LOSS OF H.M.S. "GLORIOUS."

HC Deb 07 November 1940 vol 365 cc1533-54

Mr. Stokes (Ipswich)

I have given notice of my intention to raise certain matters concerning the sinking of H.M.S. "Glorious" in June last, with her two attendant destroyers. I am not raising this point in order to use it as a stick wherewith to beat Ministers or naval officers, but because I regard it as a matter of duty to the House and particularly to many relatives of the people who lost their lives in that accident and survivors, some of whom have provided me with facts and information. What I am doing may not commend itself to the First Lord but, as a good Parliamentarian, he would agree that higher considerations than the convenience of Ministers must control our actions otherwise it would be impossible to criticise anyone with whom one was on friendly relations. As I understand it, as a junior Member of the House, our duty is when public opinion is disturbed, to investigate what has happened, and, if the reasons for the disturbance of public opinion are groundless, public opinion becomes at once reassured. If, on the other hand, there are grounds for disturbance, it is right that we and the public should know that proper action has been taken. This process may be inconvenient for Ministers, but I am sure the First Lord will be the first to recognise that while Ministers naturally get the praise when things go well, they have to put up with the disagreeables when they occur.

It is idle to deny that public opinion has been disturbed by the loss of the "Glorious" and with regard to certain other events in which the Admiralty are concerned. I submit that the House should not stay its hand in its investigation of the matter merely on account of a feeling circulated in the Lobby that it is unfair to take this matter up because the captain died. I do not know whether the captain is to blame or not. I take it that the First Lord will tell us. It is fair, however, that his name should be cleared once and for all if it was no fault of his that the "Glorious" went down. If it was his fault, there is no disgrace attached to him. When people get court-martialed they may get the blame for accidents, but there is no question of dishonour in the blame. If the captain's death is claimed as an excuse for not giving publicity and investigation to the matter, my excuse is that 1,200 gallant men went down at the same time and their relatives have a right to know what happened. Again, some people will say that the bereaved will be distressed at this Debate. That is not my experience from the letters I have had, and they have been numerous. What is upsetting people is the thought that facts have been burked and hidden in order to protect people in high places. I do not know whether that is so, but the First Lord will no doubt clear up the point. It might not have been in the public interest to discuss this matter three or four months ago, but what is there now which is not already known to the German High Command? It is a matter of old history and there is no reason why the facts should not become known. What is more likely to impress the German High Command—a rather bewildered Admiralty which is afraid of facing the facts, or an Admiralty which is so serene and confident that it is prepared to face the facts knowing that they have the matter in hand? If anything was wrong let the bereaved have the satisfaction of knowing what happened and of knowing that something has been done to prevent anything of the kind happening again.

I will endeavour to say nothing which would be of use to the enemy. So far as I know the "Glorious" was engaged in the relief of Narvik. I appreciate that it was a delicate and difficult operation and that secrecy was essential, but there are certain questions I want to put to the First Lord. The first is whether he is entirely satisfied that the proper instructions and the best that could have been devised were issued to the ship? Second, I understand that while at first it was rumoured that the ship was sunk by the "Gneisenau" and "Scharn-horst," I gather from other sources that that was not the case. It appears that cruisers of the "Hipper" class were engaged, and if that is so they must have been absent from their base seven days to come in as they did. Did the Admiralty know the movements of those ships, or was the Intelligence once again at fault? Third, the Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir Charles Forbes was within 800 miles of the incident. Did the admiral know generally of the movement of the ship and were his dispositions, even if he did not, such that he could give did if the ship met disaster? Fourth, when and at what hour did the "Glorious" sink, and were any signals received by the Admiral of the Grand Fleet or other high naval officers, and, if so, what action was taken? Fifth, has the court of inquiry, which presumably was fully mindful of the accident to the "Courageous," reported that an escort of two destroyers was sufficient for the "Glorious," engaged as she was on that particular operation? If two destroyers were insufficient why were not extra precautions taken to look after her? I know there were other things going at the same time and a great demand for light craft on the coast of France, but recognising that it may have been impossible for a full escort to be there, was it not all the more important that extra steps should have been taken to protect her?

