HC Deb 22 August 1940 vol 364 cc1447-9
38. Mr. Woodburn

asked the Home Secretary whether he is now in a position to announce the Government's policy regarding air-raid warnings; and whether he will consider having a preliminary warning when aircraft are approaching cm are in the vicinity, leaving the taking of shelter optional, and a separate or double warning indicating air raids in numbers requiring the adoption of complete air-raid precautions?

Sir J. Anderson

As regards the first part of the Question, I am arranging for a statement to be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT. As regards the second part, there would be serious practical difficulties in adopting the arrangement suggested by my hon. Friend—even if, as would rarely happen, time permitted of the circulation of a double warning. There are other objections to the proposal, from the point of view of disturbance, which will, I think, be apparent to my hon. Friend when he has had an opportunity of considering the statement which I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Hicks

Would not the right hon. Gentleman advise his friends in the Government, because of their great value to the nation, of the necessity for taking and keeping cover? Last week I saw two Members of the Government walking about and exposing themselves to danger.

Sir J. Anderson

Perhaps my hon. Friend will give me particulars.

Mr. Loftus

Does not my right hon. Friend consider that it has a bad effect when sirens give a warning 10 minutes after bombs have actually fallen?

Following is the statement:

There have been two previous statements of Government policy regarding the operation of the air-raid warning system—one made on 25th October last by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, then Secretary of State for Air, and the second, which I made on 2nd July in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Duddeston (Mr. Simmonds). On each occasion it was made clear that the officers responsible for operating the warning system have been instructed by the Government to restrict the sounding of the public warnings to those areas on which it seems likely that attack is actually impending. It remains the policy of the Government that public warnings should be so restricted.

It would, of course, be possible to adopt the alternative policy of giving public warning to every district over which an enemy aircraft is expected to fly. But an enemy raider crossing the coast at Ipswich, for example, may be making for an objective at Birmingham or Manchester; and enemy aircraft, flying singly or in two's and three's, have during past weeks crossed over very many areas in this country, by day and by night, on which no attack has ever been made. It would be possible to have the warning sirens sounded in all the towns in the course of an enemy aircraft which are within bombing range: but to do so on all occasions would mean unnecessary interruption of industry and transport, undue interference with the ordinary activities of the public, and at night constant disturbance of rest and sleep. The effect on our industrial production would be very serious, even though arrangements had been made, in accordance with my statement of 2nd July, for workers engaged in war industries to continue at work after a public air-raid warning until it was clear that an attack was actually imminent in their neighbourhood.

If these consequences are to be avoided—as they must be—public warnings must be limited to the districts which are thought likely to be selected for attack. The officers responsible for giving the warnings, interpreting the reported movements of raiding aircraft in the light of their knowledge of possible objectives and of the enemy's air strategy, are in a position to form a reasonable judgment of the areas on which the attack is most likely to be delivered; and, as I have stated, they have been instructed to limit the public warnings to those areas. Their judgment cannot be infallible, however, and on occasion it may happen that an enemy raider expected to be making for a distant district will drop his bombs elsewhere, and that consequently bombs will fall in an area which has not received a warning. We must therefore be prepared, not only to be warned without being bombed, but also on occasion to be bombed without being warned. As a general rule, attacks which develop without warning will be on a comparatively light scale for where large formations of raiders are reported public warnings will be given more freely. It must, however, be recognised that, so long as we are trying—as we must—to restrict public warnings to the areas most likely to be attacked, there can be no absolute guarantee, even in the case of heavy raids, that every area attacked will always be warned before the raid develops. If we all stopped work and went to ground every time an enemy aircraft was in our neighbourhood, we should ourselves be sabotaging our war production and should thus be playing into the enemy's hands. Wars cannot be won without taking risks; and I feel sure that the people of this country, who know now that they are all in the front line of the battle, are ready to take this risk as part of the price which we must pay in order to defeat the enemy's purposes.