PRIVILEGES. (Hansard, 11 July 1938)

§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain)
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Report of the Committee of Privileges.

§ Mr. Attlee
On a point of Order. I wish to ask you, Mr. Speaker, whether you can give us any guidance as to the scope of the Debate on the Motion of the Prime Minister?

Mr. Speaker
I have given a great deal of attention to this question and I have come to a definite decision as to what may be discussed on the Motion. The Question before the House is: That this House doth agree with the Report of the Commitee of Privileges; the finding of that Committee being that a breach of the Privileges of this House was, in fact, committed. The Committee finds that this breach of Privilege was committed by the summoning of a Member of this House to the Court of Inquiry, but they pass no reflection upon their action. The responsibility of the Secretary of State ceases, as regards this incident, after the Court had been set up. A Select Committee has been appointed by the House to inquire into, among other things, the action of Ministers concerned. Therefore, in discussing whether this House shall agree with the Report of the Committee of Privileges it would obviously be not only improper, owing to the fact that the Select Committee is now considering this very question, but out of order, to discuss the action of the Secretary of State in connection with something for which he has no responsibility and is not directly concerned. Any action of the Secretary of State with reference to this incident should be discussed on the appropriate Vote in Supply, or possibly on the Report of the Select Committee when it comes before this House.

Mr. Atlee
May I submit to you, first of all, with regard to your Ruling as to the reponsibility of the Secretary of State for War for the Court of Inquiry, that we have no information at the moment before us in this House as to when that Court was set up, how that Court was set up, why that Court was set 950 up, or by whom it was set up. Are we not entitled to inquire into the matter of how that Court came to be set up and how it took action? I further submit that the incident which is the subject of a reference to the Committee of Privileges is quite distinct from that which has come before the Joint Select Committee, which is considering the action of Ministers in reference to the use of the Official Secrets Acts, but not in reference to the summoning of a Member of Parliament in his capacity as a Territorial officer, for action done, as he claims, in pursuance of his Parliamentary duties, before another Court than this House. I submit to you that this House can properly consider the Report of the Committee of Privileges, that it need not necessarily accept that Report, and that, therefore, in discussing that Report we are surely entitled to review the general position of Members of this House who are also members of the Territorial Army, their position with regard to Courts outside this House, and the rights of this House and its Members in respect of outside tribunals.

Mr. Speaker
With regard to the last question of the right hon. Gentleman, as to this House discussing now the position of Members of Parliament with regard to Courts outside this House, that is definitely what the Select Committee has been set up to inquire into. The terms of reference to the Select Committee are: To inquire into the substance of the statement made on 27th June in this House by the hon. Member for Norwood, and the action of the Ministers concerned, and generally into the question of the applicability of the Official Secrets Acts to Members of this House in the discharge of their Parliamentary duties. All the questions which the right hon. Gentleman put to me in his question are contained in those terms of reference setting up the Select Committee.

§ Mr. Attlee
I submit that the terms of that Motion were set down before this incident arose, that they were taken over by the Prime Minister, that it is entirely concerned with the Official Secrets Acts, that it was not set up to consider the position of a Member of this House who is summoned before a Court of Inquiry or a military Court, that it is to inquire into the action of Ministers with reference to the proceedings under the Official Secrets Acts, but that that was under consideration by this House before this 951 incident arose. Therefore, that Motion had not this particular action of the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council and the Court of Inquiry in mind at the time.

Mr. Speaker
I do not think that is the case. The word "generally," as used in the terms of reference to the Select Committee, includes the general position of Members of this House, not with regard to this particular incident—the general position of Members of this House with reference to the Official Secrets Acts, not this particular incident.

§ Mr. Attlee
The terms of reference mentioned generally into the question of the applicability of the Official Secrets Acts, but this particular incident of the summoning of a Member of Parliament for a matter arising out of his Parliamentary duties before another court does not arise under the Official Secrets Acts. It might have arisen quite apart from those Acts.

Mr. Speaker
We are not dealing with that particular point. With regard to the other point that the right hon. Gentleman raises as to the Court of Inquiry, obviously the responsibility for committing a breach of Privileges rests entirely with the Court of Inquiry. No one else is responsible for that. The question we have to discuss on the Report of the Committee of Privileges is the finding they have made: that the blame rests with the Court of Inquiry and no one else.

§ Mr. Arthur Greenwood
Do I gather that your view is that the responsibility of the Minister ended with the appointment of the Court of Inquiry? May I put this to you: The Court of Inquiry was presumably appointed on the authority of the Army Council, of which the Secretary of State for War was a member, and which is under his supreme authority. Is it not generally considered that action taken by authorities subordinate to him are actions for which he must take ultimate responsibility? I put it to you that the Secretary of State for War in this House did accept such responsibility. In those circumstances would it not be permitted, during the course of the Debate, to press for the times when the decisions were taken and the exact responsibility of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for 952 War? I submit that in view of the right hon. Gentleman's own admission it is very difficult for us to conduct a Debate when he has accepted full responsibility, if you rule that we cannot take any part in a discussion raising his action.

Mr. Speaker
I have never disputed the fact that the Secretary of State had accepted full responsibility for the appointment of the Court of Inquiry. If the right hon. Gentleman does that, I think that any action of the Army Council is a matter for which he has direct responsibility to this House. But we are not discussing that at the moment; it did not come before the Committee of Privileges. The Committee of Privileges is concerned only with a breach of Privilege, that is to say, with the action of the Court of Inquiry set up with the direct responsibility of the Secretary of State for War. The Court of Inquiry could easily have been conducted without the hon. Member for Norwood being summoned. That is the responsibility of the Court of Inquiry.

§ Mr. Greenwood
The Secretary of State is the political head of this Department of State. It was within his knowledge that it was the intention of the House to undertake an inquiry. Surely, in the course of this Debate, Members are entitled to ask the right hon. Gentleman at what point the inquiry was determined upon, and whether, with his political knowledge and political responsibility to this House, it never struck him that the right thing to do was, under his supreme authority, to countermand any order which had been issued to a Member of this House to attend the Court of Inquiry.

Mr. Speaker
That question does not arise at all.

§ Mr. Churchill
May I argue further on your Ruling? I take it that I am right in assuming that we are entitled to debate the report of the Committee of Privileges and everything contained in that report, and that the contrary opinion may be expressed and sustained from any quarter of the House. For instance, take this sentence: without making any reflection upon the Military Court. I take it that the House will be entitled to debate that or any matter contained in this report?

Mr. Speaker
Obviously we must debate that sentence in the Report if we debate the Report. If some hon. Member considers that a reflection is cast on the Court of Inquiry he can certainly do so, but that does not alter the question of the responsibility of the Secretary of State. Further to the question put to me by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood): I stated in my Ruling that any action of the Secretary of State in connection with this incident, or the appointing of a court of inquiry or the action of a court of inquiry, can be raised on the appropriate Vote of Supply. Equally it can be raised, and possibly might be raised—I do not know whether the Select Committee's Report will raise it—when the Report of the Select Committee comes to be debated on the question that this House do accept it, but not now.

§ Mr. Churchill
With great respect, and apologising for pressing this point, which is of some importance, I will ask you this: Might not the fact that the Committee of Privileges makes no reflection on the Military Court be due to the fact that the Secretary of State has accepted responsibility, and would it not be proper to state that in the Debate, as showing the reasons why the Select Committee did not make, or might be assumed not to have made, any reflection on the Military Court? Are not questions of reflection on the Military Court and matters connected with the reasons why they did not make a reflection, arguable matter, and germane to the discussion of the Report?

Mr. Speaker
I do not think that point arises. I cannot rule on that pint now, because I do not know what the right hon. Gentleman or any hon. Members may say upon it.

§ Mr. Herbert Morrison
As one who is in some difficulty, wishing to speak on this matter but not seeing how one can, might I put two points to you? First of all, it may well be argued that as the Secretary of State knew that the case of the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) was actively under consideration, he ought not to have consented at all to the appointment of the Military Court of Inquiry. Apart from that, I submit that the Committee of Privileges was appointed separately from the Select 954 Committee to consider a specific aspect of this case, and that it will be a pity if the House cannot freely debate the Report of the Committee of Privileges. You have said, no doubt under advice, that the Secretary of State has no responsibility whatever for the proceedings or the decisions of the Military Court of Inquiry, and that once the Army Council had appointed that Inquiry responsibility of the Secretary of State ceased and the Army Council had full responsibility. On the point that the Secretary of State has no responsibility whatever, for the proceedings of the Military Court of Inquiry, I would draw your attention to the statement made by the Prime Minister in this House on 29th June, when we were discussing the complaint of the hon. Member for Norwood that he had been summoned to appear before the Court of Inquiry: In the meantime, my right hon. Friend"— that is to say, the Secretary of State for War— has given me an assurance that he will at once ask the Army Council to suspend proceedings until the Committee of Privileges has met and reported.''—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th June, 1938; col. 1992, Vol. 337.] It is clear from that that the Secretary of State did exercise the right to interfere with the work of the Military Court of Inquiry, and that if he did it on that point, he could have done it on the point which is the subject of the report.

Mr. Speaker
It is, no doubt, quite true that the Secretary of State takes full responsibility for the action of the Army Council in setting up a Court of Inquiry, but that is not the question before the House now. The question before us now is the report of the Committee of Privileges, which puts the blame on the Court of Inquiry, and that is quite a different question.

§ Mr. Attlee
Surely it is open to this House to consider the report of the Committee of Privileges, and if you say that the report of that Committee puts the blame on the Court of Inquiry, is it not open to someone to urge in this House that the Committee puts the blame wrongly, and that it should have put it on the Secretary of State for War for setting up this Court of Inquiry, knowing that proceedings were taking place in this 955 House? Is not that point arguable by a Member on the report of the Committee of Privileges?

Mr. Speaker
It might be an argument for disagreeing with the report of the Committee of Privileges. Beyond that the right hon. Gentleman will not expect me to go.

§ Mr. Churchill
Did I understand you to say, and did I hear you aright in saying, that the report of the Committee of Privileges put the blame upon the Military Court of Inquiry? Because it appears to me to do the contrary. The report says: without making any reflection on the Military Court.

Mr. Speaker
The Committee of Privileges decided that a breach of Privilege had been committed, and its report goes on to say: … without making any reflection upon the Military Court, it appears to us that the summons to the hon. Member for Norwood might well appear to be an attempt to induce the hon. Member to give certain information at a time when the House was proposing to set up a Select Commitee to consider, among other things, the propriety of the hon. Member being asked to give such information. It says that a breach of Privilege has been committed.

Hon. Members
By whom?

Mr. Speaker
By the Military Court.

§ Mr. Churchill
Without making any reflection on them.

Mr. Speaker
If hon. Gentlemen choose to make reflections upon the Military Court, it will be quite in order to do so.

§ Mr. Attlee
Are you not making an assumption that every Member might not necessarily make, that when once that Military Court was set up the Minister had no power to stop it, interfere with it or influence it? Is not that a question which can be discussed in this House? There is nothing in this report that lays down that when once the Court is set up the Secretary of State cannot interfere with it. We do not know whether he did interfere, but it is arguable that he might have interfered with it, and I am putting it to you that in discussing this report of the Committee of Privileges we are entitled to discuss it freely, and that there should not be any limitation by assuming 956 that the Secretary of State or the Military Court did something which is not contained actually in this report.

Mr. Speaker
The right hon. Gentleman will, no doubt, agree that the responsibility of the Secretary of State ended after the Military Court was set up, and that the setting up of the Court was nothing to do with the Committee of Privileges. The question which can be raised in the House is, as I said, on the report of the Committee of Privileges, and the proper occasion on which to raise the other question is the Supply Vote or the report of the Select Committee when it comes before the House.

§ Mr. Attlee
Is it not an assumption to say that the Secretary of State's interference ended with the setting up of the Military Court? We have no evidence that he did or did not; we do not know.

§ Mr. Churchill
We know he did.

§ Mr. Attlee
We do know, as a matter of fact, that when the Committee of Privileges was set up the right hon. Gentleman took action to stop the Military Court sitting. You are assuming necessarily that because that Court was set up the Secretary of State's interference ended. I am asking you whether there is anything in this report to give grounds for that assumption?

Mr. Speaker
The ground for the assumption is that the Committee of Privileges put the blame upon the Court of Inquiry.

§ Mr. Attlee
With respect to you, Sir, it says just the contrary.

Mr. Speaker
It decided that there had been a breach of Privilege in the setting up of the Court of Inquiry and it puts the whole blame on the Military Court of Inquiry.

§ Mr. Denman
Are we entitled to go outside the subject matter of the complaint made by the hon. Member for Norwood, which was the order of a Military Court summoning him to appear? There was no complaint whatever of the setting up of the Military Court.

§ Mr. Aneurin Bevan
If it is not in order for the House to consider in the course of this Debate the action of the Secretary of State for War because he had no responsibility for the action of the Mili- 957 tary Court after the Army Council had set up that Court, how can the Select Committee inquire into that matter? The Secretary of State will have no more responsibility under the investigation of the Select Committee than he had under that of the Committee of Privileges and, therefore, according to your Ruling, the action of the Secretary of State cannot be discussed at all.