Mr. Austin Hopkinson (Mossley)

I do not think that the hon. Member will accuse me of being unduly subservient to the present Government, but I would ask him to think twice before he presses for answers to most of his questions.

Mr. Stokes

I am putting the questions, and I will leave the First Lord to decide whether he can answer them. I am not doing any harm to the country or our cause by asking the questions. I am no authority on naval matters, and I do not press for answers to anything which the First Lord considers it not advisable to give in the interests of the country.

Another question I wish to ask is whether the Operations Division and other appropriate divisions of the Admiralty were informed fully by the Chief of Naval Staff of the movement of the ship? Was the Air Marshal commanding the Coastal Command told? I have been told he was not. Was the Vice-Admiral in charge of submarines told? I am told not. Was the admiral commanding aircraft carriers told? I assume that the court must have gone into these points. Another point, if not properly cleared up, might reflect on the gallant captain. It was said that the "Glorious" had not got her own reconnaisance flight up. I have understood the ship was engaged in relieving aircraft from Narvik and that her deck, being cluttered up with an extra amount of aircraft, it was impossible for her own flight to go up and unlikely, if it was, that she could have got them back.

I come to the most tragic part of this story. From the three vessels that went down apparently there were only 39 survivors. Is it true, as was stated in the Press—I have cuttings of interviews with survivors—that 1,000 and more men were on rafts for three nights and two days? I know the ship was out of touch, but it is said they did not see or hear anybody in that time, and what survivors there were were picked up by a Norwegian steamer. I ask whether they had been searched for. I suppose that if we did not know that the ship went down nothing could be done, but I hope with all my heart that that is not the case, and that the First Lord can reassure us on the point. It is no use saying that this is an unkind and unfair thing to bring up, because whether I raise it in the House or not people will go on saying these things, and the sooner the matter is cleared up once and for all the better.

I would also refer to an answer given to me the other day by the Parliamentary Secretary. He replied to me, with his invariable courtesy—and I have had many battles with him in the various departments with which he has been associated—but he more or less said that I had implied that the Admiralty knew all these people were knocking about on rafts and had left them there. Honestly I hope that he did not really mean it, because I feel that is a thing which even a member of the German Reichstag could hardly accuse any of their own crowd of doing. Then I understand that these rafts were not supplied with adequate lights. If that be the case it is disgraceful. Here we are, after more than a year of war, and a big ship like this, known to be the most vulnerable type of vessel in the Navy, I believe, is inadequately supplied with proper rafts.

There is a point with regard to the privileges of Members of this House to which I must refer in view of the rather Gestapo methods of the Minister of Labour this afternoon. I learned the names of one or two of the survivors, and got in touch with one of the officers and I was astonished to learn from him that he had had instructions—well, here is the telegram he sent me: Regret unable to see you, Admiralty instructions. It seems to me very wrong that that should he the case. I would not have raised the point but for the fact that the Minister of Labour has taken the same line, and I am against the Gestapo, whether they are members of my party or not. I strongly resent having received that telegram.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. A. V. Alexander)

No doubt the hon. Member will furnish me with particulars of the incident—who is the officer and who sent the instructions.

Mr. Stokes

If I am asked to furnish the name, I must ask the First Lord whether I can have an absolute and definite assurance that the person concerned will not get into trouble, because unless he gives me that assurance I cannot accede to his request.

Mr. Alexander

Obviously, no reply can be given to the implied charge which has been made unless I know the facts. I certainly undertake, at all times, when a matter is raised in the House bona fide by a Member, that it shall be investigated without any penalty attaching to the subject of the investigation.

