HC Deb 03 June 1938 vol 336 cc2501-14

3.22 p.m.

Mr. Mander

I should like now to refer to some of the successes that the Government have obtained in the realm of Spanish affairs and to the bombing that has been taking place there on a large scale recently, both with a military object and to inflict terrorism on the civil population. I believe that during the last four months something like 6,000 persons, mainly old men and women, and children, have been killed or wounded in the bombing of open towns by General Franco. It must be remembered in that connection that the Spanish Government deliberately renounced in February last the use of bombing as a reprisal, because they relied on the efforts which Great Britain was making, in association with other great Powers, to stop it. Unfortunately, nothing has come of those efforts. I do not know whether the Under-Secretary can tell us anything about it.

In the Debate which took place in February last, the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made reference to an international scheme in which he was interested, for an agreement to abolish bombing altogether. It is not only in Spain that we see this sort of thing taking place; the horrible events in Canton recently have shocked public opinion very much. I suggest that one practicable proposal is that the Government should take steps to arrange for the removal of anti-aircraft guns from the list of articles not permitted to be exported to Spain. That would be a practical step forward. Public opinion can do a great deal to restrain the countries which are indulging in this sheer terrorism. We can do it also individually by the boycott, by refusal to purchase articles from the countries concerned. The only real remedy for it in the long run is collective action to abolish war itself altogether.

Now I want to refer to the bombing of British ships that has taken place. In some cases, as is acknowledged, it has been deliberate. This bombing has been carried on experimentally by General Franco for some time. He began with smaller nations and bombed their ships, and now he has grown bolder and begun experimenting with Great Britain, and a number of British subjects have been killed and wounded as a result of his activities. The Government have made protests, and, as I believe, vigorous and sincere protests, but, of course, if it is known that your policy is one of complete non-intervention and that nothing will move you from it, the most vigorous protests are apt to be rather ineffective. I understand that our Consul resides outside Barcelona. I suggest that he should be there, on the spot, as are the Consuls of other countries, and that there should be naval and air attaches there.

Some suggestions have been made that neutral zones might be provided in the different ports. I know it is a very difficult matter and that it may not be practicable, but if that could be done, it could be arranged for British warships to be present, which could go into action at once in the event of any attack upon British ships. I understand that the present idea is that the bill for reparations in regard to British property should be sent in at the end of the war. That may be all right up to a point, but in cases where you get this deliberate bombing of British property contrary to international law, and for which there is no justification whatever—this pure piracy—then different action should be taken. We in this country, of course, cannot do what perhaps some others might do. We cannot take any action which would involve a reprisal in the form of loss of life, but we can seize property, and I think it would be perfectly proper action to seize one or more of General Franco's ships as a safeguard and a surety against the claims that may arise for the destruction of British shipping. I put that forward as a practical proposal, and I think that in the old and glorious days of the British Navy that is the least action that would have been taken in the circumstances.

I want now to refer to a case of a different kind which has arisen recently, to show the length to which General Franco's agents are going in this country. A well known line which has an extensive trade with the Canary Islands—Teneriffe—and also with the East Coast of Spain was rung up the other day by the Duke of Alba's agent, and asked if they would have a talk with him. Naturally the firm's representative went to have a talk, and he was informed that it had been discovered that as a result of the bombing of one of their ships his line was carrying food to Spanish Government ports and that, in view of that fact, no clearance certificates were to be allowed for any ships of his line sailing to the Canaries in future—a direct discrimination against British traders. I venture to say that that is absolutely intolerable and ought not to be permitted from the representative of any country in this country, and certainly not from a country which is not diplomatically represented here at all. I hope the Under-Secretary of State is taking vigorous action to make it clear that any action of that kind will not be tolerated here.