Mr. Speaker
The questions which the hon. Gentleman raises are for the Select Committee to discuss. It was specially appointed for the purpose of considering the action of the Ministers concerned.

§ Mr. Bevan
We understand from your Ruling that we are not competent to discuss the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War because he was not responsible for what the Military Court of Inquiry did. If that be the case, such a Ruling would apply equally to the Debate on the report of the Select Committee, and I submit that if your Ruling is sound on this occasion—[HON. MEMBERS: "Order"] well, that is my submission —and if that be your Ruling now, it is difficult to imagine how the Ruling could be different when the report of the Select Committee comes before us, because in that case also we shall not be able to discuss the actions of the Secretary of State for War.

Mr. Speaker
The Select Committee was set up in order to consider the action of Ministers with regard to this case, and obviously, for the purposes of their report, they will deal with the question set down in their terms of reference. When they submit their report, that will be the time to discuss the action of the Secretary of State for War.

§ Mr. Greenwood
I gather—and this seems to me to be fundamental to any discussion which may take place—that your view is that the responsibility of the Secretary of State ended when he appointed the Court of Inquiry. As a matter of fact, however, after the appointment of the Court of Inquiry, the Secretary of State for War took two different actions. First, he withdrew, or caused to be withdrawn, the command to the hon. Member for Norwood to attend the inquiry; and, secondly, he, through the Prime Minister, gave an assurance to the House that the sittings of the Court of 958 Inquiry should be suspended. He, after the Court of Inquiry had been set up, having on two different occasions taken definite action, I submit that it is very difficult for the House to rule that out, and it is difficult—I say so in all humility —to suggest that, therefore, that can be a good ground for not interrogating the Secretary of State for War to-day.

Mr. Speaker
As I understand it, the Secretary of State withdrew the summons to the hon. Member for Norwood after the question had been raised in the House; and I understood that he did that in the exercise of his proper function as President of the Army Council. The Committee of Privileges did not report as to that action.

§ Mr. H. Morrison
May I put it to you, Mr. Speaker, that the point is established that the Secretary of State had, either directly with the Court of Inquiry or at any rate through the Army Council, a jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings of the military Court of Inquiry in relation to a Member of this House? May I put to you the further point that the question which, with great respect, we are discussing with you, is the question whether, if an hon. Member of this House is, so to speak, tampered with, possibly in the course of his Parliamentary duties, by any outside authority at all, is it not constitutionally essential that the Minister most concerned must be held responsible for the action of his subordinates, directly or indirectly? You have said, Sir, that the matter could probably be debated in Committee of Supply. May I submit that, if it could be debated in Committee of Supply, it must be debatable in the whole House on a Motion moved in relation to the matter by the Prime Minister himself?

§ Captain Sir William Brass
Is it not the case that, if the right hon. Gentleman's argument is brought to its logical conclusion, the Secretary of State for War would be responsible for all the witnesses that are called by this Court of Inquiry? Obviously, that cannot be so.

Mr. Speaker
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Hackney (Mr. H. Morrison) has raised the question of the responsibility of the Minister. If he wished to raise it in Committee of Supply or on Report of Supply, of course he could do so, and it could be dealt with. 959 Any question of administration can be raised on the Army Vote of Supply. The Minister is responsible to Parliament, and the Committee of Supply can go into all these questions and report to Parliament upon them. But the definite subject which we are debating to-day is the report of the Committee of Privileges, which said that the Court of Inquiry was responsible for the breach of privilege. That was after the Court of Inquiry had been set up, and the Army Council or the Secretary of State has no responsibility for its acts.

§ Mr. Morrison
I venture to press the point that the Minister did in fact, on the statement of the Prime Minister, interfere with the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. He delayed them because of the later question that had arisen in the House, and he interfered with them after the Court of Inquiry was set up. I venture to ask, Mr. Speaker, if he could do that in one respect, what is there to prevent him from doing it in some other respect?

Mr. Speaker
There was a definite demand from this House that something should be done with regard to the Court of Inquiry, after the Court of Inquiry had been set up. I assure hon. Members that I do not wish to stifle debate on the subject; I only want, not only on this occasion but on future occasions, to avoid the doing of something which would certainly not be in order.

§ Sir Archibald Sinclair
May I ask you, Mr. Speaker, whether two things have not come perfectly clearly out of the Rulings which you have been good enough to give? The one is that we can debate any matter which is raised in the report of the Committee of Privileges; and the other is that, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) has pointed out, the Committee of Privileges found that an offence had been committed—a breach of the Privileges of this House—but they said that no reflection was cast upon the Court of Inquiry. In reply to the right hon. Gentleman, I understood you to say that it would be possible for hon. and right hon. Members to argue that, as the Committee said that no reflection was cast on the Court of Inquiry, the responsibility must be elsewhere, and I understood you 960 to say that that matter could be raised in the course of debate. Would it not, therefore, be better for us to start the Debate, and rely on the assurance which you have been good enough to give to the House that you do not wish to stifle discussion?

Mr. Speaker
The suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman, namely, that there should be a discussion on the subject of the responsibility being elsewhere, would only be going contrary to my Ruling. The House can discuss the responsibility of the Court of Inquiry in issuing a summons to the hon. Member for Norwood, and, consequently, committing a breach of Privilege.

§ The Prime Minister
It is, of course, a fact that the House may not choose to agree with the report of the Committee of Privileges, but, nevertheless, I am sanguine enough to hope that they will not take that course. The report of the committee was short; it dealt with only a single incident; and it was unanimous; and I have not seen or heard any criticism of the conclusion at which the committee arrived. It might, perhaps, be thought, from this general approval, that the committee had had an easy task, and that their conclusion was foregone. I would like to tell the House that the matter was not so simple as that. I do not know whether the Select Committee over which my right hon. Friend the Member for the Pollok Division of Glasgow (Sir J. Gilmour) is presiding will find themselves in a position to lay down any general principle as to the extent of, or as to the limitations upon, the privilege of Members of this House; but, whether they do or not, in the meantime it is the case, as is pointed out in the report, that there is no formal authoritative statement about privilege to which reference can be made and by reference to which judgment can easily be pronounced as to whether a certain action is or is not a breach of Privilege. That being so, the committee sought guidance from the pages of Erskine May, and also from the knowledge and experience of the Gentlemen at the Table. Erskine May is not very definite about the question of Privilege, but there is one passage which the committee had before them and which is important in this connection. It occurs on page 73, and I will read it to the House. It says: 961 But although either House may expound the law of Parliament, and vindicate its own privileges, it is agreed that no new privilege can be created. In 1704, the Lords communicated a resolution to the Commons at a conference, 'That neither House of Parliament have power, by any vote or declaration, to create to themselves new privileges, not warranted by the known laws and customs of Parliament'; which was assented to by the Commons. The statement there laid down by Erskine May, that no new Privileges can be created, to that extent limited the work of the Committee. What, therefore, we had to find out was whether, in anything which had occurred in connection with the question which had been referred to us, there had been any breach of an existing Privilege. If we had been able to find any previous occurrence which formed an exact or a fairly exact precedent for the circumstances which we were considering, our task would have been very much simplified; but on inquiry we were assured that there was nothing which could be so described. In these circumstances, the Committee merely had to fall back upon common sense, and I want to submit to the House that the conclusion at which they arrived was in fact reasonable and sensible. What is the purpose of privilege? I take it that it is to ensure that hon. Members of this House shall not be prevented or hampered, in the functions which they fulfil in the service of the State, by pressure from outside the House. In this particular case an hon. Member had taken action which was alleged to be an offence under the Official Secrets Act. Presumably, however, the hon. Member took that action in what he conceived to be the interests of the State, and—

§ Mr. Dingle Foot
Who alleged that the hon. Member had been guilty of an offence under the Official Secrets Act?

§ The Prime Minister
I will say suggested—[HON. MEMBERS: "By whom?"] At any rate, it was a matter of question. I am not judging the question; I am trying to give an entirely objective account.

§ Sir A. Sinclair
This is very important, because we were told that the Attorney-General has not alleged anything of the kind. The House is entitled to know who alleged that the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) was guilty of an offence under the Official Secrets Act—[Interruption]—or suggested it.

§ The Prime Minister
I do not want to enter into a controversy. I withdraw the statement, so far as my hon. Friend is concerned. I would rather put it this way, that action had been taken with the result that it was alleged that a breach of the Official Secrets Act had been committed. My hon. Friend must be presumed to have taken his action in the interests—or what he conceived to be the interests—of the State. The House, having had information upon this matter, proceeded subsequently to set up a Committee to investigate the circumstances of the case. A military court had also been set up, and, although the purpose for which the court had been set up was a different one, although they were approaching the subject from a different angle and in regard to a different individual, yet the incident to which the proceedings had reference was the same as that which formed the subject of inquiry by the Select Committee. Before the Committee of Privileges had reached its conclusions the question of any clash between this military court and the House of Commons had ceased to be of any practical importance, because the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry had been adjourned until after the Report of the Select Committee had been made. Nevertheless, that did not seem to be any reason why the Committee should not make their recommendations in accordance with the terms of reference to them. The Committee reported, in the words which I am going to read again, because they are the important part of the Committee's Report: In these circumstances, without making any reflection on the military court, it appears to us that the summons to the hon. Member for Norwood might well appear to be an attempt to induce the hon. Member to give certain information at a time when the House was proposing to set up a Select Committee to consider among other things the propriety of the hon. Member being asked to give such information. Accordingly, your Committee find that, taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, a breach of the privileges of the House was in fact committed. We do not, however, recommend that any further action should now be taken. As the House knows, the Report was unanimous. It does not always follow that members of a Committee who sign a unanimous report all have come to the same conclusion for exactly the same reasons. It may well be that in the minds of the individual members of the Com- 963 mittee various considerations have, in some cases more and in others less, influence. I do not propose to say now what was in my mind in coming to this conclusion or to suggest that there was a difference between myself and any other member of the Committee as to the reasons which led us to this conclusion. It is sufficient that the conclusion is there stated in plain words, and that it was unanimous.
I have only one more observation that I want to make. The Committee were dealing with an incident on which strong feelings had been aroused, but I think they did try to bear in mind in their report that, although they were dealing only with this incident, they might perhaps be, if not creating a new precedent, at any rate modifying or perhaps defining precedents already made. They also had to consider the terms of reference to the Select Committee, with which, naturally, they would not desire to overlap. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, I submit to the House that the Committee in coming to these conclusions, showed a due sense of their responsibility, both in respect of maintaining the conditions under which alone this House can fulfil its functions and also having regard to the interests and the safety of the State, which it is the duty of this House to preserve.

§ Mr. H. Morrison
It will be appreciated that my task in any case would inevitably have been one of some delicacy, in view of the matters that are under consideration and the authorities that we thought were concerned. The House will, I am sure, have some sympathy with me in having suddenly to adapt myself to the circumstances in which the Debate is taking place, and obviously I must move with very great care and with very great respect to the Ruling which you, Mr. Speaker, have given as to the scope which the Debate can take on the Report of the Committee of Privileges, and we must assume for the purposes of this Debate that if there has been error in action it has been error by the military Court of Inquiry, and not by the Secretary of State, and not by the Army Council. At any rate, if we have views about that it would be out of order to express them in this Debate this afternoon.
964 It will, however, be inevitable that I should make some reference to the statements of Ministers during the discussions that have taken place in the House on this matter, because their statements have a direct bearing on the work of the Military Court of Inquiry itself; and, in doing so, I wish to make no reference that would be more relevant to matters now before the Select Committee of the House, which is inquiring into the broad considerations of the issues raised by the actions of the Government originally in relation to the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys). When the matter was first raised in the House on 27th June the Military Court of Inquiry had not yet come out into the light of day as a body that had been appointed or had the matter under consideration; but we all understood on that Monday, 27th June, that the Government had abandoned any intention of interrogating the hon. Member for Norwood under the Official Secrets Act. Indeed, it was said in a letter that the hon. Member sent to the Attorney-General that he had received assurances upon this point. While I admit that these assurances related entirely to police powers of interrogation, I think the House of Commons assumed that if it was not intended to interrogate the hon. Member under police powers no military court of inquiry would use other means of interrogating him, under more difficult circumstances than interrogation under police powers would involve. In a letter to the Attorney-General, quoted in the House on 27th June, the hon. Member for Norwood said: Thank you for your letter of 24th June confirming the assurance which you gave me yesterday, namely, that 'There is no question of seeking to exercise against me now or hereafter the police powers of interrogation under the Official Secrets Act.' I am naturally relieved to know that no further pressure will be exerted upon me to reveal the sources from which I obtained the information which I communicated to the Secretary of State for War in my letter to him of 17th June."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th June, 1938; col. 1536, Vol. 337.] That assumption of the hon. Member for Norwood and that recital of the assurances he had received from the Attorney-General, were at no time, so far as I can see, dissented from by the Attorney-General or contradicted. Indeed, the Attorney-General, on the same day, in the statement he made to the House, said: 965 I decided—and this was my own decision, arrived at without consultation with or knowledge of anyone else—that this was not a case in which these police powers of interrogation should be exercised, and that my hon. Friend was entitled to be told that at the time. I told him so. He asked me if I would confirm it in writing. I said 'Certainly,' and did so.—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th June, 1938; col. 1538, Vol. 337.] If it be the case that the Attorney-General informed the hon. Member for Norwood that police powers of interrogation under the Official Secrets Act would not be invoked by the Attorney-General against him, it is an extraordinary thing that it should be possible that a military Court of Inquiry should have done something which is really worse in degree and character than the action taken by the Attorney-General—for the Attorney-General is a Member of this House, he is a Member of the Government, he is a Minister of the Crown, and in his case at any rate, whatever he does as Attorney-General he could not for one minute dispute—nor, I am sure, would he wish to dispute—his responsibility to the House of Commons for his action. If it be the case that the Attorney-General had intimated that he would not invoke police powers of interrogation, it is infinitely more serious that a military court—and still more serious if it be the case that that military court has no responsibility, directly or indirectly, to the House of Commons—should take the military action of requiring the hon. Member for Norwood to attend and to go through interrogation, and to attend not in his civilian capacity as a Member of Parliament, but, arising from his action as a Member of Parliament, to attend in uniform as a member of the Territorial Army, and undergo interrogation from his military superiors, after the Attorney-General had assured him that he would not invoke these powers of police interrogation.