Mr. Stokes

As long as that assurance is given I will gladly furnish the First Lord with the information. Of course I shall first have to ask the officer's permission. I only got the telegram the day before yesterday. There are one or two other matters which have caused uneasiness in the public mind with regard to the Naval Staff. It began with the "Courageous," where it appears that something was very much amiss. We were told there was to be a court of inquiry or court-martial. I want to ask what was the result of that court of inquiry? Then there was the case of the "Royal Oak"—profoundly disturbing. It was with great amazement that public learned that a submarine had penetrated the important base of Scapa. There, again, regretfully, 800 men were drowned, mostly clogged with oil, with other units of the Fleet not far off. It seems inconceivable that something was not wrong with the Admiralty or the Naval Staff, and I should like to know what disciplinary action was taken. Then we had the shocks of Norway. The German Navy took incredible risks in circumstances which were extremely favourable to us and got away with it. On 11th April the Prime Minister said in this House: All German ships in the Skaggerak and the Kattegat will be sunk, and by night all ships will be sunk, as opportunity serves."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th April, 1940; col. 748, Vol. 359.] They were not, and the fact that Norway was a disaster led to the fall of the last Government. The First Lord became Prime Minister, but the Naval Staff remained unchanged. Then there was the inconclusive action at Oran. Whatever one's personal view may be of that particular incident, it enabled the escape of the "Strasburg" and the retention by France of a large number of her smaller craft and her light cruisers, of which we shall probably hear more. Then there was the Dakar fiasco, which we all regret, with the passage of the French cruisers through the Straits of Gibraltar. A rumour has reached me that the Admiral-in-charge at Gibraltar has not even got steam up. If that is so, I should like to know what disciplinary action has been taken. I would remind the House that all this while the Naval Staff remained unchanged, and apparently it is to go on for ever. Finally, there was the loss of the "Empress of Britain" and our other mercantile shipping losses. I am not going to say much about them, but in talking to men of the Mercantile Marine I gather that some of them criticise our present convoy policy, and I should like to ask the First Lord whether he is satisfied that the policy adopted is the right one. Is it not possible that perhaps we are a little too much afraid of bombs from the air?

I know that I am not competent to criticise in naval matters. I am merely trying to state facts and to ask questions. I am not in the least unmindful of the good things that the Navy has done—at the River Plate and in the Mediterranean—which augurs well—the work of the submarine patrols, the mine-sweeping, the protection of convoys, and the numerous operations which keep our ships safe and the shipping coming in and out of our harbours, and particularly the guarding of transports and convoys. I have not a word to say against what I would call, though the expression may be un-Parliamentary, "the guts of the business," because there are no finer naval men anywhere in the world than ours, but it is on the administration and planning side that I feel there is something which requires a certain amount of explaining. I would remind the First Lord that if I have raised the question of the Navy Staff that does not mean that one does not recognise the tremendous devotion to duty of those officers, and, of course, of the First Lord himself. Having chosen his advisers I know the First Lord will gallantly defend them to the last ditch, but I would remind him that however much that may be desirable from the departmental point of view he has a duty to the country as well. I know he will not ignore it, though one realises that there must be great comradeship between himself and the Staff, hearing as they do all the shocks and burdens of the day in administering the affairs of the whole of the Navy. But the main point is that if confidence is to be maintained the facts must bear examination, and we ought to be allowed to examine the facts.

I have tried to confine myself to facts, and I hope and believe that the First Lord will give adequate replies to those points with which he deals without any danger to the welfare of the country, and if that be so we shall go away feeling renewed confidence in the Admiralty. I know that the First Lord is an experienced politician and debater, and that I am a mere novice, and that he could perfectly well have a Parliamentary holiday at my expense this afternoon; but that would not help 1,200 dead men and their suffering relatives, and I ask him to accept my statement that in raising these points I have felt that I was doing my duty, as I see it, in good faith, and I hope that he will answer me accordingly, even if I am also to get a stiff naval wigging.

Commander Bower (Cleveland)

Time is very short this afternoon, and I shall have to cut my remarks to a minimum. I have just come back from three months at sea, engaged on convoy work. Before that I was naval liaison officer to the Commander-in-Chief of the R.A.F. Coastal Command, in constant touch with the Operations Staff at the Admiralty—almost daily touch. I would like to confirm everything said by the hon. Member who has just spoken. In the course of my duty, I came into touch with the Admiralty and, in the early part of June, I was approached by a number of officers on the Operations Staff at the Admiralty. I do not mean silly young officers, but officers who were, for the most part, between the ages of 40 and 50, holding responsible positions. I can assure the House that, at that time, there was grave disquiet not only about the episode which we are now discussing but about the whole conduct of naval operations in Norway from the point of view of the higher command.

