the end one little girl said "Well, I always thought that I could not eat turnips but after hearing what those poor children in Europe are suffering, I feel I ought to be glad to eat anything." There is far too little realisation, even by those who are studying international problems all the time, of how little the general public know of what is happening in Europe. They would go to their jobs, save more and waste less if they realise that every moment of time and every piece of material wasted meant the prolongation of intolerable suffering.
§ Mr. Edmund Harvey (Combined English Universities)I do not wish to delay the Committee for more than a few minutes. I feel that all of us who were present to hear the Chancellor of the Exchequer open the Debate, and who have followed much of what has been said since, must realise the immense importance of the issue with which Parliament is now asked to deal for the first time. We must, however, regret that it is not realised more fully by the country as a whole and that we did not have a larger attendance to hear the Chancellor's speech on a subject of such importance that the whole future of Europe, if not of the world, depends upon its being carried through successfully. I think we can all feel thankful that even in such an important period of the war the United Nations are turning their thoughts in the way they have been doing to the work of healing and reconstruction. Looking back to what happened at the last stage of the last war and to the years-that followed we can take hope from the fact that thought is being given now to these immense problems and that international co-operation is being worked out in a practical way. The task will be far too big for any one nation to tackle or for voluntary relief to deal with, as it did very largely, after the last war.
619 What I want to plead for to-day is that in this planning and inter-governmental action which is absolutely necessary there shall be room still, and a secure place, for the voluntary organisations and their workers who can bring to their task the human touch that will be needed and who can give a certain amount of elasticity that cannot altogether be provided by the very best of planning. I remember that at the close of the last war, when I was working on relief and reconstruction in France, a good deal of thought was given to the subject of planning and reconstruction by the French local government authorities. The mission with which I was connected was co-operating with them, but plans had to be modified many times because of unforeseen factors. Many people were coming back to homes that did not exist in a way which had not been planned for by their own authorities. I remember an old lady of 80 appearing one evening with a cow and expecting to get back to her own village which had been utterly destroyed. She was only one of a number. You will have all over Europe crowds coming back in spite of all planning and all governmental action and you will need to have ample elasticity in your organisation, not to have it all tied up with decisions which leave no initiative or authority to the people on the spot. You will need to trust and make use of volunteers with experience and suitable qualifications who will work in with this inter-governmental planning. Unless you have this human touch you will fail again and again in a task where success is of immense importance not only to the individual but to the well being of the whole population.
So I shall be glad if we can get an assurance from the Minister of State that, along with this wise planning—which. I hope will be carried out in harmony with the spirit of the resolution that has laid down that no regard will be paid to race, nationality or creed but to human needs—there will be ample scope for the work of the volunteer and for the human sympathy and fellowship which no governmental machine can give. They must be married together if we are to get the success we need. I am sure that in all quarters of the Committee we shall wish that utmost success to the Minister in his great work and be thankful that he has this high position of authority and 620 such men to aid him as the Junior Burgess for Oxford University (Sir A. Salter) and Sir Frederick Leith Ross, with their wide experience and vision. I am sure the Minister will have the sympathy and good will of all parties in this House for this work of binding up the wounds of war.
§ The Minister of State (Mr. Richard Law)This has been an extremly interesting and an extremely encouraging Debate. My hon. Friend the Member for the Combined English Universities (Mr. Harvey) rather lamented that the attendance of the Committee had been small. Well, there are times when quality makes up for quantity and I believe that to-day has been such an occasion. We have had a number of extraordinarily interesting, thoughtful and constructive speeches from Members of the Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for East Willesden (Mr. Hammersley) said he thought it was important that a message should go out from the British House of Commons to the effect that we did recognise our responsibilities for the recovery of Europe and that we did believe in the principles of international co-operation. I am quite sure that such a message has, in fact, gone out from the Committee to-day.