§ Sir Arnold Wilson
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that no statement at a military Court of Inquiry can be used so as to incriminate the person who gives it?

§ Mr. Morrison
I confess I do not know that; but it seems entirely irrelevant to the issue before the House. The issue before the House is this: If it be the case that a court of military officers without authority presumably from this honour- 966 able House, and without authority from the Minister concerned, can call up a Member of the House of Commons in military uniform and interrogate him after the matter has been raised with the Minister and after it has been raised in this House—if it is possible in the year 1938 without effectual challenge, then I am bound to say that we have been living under very grave illusions as to the rights of Members of Parliament and as to Parliamentary authority in relation to the military power of the country. For we are now in a worse position than we were before the Debate began, because it is plain that Members of Parliament can be called up before military courts of inquiry on matters arising out of their Parliamentary duties and on matters arising out of questions before the House of Commons.
If that can be done, and done by officers of His Majesty's Army without authority of the Army Council or of the Secretary of State responsible to this House, if that be the serious position in which we are, that the rights and liberties of the Members of this House may be interfered with by military Courts of Inquiry, I want to say that His Majesty's Government have permitted to develop a state of affairs which they ought never to permit to develop, in the relationships between the military authorities and Parliament and the Government itself. It is the position, notwithstanding the statements, from which I have quoted, in the house on 27th June, it is the case notwithstanding the declaration of the Attorney-General that he had completely abandoned his police rights of interrogation, that people not responsible to the Minister nor responsible to Parliament, had exercised a right, more seriously of exercising powers of interrogation, than were contemplated by the Attorney-General himself.
It seems, therefore, that the action, not of the Secretary of State—I must not say that—but the action of a military Court of Inquiry was an attempt to evade the decision of the Attorney-General in this matter, and an attempt to evade Parliamentary understanding in this matter. It was a flagrant defiance of the authority of Parliament, and whatever may be said about the past responsibility of the Secretary of State, I say that the future responsibility of the Secretary of State is to pull up with very great 967 severity the military gentlemen concerned with this affront to Parliament on matters which were before the House of Commons itself. The Court of Inquiry was set up, but we do not know who set it up. We have a vague impression that it was set up by the Army Council. We do not know which Minister, if any, was consulted before it was set up. We do not know who was president at the meeting of the Army Council which decided to set up this Court of Inquiry, and I want to suggest that in the particular circumstances that military Court of Inquiry ought not to have been set up at that point.
There was no terrific urgency, the matter was being dealt with by the Attorney-General and the Secretary of State. They had seen the hon. Member for Norwood, correspondence had passed, and if it be argued, as it was argued by the Secretary of State, that the decision to set up the military Court of Inquiry was reached before any Debate arose in this House—that is to say presumably on the Monday before the House had met—if that be argued it is in no way a defence, because in fact before the House met on Monday, 27th June, meetings had taken place between the hon. Member for Norwood and the Attorney-General, and correspondence had passed between him and the Under-Secretary of State. It was known that the Member of Parliament was going to raise the matter with you, Mr. Speaker, during the proceedings of the afternoon. Therefore, as to who is responsible for setting up the Court of Inquiry we take the view that in those particular circumstances the military Court of Inquiry ought not to have been set up at that point at all.

§ Mr. Denman
On a point of Order. This is precisely the point I raised with you in advance. The setting up of the Court of Inquiry is a matter which we are told is going before the Select Committee. It is not the subject of the complaint of the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys). Are we in order in discussing it?

Mr. Speaker
It is not in order. The matter is being considered by the Select Committee.

§ Mr. Attlee
On a point of Order. May I submit to you that there were three 968 statements by the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys)? The first was on 27th June, which was a Monday, and the matters arising out of that are the matters that are referred to the Select Committee according to the Motion by the Prime Minister on the day when he set up the Select Committee. But subsequent to that there was on 29th June a further statement by the hon. Member for Norwood, in which he said that he had been summoned to appear before a military court of inquiry, and it was on that second statement that the Committee of Privileges was set up, and the matter referred to the Select Committee is the questions that were raised by the hon. Member for Norwood's statement on 27th June, which contained no reference at all to the military Court of Inquiry, because at that time he had not been summoned to attend before it and may not even have known that it was set up. I submit, therefore—and I wanted to catch your eye when you gave your previous Ruling —that this question of the military Court of Inquiry is not among the matters submitted to the Select Committee, because they are directed to inquire into the statement of 27th June, which contains no reference at all to the military Court of Inquiry.

Mr. Speaker
This matter has been sent to the committee for them to inquire into, and consequently all these questions are sub judice at the present moment.

§ Mr. H. Morrison
With great respect I have not the least desire to entrench upon the instructions before the Select Committee. Before, however, the Select Committee had been set up the Member for Norwood, being a Territorial officer, received a summons to appear before a military court of inquiry, and everything connected with that appears to be concerned with the discussion we are on this afternoon and the report of the Committee of Privileges, and part of my complaint in relation to the Committee of Privileges, and a prominent part of my complaint, is that having regard to the situation the matter had reached on the Monday, that military tribunal which has committed this offence and is referred to in the report of the committee ought not to have been set up. I suggest with great respect that this is directly material to the issue before the House this afternoon.

Mr. Speaker
The question which the right hon. Gentleman seeks to raise is no doubt an important one, but it has nothing to do with the question now before the House.

§ Mr. Morrison
On a point of Order. May I ask your view on this? I have read briefly the terms of reference to the Select Committee and there is no reference to the Court of Inquiry in any way.

Mr. Speaker
The setting up of the Court of Inquiry comes under the action of the Minister.

§ Mr. Morrison
The terms of reference to the Select Committee were substantially settled before the question arose, I submit, because the terms of reference to the Select Committee which were moved by the Prime Minister are almost word for word the same words as in the Motion of the hon. Member for Norwood; and in these circumstances, as the terms of reference were settled before the incident was ventilated in any way, may I suggest it must be relevant to the Committee of Privileges' report, which Committee of Privileges was set up after the main issue was before the House. May I be allowed to quote from the statement of the Secretary of State on 30th June? He said: I may say incidentally that that decision"—(to set up this Committee)—"was taken before any Debate had arisen in this House. The fullest information on these matters will be laid before the Select Committee."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th June, 1938; col. 465, Vol. 337.] It was therefore a matter obviously for the Select Committee to consider and not the Committee of Privileges.

Mr. Speaker
The Select Committee was set up with regard to this particular point that we are considering.

§ Mr. Attlee
I would like to submit that you have ruled that this matter of the setting up of the Court of Inquiry is one of those matters which will be inquired into by the Select Committee. It forms part of their reference. The Select Committee is appointed to inquire into the substance of a statement made on 27th June by the hon. Member for Norwood and the actions of the Ministers concerned. I take it the Ministers were concerned in the matter in that particular complaint and any subsequent complaint, and what I want to make sure of is that 970 if we are ruled out from raising the matter in this House we shall not be subsequently ruled out on the Select Committee by a statement that the matter arose on something which took place after 27th June

Mr. Speaker
I cannot permit here a discussion on a matter which has been placed before a Committee of this House. I cannot do that, as I have said before. I safeguarded myself when I said that the question might possibly be discussed on the Report of the Committee of Inquiry or on the Army Vote.

§ Mr. Morrison
I can only conclude my speech under very great difficulties. There is no point in going on, when I have got in all the arguments that I can possibly get in within the narrow limits permitted. I want to say only this, that I have discussed, as I gathered I am permitted to discuss, the action of the military Court of Inquiry and that I have not discussed whether that committee ought to have been appointed or whether it ought not. In these circumstances it seems to me that it is impossible for me, with what little ingenuity I have got, to continue the speech, and I can only conclude by once more reaffirming my very emphatic protest against the military power apparently unbridled, apparently uncontrolled by the Minister and apparently irresponsible, to interfere with the reasonable rights and privileges of this House.

§ Mr. Bevan
On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. Before the Debate continues may we have your Ruling upon a matter, which, I am sure, is in every hon. Member's mind? If we are to forgo, under your Ruling, an opportunity of discussing the wider aspects of this matter to-day, what assurance have we that we shall have an opportunity of discussing them when the report of the Select Committee is before this House? Your Ruling, I understand, has taken two forms. One is that the matters to which hon. Members want to refer are those upon which the Select Committee will report, and the second point that has been made by you is, that the Minister has no responsibility for the action of the Court of Inquiry. That is the second reason why we cannot discuss this to-day. Will that second reason be invoked when the report of the Select Committee is be fore the House, be- 971 cause if it is, then neither on that nor on this occasion shall we have an opportunity of discussing the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War? [Interruption.] If the hon. Member's understanding were equal to his knowledge he would be the most important Member of this House. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that it is necessary to draw a distinction between those two points if the House is to be in a position of knowing exactly what its rights are. If the one point stands that we cannot discuss the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War for the conduct of the Court of Inquiry in sending for the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) we cannot discuss it on the report of the Select Committee. I submit, therefore, that it is necessary to draw a distinction between those two points.

Mr. Speaker
I am afraid that we must await the report of the Select Committee. As I have already said this is not the time to discuss that, and it ought to be discussed either on the report of the Select Committee on Official Secrets Acts or in Committee of Supply.

§ Mr. Bevan
May I submit with respect that, if the Ruling be that we cannot discuss the action of the Court of Inquiry in sending for the hon. Member for Norwood in relation to the Secretary of State for War because he is not responsible for the Court of Inquiry, we cannot discuss it when the report of the Select Committee is before the House. How can he be responsible then and not now?

Mr. Speaker
The whole question of the action of the Minister may arise on the report of the Select Committee.

§ Mr. Bellenger
You have ruled, Mr. Speaker, that the Select Committee is inquiring into the action of Ministers, and also that the action of Ministers will be open for discussion on the report of that Select Committee. Am I to take it that the action of Ministers refers not only to the first incident but to any incident in connection with this matter?

Mr. Speaker
I would remind the hon. Member that this is a very representative Committee set up by this House and the House ought to await its Report.

§ Mr. Marshall
In view of the fact that you, Mr. Speaker, ruled that the Minister 972 had no responsibility for that Committee's actions, is not the whole question of Ministerial responsibility raised in this matter, and will it not be possible, if that Ruling stands, for certain things to take place in the Department of a Minister who can then come to this House and say, "I have no responsibility for it." Does not that raise a very wide question?

Mr. Speaker
I am afraid that that is not the issue.

Mr. J. J. Davidson
In view of the fact that hon. Members on the back benches may have an opportunity of intervening in this Debate, may I ask you, Mr. Speaker, as you have stated that we are not permitted to discuss the Minister's responsibility for setting up this inquiry, whether it will be in order to discuss the question as to whom the Court would report and who would be responsible for submitting the report to the House?

Mr. Speaker
That is the kind of question, no doubt, which ought to be raised in Committee of Supply on the appropriate Estimates.

§ Mr. Alan Herbert
I was unable to hear your last Ruling but five, Mr. Speaker, owing to an advertising aeroplane passing across the sky, and can you give orders that our proceedings shall not be disturbed in that manner?

