HC Deb 03 May 1939 vol 346 cc2027-9

11.18 p.m.

Mr. Foot

I beg to move, in page 13, line 39, to leave out paragraph (d)

The main purpose of this Clause is to deal with persons under a disability, that is, those who are infants or lunatics. It is proper that time shall not run against them until the disability comes to an end; that is to say that if a person is an infant and has a cause of action the period of limitation shall not be taken to run until he reaches the age of 21, or if he is of unsound mind shall not begin to run until he recovers his sanity. That is an obviously necessary provision, but there is this unfortunate exception in paragraph (d): this Section, so far as it relates to the disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, shall not apply to any action to which the last foregoing Section applies"— that is to say an action against a public authority— unless the plaintiff proves that the person under a disability was not, at the time when the right of action accrued to him in the custody of a parent. That seems to be a monstrous provision. It means that if a child receives some injury at the hands of a servant of a public authority, and if its parents, being perhaps ignorant people, and not understanding its rights, do not bring an action on the child's behalf, the child will lose its rights. When he reaches the age of 21, he may possibly be injured for life, but nevertheless he will not be able to bring an action. In any other case, if the defendant were a private firm or a private person, he would be able to bring his action on reaching the age of 21.

Answering the first Amendment this afternoon, the Attorney-General based himself almost entirely upon the report of the Statutory Law Revision Committee, and he told us how carefully the matter had been considered and how the Committee had arrived at a very reasonable recommendation. As he knows, this particular matter does not appear in any way in the recommendations of the Committee. It is fair to say that the Committee would never have recommended anything of the kind. When the Bill was first introduced last Session, this paragraph was put in at the instance, I believe, of some public authorities. It seems extraordinarily unjust that we should deprive a small class of people of their rights in this way.

Sir Hugh Seely

I beg to second the Amendment.

11.22 p.m.

Mr. Silverman

I would ask the Attorney-General what this Sub-section means. I have had considerable difficulty in understanding it. Is a child who is at school or in hospital in the custody of the parent or in the custody of the hospital or school? The Sub-section provides that it shall not apply when the right of action occurs, that is to say, at the moment when the act of negligence occurs—if it is that—and the child was not in the custody of the parent. The very reason why the exception was recommended by the local authorities was that so many children attended the schools. I thought that was one reason put forward by the defence. How is this provision to be interpreted? If there was an act of negligence in the school during school hours and the child suffered, that was the moment when the right of action occurred. At that moment was the child in the custody of the parent or of the school?

11.24 p.m.

The Attorney-General

In such a case the child is in the custody of the parent. The paragraph which the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Foot) proposes to delete was not recommended by the Statutory Law Revision Committee. The point which this Sub-section was designed to meet seems to be one of substance. There are these education authorities and estab- lishments and local authorities carrying out their duties, and no doubt there are possibilities which materialise from time to time of accidents which may or may not be negligent as alleged. If you say that here is a limitation which shall in no case begin to run until the child has attained the age of 21, you are giving to that class of case, which is an important one, a period of limitation which in fact will probably extend to 18 or 20 years. I agree that a proposal of this kind can be criticised, but it seems to me to afford a good rough-and-ready solution which does substantial justice and which, I think, is unlikely to do any injustice. It seems to me that, if a child is living with its parents and has an accident, one may reasonably assume that the parents will take the necessary steps to see that damages are recovered if damages are recoverable, and that it is not unreasonable to provide that, if a child is in the custody of its parents, the disability period shall not apply. It is right not to apply this generally, because you might have a child in the custody of the local authority by whose education officer the accident might have been caused, but in other cases it is not an unreasonable provision, and I commend it to the House.

Amendment negatived.