My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he opened this Debate, referred to the White Paper as "a formidable document." The hon. Lady the Member for the Combined English Universities (Miss Rathbone) said it was one of the dullest White Papers she had ever read. I must say I disagree with her entirely. Formidable this White Paper certainly is: it is formidable in its complexity, in its scope and in the terrific magnitude of the problems with which it deals. But as well as being formidable it is, I believe, tremendously inspiring.
§ Miss RathboneMay I say that we who are interested in this matter do not find it dull?
§ Mr. LawI am very glad that I misunderstood the hon. Lady.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Bristol (Captain Bernays) said he thought the proceedings of the Atlantic City Conference were a decisive example for the future. I entirely agree. I think that, if the approach of the United Nations to the problems of peace is to be the same as the approach that was 621 made at Atlantic City—an approach which combined realism with determination, benevolence without any trace of patronage and self-respect without any trace of excessive nationalism—then there is hope for us all. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood) pointed out that we have a special responsibility for this Whole relief problem because it was here in London that the whole thing was started two or three years ago, and he warned us that we must not evade that responsibility. I think there is no chance that we shall try to evade it, and the proceedings at Atlantic City bear that out too. It may not be altogether inappropriate if I echo here something that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer said. From everything that I have heard about Atlantic City the United Kingdom delegation, under the able leadership of the Minister of Food, had a very great part to play and played it nobly. Here again, if we can look forward in the post-war world to that kind of leadership from this country, a leadership sane, balanced, knowledgeable, and without any trace of dictation—and the proceedings at Atlantic City seem to indicate that we can—there is very much hope for us all.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield surveyed some of the history of the past and I hope the Committee will not think it unduly tedious on my part if I cover and elaborate some of the points that he made. I think if I recapitulate some of the previous history of U.N.R.R.A., it will help the Committee both to understand the difficulties with which U.N.R.R.A. is faced and the manner in which it is hoped it will be able to meet them; and I hope it may throw some light upon some of the points that are troubling some of my hon. Friends. As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, the story of relief does not begin with the Atlantic City Conference. It does not even begin with the signature of the U.N.R.R.A. agreement at the White House. It began merely nearly three years ago with the meeting of the Allied Governments at St. James's Palace. As the result of those meetings, there was set up the Inter-Allied Committee of Postwar Requirements, of which the Inter-Allied Bureau, under the direction of Sir Frederick Leith Ross, was, as it were, the secretariat. The Inter-Allied Committee had no executive functions. Even 622 then, nearly three years ago, it was recognised that some executive machinery would sooner or later be required, but the function of the Inter-Allied Committee was not to execute policy but rather to gather information without which it would have been impossible to formulate any policy at all. Accordingly the Inter-Allied Committee prepared a series of estimates for the needs of liberated Europe, and those estimates have in a sense been the foundation of U.N.R.R.A.; and, if it had not been for the activities of the Inter-Allied Committee and the Bureau, the task of U.N.R.R.A. would have been even more formidable than in fact it is to-day.
The estimates prepared by the Inter-Allied Committee were necessarily incomplete and imperfect, but they provided the basis upon which relief work has been founded ever since. I said that these estimates were incomplete and imperfect for this reason. The Inter-Allied Committee was not concerned with questions of supply but purely with questions of relief. It did not have to consider whether supplies were available, but only on the assumption that they were available, what measure of supply would be necessary to meet an ascertained need. In this sense the estimates of the Inter-Allied Committee must be regarded to some extent as theoretical. Nevertheless, subject to this qualification, which I admit in the circumstances in which we find ourselves is a considerable qualification, I do not think it would be possible to overestimate the value of the work that has been done by the Inter-Allied Committee, work without which it would have been impossible for U.N.R.R.A. to proceed at all. Not only that. The proceedings of the Inter-Allied Committee to those who followed them were an outstanding example of United Nations co-operation. It was quite remarkable how the representatives of our various peoples were prepared to set aside their particular interests for the sake of promoting the common interest. U.N.R.R.A. has indeed a high example to follow in the proceedings of the Inter-Allied Committee but, if the Atlantic City Conference is any guide, that example will be followed to the fullest possible extent.
