CLAUSE 3.—(Conscientious objectors.) (Hansard, 18 May 1939)

§ Mr. Lennox-Boyd
I beg to move, in page 6, line 39, to leave out from the beginning to the end of the Sub-section.
This Amendment is to carry out a pledge given on the Committee stage that there should be an unrestricted right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal for the applicant as well as for the Minister.

§ Mr. Lennox-Boyd
I beg to move, in page 7, line 7, to leave out "them," and to insert "it."

§ Mr. Ede
I beg to move, in page 7, line 35, after the second "the," to insert "sworn."
The noise of the wheels of the tumbrils is already beginning to sound in our ears, and I realise that I shall serve everybody's interest best if I get my Amendment out of the prison quickly, so that other persons who may also have some slight hope of escape may be able to join me in freedom later on. Therefore I would appeal to the Treasury Bench in the words that Marmion used just before his death: Few words are mine to spare, Forgive and listen gentle Clare. This Amendment deals with the way in which the information is to be brought before the tribunal when it is alleged that a person who has been given exemption on conscientious grounds by the tribunal has 1747 proved himself unworthy of it. After all, he is a person who has once proved his case, and this information may be brought before the tribunal by any person. The right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Labour said in Committee that he hoped we were going to achieve conscription without persecution, and it is to secure that end that this Amendment is moved. We ask the Treasury Bench to agree that where this man who has once proved his case is again to be brought for trial it should be upon some seriously submitted statement.
I hope that the right hon. and learned Attorney-General, if he is going to reply, will feel that less than a sworn statement ought not to be accepted. Undoubtedly there will be a very great deal of bad feeling, as there was on the last occasion, by people who are not exempted towards those who are. My own recollection of the Army in the last War was that nearly every conscript then was regarded as a conscientious objector, that is, all conscripts coming from the depots in France up the line were occasionally greeted with the statement, "Here comes another lot of Conchies." I hope the right hon. and learned Gentleman will realise the kind of feelings that are likely to be aroused. I want to report to him the case of a lady who came to give evidence at the police court, and went into the witness box and was handed the oath. She read it and after repeating the words, "The evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," she said: "With all those limitations upon me I would prefer to say nothing."
I am quite sure that no one wants cases to be brought before these tribunals on mere tittle-tattle by mere busybodies, by persons who appoint themselves as private inquiry agents, and generally behave as what are known in plebeian circles as Nosey Parkers. I cannot speak on my second Amendment, because I understand it is not to be called from the Chair, but one of the best ways to prevent the tribunals from being burdened with frivolous and unnecessary informations is to secure that the person who is going to lay the information should know beforehand that it will have to be sworn, and that he will have to accept all the responsibilities that follow when he makes a sworn statement.

§ Mr. E. J. Williams
I beg to second the Amendment.

§ The Attorney-General
No one dislikes more than I do accusations which are based on tittle-tattle and are actuated by improper or malicious motives. On the other hand, I do not think that there is necessity for this Amendment or that it would be wise to insert it. Everybody desires, of course, that no action should be taken on irresponsible tittle-tattle. On the other hand, everyone desires that if conditions imposed by the tribunal are not observed the tribunal should have information with regard to it. As the Clause is drafted the tribunal have to be satisfied upon the information, and if they have any reason to suspect that the unsworn information comes from a possibly suspect source or requires further testing, they can make their inquiries and can, if necessary, under the powers which they will undoubtedly have under the regulations, put a person on oath to substantiate the information which he has given. This information will not lead to any action except a rehearing before the tribunal, when the validity of the information will be tested. It would be a pity to say that no one could give information to the tribunal unless he went and made a sworn statement before a commissioner for oaths. The tribunal on information given them can themselves inquire into it and can, if necessary, put the person giving the information on oath. In some cases the information may come from an obviously untainted source, although not in the form of an affidavit. In certain cases it would put an unnecessary burden on the tribunal and might prevent people giving perfectly bona fide evidence which the tribunal ought to have before them in order that they might consider whether they should follow it up by inquiry.

§ Mr. McEntee
Do I understand that the tribunal will have the right, if they so desire, to put a witness on oath?

§ The Attorney-General
Yes, but the tribunal do not act unless they are satisfied on the information. For instance, they may get a letter, and if they know that there is nothing in it they will not be satisfied, but they can give the person the chance to give, if necessary on oath, the information he gave in his letter, and to answer any questions.

§ Mr. McEntee
Will they have that power under the regulations?

§ The Attorney-General
The Bill says that the regulations may confer powers to take evidence on oath, and it is intended that they shall have the power to put any witness they desire on oath.

§ Mr. Lennox-Boyd
I beg to move, in page 8, line 1, to leave out "on an," and to insert after being satisfied that the ground of his application was established, they had power to deal with him on his. Under the Bill, if a conscientious objector fails to fulfil the conditions he must appear once more before the tribunal and go through the process through which he has gone already. If the Bill is kept as it is, there would be power for the tribunal on the second hearing to put the conscientious objector on the military register without qualification. That is not our intention. The insertion of the words in the Amendment will have the result that if he is put on the military register after a second hearing he will be put on for non-combatant service.

§ Mr. Lennox-Boyd
I beg to move, in page 8, line 32, to leave out "may," and to insert "shall."
By this Amendment the regulations "shall" give the tribunals power to take evidence on oath, although it will still be open to them to hear evidence that is not on oath.

§ Mr. Ede
I would like to ask the Attorney-General on the point I raised on the previous Amendment whether it will be possible for a person to lay information before the tribunal direct, and can the tribunal at that stage put him on oath before they call up the objector for rehearing?

§ The Attorney-General
I think that is clear, because under the Clause the tribunal have to be satisfied before reporting to the Minister. If they think the letter, or whatever it is, is unreliable, they will not be satisfied. Within their powers it seems to me perfectly clear that they can say that unless the person who wrote the letter is prepared to repeat the 1750 evidence on oath they will not be satisfied, because they cannot compel him to do so and they will not take any more steps.

§ Mr. Messer
I understand that what the Amendment does in effect is to carry out the intention that was stated in the Debate in Committee, when there seemed to be some misunderstanding as to what the permissive part of the paragraph intended. In other words, it appears that those responsible for the drafting were not very careful about their grammar and were apparently under the impression that the verb "may" governed the noun "tribunal," whereas it governed the noun "regulations." This Amendment, I take it, puts that in order.

§ Mr. Lennox-Boyd
That is so.

§ Mr. Lennox-Boyd
I beg to move, in page 8, Line 33, to leave out "provide for enabling," and to insert make provision as to the representation of. This and the next Amendment provide for the clearing up of one or two difficulties, one in particular, which were raised on the Committee stage. As it is proposed to amend the Clause, the regulations shall provide for the representation of the parties before the tribunal, and this shall include the right to appear in person or by counsel or solicitor or by a trade union representative. The tribunal may also allow the parties to be represented by anybody else whom they think proper in a particular case. During the discussion some doubt was expressed lest, by naming certain persons for whom the regulations shall provide, other people were thereby excluded. This point was much in the mind of the right hon. Member for Bow and Bromley, and we have done our best by the changed wording of this Clause to meet his doubts. Although certain people must be named in the regulations, other people can be asked to attend if the court think fit.

§ Mr. Lansbury
When making the regulations, I suppose they will take into account allowing a friend other than a member of the trade union to appear?

§ Mr. Lennox-Boyd
Certainly. The regulations may provide for the presence 1751 of anybody whom the tribunal thinks it desirable to hear.