Let me now refer to the work of the Non-Intervention Committee and the position at the present time. May I put the position as I see it? So far as I can form a judgment, the Government now want General Franco to win. It fits in with their plans, and they think it is the best way out. If General Franco wins, that means that Germany wins in Spain. With regard to Italy, there is an agreement which arranges for the departure of the Italians altogether from Spain. I am going to assume that that goes through—and I sincerely hope that it will be carried out—but if it does go through, it does not by any means solve the problem. The Germans are under no obligation to go, and they are not in the least likely to surrender the harbours, the aerodromes, and the other gauges which they have at the present time and which are of enormous value to them in controlling the country from a Nazi point of view. One realises by studying the records of the Great War, that throughout that period the people who, at the present time, are backing General Franco, are the very people who were backing the Germans throughout the Great War. If anyone doubts that, they should look up the files of the "Times," and they will find that it is so. Quite apart from gratitude for what has been done for Franco by Germany, their natural feelings and instincts are on that side and there is no hope that they are going to turn round to us and say, "We are hoping you will give us money and we are going to throw over the other people," for it is not likely to happen.

In regard to the Italian Agreement, Signor Mussolini has been singularly successful, and I congratulate him, because he has the British Prime Minister at the end of a string. The Prime Minister has pledged his political reputation that he can make a first-class Anglo-Italian Agreement, and he has simply got to put it through. Therefore, I say that Signor Mussolini is in a very happy position, much happier than that of the British Prime Minister. In this position which I have been describing, namely the victory of Germany if Franco wins in Spain, I am surprised and disappointed to find that apparently the French Government, with whom we are so closely allied and with whom our interests run so intimately, are apparently tamely following in the same course as directed by the British Government, a course which must, from their point of view, lead to a great diversion of the French Army from the West down to the Pyrenees. I hope that they will be a little stiffer in dealing with the British Government in future.

The position of the Non-Intervention Committee, as I understand it, is this: On 4th November all nations represented on the Committee were in complete agreement as to the terms on which the Counting Commissions should operate when they went to Spain. since then certain British proposals have been put forward which weaken, and to a large extent render futile, the agreements which were unanimously come to on 4th November. Certain attacks have been made on the Russian Government for the part they have been playing in obstructing, but one must in justice say that they are the only people who have been consistent. They are remaining exactly where everybody else was on 4th November, and it seems to me unfair to attack them in these circumstances. Let me quote words used by Lord Plymouth himself during the Debate in the Non-Intervention Committee on 13th January, 1938: In view of the fact that we have passed this resolution— That is the resolution of 4th November— I feel it would be a very serious thing to attempt to reverse the decision that we came to then, and to try to reach an agreement that is upon some different basis from that which we originally agreed upon when we passed our resolution of November 4th. That is what he has been doing ever since, in spite of his use of those words.

Let me consider rapidly the changes which have been proposed by the British Government. On the question of the date when the land control should come into operation, first it was to precede shortly the commencement of withdrawal. That was unanimously agreed to. Then a proposal was brought forward by the British Government that the land control should come into operation when the Counting Commission arrived in Spain, obviously at a moment when there was no certainty that anything at all would take place or that there was the slightest hope of any withdrawal. That was a fundamental change. I understand the position now is—to bring things up to date—that the Russian Government, in spite of the obvious objection, have agreed to let that point go, only making the stipulation that the control shall not last longer than the 40 days, that is the 30 days plus 10 days' grace, and that there shall be no suggestion for an extension, which certainly would be brought forward under other circumstances. That seems a reasonable proposal if it is adhered to—40 days, no more and no excuses of any kind.

The second proposal of the British Government is as to the method of counting the volunteers. The basis on which it has always been discussed in the subcommittee is that there would be separate categories for artillery, infantry, cavalry, tanks, machine guns, military engineers, signals, air, and navy. That has been fundamentally altered. The categories have been cut down to four—military, naval, air and civil. That means all the army categories are to be lumped into one, and it is obvious what manipulation there could he, such as an exchange of so many infantrymen against so many technical troops. There is room for any amount or gross injustice there. The position as a result of what took place at the sub-committee yesterday is, I believe, that the Russian Government have nevertheless conceded that too, so there is full agreement there.