§ Mr. Foot
Whatever else may be the outcome of this Debate, in view of the remarks that fell from the Prime Minister, there is one thing that should be made perfectly clear. It is not alleged, and cannot be alleged on any facts that have so far been disclosed to the House on any occasion, that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) has done anything to bring himself within the mischief of the Official Secrets Acts. I hope that that will be made perfectly clear by whoever winds up for the Government. So far as it goes, I suppose that all of us would support the actual Motion now before the House. The circumstances giving rise to that report are, as we shall all agree, somewhat unfortunate, but, nevertheless, it seems to us on these benches that it is a matter for congratulation that in times like these the Privilege of Parliament should be reasserted, and, what is more, successfully reasserted.
973 This report is a document of considerable importance to this House. As the Prime Minister said, it has been recognised ever since the beginning of the eighteenth century that we cannot create any new Privilege. The committee here point out that there is no exact precedent that they can find for the circumstances of this case, but, in spite of that, they did feel able to apply the law of Privilege to these particular circumstances. As I understand it, the report means that the committee take the view that, although we cannot create new Privileges, we can interpret the existing law of Privilege and apply it to new circumstances as occasion arises. That appears to be a position of very great importance to the future of the House of Commons. In the Debate on the 30th of last month there seemed to be a tendency among one or two hon. Members opposite to treat Privilege as a kind of anachronistic survival with a logical foundation. I hope that this Debate will make it abundantly clear that that is not the view of the House of Commons. Parliamentary Privilege does not consist of any special favour or advantage claimed by Members of Parliament simply for their own convenience. It is something which is necessary, and which always has been necessary for the proper working of our Parliamentary institutions.
It arises in this way. All of us here are under a statutory duty to attend the service of the House. That duty has always been paramount, coming before any other calls upon the Members' time. In the past, all kinds of devices have been adopted in order to enforce that duty of attendance. We have had calls of the House on a great many occasions. We have had hon. Members who have failed to attend sent for, and there was one occasion when hon. Members were prosecuted for absenting themselves from the sittings of this House. We have not adopted for a very long time any of these devices. We prefer to leave it to the party Whips to ensure that the statutory duty of attendance is carried out, but it should be made clear that that duty is still a paramount duty and, as far as all Members are concerned, comes before any other employment or fulfilment of any offices whatever. Hon. Members in the Debate a few days ago spoke as if there might be a kind of conflict of loyalties or duties in the case where a Member of Parliament was also a member of the 974 Territorial Army. I do not think that at any time in its history the House would ever have recognised any such conflict. It has always been laid down that the first duty is the duty of attendance upon the service of the House. The Privilege of Members consists in this simply. A Member is given the necessary protection and exemption from other duties to enable him to discharge his first duty of attendance at this House.
The dates in this matter are of some importance. On 23rd June there was an interview between the Attorney-General and the hon. Member for Norwood. On 24th June it was known to the Attorney-General, and may have been to others, that the hon. Member intended raising this matter in the House. Even if it was not known to the War Office and to the members of the Tribunal on 24th or 25th June, it became public property on the afternoon of the 27th, when the hon. Member stood up in his place and drew the attention of the House to the interview he had had with the Attorney-General. It is almost inconceivable that the fact that this matter had been brought to the attention of this House, and was then not under the judgment of the Select Committee but under the judgment of the House of Commons itself, because the House of Commons made clear on the Monday its intention to go on and consider the matter further—it is almost inconceivable that that fact, which was known to everybody who had seen a newspaper on the evening of Monday or Tuesday morning, should not have been known to the Court of Inquiry. It may also have been known perfectly well to the Secretary of State and to the Army Council, which is something under Mr. Speaker's Ruling we are not permitted to discuss. Not only was the sending of the summons to the hon. Member for Norwood a breach of Privilege, but the action of the Tribunal in starting its sittings at all while this matter was under the consideration of the House of Commons and when it was proposed to set up the Select Committee, was a very doubtful proceeding.

Captain Arthur Evans
Does not the hon. Gentleman consider that, in spite of the machinery set up by this House, it was no doubt the duty of the War Office authorities to take whatever steps were necessary to find out if a leakage had 975 taken place by one of their officers, how extensive was that leakage and what steps were necessary to see that a leakage did not occur again?

§ Mr. Foot
I am not saying it was not their duty. What I am discussing is the point of time that they started to discharge that duty, and I am saying that these matters were under the consideration of the House of Commons, that it was perfectly well known to everybody that the House of Commons was to consider this particular question on the Thursday, and, therefore, it seemed a very doubtful proceeding to begin the sittings of the tribunal on the Wednesday.
This tribunal was an inquiry into the alleged leakage of information to the hon. Member for Norwood. One would suppose that the hon. Member was an essential witness in any proceedings the tribunal might carry on. Even if he had not been summoned he would have been in the position of the very greatest difficulty, because he bad raised on the Monday a question affecting the rights and Privileges of a Member of Parliament. One of the questions which he had raised was whether he should be called upon to disclose the source of the information that he had received, and that was a question which it was decided should be inquired into by the Select Committee. Suppose the military inquiry had gone on and suppose the hon. Member had not been summoned there as a witness. It might very well have been that there might have been some miscarriage of justice in that inquiry, and yet if the hon. Member, seeing that difficulty, had volunteered to give evidence, he would have been on the other horn of a dilemma, because he would have been making futile the proceedings of this House and of the Select Committee which he had himself invoked.
Therefore, I say the Committee of Privileges might have gone a little further and might have said that not only was it a breach of Privilege to send a summons to the hon. Member, but that the court ought not to have commenced inquiring into these matters at all while they were before the House of Commons, or a Committee of this House. I will not delay the House further, because other hon. Members who may put these points with greater force than I can wish to speak, but I think we may congratulate ourselves that the tribunal or those in authority over 976 it have bowed to the authority of this House, and that the Privilege of the House of Commons and its Members has been once more firmly re-established.

§ Mr. Churchill
I came to the House this afternoon not at all expecting that any controversial matter would be introduced into our discussion. I am still disposed to make a very few observations, mainly of a laudatory character on our Ministers, our institutions and, generally, on the way in which this Privilege affair—I am keeping very strictly within the limits of the topics that we can discuss—has been conducted. Except in one respect, which I shall come to later on, which has newly dawned upon my conscience, I am in hearty accord with the Report of the Committee of Privileges, which I understand it is in order for us to debate. I feel that we owe a debt to our chairman, the Prime Minister, for having led us unanimously to this conclusion. The technical grounds of this breach of Privilege are clear. The hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Foot) has pointed them out. A Member of this House while preoccupied with the duty to attend before a Select Committee, of which the Prime Minister had already given notice, was summoned to appear before an inferior court upon the same subject or upon matters cognate to that subject. He was, therefore, in a Parliamentary sense obstructed in the performance of his Parliamentary duties.
In the old precedents, resolutions and rulings on this subject which we have had the advantage of having had placed before us by the officers of the House, the word "molestation" occurs several times, and it seems to me that the word "molestation" is very relevant to the issues which have been raised. Obstruction and molestation are the technical grounds upon which this breach of Privilege has been claimed. The Committee of Privileges has declared that a breach has been committed, and if the House accept the Prime Minister's Motion, which I can hardly doubt—it would be a great misfortune if the House were to differ from it—this assertion of Privilege for which, as the Prime Minister said, no exact precedent can be found in the records of several hundreds of years, will become a milestone, or at least a furlong stone, in our Parliamentary history. It is the revival and 977 the reassertion of a basis of custom which lay latent in the Privileges of this House, and which have now been brought out upon a modern instance into active and vigorous effect.
I readily agree, however, with those who think that these technical grounds ought not to have been invoked unless the circumstances of this particular case were both substantial and grievous. It is not every day that Parliament is called upon to take notice of everything that happens. Many things in the ordinary course may take place and Parliament may not take care to notice them, but it was the surrounding facts of this case that made it necessary to assert the technical position. It is not necessary to labour those surrounding facts, because we are agreed upon them; the Committee of Privileges were agreed upon them. There is no question that those facts made the technical breach one which required to be marked. It is enough to say that when the House of Commons has been asked by the Prime Minister to set up a Select Committee to inquire into a particular matter other parallel and simultaneous inquiries are inopportune and objectionable. When a Member of this House has to go before a Select Committee upon a question as to whether he should or should not answer a specific question, it cannot be tolerated that an inferior tribunal should hale him before them and ask him the same question upon the propriety of putting which the House is about to deliberate. I agree entirely with the Prime Minister that we are not laying down a general principle, but we are interpreting a principle lying in the general body of Privilege and interpreting it in relation to the actual facts of this case, which are obviously plain.
Now I come to the only point on which I feel some newly awakened doubts about this report, to which I have agreed. I refer particularly to the words, to which I agreed, without making any reflection upon the Military Court. It may well be asked, ought we to have agreed to such a statement? Here is a breach of Privilege. Can a breach of Privilege be launched out without any objective upon which it can alight? Therefore, it seems to me that one may be asked, "Why did you agree to writing these words," 978 without making any reflection upon the Military Court. I can only say in reply to that question and as some justification that my first reason was that I did not think the Military Court were to blame. It seemed to me that it would be very hard to censure these officers and bring them to the Bar, or take any action against them, as officers of the court, because they were only doing their duty. They were only obeying orders. What a terrible position those officers were placed in. On the one hand they commit a breach of Privilege, on the other hand a breach of discipline. I certainly had no desire or intention to put blame upon the Military Court, and I was surprised to hear that that is the way in which the report was read. I was glad when it was proposed to add the words that we were not making any reflection upon the Military Court.
I have never in my experience, including several years at the War Office, supposed that these courts were responsible bodies in themselves, with no higher body behind. I never supposed that the War Office itself was an automatic machine, which rolled forward blindly, senselessly, without taking any notice of what was going on. I have never for a moment imagined that such a situation could arise that a court of this kind would go forth all on its own, pushing on remorselessly, without the slightest responsibility attaching to anybody else. I must say that some of the statements which have been made to-day do create a new situation in respect of military courts, a situation not at all foreseen and certainly a situation which very few people imagined existed up to the present time. One always expected that these courts, not of course in the opinions they express upon matters, but in the dates of their sitting, the times of their sitting, were controlled and regulated for the public interest and convenience and in accordance with decorum, by the military authorities, at the head of whom there ranks a politician to whom it is not in order to refer to-day. Later on, perhaps, we may have an opportunity of doing so.
I am bound to say that I feel great misgiving about throwing the blame, as we are now told we have thrown the blame, upon this Military Court. The Court had no choice. These military men are, in my opinion, the last people who would wish to show disrespect to the House. 979 Ever since the days of Lord Wolseley and Sir Evelyn Wood, I have known, intimately high officers of the Army, and I have known officers of the class from whom the officers of this particular Court come, and I can assure the House that there is no set of men anywhere more respectful to Parliamentary authority and who would be less likely to set themselves up against the House of Commons, or wish to affront it in any way.

§ Mr. Thorne
What about the Curragh?

§ Mr. Churchill
That was not a case where officers set themselves against the authorities, they resigned their commissions, but I should be straying rather far from the narrow path along which I have to progress if I attempted to deal fully with that matter, although I am quite capable of discussing it in detail. But military questions, obviously of the highest consequence, are raised in view of the fact that it appears that this Court is alone responsible for its action and that there is not responsibility higher than this Court. I shall not press any further upon this subject, though I feel astonished that we have not had an appeal to the Chair by the Secretary of State for War to be allowed, almost as a personal matter, to stand between this subordinate Court and the censure which is now directed upon it. Every instinct would have prompted him to spring up and say not merely "I take the full responsibility" in the technical sense, but to say it precisely that these officers were obeying the orders of a higher authority in everything they did. The blame does not rest upon them but on those who have told us that they accept responsibility for their action. That is all I wish to say on this particular subject which I might, indeed, have illuminated a little further but for the conditions under which we are discussing the matter.
Although there has been some feeling expressed to-day I do not think that we have anything to regret that this incident has occurred, or that it has been raised, or that the matter has gone forward to the Committee of Privileges or that Mr. Speaker has ruled upon it as he has. There are some of the younger Members of this House, and some for whom youth is no longer an excuse, who seem altogether not fully to appreciate the dignity and Privilege which may in certain cir- 980 cumstances envelop even the humblest of us. This dignity and these Privileges lie at the very foundation of our Parliamentary system. We have taught this system to a large part of the human race, and it flourishes and is cherished throughout the British Empire. We are trying to convince the rest of the world of its superiority over various forms of tyranny, personal, party or sectarian. I think this has been a highly educative episode to foreigners. I think this Report will be read with the greatest interest abroad, and admiring and envious eyes will be turned towards this country from many lands. The lessons of this Report should be proclaimed. Here we see that force does not rule, but law. Law rules largely in virtue of customs transmitted to us by our clear-sighted, resolute and faithful forbears. We see in this Report, going back as it does in its purview over the centuries, that all wisdom is not new wisdom, that continuity of national life is precious and exalting and adds to our safety as well as to our comfort. Mr. Disraeli, in one of his most famous sayings declared: Nations are ruled by force or by tradition. There is no humiliation in bowing to tradition. It is especially becoming in the Prime Minister, with a large majority at his back, to do so. I congratulate the Prime Minister on having, as Leader of the House, which is a separate function he discharges, enforced the customs of Parliament to his own inconvenience and even to some extent in his own despite. We cannot too boldly proclaim the salutary principle that the Executive is the servant and not the master of Parliamentary institutions, and that good government and happy nations arise from the proper balance of forces and functions within a State rather than from the subordination of all to any of them.