Naturally I feel very diffident at raising these matters in the House, but I can assure hon. Members that I shall in no way disclose anything which may be of assistance to the enemy. Five months have now elapsed since this not inconsiderable disaster took place. Considerations of secrecy are no longer operative, except for one reason, and that is to conceal the deficiencies of high officers. The officers to whom I have already referred urged me, some of them individually and some collectively. They gave me a definite request that I should raise the matter on the Floor of the House of Commons. I think hon. Members will agree with me that I adopted a right attitude when I refused at once. I said that it would be quite indefensible for me, as an officer serving on the naval staff, to use information which I got in the course of my duties in order to bring up such matters in this House. I am not so sure now that I was right, after what has happened, but at any rate, I did refuse. I told them I could not do it, but, I added: "There is one thing I can do. As a Member of Parliament I have the privilege and constitutional right of access to every Minister of the Crown." I think hon. Members agree with me that I have that right. I said: "I will see the First Lord of the Admiralty."

It happened that the First Lord was fully occupied. As a matter of fact, he was at Bordeaux. I myself in those strenuous days of evacuation from Dunkirk and after was fully occupied with my naval duties. I could not see the First Lord, but I wrote him a letter in which I pointed out the grave concern which was felt among many responsible members of the naval staff at the conduct of the operations in Norway and in connection with the loss of the "Glorious." The fact was that the evacuation of Narvik was considered, for reasons hitherto undisclosed, of such a secret nature that none but the higher officers were informed that it was to take place. Naturally an operation of that sort would, in normal circumstances, involve the closest co-operation between the staffs of the Admiralty, the R.A.F. Coastal Command, Vice-Admiral Commanding Submarines and other high officers. Such co- operation never took place. I can give my personal word for that. I was myself on duty at the Coastal Command at the time. We knew nothing about it. I have no time to go into the details, but the fact is that this ship was sunk and those lives were lost and even such highly placed officers as the Director of Operations at the Admiralty knew nothing about it.

Mr. Alexander

What was it that the Director of Operations knew nothing about?

Commander Bower

I am prepared to tell the First Lord that the Director of Operations was not informed, according to what he told me, at the time fully, as to what was happening in connection with the evacuation of Narvik. Certain it is that the Operations Staff at the Coastal Command R.A.F. of which I was a member, did not know. Certain it is that all the junior members of the Operations Staff at the Admiralty, whose duty it would have been to provide the plans, did not know either. I know full well that what my hon. Friend has described as Gestapo methods have been applied to those officers since, as indeed they have been applied to me, as I shall show in a minute. Those officers have their careers to think of, but I have not. I can speak openly

I wrote this letter to the First Lord. Far from realising that I had acted with discretion and with forbearance in raising the matter privately he sent for me and told me he took the greatest exception to the letter, for various reasons. I protested. I said that as a Member of Parliament I had an absolute, not a relative, privilege to write him such a letter, whether I was a serving officer or not. He contested that. He said it was not so. He argued for a while. He then became very friendly. He said: "This has put me in a very difficult position, vis-à-vis the Sea Lords." I asked him why, and he then admitted that he had shown my letter to the First Sea Lord. I do not think that was a very proper proceeding, to show a letter from a Member of Parliament, writing in his capacity as an M.P., to a Minister. He then said, "Look here, this has put me in a very awkward position. Naturally, these fellows do not like having you at coastal command with access to the Admiralty. Will you accept another appointment?" I replied, "Certainly."

He said, "I would like you to accept an appointment at sea," and I replied, "Certainly, only too delighted." The House will remember that we were faced with imminent invasion. To cut a long story short, he offered me an appointment. Acting on his description of that appointment, which description subsequently turned out to be what I can only describe as a false prospectus, I accepted. He asked me whether I would go to do an anti-submarine course and I said "Yes." I went down there. When I got there I found a lot of my old naval friends who, when they heard that I had been appointed to this position said, "What on earth are you doing there? It is a most inferior command." I replied, "The First Lord has promised me that the new command will be every bit as good as my last appointment," but I was a little anxious about the matter.