The next point concerns sea control. The original proposal was that there should be control at all the ports in Spain, both day and night, as obviously there would have to be if it was to be effective. In the very small ports there would probably be three observers, who could work on a rota of eight-hour shifts, and larger ports would probably have 24 observers, who would be on the spot to board immediately any ships which came in. The British Government's proposal is that the observers should not be permanent, that they should not be available day and night, and should not be stationed at all the ports. That makes a fundamental change in the efficient working of the scheme. I am glad to learn that the Russian Government, while making these other concessions are insisting, and I hope they will stick to it, that land and sea control shall come into operation at the same time. Otherwise it would be grossly unfair to one side.

Then there are questions of finance. They have been divided, as the Prime Minister said at Question time to-day, into two categories: administrative costs and the costs of the transport and maintenance of troops. I understand that it is agreed that the administrative costs should be shared among the great Powers. It is also agreed that the transport of the troops back to their own countries by sea should be shared pro rata by the countries to which they belong. But there is no agreement as to the cost of maintaining these troops in Spain until they can be repatriated and transferred to the ports. I understand—and I am saying this in order to make the position as clear as possible—that the only point of difficulty there is that the Russian Government insist that the cost of the maintenance of the troops in Spain and their transport to the ports should be borne by the countries to which they belong, and that does not seem to me to be very unreasonable.

What are the weak points? It is conceivable that, before the Counting Commission get out there, some of the troops, let us say the German troops, have been transferred to Spanish West Africa or the islands. There is no provision for checking that. After the counting has taken place they can be brought back in Spanish ships. There is nothing to prevent that. Another weak point in the scheme is in regard to the question of aircraft. There is going to he no control of any kind on aircraft. It is a matter of fundamental importance. It is exceedingly difficult to find an effective scheme, but you cannot expect the Spanish Government to accept a scheme which permits Franco aircraft to arrive by air in any quantity at any time and yet prevents the arrival of Government aircraft which can be brought only by sea. Obviously such a proposal is quite inadmissible. It is difficult to see how such a scheme is going to be put into operation. I hope the age of miracles is not over and that some fair scheme will be put into operation, and that the Counting Commission will go out there. I would suggest that the first thing they should do is to propose an armistice while the counting is taking place. You cannot effectively count soldiers while fighting is going on. Once you got an armistice, however short, it would be very much more difficult to start the war again. I hope that proposal will be taken into consideration.

Finally, I would say, with regard to the whole non-intervention policy, that it is one of the most shameful episodes in the recent history of England. It is a policy of calculated imposture and organisd hypocrisy. It is the imposition of sanctions against a subject of aggression. The least we can do is to restore to the Spanish Government the international right to buy arms, a right which should never have been taken from them. If we were to do this, even at this late hour, we would drive away into dark corners war and the risks of war, and not in Spain alone.

3.43 P.m.

Mr. G. Strauss

For a few minutes I want to raise one other aspect of this problem. I think the whole world has been horrified by the bombings which have recently taken place on non-combatants in this war. But, indeed, I think that one of the most fearful results of these outrages has been that by their frightfulness and unending repetition the capacity of the peoples of the world for spontaneous protest has been atrophied, and the will to impose effective restraints has been blunted. Nevertheless, there are certain things that can be done. Something can be done to stop the killing and wounding of British sailors on British boats who are going about their legitimate business. Not only the lives of those involved—and every one of us must deplore the unnecessary death of people who are going about their normal tasks—but the Whole prestige of this country is at stake. British shipping is being threatened by the action of General Franco and his Fascist allies in their deliberate bombardment of British boats. It has been suggested that the ships trading between England and Spain are few in number and not carrying much cargo. That is quite untrue. The value of the tonnage of British shipping which moved from this country to Republican Spain in the last six months is, I am told, something like £3,000,000. Cargoes to the value of about £4,500,000 have been carried, including coal to the value of £750,000, and potatoes to the value of £200,000, while, from Australia, £2,000,000 worth of wheat has been shipped. That is a considerable trade and it is obviously of urgent importance to this country that it should not be interfered with. Moreover it is directly in the interest of this country that international maritime law about neutral shipping should be upheld, because if we allow this law to go by default, Great Britain is likely to be the greatest sufferer if she should ever become engaged in war. since the beginning of this year, according to my information, there have been i6 aerial attacks on British boats, either in or just outside Spanish Government ports. Twelve people on those boats have been killed and 42 have been wounded, and among the wounded are two officers of the international committee.