§ Sir Arnold Wilson
I join the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) in welcoming this report and also in his congratulations to the Prime Minister, though perhaps for another reason. I am glad that the Prime Minister made it clear that this House is claiming no new privilege. Under the law as it stands hon. Members are not immune from attendance at any courts of justice, nor from any 981 criminal indictment, and if I thought that the Privilege here claimed might give rise to a miscarriage of justice I should disagree with much that is in the report. But a Court of Inquiry is not a court of justice. It can incriminate no one. There is no accused person before it and no charge against any person which has to be investigated. It is set up to investigate a given set of circumstances and anybody may appear before it without feeling that they are under a cloud or that they might incriminate themselves. Nothing said before a Court of Inquiry can be cited as evidence. It is true that in this case the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) was asked to attend; so for all we know to the contrary were dozens of other persons. There is nothing to suggest that he was in danger of molestation. I think that it is highly probable that he was asked when it would be convenient for him to attend and that he indicated a day and hour convenient for him.
I think it probable that he was not served with a summons except at his own invitation and at the time and hour which he had in fact indicated as convenient. He may on second thoughts have come to the conclusion that such a summons was a breach of Privilege, but it would be premature for us in anticipation of the report of the Select Committee to suppose that the summons came as a surprise or to doubt that every courtesy was shown to him as is invariably shown to hon. Members by military officials. Nor is it correct to suppose that a court of inquiry cannot be set up by any military authority without the approval of the Army Council. Courts of Inquiry under the Rules of Procedure can be set up by any Divisional General and in certain circumstances by an inferior military authority to inquire into matters which are relevant to their responsibilities, and that is doubtless what occurred in this case.

§ Mr. Bellenger
No.

§ Sir A. Wilson
In this case the Secretary of State for War has accepted formal responsibility, but we may perhaps forget that between him and the Divisional Generals stands, under the Order in Council, the Under-Secretary to the War Office, who is the member of the Army Council formally charged with the responsibility for all Territorial Force Associations. As it so happens he is a Member 982 of the other House but the hon. Member for Norwood had he wished to avoid raising a question of Privilege might well have telephoned him and asked whether it would be convenient for him to defer or adjourn the court.

§ Mr. Ede
How does the hon. Member know that the Under-Secretary of State for War knew anything about this inquiry? When I asked the Secretary of State for War whether the Under-Secretary was present at the meeting which ordered the inquiry he declined to answer.

§ Sir A. Wilson
I am depending solely and exclusively upon the text of the Order in Council of 1904 as amended by an Order in Council of 1936, which lays down the composition of the Army Council and provides that the Under-Secretary of State shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for War on matters affecting Territorial Force Associations. If he had not direct personal knowledge it would have been constitutional and indeed courteous to have referred to him as the responsible Minister of the Government and asked him whether he was aware of the facts and if so to ask him to give them his consideration before an acute question should arise in this House, and I am sure it was the desire of the hon. Member for Norwood that no acute question should arise.

§ Mr. Sandys
As I am giving evidence at this moment before the Select Committee I do not wish to say anything in this Debate and, therefore, I ask the hon. Member not to accept my silence as indicating that I accept what he is saying.

§ Sir A. Wilson
I do not wish to take advantage of the voluntary and desirable silence which the hon. Member has imposed upon himself. I wish to point out that there are two sides to this question and that a Court of Inquiry is not a tribunal, it is not an inquisition, it is not a body which can pass any sentence, and that it has not hitherto been suggested that hon. Members are or should be immune under military law. All that I can find about Members of Parliament in the Manual of Military Law is a footnote to say that, if officers who are also Members of Parliament are arrested Mr. Speaker should be told. That is the extent of our immunity. The "News Chronicle" to-day says that Parliament if it wished could "punish the brass 983 hats severely." It is well that we should remind ourselves that we have no power to punish anybody except ourselves. We can impose serious penalties upon ourselves, but officers who hold their commissions from the King cannot be punished by this House.

§ Mr. Thorne
They can be admonished by Mr. Speaker.

§ Sir A. Wilson
Admonition is not severe punishment and I know of no precedent for admonishing a servant of the Crown. For the rest the courts of justice are open and we have no right to interfere with the courts of justice. The Order in Council lays it down that the Secretary of State for War is responsible in all that pertains to the Army, to the King, and to Parliament, and the Army Council was not set up by this House but by Letters Patent. Let us be careful of our own Privileges but let us be equally careful of the privileges and status of the Armed Forces—not of Parliament, but of the Crown.

§ Mr. Ede
I think that the speech to which we have just listened calls for a very strong reply from these benches. We have been told to-day that, not by Act of Parliament, but by a conference between the two Houses, it was decided, in 1704, that no new Privileges should be created; but if there are many Members of the mind of the hon. Member for Hitchin (Sir A. Wilson), we may very well lose many of the Privileges which at present exist. I dissent most heartily from practically everything which the hon. Member said. This House, on its own resolution, has sent a Lord Mayor of London and his Sheriffs to the Tower, and we have never renounced the right to do so. It is true that in more recent years we have thought that to call people to the Bar and to get Mr. Speaker to admonish them, was a sufficient punishment, but we have never adopted that as the only means which we have of asserting our will over people who have offended us or who have abused the Privileges of Members. In view of the turn which the Debate has taken, I want to say that if this Report is to be regarded as a censure on the men who composed the military Court of Inquiry, we are passing such a censure on very insufficient evidence It is a fundamental 984 principle of English law that no man shall be declared to be guilty until he has been heard in his own defence, and neither the Committee of Privileges nor the House has heard the officers who posed the military Court of Inquiry.

§ Lieut.-Commander Agnew
Has the hon. Member read the Report? It states clearly without making any reflection upon the Military Court.

§ Mr. Ede
I take refuge in the eloquent phrase of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). We cannot launch a censure for breach of Privilege without having some place on which it can alight.

§ Mr. Churchill
I was under the impression that, in signing this Report, I was casting no reflection on the Military Court, but I have heard from you, Sir, that the Report puts blame on the Military Court. That has altered my view about the Report, and the reasons which I gave.

§ Mr. Ede
That is precisely the point I am making. We have been told to-day that this is a vote of censure on the Military Court. We have it on the authority of Mr. Speaker, and the course of the Debate has been to that effect. As an ex-soldier, I object to the civilian sheltering himself behind soldiers who cannot reply. I do not care who the civilian is, or how highly he is placed. I am not allowed to identify him. I have sat on the bench of a very humble court when learned counsel has said, "Look round the court and see if you can identify the person about whom you are making a complaint." I understand that if I were asked that question to-day and were to attempt to reply to it, I should be told that I was out of order. Therefore, as an ex-soldier, I can only express my dissatisfaction at finding myself compelled to pass a vote of censure on men who have never been heard in their own defence, for there was only one witness, according to the report, who was called in front of the Committee of Privileges, the learned Clerk of the House. I had imagined that the phrase to which the right hon. Gentleman drew attention was meant to indicate that these officers were acting under such orders as absolved them from the censure of the House, and that phrase could really have no other meaning than that.

§ The Prime Minister
I must interrupt the hon. Member, as Chairman of the Committee, and say that that was not the meaning which I attached to it.

§ Mr. Ede
What meaning did the right hon. Gentleman attach to it?

§ The Prime Minister
Since the hon. Member puts that question to me, I am ready to answer it. The meaning I attached to it was that the Military Court had committed a technical offence, but that it was not considered that they had deliberately attempted to challenge the authority of the House.

§ Mr. Ede
In the course of the few minutes during which I shall address the House, I hope to deal with the question of the technicality of the offence, if, in fact, it was an offence, by the Court of Inquiry. We have been assured all along that the setting up of that Court of Inquiry was something that was purely automatic, and in so far as it was directed to discovering whether a leakage had occurred and the person who was responsible for that leakage, one must say that it ought to have been regarded as automatic. I share very strongly the view that it was the duty of the Army Council, as soon as they discovered there was a leakage, to endeavour to trace the leakage, but I do not think they had the right—and this is where, I think, the Committee of Privileges is involved—to go to a Member of the House, who, in the course of his duties as a Member of the House, was using the information, and endeavour to trace the leakage back from him to the point where it occurred. I believe that their proper duty was to conduct the inquiry from the other end entirely. I was very much perturbed by the speech of the Prime Minister this afternoon, because I gathered from him—and he will correct me if I am wrong—that his view was that if the Select Committee had not been set up, no breach of Privilege would have been committed.

§ The Prime Minister
I did not say so.

§ Mr. Ede
I know the right hon. Gentleman did not say so—

§ The Prime Minister
The hon. Gentleman has no right to attribute to me expressions which I did not use and which I am not prepared to accept.

§ Mr. Ede
I did not say that the right hon. Gentleman said so, but I said that was what I gathered from his statement.

§ The Prime Minister
The hon. Member said that I would correct him if he was wrong; I did so.

§ Mr. Ede
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will also be able to correct the general impression which his speech gave, because I hope the House will not take the view that the breach of Privilege occurred only because, simultaneously with the military Court of Inquiry a Select Committee was appointed by this House. I readily accept the statement of the Prime Minister that that was not the inference which he desired us to draw from his speech. My view is that the words used by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping are essential to the consideration of this matter. The molestation of the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) consisted in his being called in front of a military court of inquiry to give evidence with regard to something with which his connection was known to the military Court of Inquiry only through the way in which he discharged his duties as a Member of the House. How they came to know of it, although the House was told a few days ago, I must not mention to-day, but a bird of the air whispered in their ears that the hon. Member had this information, and that he had been using it, not to inform the enemies of the country, but in an effort to bring the defences of the country up to the state in which he thought they ought to be. That is the only way, as far as I know, in which the Army Council or the Court of Inquiry can connect the hon. Member for Norwood with this matter. I assert that that in itself, whether we had set up a Select Committee or not, was a breach of the Privileges of this House and a matter of which we have a perfect right to take cognisance.
I wish to conclude by saying that I should regret it very much if it were thought outside that the Vote which we are about to give in this matter is to be regarded as a vote of censure on the high military officers who composed the Court of Inquiry and the officers who ordered the court to assemble. I believe that we should always look, in our dealings with the Army, for a civilian to be responsible to us for its action. I repudiate entirely 987 the doctrine of the hon. Member for Hitchin with regard to our relations with the Army. Let us not forget that a standing Army in this country is still illegal. The Bill of Rights still remains; and but for our passing Vote A of the Army Estimates every year, there could not be a single man maintained in His Majesty's Army, and but for the passing of the Army Annual Act, if that force existed, there would be no military discipline exercisable over it. Therefore, to my mind, we ought to be very careful how far we, as a House, ever say that the military, in their relations to the House, can be brought within our cognisance except through one of the civilian heads of the Fighting Forces. Although I shall vote for the Motion this afternoon, I do not believe that the officers who composed the Court of Inquiry are the people on whom the conscience of the nation will place the responsibility for this gross breach of our Privileges.

Captain A. Evans
My right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), and indeed the hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede), rather suggested that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War was running away from his responsibilities and shielding himself behind those high military officers who hold positions of responsibility at the War Office.

§ Mr. Ede
As the hon, and gallant Member referred directly to me, may I say that I repudiate any such construction being placed on my speech? I dealt with the fact that we have been told this afternoon that this report is a censure on the Military Court, and that we may not discuss the action of the Secretary of State for War in connection with it.

Captain Evans
I am glad to have the assurance that the hon. Member was not making a charge of that nature against my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War. I think the House would be very happy if my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping found himself in the same position to deny such a charge.

§ Mr. Churchill
I shall not qualify in the slightest degree what I said.

Captain Evans
If I may say so, that is very unfair, and, with great respect to my right hon. Friend, a very unusual course 988 for him to pursue. He knows as well as the House that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War has told the House time and time again that he accepts full and unqualified responsibility for this action. For my part I am satisfied that when it is possible for him, within the terms of your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, to deal with this matter fully—as I imagine he will do when the report of the Select Committee comes to be debated on the Floor of this House—we shall find that he is the last man to desire to shelter behind either military officers or officials of the Civil Service. I am glad indeed that my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping for his part did not cast any reflection on the military court, or, I imagine, on the military authorities concerned with this particular action. My right hon. Friend has himself been Secretary of State for War. It is common knowledge that in that office he rendered very distinguished services to the country. I am satisfied that if, during that period of responsibility, it had come to his knowledge that military intelligence of the first importance, probably relating to a military operations order, had been divulged by a certain military source, irrespective of the quarter to which that information had been divulged, he would have considered it his first duty to put into operation any military machinery that was necessary to locate the source of that leakage.
As you, Mr. Speaker, have ruled that this is a matter for the military court, I think we are entitled to examine the responsibility which rests upon a military court when faced with a case of this kind. It is true that it came to the knowledge of the Secretary of State for War through the medium of my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) that a leakage had occurred. I do not wish to discuss the position of my hon. Friend in that respect, but to make my point clear I will just say this—that he did not feel himself free to divulge to the authorities at that time from whence the information came. The military authorities faced with that responsibility, at that particular time, had no knowledge of the extent of the leakage. Had it been divulged by a newspaper correspondent? Was it common knowledge within a narrow or a wide circle? They had no knowledge. The only knowledge which was in their possession was that a leakage had taken 989 place, a leakage of first-class importance, and it was their prime and immediate duty to put into operation machinery which would find out how that leakage had occurred. If subsequently it was found that information had been divulged to a Member of Parliament, then that is an aspect of the case to which I am not allowed to refer at this point.