I have said that this story began with the meeting at St. James's Palace in 1941. Conditions in 1944 are very different from what they were then, and it is those differences 623 which largely condition the work of U.N.R.R.A. In 1941 we were living, as we supposed, in a time of abundance and of surpluses. The problem in those days was simply how to distribute that abundance and dispose of those surpluses. It is very different to-day. It is no longer a problem of distributing abundance and disposing of surpluses. It is no longer a case of cutting up the cake and handing it round on a silver platter. It is a case of scraping the pot and making do. It is no longer a question of distributing from our abundance to each according to his need, but of spreading the butter as widely as we can, and distributing our slender resources with as little unfairness as possible. To-day, as compared with 1941, we are in a period of acute scarcity. There is a world shortage of food, a world shortage of many kinds of raw material, above all there is a world shortage of labour and shipping. And these shortages obviously have a very great effect upon the operations of U.N.R.R.A.
Another great change has taken place since 1941. Then it was not a world war that we were engaged in. There was no Far Eastern war. The United States was not among our Allies. In those days we were proceeding on the assumption that, at a given moment of time, the war would come to an end, Europe would be liberated and we should be free to proceed at once, and without any other pre-occupation, to the task of reconstruction and relief. In fact, as we know, things have turned out otherwise. In all human probability the war with Japan will continue after the war with Germany is over, and, even so far as the war in Europe is concerned, it is possible that the war with Germany itself will still be continuing after parts of Europe have been liberated. In other words, the prosecution of the war and the affording of relief have to proceed simultaneously. The claims of war and the claims of peace will be marching along side by side, and to some extent in competition. More than that, in 1941 we were thinking only in terms of the relief of Europe. Now we have to think of the relief of Asia as well. The task is both vaster and much more complicated than we thought it was in 1941. At the same time, the resources which we have for discharging that task are nothing like so great.
624 It is against this background of a gigantic task, with strictly limited resources for meeting it, that we have to consider the functions of U.N.R.R.A. and the whole problem of relief. The Committee will have seen from the White Paper that the Council meeting at Atlantic City has taken full account of these difficulties—the difficulties that arise from the fact that the war will still be continuing after the period of relief has begun, and the difficulties that arise from shortages of supply. In the first place, it was laid down at Atlantic City that the prosecution of the war must have absolute paramountcy over everything else, that everything must be subordinated to the prosecution of the war. From that proposition, from which I imagine there will be little dissent, certain consequences flow, notably this, that the operations of U.N.R.R.A. have to be co-ordinated with and to some extent subordinated to the supplying agencies which are responsible for allocating the supplies and shipping which are needed for the prosecution of the war. Any other arrangement would obviously, I think, lead to chaos, a chaos which would affect the course of military operations, would prolong the war and would make infinitely more difficult the already difficult task of U.N.R.R.A. That does not mean, however, that the policy of U.N.R.R.A. is to be dictated to it by the supply agencies. It does mean that the demands of U.N.R.R.A. for purely relief purposes have to be fitted into the wider demands of the war. It means that the needs of our Armed Forces must be fully met. It means that the contribution of civilian populations to the war effort must not be limited, and that a fair distribution of available supplies to civilian populations must take into account their contributions, actual or potential, to the war effort.
Several of my hon. Friends, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield, raised the question of the relationship between relief and rehabilitation on the one hand, and reconstruction on the other. My right hon. Friend said that, however much you tried to make a dividing line, you could not really divide rehabilitation from reconstruction. My hon. Friend the Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby) and I think my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Palmer) said it was essential that 625 U.N.R.R.A. should have the closest contact with other United Nations economic organisations which have been set up or may be set up in the future. It is quite true that it is impossible on a matter of this kind to draw any hard and fast line. I think that there is a workable line drawn in the White Paper. U.N.R.R.A. is concerned with the short-term problems of relief, suffering and want arising directly out of the war. So far as rehabilitation, that is to say the supply of spare parts, machinery and so on, is needed for that purpose, then U.N.R.R.A. will assist in rehabilitation; but it is laid down clearly in Resolution 12, paragraph 9, that U.N.R.R.A. is not itself an organ of world reconstruction. I think that that is as it should be. It would clearly be impracticable for this piece of United Nations machinery, which has already this formidable task before it, to take on in addition the task of a world economic conference.