I then came back to the Admiralty, where I found exactly the same thing. In the Anti-Submarine Department of the Admiralty the officers said, "Why are you going to a command of this description? These corvettes are to be commanded by lieutenants R.N.R. and R.N.V.R." This information upset me. I had another interview with the First Lord, when he again assured me that he had my interests at heart and that I was in no way being victimised. Not until I got to my command, and was safely away doing 10 days at sea and three days in harbour did I discover that what the First Lord said was entirely wrong and what my friends said in the Navy was entirely right. In other words, a Member of Parliament was victimised for expressing certain opinions, which in my view he had a perfect right to express, about the conduct of those operations.

I hope I have not appeared too unduly personal in this matter. I have no desire to raise a personal issue. I have no personal grievance, because at all times I was free to come back to my Parliamentary duties, which I have now done. The point is that there was, and is still, on the naval staff, and throughout the Navy, a feeling of grave disquiet as to the conduct of those operations. One of the people much criticised in the Navy has gone, the late Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet. I will say nothing about him, but at the present moment there is definite disquiet about the Board of Admiralty as a whole. I dislike saying this, but after all I expressed it privately to the First Lord, and all I got was victimisation. There is grave disquiet in regard to the Board of Admiralty collectively and especially about the First Sea Lord.

It being the hour appointed for the interruption of Business, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without question put.

Question again proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Captain Margesson.]

Commander Bower

I dislike saying what I am going to say, because I served with the First Sea Lord years ago when my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes) was Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, when the First Sea Lord was Chief of Staff and I was a junior member of the staff of the Mediterranean at that time. There was no finer man in the world. However, there is such a thing as anno domini. He is 63. He is not in the best of health, and everybody who knows him says the same thing, that he is not the man that he was. I leave it there and I will say no more about that. In this war, when we are fighting for our lives, when in the Army and the Air Force we have got rid of those who are perhaps not quite competent enough, very often from no fault of their own, why this miasma, this fog of secrecy which can have only one object, to conceal the deficiency of senior officers? Nothing which could come out now could possibly supply information to the enemy which they have not got already. Yet only the other day a question was asked and the Financial Secretary gave a reply which again suggested that it was outrageous that there should be any criticism of any superior officer or anybody at the Admiralty. I affirm once more, from my own experience, that there has been and is that criticism.

I have referred to a personal episode that would normally have been raised by me as a matter of privilege. In present times, I hope the House will agree with me, that would be undesirable, but at the same time I want to have placed on record in the OFFICIAL REPORT of this House what has happened and the reply of the right hon. Gentleman if he has one. Also, I propose to take certain steps and inform you, Mr. Speaker, and the Prime Minister of what has happened. From the point of view of Members of this House who are serving in the Armed Forces, I want to read out something which the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty wrote to me. This is the issue between us, and this is what I contest. He says: It is true that any Member of Parliament has, on the question of privilege, the right to approach a Minister, but it is also true, as I have already explained to you, that a Minister then has the right to judge the merits of the subject of the approach. Put into plain language, that simply means that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty contends that any Member who is serving in the Armed Forces has the right to write to him, but that having done so he has a right to victimise him as if he were not a Member of Parliament. I cannot let that pass, and that is why to-day I have mentioned what may appear to be a personal matter. To return to the main subject of this Debate, it is no use the First Lord of the Admiralty getting up and saying that there has been and is no disquiet in the Admiralty. I am not the only officer who has been made the subject of these Gestapo methods. I would say this in conclusion: We in this country are not fighting against Hitler in order to set up the First Lord of the Admiralty as a little pinchbeck Himmler with a tinpot Gestapo.

Mr. Austin Hopkinson (Mossley)

The hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) informed us that he had been approached by various serving officers of the Navy with these grievances and criticising their superior officers. I should like if possible to get this perfectly clear. As I conceive it, the case stands thus: If a serving officer chooses to approach his own representative, that is to say the Member of Parliament who sits for his constituency, that is perfectly proper and in accordance with tradition and practice. What I think he should not allow is this: If any Member of Parliament is running a stunt, and very often a self-advertising stunt, in this House with a view to consolidating his position with uninformed public opinion outside, I do not think it is desirable in the interests of the Services that serving officers should pass over their own representatives and go to a Member of this House. That is a point upon which I think the House if possible should make its will known.

