§ 28. Major Procterasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware of the frequency with which stipendiary magistrates and justices refuse bail upon the mere objection of the police, without any reasons being given for the objection, or upon improper grounds, such as an allegation that the case for the prosecution is not complete or that the accused may interfere with witnesses; and whether he will draw the attention of all magistrates and justices to the legal principles which should be observed in all cases?
§ Sir S. HoareI am in entire sympathy with the principle that unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary justices should make full use of their discretionary power to grant bail. The importance of this principle is, I believe, generally recognised by justices, on whom rests the responsibility of reaching a decision after considering all the circumstances of each individual case. Moreover, the decision of the justices is not final, and where a person committed for trial has been refused bail, it is open to him to make application to a Judge in Chambers or to the High Court. In these circumstances, I do not think that a circular from the Home Office to justices would serve any useful purpose.
§ 29. Major Procterasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that justices in petty sessions frequently reduce a serious charge before them to a less grave charge in order that they may deal with the case instead of committing it for trial, thereby defeating the object of Section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1925; and whether he will either introduce legislation to enable justices to deal with such grave cases or circularise all justices recommending that the practice of reducing grave charges in order to deal with them summarily should be discontinued?
§ Sir S. HoareIn indictable cases, it is the duty of justices to commit for trial upon such charges as are supported by the depositions of the witnesses, unless such charges are triable summarily by virtue of Section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, and I am advised that it would be irregular for justices to reduce charges merely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction. On the other hand, where the offence charged is not triable summarily but the offence revealed by the depositions is so triable, it is open to the justices, if they think fit and if the accused consents, to deal summarily with the lesser charge. I have no information suggesting that justices are not fully aware of this distinction, and, as at present advised, I do not think it is necessary either to amend the law or to issue a circular to justices on the subject.