I have not time to go through the answers given to us by the Under-Secretary of State, but they show clearly that in the view of the Government some, if not all, of these attacks have been deliberate. That has been admitted more than once. It also becomes clear from the answers which have been given that protests and apparently strong protests, have been made by the Government to General Franco on more than one occasion, the first having been put in, I understand, on nth May. The only reply to these repeated protests has been further bombing and sinking of ships. We were told on 30th May that the rebel authorities had said that they were going to make inquiries into this bombing, but in point of fact the only reply has been the bombing of other ships. It is clear that these bombings have been deliberate and that the Government's protests have been ineffective. I suggest that the patience of His Majesty's Government should now be exhausted and that they should take effective action to protect the lives of our sailors and the vital national interests which are being so seriously threatened. Many things could be done. One step suggested by the hon. Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander) is to demand compensation immediately. When our Ambassador in China was wounded the British Government demanded from Japan—a properly constituted Government, with whom we were in friendly relations—

Mr. Butler

In the case of our Ambassador in China, there was a grant. h was not a question of compensation.

Mr. Mander

There was a grant and we paid it.

Mr. Strauss

I think it is right to say that not only did we require an immediate apology but that we have already put in demands for compensation to the Japanese Government. I cannot see why such a demand should not be made immediately to the rebel authorities in Spain, not only in respect of shipping itself but in respect of the people who have been killed, and if the demands are not met we ought to set up clearing arrangements by which money under our control could be applied on compensation for this damage. Further, as these aeroplanes are mostly Italian or German and are flown by Italian and German officers and in view also of the fact that they are still part of the Italian and German air forces, a protest should be made to the heads of those States asking them to insist immediately that their air forces shall no longer be allowed to bomb British merchantmen at sea.

Thirdly, I suggest that we should take the action which was proved successful after the Nyon Conference, and allow British warships—destroyers, it may be—to defend in territorial waters, with the permission which would doubtless be given by the Spanish Government, our British ships from attack when they are in the harbours of the Spanish Government. I suggest that, abroad, the complacency with which His Majesty's Government have looked upon this infringement of international law by these bombardments of our British shipping has given rise to amazement. If we allow these attacks to continue without taking effective action, the prestige of this country will suffer severely in the eyes of the peoples of other countries. I suggest that at home the people are rapidly losing patience at this constant and licensed murder of our British sailors, and I ask the Government to declare—there were indications recently that they may be taking a stronger line on this matter, and I hope that that is so I ask them to declare this afternoon that, as all protests so far have proved ineffective, the time for talk has finished, and the time for action has arrived.

3.52 p.m.

Mr. Butler

I will do my best, in the short time available, to deal with the very serious matters which have been raised. There are three points. The first is the bombing of open towns; the second the bombing of British ships, and the third, to which I can only make just a reference, the Non-Intervention Committee. With regard to the bombing of open towns, it would be quite impossible to exaggerate the horror with which His Majesty's Government have read of recent bombings. Following the recent heavy bombings of Alicante and Granollers, His Majesty's Government have delivered a further protest at Burgos, in the course of which it was emphasised that the destruction of innocent lives only serves to embitter the Spanish conflict. We are asking the French Government and the Holy See to co-operate with us in our representations, and at the same time we are urgently considering other methods of action for preventing this terrible bombing, which all civilised peoples so much deplore. We have, in fact, been so horrified by the loss of civilian lives in Spain that I would repudiate the word "complacency," which the hon. Gentleman used. It in no way represents our feeling.