§ Mr. GreenwoodIt is quite clear that U.N.R.R.A. is a device for a specific purpose, and the point I tried to make was that the policy followed would really affect the shape and terms of post-war reconstruction. I was not recommending that U.N.R.R.A. should be a world body for all purposes.
§ Mr. LawI am much obliged to my right hon Friend for his interjection. I thoroughly endorse what he has just said. It is true that what is done here will affect the long-term picture, and it is, therefore, all the more essential that the closest contact should be maintained between U.N.R.R.A. and other organisations which may be set up by the United Nations. Provision is made for that contact in the Resolutions themselves. The White Paper lays it down that the administration has to maintain contact with the supply agencies. It also lays down that it should maintain contact with other inter-governmental agencies, and it specifies the International Labour Office and the Interim Food Commission which resulted from Hot Springs, or the permanent Food Office which we hope will result from the interim deliberations of the Food Commission. This question of collaboration has been thoroughly well taken care of by the Council. I agree with my right hon. Friend and my other hon. Friends that it is an important point.
626 As well as the principle that the operations of U.N.R.R.A. must be subordinated to the war effort these Resolutions have enunciated another important principle. That is, although it is not defined in these words, that in a time of great shortage it is undesirable as well as unfair that there should be an unlimited scramble for goods and services in short supply. It is clearly unfair that where you have two nations, both of which have been equally despoiled by the enemy and both of which have equally resisted him, one nation should have a preferential advantage over the other which is based upon nothing but considerations of finance. It is clearly undesirable for quite other reasons. If when the war is drawing to its closing stages we in the United Nations admit the principle of the auction room, that the longest purse must be the final arbiter in these matters, and if we allow an unlimited scramble for limited supplies, not only will we build up a post-war boom which will be a record in all post-war booms, but we will create a slump by the side of which the depression of the thirties will appear like a smiling sunlit valley. We should, if we took that course, be underwriting unemployment queues and breadlines in this country, the United States, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and in each of the United Nations.
The Council, at Atlantic City, however, decided otherwise. It decided against that course. It was laid down by the Council that one of the principal functions of the Director-General of U.N.R.R.A. should be to hold the balance between those countries which have adequate resources and those which are lacking in resources. In, I think, the third part of the first Resolution on general policy, in the White Paper, the Director-General is instructed to supply himself with an over-all picture of relief as a whole from all the liberated territories, whether they have resources or whether they have not. He is instructed to acquaint himself with the global picture of relief. It is his right, indeed it is his duty, if he sees any disparity of treatment between one country and another, to make his representations to the supplying agencies. And it is the duty of the supplying agencies to heed his representations.
I have given the Committee two of the main principles which must govern 627 the operations of U.N.R.R.A.: the paramountcy of the war and the need for holding the balance between countries with resources and those without; but there is a third principle which emerges quite clearly from this White Paper. It is, I think, a vital principle. The Committee will have noticed that in more than one Resolution some allusion is made to the Director-General or the administration taking such and such action "if so invited" or "if so requested" by the military commander or by the local government. That means in effect that U.N.R.R.A. is not conceived of as a dictatorship, not even a benevolent dictatorship. U.N.R.R.A. is not even conceived of as a kindly governess or universal aunt, bustling about, whether she is wanted or not, and handing out a smack to a rebellious child or a sweet or candy to a satisfactory child. That is not the picture at all. U.N.R.R.A. goes only where U.N.R.R.A. is wanted. If a country requires the assistance of U.N.R.R.A., that assistance will be given to the fullest extent possible, but if a country prefers to apply its own power and to get on without U.N.R.R.A's assistance, it is free to do that.