§ Mr. Bevan
That is the very matter upon which, in my submission, no hon. Member would like the House to be deprived of any illumination which can be given by the hon. and gallant Member.

Captain Evans
It would be ridiculous for the House to assume at this stage that information had not been divulged to a certain quarter. I am not in a position to say who divulged the information, or to whom it was divulged. That is the question which is at the moment under review by a Select Committee of this House. But I hope that when the Select Committee give us the benefit of their findings, we shall be able to discuss that aspect of the case in some detail. The point which I wish to put to the House is this—that the military authorities, having set up the machinery to find out exactly how this leakage occurred, acted strictly in accordance with practice and strictly in accordance with King's Regulations and the Manual of Military Law. My right hon. Friend the Member for Epping knows as well as I do that if a court of inquiry is set up, and it appears to the authorities that an officer, be he an officer of the Territorial Army or the Regular Army, might be involved in that inquiry they have no option but to summon him to give evidence before that court of inquiry, not only in the interests of the War Office, but, indeed, in the interests of the officer himself.

§ Mr. Churchill
Since the hon, and gallant Member has appealed to me to say what I think the practice should have been at that stage, I will say this. I should have thought that the Adjutant-General, in the ordinary course, would have said to the Secretary of State for War, "This matter is taking its course, but in view of what happened in the House of Commons yesterday, ought it not to be suspended?" If the Adjutant-General had not said that, then the Secretary of State himself ought to have said, "In view of what happened in the 990 House of Commons yesterday, obviously this court must be delayed." That is what would have happened, according to my experience.

Captain Evans
That, I think, is the unfortunate part of this Debate—that we are restricted from dealing with certain aspects of the case which would, I think, enable my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War at least to clear up the point which has just been raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping.

§ Mr. Bevan
On a point of Order. We are placed under a great disability. We cannot discuss the responsibility of the Secretary of State because you, Mr. Speaker, have ruled that the Secretary of State has no responsibility for the action of the Court of Inquiry in sending for the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys). Now the hon, and gallant Gentleman suggests that if the Secretary of State for War were free to speak on the matter, he could exculpate himself of the charge which you, Sir, say cannot be levelled against him.

Mr. Speaker
The Ruling which I gave at the commencement of the Debate was that as the Select Committee is now considering the matter it would be out of order for us on this occasion to discuss the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War. That was all I said with regard to the point at issue.

Captain Evans
If the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) had not been so anxious to pose as an authority on the Rules of the House, he would have allowed me to finish what I was saying. I was about to say that if there was not, as in this case, an absence of any precedent—and that is a point which we have to bear in mind—and if the Rule was clear, then there would be no Select Committee of this House reviewing the matter at the present time. But there is a doubt in everybody's mind, and it is for that reason that the whole principle is being considered, under certain terms of reference which were in fact drawn up by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood himself and approved by the Prime Minister. It is because of that doubt that the matter is under review.
It is clear that the military authorities had no option but to give my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood an opportunity 991 of giving evidence before this military Court of Inquiry, in the absence of any precedents or rules. If the military authorities, in their discretion, had refused to give that right to my hon. Friend, the Members of the Opposition would have been the first people in this House to get up and say that the War Office were military dictators denying to my hon. Friend a right which he ought to enjoy. [Laughter.] It may appear humorous to hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway, but it is for the very purpose of clearing up this uncertainty and laying down, once and for all, the relationship which ought to exist between Members of Parliament who are also officers on the Active List of the Territorial Army and the military authorities, that this Select Committee is now sitting. I think it is clear that no reflection has been cast on the Military Court. As the Prime Minister pointed out in reply to the hon. Member for South Shields just now, it may well be that they have committed a technical offence. If they have, it is the fault, not of His Majesty's Government or of the Army authorities, but, indeed, of this House, because we have not sought an earlier opportunity of clearing up a point which must develop in importance as time goes on.

§ Sir A. Sinclair
My hon, and gallant Friend has been in great difficulties in that he wished to take a certain line which he was prevented from taking by your Ruling, Mr. Speaker. But here is a matter upon which he is able to give the House the full benefit of his mature reflections, and that is whether or not a breach of Privilege has been committed. The report which we are discussing contains a finding that a breach of Privilege has been committed. Now, the hon, and gallant Gentleman says it might have been committed but he is not sure whether it has been committed or not. But that is the subject which we are discussing, and if he does not think it is a breach of Privilege, then he ought to say so and oppose the adoption of this report.

Captain Evans
In spite of the right hon. Baronet's interruption I am under no delusion as to the question of a breach of Privilege having been committed. I have done myself the justice of reading through the findings, and it is clear that 992 a breach of Privilege has been committed, but it is also clear that the Committee of Privileges, of which the right hon. Gentleman himself is a member, subscribed to the conclusion that they cast no reflection at all on the Military Court. That is the whole point, and it was with a view to developing that point that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who is also a member of the Committee of Privileges, was asked by the hon. Member for South Shields to indicate to the House what was in his mind. My right hon. Friend said frankly that what was in his mind was that one branch of the military service had committed a technical breach of the Privileges of this House, but with no intent to upset the authority of Parliament. That is the point which I was making, and perhaps when the right hon. Baronet has an opportunity of addressing the House, he will tell us what was in his mind when he subscribed to the conclusion that the military court was in no way responsible.
I feel that I owe an apology to the House as a rather junior Member for attempting to address it on this question of Privilege, but I think it is clear that the House did a wise thing in setting up a Select Committee to deal with the point of principle which at the moment is in a most unsatisfactory state. It will mean that the Manual of Military Law, that King's Regulations, which are automatically put into operation by general officers commanding divisions, perhaps without reference at all to the Secretary of State, will have to be revised in relation to the findings of the Select Committee and the decision of Parliament.

§ Mr. Bevan
There was one remark made by the hon, and gallant Member for South Cardiff (Captain Evans) in which, I think, he carried with him the whole House. That was when he said that the Committee of Privileges had decided that a breach of Privilege had been committed. As to the rest of the speech, I am sure the House would have been delighted to form some conclusion upon it if they had been able to understand it, but I am at my wits' end after listening to the hon. and gallant Member to discover what position he takes up on this question. He appears to be satisfied with this proposal because he does not want to disagree with the Prime Minister—for 993 reasons into which I shall not enter at the moment. The hon, and gallant Gentleman has private anxieties which he could disclose to the House without a breach of Privileges, but I will not embarrass him further by referring to them. He has said that while there was obviously a breach of Privileges the position was so ambiguous, the relationship of a court of inquiry to the House of Commons was so uncertain, that no heavy censure should fall on Army officers for having acted as they did. That makes the situation worse. Let the hon, and gallant Gentleman and the House consider what he has suggested. It was that the relationship between the military authorities and the House of Commons was so uncertain and that the attitude of mind of the officers of the Army towards the House of Commons was such that they did not know whether it was a breach of Privileges to subpoena a Member of this House after the matter had been the subject of questions and answers, and after a Select Committee had been set up.
If that is the state of mind of the leaders of the Army, it is time they were educated. The hon, and gallant Gentleman has suggested that they were uncertain and that they did not know they had not the right to take hold of a Member of this House and haul him up before a Court of Inquiry. Is that the position? Is the hon, and gallant Gentleman attempting to suggest that the Army authorities' sense of subordination to the supremacy of the House of Commons is so insecure that they think they can seize hold of a Member of this House and haul him up before a Court of Inquiry without being quite certain it was a breach of Privileges?

Captain Evans
The hon. Gentleman must bear this point in mind. Is it not reasonable for the Army authorities to assume that a Member of this House who happens to be an officer on the Active List of the Territorial Army is just as anxious as the military authorities to attend before a Court of Inquiry to do what he can to assist the court in finding out how essential military information came to be divulged? It may well be, although I do not know, that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Norwood was, as has been supposed by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hitchin (Sir A. Wilson), invited to attend the Court of 994 Inquiry, but that is, no doubt, a matter which will appear in later discussions.

§ Mr. Bevan
It is clearly irrelevant whether the hon. Member was invited or ordered, because I have seen letters from employers to employés asking for their resignation which could not be distinguished from the "sack." The actual terms are of no importance. The fact is that the hon. Gentleman was asked to appear before the court in uniform. I can take the hon, and gallant Gentleman as my object lesson, because he is the only Welshman who has had the temerity to sustain a defence against the Government's position. He suggests that the Court of Inquiry was justified, because the hon. Member for Norwood was not only a Member of this House, but an officer of the Territorial Army. That seems to make the position worse because now we understand that the leaders of the Army, when they ask themselves what authority they regard as supreme, decide that it is the Army, and that if a man is an officer and at the same time a Member of this House, in the view of the leaders of the Army, his membership of the Army is superior to his membership of the House. Therefore, he can be asked to do in his capacity as an officer what he cannot be asked to do as a Member of the House.
The view that we take is clear—that if a man is at one and the same time a member of the armed forces of the Crown and a Member of this House, his position as a Member of this House must not be jeopardised because of the duties falling upon him as a member of the armed forces. The Privileges of Members who are not members of the Army would be put in jeopardy if a Member who was an officer had to obey orders which he would not have to obey as a Member of the House. The defence that is being put up in this matter shows the unfortunate state of mind into which some hon. Members with certain political leanings have allowed themselves to fall in recent years. It is time we asserted the principle that the civilian authority is supreme and that the Army must regard itself as the servant of the House of Commons, and in no sense as a State within the State.
That brings me, with every respect, to some considerations arising out of the Ruling that you, Mr. Speaker, were good 995 enough to lay down this afternoon. We are forbidden to discuss the responsibility of the Secretary of State, and I am sure that it is a proscription under which the Secretary of State chafes as much as any Member. I am sure he would be only too delighted to make a defence for actions for which you, Mr. Speaker, say he was not responsible. Some opportunity will probably be given to him in future. We are forbidden to discuss the relationship of the Secretary of State to the conduct of the Court of Inquiry, because Mr. Speaker has said that he was not responsible for how that Court acted. That seems to me to place a military Court of Inquiry on an entirely superior status to that which it had before. I always assumed that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force are spheres of administration rather than spheres of jurisprudence, and that the immunity from criticism which belongs to the civilian courts does not belong to courts of inquiry that are set up under the Army Act and the King's Regulations. If courts of inquiry act in these matters automatically without instructions from any superior authority, they become self-acting and self-motivating tribunals If we are to permit this to continue the next thing that will happen is that if a court of inquiry is being held into the conduct of a member of the armed forces, we shall be estopped from putting Questions on the Order Paper because such an inquiry is being held.

§ Mr. Macquisten
If a court of inquiry were taking place, would it not be highly improper to ask questions about something which was sub judice?

§ Mr. Bevan
A court of inquiry has been an act of administration up to now. The Ruling which has been given to-day elevates that court of inquiry to a superior legal status.

Mr. Speaker
I did not say anything in that sense. All I said was that on the particular vote which we are asked to give on the Report of the Committee of Privileges the Secretary of State has no responsibility. The hon. Member must not say that I laid down that the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the administration of the Army cannot be debated, because on several occasions I have told the House when it can be debated.

§ Mr. Bevan
I was not quarrelling with your Ruling, Sir, but was pointing out the implications which might follow if certain conclusions were drawn from the Ruling such as hon. Members have drawn during the Debate. The hon, and gallant Member for South Cardiff has said that in his judgment the Court of Inquiry acted in this matter because it considered it proper to do so; not because it had received instructions from anyone, but because it was in this matter self-motivated. What has caused us anxiety is the impression that we gathered that the Secretary of State for War had no responsibility for what the Court of Inquiry did and that it is because of that we are stopped from discussing the matter. If he has no responsibility the conclusion is that the Court of Inquiry is the only authority responsible. If that is so, there is no one to answer to this House for the conduct of the Court of Inquiry, in which case the military tribunal is coming to occupy an unchallengeable position in the Constitution. That is a very serious position.

Mr. Speaker
The hon. Member must not interpret my Ruling in that way. On the proper occasion the Secretary of State can answer for the Court of Inquiry, but not on this occasion. It can be on the Supply Day or on the discussion of the Report of the Select Committee.

§ Mr. Bevan
I will leave that point, except to say that it is an unfortunate concatenation of circumstances that brings this House into conflict at this moment with the military authorities, and makes the Court of Inquiry and the Army scapegoats for actions for which other people are responsible. I want to raise another matter which seems to be germane. The Report of the Committee of Privileges says: Before, however, the Select Committee had actually been set up, the hon. Member for Norwood, being a Territorial Officer, received a summons to appear before a military Court of Inquiry into the circumstances… The circumstances were that the House of Commons had set up a Select Committee and after that was done the hon, and gallant Member for Norwood was sent for by the Court of Inquiry.

§ Lieut.-Commander Agnew
The hon. Member is wrong. The report says: Before, however, the Select Committee had actually been set up.