In listening to the hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down it occurred to me that I myself had privately approached the First Lord on certain subjects. The things I said to the First Lord of the Admiralty—and I think he will bear me out—were just as critical and pungent as anything put to him by the hon. and gallant Member opposite. But the difference is this: Supposing the First Lord had decided that I was using information which I ought not to use, then he would have been justified in taking steps, not actually in imposing punishment but at any rate of showing his distaste at procedure of that sort on the part of a serving officer. One fact which the House has learned concerning our fighting services is this: the speech to which we have listened from the hon. and gallant Member opposite shows conclusively, once for all, that the grossest mistake was made, possibly due to some political influence, in ever appointing him to the naval staff.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. A. V. Alexander)

May I say at the outset that I regret very much that the Debate has arisen in the particular way it has? The hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) has put a number of questions to me. He had previously put some questions on the Paper for answer at Question Time. I had on more than one occasion—on two occasions at least—asked him in the public interest not to press those Questions. I take the line generally in regard to this and other operations that it is very much against the public interest, even under the privilege of Parliament sitting in public session—

Earl Winterton (Horsham and Worthing)

I do not wish to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but considering the times we have sat in secret session—to which I have objected—there is no reason why the Government should not have sat in secret to discuss this matter.

Mr. Alexander

It is a question for the House, as the noble Lords knows. But the raising of this matter in this way on the Adjournment makes it quite impossible for me in any way to reply to the operational questions which the hon. Member has put. At the outset of his speech he said, I think, that he had no intention of attacking either the First Lord or the higher naval staff.

Mr. Stokes

I beg my right hon. Friend's pardon, I did not say that. I said I was not raising the matter as a means of whipping the Minister or the staff concerned, but because I considered it a matter of public duty to raise it in this House.

Mr. Alexander

I took my hon. Friend's words down, and he said that he did not raise the matter as a stick with which to beat Ministers or high officers. I must say that as the speech went on it did seem to me to be a very good attempt to beat people up. I must say at once that, at any rate at this moment, I am not prepared to give answers to the questions put by my hon. Friend with regard to operations. Moreover, we are fighting, in a crisis such perhaps as our country has never yet faced, against an enemy of the most unscrupulous and of the most secretive character, who is certainly not prepared to give to anybody the kind of information on operational matters which has been asked for in the House to-day.

I would, for example, have been very glad for the Board of Admiralty to have had a chance of attending an inquest held in public in Germany upon the operation which resulted in the destruction of the "Graf Spee" in the River Plate. The Admiralty would have gained an enormous amount of information with regard to the reasons for certain actions on the part of the German Commander of that ship in the battle. I feel that it is not incumbent upon the House to discuss the details of operations of that kind in the present circumstances, and I do not think anybody here is a more sincere devotee of the Parliamentary system than I am myself. I have had a great many years of Opposition practice here and I have never hesitated to hit hard. I do not mind being hit hard in return, but in the present circumstances I feel that the House must give a large amount of confidence to the Government, with, of course, the inalienable right of the House, in its full sovereignty, to change the Government if it is not satisfied with the existing one. I must therefore say to the hon. Member for Ipswich that I do not propose to answer the operational questions that he put to me. However, there are one or two things I should like to say to him with regard to the subject of his speech. I do not agree with him that it is not inadvisable to talk about the actual circumstances, because I think it is harrowing to the feelings of relatives. I know full well the extent of the strain and stress, and the volume of sorrow, entailed upon relatives of men who fall in the service of the country. But that questions of that kind should be raised after four months seems to me to be not a right thing to do.

Mr. Stokes

I did not say that it was not harrowing to the feelings of relatives. I said that I thought they would get some satisfaction from a statement that the matter had been properly thrashed out and the responsibility laid in the right place.

Mr. Alexander

I would say, in reply to my hon. Friend, that in fact we ourselves do not know to-day, after the most careful, vigilant and pressing inquiries, what is the extent of the loss of the personnel of His Majesty's Ship "Glorious" and her attendant ships. It is true that the survivors who were rescued in the manner described by the hon. Member only numbered 35, but the German wireless claimed that they had picked up hundreds whom they had made prisoners of war. We have had from them the names of only about half a dozen survivors, which have been published, clearly indicating that some survivors were recovered by the German ships, although we have not been able to get any further names.