As the Chancellor of the Exchequer said earlier to-day one of the principal functions of U.N.R.R.A. is to help the nations to help themselves. Such a conception as that, the idea that a nation should be free and encouraged to work out its own destiny, is entirely contrary to the ideas of architects. It is fundamental to the conception of the United Nations. If a nation wishes to do without the assistance of U.N.R.R.A., that nation is perfectly free to do so, but that does not mean that if a nation does without the assistance of U.N.R.R.A. it is at liberty to go out into the markets of the world and buy, regardless of what arrangements are being made by U.N.R.R.A.
Those are, as it seems to me, the main principles which are behind the United Nations Relief Administration. How are those principles to be made effective, and what is the machinery to make them effective? First of all, there is the Central Council and there is the Central Committee. Those are the policy-forming bodies. I think it was my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Dr. Haden Guest) who said that the Council 628 or the Committee of U.N.R.R.A. would have a power far greater than that of any existing national government. I think he exaggerated the power of the Committee and of the Council, because, from what I have just said about principles on which U.N.R.R.A. will operate and the principle which allows any nation to contract out of compulsory benevolence, it is clear that the Council and the Committee cannot exercise their power in any tyrannical way. However, the seat of policy is the Council and the Central Committee, and that policy is executed by the Director-General and his administrative staff. The Council, the Director-General and the Committee are being advised by a number of technical committees of which the membership, it is hoped, will be very highly qualified. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Palmer) said that even if we did not insist upon U.N.R.R.A. going out for quantity we ought to concentrate at any rate upon quality. We ought to see that the personnel it was using was highly qualified. I think my hon. Friend will find all the technical committee personnel just as highly qualified as the United Nations can lay their hands upon.
§ Mr. PalmerThe particular point I wanted to make was not in relation to the actual Administration Board and the setting up of a technical committee. It was in relation to the sending abroad of personnel in the field of relief work overseas. I am very anxious that man-power of high quality shall be made available for that work.
§ Mr. LawI am obliged to my hon. Friend but I think that principle would apply also to the technical committees as well as to the sending of personnel abroad. In addition to the technical committees I am speaking of, the central organisation includes a Committee on Supplies, of which the function would be to keep an eye on supply questions and the relationship of U.N.R.R.A. with the supplying agencies, as well as to adjudicate upon the question of payment—what country can pay and what country cannot pay. Then there is a Finance Committee, which has to advise the Director-General and the Council upon budgetary matters. So much for the Central administration.
It is obvious that for work of this worldwide scope, everything cannot be centralised 629 in one part of the globe. Accordingly, there are to be two regional committees, one in the Far East and one for Europe, the European Regional Committee to be situated in London. As we have heard to-day, Sir Frederick Leith Ross is to be one of the Directors General of that local administration. In the same way, the Far Eastern Committee will have a Far Eastern administration which will, of course, be subordinated to the Director-General in Washington. My hon. Friend the Member for Winchester, and also I think the hon. Member for Islington North, referred to the sending of personnel abroad. This is an extremely complicated question. It is really impossible to define, with any real exactitude, what numbers of personnel U.N.R.R.A. will want to send abroad. The limiting factors are these: It is laid down in the White Paper, and in the resolutions, that it is only at the request of a member government and under the direction of the Director-General that foreign voluntary workers will be called in at all. It may well be that in a number of countries, particularly in Western Europe, there will be no very great demand for voluntary workers from this country. Governments and peoples will naturally prefer to do this work themselves, if they can.
In other parts of Europe the demand may be greater but it is impossible to estimate what it will be. At the moment the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad is making up teams to be held in reserve against any demand from U.N.R.R.A. These teams will, I hope, be highly qualified and I think if one just runs over some of the names of the kind of teams that will be wanted it will be seen that the qualifications necessary are very high, and that there will be no great demand for well meaning amateurs. For example there is a water purification unit, a bacteriological unit, a static disinfector unit and so on and so on. It is not going to be, as I am sure the Committee realise, a sort of Continental holiday for young people from Mayfair. What we shall want are extremely skilled and highly qualified people to go out and assist in the relief work of Europe.