§ Mr. Bevan
The point I am making is that the Committee of Privileges said that a breach of Privileges had been committed because the hon. Member was sent for by an Army inquiry to investigate matters which were already the subjects of questions in the House of Commons and about which a Select Committee was to be set up. Let us suppose circumstances in which the House of Commons did not, in fact, set up a Select Committee. Suppose there were questions and answers in the House on the Monday and that the House took no further cognisance of the matter. We are then to assume that no breach of Privileges would have been committed against a Member of this House if the Army inquiry had sent for him in his uniform as a member of the Territorial Forces to give evidence to show where he had obtained the information which was disclosed by his discharging his duties as a Member of this House. In other words, there is a state of affairs which could never have occurred some few hundred years ago, when these Privileges were established, when the House met in private, when no official report was made. The purpose of secrecy was to enable Members to use information against the Executive, to criticise and curtail the Executive, which then was the Crown—the Crown itself having control of the armed Forces of the State—and to be in a position to criticise without having any penalties imposed upon them. Now, however, because circumstances have changed, because we have strangers here, and we publish our reports, that information which formerly was secret is common knowledge, and if the leaders of the Army get to know how a Member has behaved in his capacity as a Member it is assumed by this report that it is perfectly correct in asking that Member how he got the information.

§ Mr. Lewis
I would point out that in this case it was not a statement made in the House at all, but a statement made in a letter to the Secretary of State for War.

§ Mr. Bevan
That makes it worse, because in these circumstances the constitutional position now is that the Minister of the Crown, in the last analysis, rests upon his support in this House. We all know what is the background of this movement. The background of all this, of course, is that 998 there has been going on what has been described in some circles as a Churchill espionage, and there have been attempts to trace those sources of the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill)—

Mr. Speaker
The hon. Member is now really going into questions which must be raised in Committee of Supply.

§ Mr. Bevan
I was making only a passing reference to the point, and did not propose to follow it up. I propose to follow my main theme, which I have already unfolded, and it is that a breach of Privilege had been committed against the hon. Member for Norwood and against this House, irrespective of the fact that a Select Committee had been set up; that the leaders of the Army had come into possession of information which had been disclosed by a Member of this House in his capacity as a Member of this House; that the fact that their action had been taken at a time when they know what questions we put to Ministers in our capacity as Members of the House of Commons is an entirely irrelevant consideration; and that, in fact, the hon. Member for Norwood ought not to have been subpoenaed to attend the Court of Inquiry even if the House of Commons had not set up a Select Committee. I only wish to say this in conclusion, that if hon. Members think that this carries the Privileges of Members of the House of Commons farther than they ought to be carried—

Mr. Speaker
The Select Committee has been set up definitely to inquire into the statements of the hon. Member for Norwood, and in regard to the position of Members generally, and we cannot discuss that question because it is sub judice.

§ Mr. Bevan
I beg your pardon. In my submission I am discussing strictly the report of the Committee of Privileges, and indeed I am entitled to oppose it if I wish. I am entitled to say that the Committee should have gone further and called into account the matters which are before the Select Committee. This certainly does carry an interpretation of our rights. We must feel free to be able to apply our knowledge for the benefit of the country.

Mr. Speaker
Again the hon. Member is discussing the question of the position of 999 this House in the matter of Privilege, a question which the Select Committee has been set up definitely to consider. He must not discuss that, because at the moment it is sub judice.

§ Mr. Bevan
I cannot see where my remarks are out of order, because I am not discussing any of the actions taken by any Minister of the Crown at all, but discussing strictly the terms of the report of this Committee of Privileges. They say: In these circumstances. What are the circumstances? The circumstances described are that a Select Committee had been set up. It seems to me that they unduly restricted themselves in their recommendation. I am claiming that the Army authorities went far beyond their rights—and there, I admit, I am coming up against the Select Committee—in sending for the hon. Member for Norwood at all. We have to draw one of two conclusions: If the Army is solely responsible for its conduct, if the Court of Inquiry is responsible and no one else, I submit that that discloses a very unfortunate state of mind on the part of the leaders of the Army. It discloses a state of mind of latent hostility to the supremacy of the civilian Parliament. I submit that we must assert that the court of this House is superior to any court established by the Army authorities. If, on the other hand, that interpretation of the position be wrong, if it be that the Army has not acted in this way and has not got that state of mind, then that state of mind is possessed by other people, and if it is possessed by other people it is even more unfortunate, because their personal and public positions ought to have inoculated them against falling into such an attitude as that. I do not wish to make observations which would be out of order or discourteous, but I should have thought that in these days the Members of the Government, and particularly the heads of the Army in this House, ought to be particularly scrupulous to defend civilian rights against usurpations of authoritative power, and I hope that when we have an opportunity of discussing this matter in the future they will be able to set our fears at rest and show that they did not try to invade the Privilege of this House in order to conceal incompetence in their offices.

§ Mr. Macquisten
I should like to support the hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) in saying that it would be very unfortunate if this tribunal should be blamed. Those who know history know that this country has never been ruled by the Army since the time of Cromwell, and that there is no body of men more loyal to the civilian power than His Majesty's Army and Navy. The hon. Member for Plaistow (Mr. Thorne) interjected, "What about the Curragh?" but he forgot that in that case His Majesty's Army refused to take part in a civil war, declining to attack the King's friends to oblige the King's enemies, although they were told to do so by a Cabinet of which the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) was one of the leading members.

§ Mr. Gallacher
What a get-out. You can do better than that.

§ Mr. Macquisten
Well, that is the history of it. They were entitled to resign their commissions, which they did, very patriotically. I do not blame this tribunal at all. They simply started proceedings and went on. If they had thought for a moment they would have said, "This fellow is a Member of Parliament and we had better walk delicately, like Agag," but they did not. I agree with the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) that it would have been a breach of Privilege even supposing the other matter had not arisen. Even if there had not been the statement in the House it would have been a breach of Privilege for anybody to use the Official Secrets Act against a Member of Parliament, whether as regards the Army, Navy or anything else, and that is what this Committee of Privileges has found the action to be. I am very glad that it has done so, because it will be an education to everybody in the country as to the position of a Member of Parliament. We do not get these Privileges for our own personal good. They are granted to enable us to do our duty without fear or reproach. The electors will be sufficiently intelligent to elect patriotic Members to Parliament; I think that in most cases they do—even those of them who are most subject to suspicion. I do not think there is a single Member of Parliament to whatever party he may belong who would betray his country.
1001 Though a slight mistake was made, though a little bureaucratic officiousness led to this unfortunate position, I believe the incident has not been without its value. It has been educative to everybody, including some Members of Parliament, and I think we should accept the Motion which the Government have moved. I am glad to say that the Committee of Privileges were sufficiently impressed to say that they did not blame this tribunal, which just started in the automatic way of these inquiries. "Their's not to reason why"—but to go on and do their duty. The view they took was that there had been a leakage somewhere and they wanted to find out where, and they would use any method to do so which was consistent with the ordinary procedure. With all respect to what the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale said, the tribunal is a court of a kind. I could imagine that if any questions were asked when a court of that kind was sitting the reply would be that the matter was sub judice.

§ Mr. Bevan
It might be not improper, though it might be injudicious for questions to be asked while the proceedings were going on, but it would not be sub judice.

§ Mr. Macquisten
It might not be sub judice but it would be sub commonsense.

§ Mr. Bevan
It has sometimes happened that superior officers have abused their position in the conduct of an inquiry, and justice has been obtained by a Member of this House putting down a question.

§ Mr. Macquisten
I think the invariable answer of the Minister has been in such cases that the matter is before a court of inquiry and that he is awaiting the result. I believe that this particular inquiry was very largely automatic, in the way that things are done in the Army, and that no disrespect whatever was intended to the House of Commons, but I think it is a curious thing that the Select Committee was appointed after the first speech of the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) and before the citation from the Court of Inquiry had reached him. I am very glad that the Court of Inquiry had the good sense to adjourn their proceedings when the matter was brought to their notice, and I hope that when the time comes they will find out the definite source of the information, but 1002 they have no right to cross-examine Members of Parliament, because it savours too much of the inquisition, which is foreign to this country. Why should a journalist, even, who made a smart coup have to give away his authority? It is all wrong. I think that the developments in this case have cleared the air and have been an immense benefit and education to the country, letting people see what the position of Members of Parliament is, and that officers and heads of Departments of State have to leave us to do the best we can in the belief that we are all inspired by the most patriotic motives, doing what we are doing for the good of the country.

§ Mr. Dalton
We are debating this afternoon, subject to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, a narrow issue, namely, the Report of the Committee of Privileges. But I think I shall not be out of order if in one sentence I express the hope, encouraged by some observations which fell from you, Sir, at the beginning of the discussion on the scope of the Debate, that a number of wider issues, of which this is a narrow example, will be fully examined by the Select Committee. In particular this issue—how far a Member of the House of Commons, whether or not he be a Territorial officer, is liable to be called at any time before any court outside this House, whether a military or a civil court, in respect of anything which he may have said or done in performance of his Parliamentary duties. That is a wider question, not debatable indeed to-day, but it has been suggested to our minds by this particular case, which has made us feel somewhat less secure than many of us had imagined ourselves to be from interference by external bodies, external courts, whether military or civil, in the performance of what we judge, in the exercise of our reasonable individual discretion, to be our proper Parliamentary duties.
Now I have read with the close attention which it deserves the Report of the Committee of Privileges. I think the Chancellor of the Exchequer is going to say a word or two in a few moments, and he may be able to illuminate in some respects a document which I think is not at all points completely clear. We have already had conflicting interpretations by Members of the Committee themselves of the meaning of one simple phrase con- 1003 tained in the report. But before I come to that point I should like to dwell on the statement made in the Report of the Committee of Privileges that they could discover no precise precedent for this incident, and that may well be so. I have done my best, reading the relevant chapters of Erskine May, to find there some precise precedent, and I confess frankly that I have failed, as the Committee failed, to find one. But I have found words which go very near to it, as it seems to me. My hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) who has taken a most helpful part in these discussions, in which he displayed clarity, humour and knowledge—a combination not always found in speeches either here or elsewhere—drew attention to the Ninth Article of the Bill of Rights: The freedom of speech, of Debates and proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. It is clear than such courts or places include the Military Court of Inquiry which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has now ordered to desist from its labours. Erskine May, after having quoted this 9th Article of the Bill of Rights, chapter IV, page 107 of the 13th edition, says: But although by the ancient custom of Parliament as well as by the law, a Member may not he questioned out of Parliament, yet he is liable to censure and punishment by the House itself. And I note that in that quotation it is laid down quite clearly by Erskine May that a Member may not be questioned out of Parliament respecting any act that he may perform in pursuance of his parliamentary duties. I should have thought, although the precise circumstances which have now arisen are unique in the sense that there is no precise precedent, that this passage which I have quoted from Erskine May, itself based upon many particular cases, came very near to supplying a formula governing this matter.
I think I shall be in Order—I am desirous, Mr. Speaker, of keeping your Ruling—in making one further comment on this point. The question has been raised whether the Privileges of the House—which in this case have been breached or broken (whichever is the correct word) cover the writing of a letter by an hon. 1004 Member to a Minister. The 9th Article of the Bill of Rights speaks of "freedom of speech, Debates and proceedings in Parliament." It is, I think, an interesting question for consideration whether, "proceedings in Parliament" are to be interpreted so as to include the writing of letters by Members of Parliament to Ministers. I hope that the words "proceedings in Parliament" are wide enough to cover that. In my judgment they should be. But, if not, then an unfortunate consequence will follow, because then, in order to claim Privilege, a Member must be quite clear that what he is doing comes within the formula "proceedings in Parliament," and if that phrase is to be construed narrowly, the hon. Gentleman the Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys), in writing a letter to the Secretary of State for War—which, as the right hon. Gentleman complained the other day, was not marked "Secret" or "Confidential"—rather than publishing it in the Press, or using the facts contained therein in a speech in this House, or even putting a question on the Order Paper without consultation with the right hon. Gentleman, may have subjected himself to certain penalties to which he would not have subjected himself had he failed to observe the discretion which he did observe, and had he proceeded, without consultation with the right hon. Gentleman at all, to make a statement from his place in the House in the terms which he used in the letter.
Therefore, I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer may be able to enlighten us upon this question of legal interpretation. I hope that in regard to these words "proceedings in Parliament," which are enshrined in the Ninth Article of the Bill of Rights and are frequently referred to in Erskine May, he will be able to assure us that they do cover not merely speeches and questions in this Chamber but also communications from Members of Parliament to Ministers. If not, it may indeed be that we shall have to look at the report of the Select Committee somewhat critically from this angle, in order to make sure that we are safeguarded in respect of our communications with Ministers under the seal, if not of a letter marked "Secret and confidential," nevertheless under the seal of ordinary privacy in correspondence.
It is admitted—let us be clear how far there is common ground, and how far 1005 there are doubts and ambiguities in this report—it is admitted that a breach of Privilege has taken place. Very naturally, the next question that one would ask is the question that has been asked to-day by many speakers—Who is to blame for this breach of Privilege? And it is here that I venture to repeat that this report uses certain words which mean different things to different Members of the Committee. You, Mr. Speaker, at the beginning of to-day's Debate, when giving us your guidance and laying down the limits within which Debate might properly proceed, said that, reading the report, you construed it to mean that the Members of the Military Court had been guilty of this breach of Privilege. At a later stage in the proceedings the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), who was a Member of the Committee, explained that to him the words "without making any reflection on the Military Court" mean that that reflection was to be made on another person unnamed in the report. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal party intimated, I thought, in reply to a question, that that was also his interpretation. The Prime Minister, on the other hand—these are all Members of the Committee; they all sat together and, having heard one another's views, concocted this form of words which they have presented to the House—the Prime Minister explained to us that to him it meant not what it meant to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping, nor what it meant to the Leader of the Liberal party, but it meant that the members of the Military Court had indeed committed a breach of Privilege but it was only a little one.