Mr. Stokes

Were not those men from other ships?

Mr. Alexander

There were other ships, of course, but the names have been published of men who were members of the crew of the "Glorious" or of one of the destroyers. Therefore, the state of uncertainty remains and I cannot say to-day what is the full extent of the numbers rescued from these ships.

I now turn to the more personal aspect of the question which has been raised by the hon. and gallant Member for the Cleveland division (Commander Bower). I must say that I very much regret the tone of the attack which he made upon the naval staff, because obviously only one person can be responsible to the House, and that is the First Lord. I should have preferred the attack to be launched upon me and for me to be held responsible to the House.

Commander Bower

I gave my right hon. Friend every possible opportunity in approaching him personally, without any publicity, and all that I got was victimisation. What other alternative had I but to raise the matter in the House?

Mr. Alexander

I am coming to the charges which the hon. and gallant Member makes and I would say that the incidents which have been the subject of his statement in the House to-day are not, of course, the first in respect of which he has had differences with the First Lord about the administration of the Admiralty. There was the case last February which he mentioned, and which necessitated the present Prime Minister, then First Lord, giving the hon. and gallant Member a warning as a member of the naval staff that if the kind of letter that he was then writing were proceeded with it would be necessary to ask him to revert to his Parliamentary duties.

Commander Bower

This is a very important point. I quite admit that I received a reprimand from the then First Lord of the Admiralty because I wrote a letter to one of the Sea Lords and I am perfectly prepared to admit that that was improper. But, and this is what my right hon. Friend has forgotten, at that time the Prime Minister said to me in a letter which I have in my possession: You had no business to write to the Sea Lord; you ought to have written to me. And he confirmed my right, which I exercised, to write to the First Lord. The Prime Minister, when he was First Lord, would never have sought to penalise me for writing a constitutional letter to him, but this First Lord did.

Mr. Alexander

I see now what the charge is. I therefore go back to the subject of the letter from which the hon. and gallant Member quoted. Perhaps he will allow me to finish the quotation from the letter: I added to the part which he quoted the following: I have also already explained to you that in your letter of June 12th you quoted a signal referring to a Cabinet decision, and that you could not have used that signal in your letter as a Member of Parliament unless you had access to it in your capacity as a naval officer; and that it would put any First Lord into an impossible position to have to explain to a Junior Naval Officer, because he was a Member of Parliament, what was the reason for a Cabinet decision referred to in a naval signal which he would never have seen unless he was on the Naval Staff.

Commander Bower

I would like to ask my right hon. Friend what on earth is the harm in a Member of Parliament who happens to be a serving officer drawing the attention of the First Lord to a signal which he ought to have seen anyhow and which was not disclosed to any third person?

Mr. Alexander

I can assure the hon. and gallant Member that I see all important signals, but that is no reason why he should write to me, as a Member of Parliament, a letter asking for an explanation of a signal because it deals with a Cabinet decision. It is impossible for me to do that, and I have made up my mind, Unless Members of Parliament who also desire to serve their country in the position of officers in the fighting services can use proper discretion in such matters, then it is absolutely essential that they should revert to their Parliamentary duties, or alternatively retain their status as an officer and give up their Parliamentary dirties.

On the question of victimisation I submit that there never was any. But that I should not be allowed to show a long letter full of charges against the Naval Staff, to the head of the naval side of the Admiralty, is unthinkable. I remember that the Prime Minister referred in his letter of last February to a complaint he had received from the hon. and gallant Member. To make such a complaint was a reasonable thing to do; but because of that, there was no victimisation of the hon. and gallant Member. I believed that he wished to serve in the Navy to the best of his capacity, in the interests of the country, and I offered him the alternative, instead of reverting to his Parliamentary duties, of taking a sea command. He now infers that the kind of command that he was given was beneath him.

Commander Bower

It was.