I think it was my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bristol North who compared conditions now so far as this matter of relief is concerned with conditions at the end of the last war. His comparison 630 was very just. We have made tremendous advances in this war as compared with the last in our preparations for the future. This question of relief is a case in point. In the last war, as I think my hon. and gallant Friend pointed out, it was not until the very last moment—the machinery was not indeed until after the war—that the machinery was set up. We waited until the problem was right upon us and then we set up the machinery. This time we are setting up the machinery well in advance of the need for it, and I can assure the Committee that His Majesty's Government are quite as convinced as any hon. Member of the Committee of the urgency of this matter. Another difference between this war and the last which I think my hon. and gallant Friend also pointed out is that this time all the countries concerned have a say in the operation of the relief organisation. It is not a question this time, as it was last time, of certain unhappy peoples in Europe being paupers on the dole. This time everybody is a member of U.N.R.R.A. and everybody has to pull his weight.
Then there is the question of finance. It is not only a difference in scale, though the difference in scale is tremendous. I think the total expenditure in relief after the last war, I take the League of Nations figures, was something like 1,000 million dollars. The figure now is something like 2,000 million dollars. That of course is understandable because the problem today is infinitely greater than in 1918, but the real difference in the financial point is that in the last war finance of relief was very largely through loans. Theoretically, these loans had to be repaid. In fact very few of them were repaid and they lingered on as a kind of soreness, a kind of poison, in international relationships for many years. This time there is no question of loans. Those countries that can pay will pay, and those countries that cannot pay will have a gift from countries more fortunate than themselves.
Finally, there is this difference between conditions now and conditions 25 years ago. This time, as my hon. and gallant Friend pointed out, the machinery for the production of relief supplies is co-ordinated, geared in with, the machinery for the production of war supplies and supplies for other peace purposes. 631 That will mean that the relief administration will get a fair crack of the whip. It will mean that it will not be, as it was last time when, in the main, relief goods were those goods which nobody else wanted. Relief production and war production and peace production will on this occasion march along together, and each one will get its fair share. I would like in conclusion just to refer back to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood) said in his speech earlier in the Debate. We have a moral obligation to make U.N.R.R.A. a success. We are committed to the success in this first step in United Nations co-operation. I can assure the Committee that there will be no lack of effort on the part of His Majesty's Government to see that this and other ventures in international co-operation are successful in the fullest possible degree.
§ Dr. Haden GuestBefore my right hon. Friend concludes might I ask a question? He mentioned an amount spent on League of Nations relief. Could he give figures for the total relief by the Hoover administration and by the large number of voluntary relief organisations?
§ Mr. LawNo, I am afraid I have not got that figure. I was speaking only of the League of Nations loans. I agree it would be a misleading figure if it was thought to cover the whole field.
§ Sir Ralph Glyn (Abingdon)Can my right hon. Friend clear up one point? In the White Paper nothing is said on what method would have to be adopted in the unfortunate event of any one of the United Nations wishing to drop out of the scheme. If they cannot hang together and carry the scheme through, I cannot see from the White Paper that any machinery exists for any country to withdraw should it so wish. There is no way out. Would my right hon. Friend say anything about that?
§ Mr. LawI do not suppose my hon. Friend is looking for any kind of sanction, against, as it were, a defaulting nation, because I do not think there is one. I cannot see the circumstances in which a nation might wish to withdraw. If it did withdraw, it would lose the advantages of being a member of the administration. That is in the Agreement.
§ Question put, and agreed to.
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Resolved:
That a supplementary sum, not exceeding £750,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, towards defraying the expenses which may be incurred during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1944, for general Navy, Army and Air Services and Supplies in so far as specific provision is not made therefor by Parliament; for securing the public safety, the Defence of the Realm, the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of the war, for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, for relief and rehabilitation in areas brought under control of any of the United Nations and generally for all expenses, beyond those provided for in the ordinary Grants of Parliament, arising out of the existence of a state of war.