These apparently wanton aerial bombardments should, we think, be brought to an end, with the aid, perhaps, of public opinion. We believe that much can be done by the force of public opinion, and we are therefore considering asking certain foreign governments, who are in no way identified with either of the contending parties in Spain, to join with us in setting up a small independent commission which could hold itself in readiness to proceed to the scene of any aerial bombardment at the request of the party that suffered the attack, and report on the damage done, indicating in their view any possible military objectives which were in the neighbourhood. The Commission would immediately publish its report, and world opinion would then judge, with full knowledge that the matter had been impartially investigated, whether there could be any justification for the use of these barbarous methods of warfare.

Mr. Mander

Will it be associated with the League of Nations?

Mr. Butler

I am giving the hon. Member our immediate views on the subject before the House rises for the Whitsuntide Recess, and I would request him to allow us to continue to examine this matter.

Miss Rathbone

Does that apply to China?

Mr. Butler

I am referring now to Spain, but we are not going to forget the international aspect of this question. I hope the words I have used, if they leave the matter somewhat open, will indicate how seriously we regard this problem. With regard to the bombing of British ships, the gist of the recent reply which we have received from General Franco's administration can, I think, be properly given by me to the House. In the first place, the reply says that the suggestion that British shipping is being deliberately selected for attack is devoid of any foundation whatever. In the second place, we are informed that the head of the administration himself and Count Jordana are interesting themselves in this matter, and that they have called for a full inquiry into the circumstances of the attack of which we complain and which the National Government regrets. This is the substance of the official reply we have received from the Burgos authorities, and I sincerely hope that this reply, its terms and the spirit in which it has been sent, indicate that those authorities realise what a very serious view His Majesty's Government have taken of the bombing of these ships.

Mr. Watkins

Has there been any further bombing after that?

Mr. Butler

No, the reply has just been received. The hon. Gentleman who raised the question and the hon. Member who spoke before me asked for several detailed points to be considered. We have given serious consideration to many suggestions for the future. The most important is the reliance which we can feel that the Burgos authorities will pay attention to our recent emphatic protests. Besides that, we are proceeding with the investigation of safety zones for Spanish ports. There is no doubt that several of the berths used by British shipping have been exceedingly close to objectives which could be described as military. For instance, in some cases British ships have lain alongside Spanish ships of war. In those circumstances some of the ships which have been hit cannot be said to have been objects of deliberate attack, but in five cases which I have previously given we have reached the conclusion that the attacks have been deliberate. With regard to those attacks which cannot be called deliberate, there is some prospect of results, in our view, in this proposal for safety zones. We have been in touch with representatives of shipping interests in regard to this matter and I understand that they have taken steps to get in touch with the authorities at Barcelona and Valencia. We shall certainly lend all our efforts in trying to obtain a successful outcome of these discussions, although, owing to the small size of the port of Valencia, there are great difficulties in that place. With regard to the suggestion of our using warships and anti-aircraft guns on the spot, that could not be distinguished, I think, from a policy of intervention. We have examined that very closely, but we feel that it could be regarded as intervention if either batteries or ships or guns were to fire on the aircraft.

Miss Rathbone

Does that mean that even if it were known that an insurgent vessel was firing on a British ship, it would be intervention in the war if the British ship fired back?

Mr. Butler

I think the hon. Lady cannot expect me to go into that question now, but within territorial waters if a ship of the British Navy fires on other ships engaged in the conflict, it is very difficult to distinguish that from intervention in the conflict. I am advised in that by my advisers and by my own common sense. With regard to the question of the Non-Intervention Committee, I can only say that I cannot accept the gloomy picture of the hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander) of the work of the Committee, nor his strictures on the efforts of every Government except that of Russia. So far as the British Government are concerned, we have been trying, under the wise guidance of Lord Plymouth, to achieve success, and the result is that the Committee is nearer agreement on a plan than ever before.

Mr. Mander

Were any of my statements inaccurate?

Mr. Butler

I am sorry I cannot deal with each of them. I was about to say that the Soviet Government had given either approval or qualified approval to three points which were outstanding. These relate to the methods to be adopted and the work thus shows a certain progress.

Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Four o' Clock, until Tuesday, 14th June, pursuant to the Resolution of the House this day.