Mr. Alexander

I am glad to hear that because it clarifies his complaint. He infers that, because it was offered to him, I was victimising him. He was offered, in relation to his rank and considering his absence from sea duty for a very long period, an appointment as good as anybody could expect. What I wrote to him in my letter of 23rd September—from which he has quoted—provides, I think, conclusive proof of that. I said that I had called for a list of some examples of officers of his seniority, or above, who would have gladly followed the procedure which was offered him. In that list there were two captains and 13 full commanders, who had been to sea in the last few months in command of little trawlers, and even smaller yachts, until they had refreshed their experience of sea command—which was all that I was asking the hon. and gallant Member to do. There was the case of Lieut.-Commander Lord Beatty, who was content to go as a junior officer on a battleship, was then given command of a much smaller anti-submarine vessel than the Fleur de Lys, but who has done so well that he has now been made captain of one of the American destroyers. I dealt with the hon. and gallant Member personally in a perfectly bona fide way. I was determined that if he proved himself in the command that he was given, he would be given a full opportunity of a higher command, more fitting perhaps to what he thought was his right, on his experience. But I am certain that, if he were occupying the kind of position that I am occupying to-day, he would not have offered a sea command to an officer who had not been to sea for many years, until he had had the opportunity of the refresher which I offered to the hon. and gallant Member. I regret that he has taken the line which he has taken on that matter, and has decided that he is better able to serve his country as a Member of Parliament than as a serving naval officer. The suggestion made in his speech that I had been guilty of Gestapo methods or had issued to him a false prospectus of what he could expect in his new appointment, was entirely without foundation. My only regret, in view of his speech is that, instead of giving him the opportunity which I did, of serving his country in a sea command, I did not ask him at once to revert to the ordinary duties of a Member of Parliament.

Commander Bower

Why does the right hon. Gentleman so despise the ordinary duties of a Member of Parliament? We are ordinary Members of Parliament first, and serving officers second.

Mr. Alexander

The hon. and gallant Member has experience in the two capacities. His experience as a Member of Parliament is, I think, not so long as his experience as a naval officer. He himself chose at the beginning of the war to serve his country as a naval officer, because he thought that he would be able to serve his country better in that capacity.

I come to the direct attack made upon the Naval Staff by the hon. and gallant Member, and the less direct attack by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes). Any Minister of the Crown at the head of any fighting service in a war like this who is not prepared to be both vigorous and ruthless in dealing with serving officers, whether of high or of low command, does not deserve to remain in office; but where a serving officer is known to the Minister to be doing well, there is no other course for the Minister but to defend him. I have no reason at this moment to do other than to pay tribute to the service, the capacity and the patriotic devotion of the First Sea Lord, who has been so personally mentioned to-day and who has given us very great reason for gratitude. As for the suggestion that he is not in a state of health to continue his work, all I can say is that, day after day and night after night, working usually for about 18 hours out of the 24, and sometimes longer, he has shown a youthfulness and a capacity which some junior officers might well desire to emulate. I will not allow it to be said that this kind of charge is justified. I would add that, in the words of the Prime Minister some months ago—I have not the exact quotation—when it comes to the proper conduct of this war we must be prepared to make whatever changes are required, provided that when the changes are made we make quite sure that we have officers at least as good, and, we hope, better, for performing the duties from which the serving officers in question are being removed.

I hope that, although the hon. Member for Ipswich may think probably that, as he seemed to prophesy, I have evaded his inquiries, he will also remember that our first, and our only duty, it seems to me, at the moment, is to concentrate upon beating a very ruthless and very vicious enemy. If I thought that by answering in detail the questions which the hon. Member had put to me I could better help to win this war, I would have no hesitation at all, believe me. If the hon. Member considers he has not been given sufficiently courteous treatment, all I would say is that a number of Members of the House would testify that where they have been anxious about certain aspects of the naval conduct of this war, they have not hesitated to come and speak to me personally, and I do not think that any Member who has come to me—with the possible exception of the personal service question raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Cleveland—has had any reason to complain about the way his approaches have been met. If I can be of any assistance to Members of this honourable House in satisfying their anxieties or in giving information which would be helpful to them in changing or improving Admiralty policy, I am always at their service.

Mr. Stokes

My right hon. Friend said that I had put Questions down which he had asked me to remove. He will agree that that was some months ago, and that I at once removed them.

Mr. Alexander

I thought I had made it clear that the hon. Member had kindly removed those Questions when I asked him. I only regret that he did not continue to maintain that tradition.

It being the hour appointed for the Adjournment of the House Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put.