§ 39. Mr. Shinwellasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has considered the proposals made by Mr. W. S. Burn to construct a cargo warship and vessels of fast speed?
Mr. AlexanderYes, Sir. The Admiralty have given prolonged and careful consideration, from both operational and technical standpoints, to Mr. Burn's proposals throughout their various stages. It is not possible to set out adequately the results of these investigations within the limits of a short answer. For this reason, and in view of the special interest that has been taken in Mr. Burn's suggested designs, I propose, with my hon. Friend's permission, to circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a relatively detailed statement which I have had specially prepared.
§ Mr. ShinwellI am obliged for that, but may I ask whether notice has been taken of the recent pronouncement of the Chamber of Shipping on the subject of speedy vessels, and whether that is also referred to in the statement to be circulated?
Mr. AlexanderThe statement which is to be circulated deals entirely with Mr. Burn's proposals, but I have had notice taken of the Chamber of Shipping's proposals, and, of course, all the considerations they have in mind.
§ Following is the statement:
§ PROPOSALS OF MR. BURN.
§ The Admiralty have carefully considered the various proposals of Mr. W. S. Burn for the building of "cargo-warships," whose object is to reduce the loss of merchant shipping tonnage from U-boat atacks.
§ 2. The principal features of the designs which Mr. Burn has proposed are:—
- (a) Reduced visibility.
- (b) Higher speeds.
- (c) The fitting of a flight deck to enable an aeroplane to fly off or land.
- (d) The fitting of anti-torpedo "blisters," or internal protection, and greater sub-division by internal bulkheads.
§ 3. The Admiralty have considered the "cargo-warship," both in its capacity as a warship—that is, its capacity to beat off enemy attack—and in its capacity as a cargo-carrying ship.
§ Capacity as a Warship.
§ 4. The principal defensive features of the design are high angle/low angle armament, flight deck and torpedo protection.
§ The anti-submarine and anti-aircraft armament shown in the design is very small and ineffective. Indeed, so far from possessing the armament of a warship, the proposed vessel would be considerably less well armed than the average British merchant ship, and the necessity for keeping the flight deck clear of obstruction would make it difficult to provide effective armament.
§ 5. The flight deck is obstructed by a large deck house forward which would make flying-on operations hazardous. In addition, the flying deck is so near the water-line that flying operations would only be possible in calm water. In order to make flying operations possible under any conditions, the whole of the flight deck arrangements would have to be re-modelled and the flight deck would have to be raised considerably higher above the water-line. This would entirely destroy the chief claim of the design, namely, invisibility.
§ 6. The torpedo protection provided in the form of an internal "blister," would be quite ineffective against torpedo charges of the sizes normally used. This view is based both on experiments and on war experience.
§ 7. It must be stated, therefore, that, as a warship, the design has nothing to recommend it.
§ Capacity as a Cargo Ship.
§ 8. The low freeboard, the absence of superstructure and the need to use part of the capacity of the main hull to house the officers and crew, leave the proposed vessel seriously short of cargo space, which is the fundamental requirement of a cargo ship.
§ 9. It is the policy of the Government to build as many fast merchant ships as the capacity for producing such vessels allows It must be borne in mind that a great deal of capacity which would be suitable for this purpose is inevitably absorbed by the large numbers of high-powered naval vessels required for the protection of shipping generally.
1308§ 10. In fast merchant vessels, as in all other merchant vessels, the need for reliable propelling machinery which will operate continuously without failure, is imperative and especially so in war time. This need must often overrule the possible use of new types of marine engines of unproven reliability. The proposals for propelling machinery of the "cargo-warship" are not very definite. They would seem to cover Diesel-electric propulsion as well as turbo-electric, which latter the designer considers to lack the virtue' of low fuel consumption, but they appear to incline towards the use of engines "of almost aeronautical type." It must be emphasised that the development of an experimental type of highly rated oil-engine would involve much effort which could otherwise be devoted to other forms of immediately useful production. In any case such an engine would require a considerable time to come into production. Moreover, highly rated engines of this type, to judge by aeronautical experience, would have a short life compared to that needed for continuous ocean service.
§ 11. There are other objections in the proposed design, but sufficient has been said to show that it fails in the fundamental objects for which it is intended.