HC Deb 16 June 1938 vol 337 cc499-501

Paragraph (2) of Section thirty-three of the Summary jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1908 (which empowers a court in certain circumstances to hear and dispose of a case in the absence of the accused), shall have effect as if for the words "involving the imposition of a pecuniary penalty only" there were substituted the words "for which a sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed."—[The Lord Advocate.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Lord Advocate

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

The main purpose of this new Clause is to effect a slight improvement in the procedure laid down in Clause 4 of the Bill in relation to obviating the necessity of personal attendance by accused persons in courts at a distance from the places where they reside. The House will be aware that in Clause 4 the privileges which exist in that respect are considerably extended. The purpose of this new Clause is to make a slight improvement because of a difficulty which came to light only a few weeks ago. Since 1908, it has been possible to dispense with the attendance of an accused person in a court of summary jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions into which I need not enter now, where the offence with which he is charged is one "involving the imposition of a pecuniary penalty only." That was clearly understood until a comparatively short time ago, when the difficulty arose that, under certain provisions of the Road Traffic Acts, in addition to a pecuniary penalty, there may follow such consequences as the endorsement of a licence. From that point of view, in one court objection was taken to allowing the proceedings to go on in the absence of the accused person.

Mr. Westwood

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman assure me that that case was not in Kirkcaldy, so that I am cleared?

The Lord Advocate

It was not in Kirk-caldy. The object of this new Clause is to make a slight alteration in the terms of the 1908 Act so as to make it plain that what justifies procedure in the absence of the accused person is the impossibility of imposing a sentence of imprisonment in the first instance. In 1908, when the Summary Jurisdiction Act was passed, there were, broadly speaking, only two kinds of penalties, fined or imprisonment, and when legislation in 1908 referred to an offence involving the imposition of a pecuniary penalty only, what was really meant was an offence for which imprisonment could not be imposed in the first instance. In this new Clause, I propose to substitute for those words the words: for which a sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed. The effect will be simply to meet that borderline case which has come into existence since, in which a licence may be endorsed or suspended. The result will be, on the lines of the wishes expressed by hon. Members in the Second Reading Debate and in Committee, to render it unnecessary for, let us say, a motorist in London or the South of England to go up to Inverness or Aberdeen personally in order to answer a prosecution, it may be for a relatively trivial offence, in regard to which he is content to leave the matter to the representation of his solicitor.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.