§ The Prime Minister
indicated dissent.

§ Mr. Dalton
I do not wish to misinterpret the right hon. Gentleman if he wishes to correct my statement.

§ The Prime Minister
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be kind enough to use the words that I used, not words that I did not use.

§ Mr. Dalton
Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will be kind enough to repeat them.

§ The Prime Minister
I said that to my mind the meaning of the phrase was that they had committed a technical offence but that they had not deliberately intended to affront the House of Commons.

§ Mr. Dalton
A technical offence, that is to say only a small one. They did not seriously intend to affront the House of Commons—no; but the difference which has clearly revealed itself in the various interpretations of these simple words is that some members of the Committee do and others do not, hold the view that the Secretary of State for War was himself responsible by his acts of omission for this breach of Privilege. We have heard the various explanations, and we shall all vote for the report, and we shall each put upon it the interpretation that best fits our own view of the responsibilities.
So far as the soldiers are concerned, two different views have been put this afternoon. There are some who have said that soldiers are, naturally and properly, simple-minded men who ought not to be expected to know very much about Parliament, and therefore they very naturally fall into error, if not guided by persons of political sagacity placed temporarily in authority over them. On the other hand there are others who say that soldiers, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) argued, ought at any rate to have a modicum of political understanding to the extent of knowing that they cannot treat Members of Parliament as if they were perpetually junior officers on parade.
Between these two views perhaps the middle view is right, but certainly I do sympathise with the soldiers who have been involved in this matter, in that they have been allowed to drift, through lack of proper guidance, into a situation which has caused them, in the phrase of the Prime Minister, to commit a technical, though not a deliberate, breach of the Privilege of this House. I think it is very unfortunate that they should have been so allowed to drift. I have been reading again this week-end all the statements that have been made and quoted in this House in this matter, and the very first Minute from which all these proceedings arose, the Minute from the General Staff which was quoted in the House on Thursday, 30th June, incidentally observed that it was quite unnecessary to impart such information to a junior officer.
That is a most revealing phrase. I should have thought that there a sagacious politician would have seen the 1007 red light. "A junior officer"—that is how the hon. Gentleman the Member for Norwood appears to these brass-hatted persons. It is not too much to expect that soldiers will understand that a Member of Parliament who is also a Territorial officer has in this respect two quite distinct aspects. As a Territorial officer he may be only a second lieutenant, but in this House he wears a uniform, mystically speaking, as old as any soldier wears. He wears the same uniform that Hampden and Pym wore in the days when they defended our liberties against more portentous tyrants than those whom we contemplate to-day. And that uniform has been passed down to each of us. We wear it sometimes with breaks, according as our right to that uniform is challenged from time to time in our constituencies; but while we are here—whether or not we should be here, whether or not the electors have been wise or otherwise in sending us here —we are entitled to all the prestige that that uniform confers. Let it be remembered, as has been said already by one of my hon. Friends, that the most junior Member in this House ranks above the most senior General and is able to send him about his business at any time without much ceremony by withholding consent to the provision made under the Army Act for paying him or, under the Army and Air Force Annual Act, for permitting him to maintain discipline.
I do not greatly complain that military men, with their minds preoccupied with the sad neglect by the Government of the national Defences which they must all deplore, should not have much time to reflect upon these constitutional proprieties. For that reason I do not quarrel with the words used in the report: without making any reflection upon the Military Court, because I have put my own interpretation upon the phrase. When we have accepted, as I think we shall unanimously, this report, I hope that it will be clear, as I think it has been made clear by a number of speakers in this Debate, that the Report and its acceptance by the House this afternoon do not exculpate from responsibility, and grave responsibility—debatable, under your Ruling, upon another occasion—those politicians who should have given guidance to these simple soldiers, and who failed in their duty to do so.

§ The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Simon)
There is every indication that the House is prepared to accept unanimously the report of the Committee of Privileges and therefore to accept the Motion which the Prime Minister made from this Box some hours ago. The observant foreigner, if such there be in the Gallery, may conceivably ask himself why we should occupy three or four hours of time discussing a matter with which we are all agreed; but, as a matter of fact, we have been touching upon a corner of things which is of enormous value. Although a good deal of the time has been occupied necessarily in ascertaining at what point some speeches transgressed the limits set to the Debate, even within the limited sphere I agree with those who think that the matter is of great Parliamentary importance.
I do not intend to reopen subjects of controversy, but perhaps I might, for the purposes of record, make one or two observations in a few words. In the first place, when we talk about the business of the Court of Inquiry about which one or two speeches have been made, perhaps it is as well to remind hon. Members, and to put on record, that what is involved in a Court of Inquiry under the King's Regulations is a perfectly ordinary procedure, entirely necessary, which is adopted in a great number of cases when something has gone wrong for which the Army authorities are responsible. There is no accused before a Court of Inquiry and there is no indictment against anybody, and whatever transpires cannot be made the basis of an incriminating charge. In this case, the Court of Inquiry manifestly arose because of a matter which must be regarded as of importance, namely, that it appeared that military secrets, which we are told are of very great importance and extreme secrecy, had not been kept secret by those to whom they had been entrusted.
We ought to recognise that it was perfectly natural that there should be a Court of Inquiry, but different views have been expressed in the Debate as to whether in the circumstances it was right to hold the Court of Inquiry there and then. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Hackney (Mr. H. Morrison) took the view that, circumstances being what they were because of things that 1009 arose here in the House, it would have been much better not to set up the Court of Inquiry until all that was finished. [Interruption.] Is that not right?

§ Mr. H. Morrison
I attempted to make that point clear, but the procedure laid down would not allow me to develop it.

§ Sir J. Simon
I do not think I misrepresented his views, but, at any rate, the hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) took the view to which I referred, namely, that the Army Council have a duty to inquire into the leakage. I should have thought that was natural. At any rate, they did.

§ Mr. Ede
The right hon. Gentleman will no doubt do me the honesty and the credit to remember that I said that they ought to have inquired into the other side of the leakage, and not that of the hon. Member for Norwood. I was very careful to limit it to that.

§ Sir J. Simon
Certainly, and I hope that nothing I have said fails to represent honestly and simply what was said by the hon. Gentleman. He took the view, and I share it, that, the leak having taken place—as we are told, a serious leak, although I know nothing about it myself—the Army Council said: "We cannot delay about this. We must inquire."

§ Sir A. Sinclair
On a point of Order. Is not that just the point which we have been debarred from discussing this afternoon, namely, whether it was the duty of the Army Council to order a Court of Inquiry? That was what we tried to discuss and have been prevented from discussing.

Mr. Speaker
If the Debate goes on, I shall continue to prevent it.

§ Sir J. Simon
I am very sorry if I appeared to traverse your Ruling. I think it is within the recollection of the House that I was merely calling attention, I hope non-controversially, to two points of view which have been expressed in the Debate.

§ Mr. H. Morrison
I only tried to remind the right hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] If hon. Members want a first-class row we are quite ready for it—and to point out to him that, while he is quite entitled to refer to my statement, I was stopped from advancing into the territory as to whether the Court of Inquiry 1010 ought or ought not to have been appointed, and that it was a little difficult if my uncompleted argument were to be debated by the right hon. Gentleman.

§ Sir J. Simon
I am very sorry indeed—

Mr. Speaker
I did not stop the right hon. Gentleman because it was obvious that he was merely replying to some statements that had been made by other hon. Members.

§ Sir J. Simon
I am sure that I did not mean to go outside your Ruling. I thought that it was legitimate, and perhaps a little useful, for me to remind hon. Members of the nature of a Court of Inquiry. Really, I have not any deeplaid plot about what I was saying. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) raised the question of whether this should not be called a judicial proceeding. It is not for me to say. I should have thought that it was very much in the same general category as the sort of inquiry which is set up by, say, the Minister of Health or other administrative bodies. I think it has been the common practise in this House that when an inquiry of this nature has been set up, say about Croydon, to treat it, until the inquiry is over, as something which should not be interfered with by administrative action.

§ Mr. Bevan
In that kind of case there is no prohibition from the Clerks at the Table upon hon. Members putting down questions on the Order Paper, arising out of what the committee is inquiring into, and the Minister merely says that as an inquiry is going on he does not propose to act. It is his alibi and not our prohibition.

§ Sir J. Simon
It does not really call for controversy. I was endeavouring to state what I believed to be the true position. I should have thought there was a distinction between that kind of inquiry and a court martial. I should have thought it a most unhappy practice if we affected the result of an inquiry, which ought to be conducted in a semi-judicial spirit by saying: "Whether there is an inquiry going on or not, we propose to interfere with and challenge it at any moment."
You have laid it down, Mr. Speaker, that we ought not to discuss at this pre- 1011 sent time whether a Court of Inquiry should have been set up, and further that we cannot in this Debate discuss the responsibility of the Secretary of State. I must say, Sir, that I think it very unfair on the Secretary of State if the implication be anywhere suggested that because he does not take part in this Debate we should treat him as endeavouring to shirk his responsibility. My right hon. Friend has one of those characters and records which no doubt attract criticism, but I should have thought that the last thing which could be said about him was that he was not prepared to show courage and to face the music. There is a perfectly good reason why he should not take part in the Debate to-day, the same reason which was put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) who interposed only in a sentence. He gave as his reason that the Debate was on a strictly limited point, which is the breach of Privilege which has been investigated by the Committee of Privileges and that as he—and this equally applies to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War—was giving evidence before the Select Committee it would be improper for him to speak in to-day's Debate. Undoubtedly my right hon. Friend will have his part to take, and surely he will take it, when we discuss the Report of the Select Committee. With very great respect, I do protest, as a colleague, against such an imputation, taken in good part here but easily misunderstood outside, that the Secretary of State for War was sheltering himself, under the ruling of the Chair, behind his subordinates.
The report makes it exceedingly plain that the matters which the Committee of Privileges had to decide were very narrow ones. Every Committee of Privileges examines the complaint as that complaint is brought to the notice of the House of Commons. As a rule, it is the complainant who brings to the attention of the House the matter which he thinks is a breach of Privilege, and in dealing with it you, Sir, have to decide not that it is a breach of Privilege but to rule that at first sight, prima facie, a question of Privilege seems to arise. The hon. Member for Norwood was perfectly clear, and in what he regarded as the interests of fairness and justice he came forward here and said: "This is the question of 1012 Privilege which I suggest arises." He said, in the terms of the report, that a military Court of Inquiry had summoned him to attend. There can surely be no manner of doubt, when the Committee of Privileges reports that in its view there has been a breach of Privilege in this regard, that it was a breach of Privilege created by the giving of that order by that military Court of Inquiry. That is exactly the position as I understand it, in the works which the report of the Committee uses.

§ Mr. Burke
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman a question on that point? Did the breach of Privilege occur through the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) being summoned, as is indicated in this report, or, as is intimated at the end of the report, through his being summoned at the particular time? Is it a breach in respect of the time or simply in respect of the summoning of a Member of Parliament?

§ Sir J. Simon
That, again, I think, is clear from the language of the report. It is not for me to interpret the document, but the complaint was a complaint by my hon. Friend of an order by a military Court of Inquiry summoning him to appear before it, and my recollection is that when my hon. Friend told the House what had happened, he naturally connected it with the matter to which he had previously called attention. Be that as it may, the report of the Committee of Privileges is plain enough. It says: In these circumstances, without making any reflection upon the military court, it appears to us that the summons to the hon. Member for Norwood might well appear to be an attempt to induce the hon. Member to give certain information at a time when the House was proposing to set up a Select Committee to consider among other things the propriety of the hon. Member being asked to give such information. For my own part, I cannot doubt that, when this particular Report of the Committee of Privileges, if it is adopted by the House, enters into our records, and the subject is referred to in subsequent editions of standard books on the subject, that paragraph will be the valid paragraph.
With regard to the phrase: without making reflection upon the military Court, the Prime Minister has twice stated his understanding of the matter. I was not 1013 a member of the Committee, but it certainly appears to me that the explanation which the Prime Minister gives is the one which would appeal to any thoughtful person who reads the report and gives it its fair value. It never would have occurred to me, and I say this with great respect to anyone who suggests the opposite, that any member of this Committee assenting to these words: without making any reflection upon the military court. was really engaged in a covert slap at someone else who was not mentioned. If, indeed, that is what he meant to do, I venture to say that he ought to have secured some amendment of the report. I do not believe that the House of Commons would accept for a single moment an interpretation of these words which was understood to be in the nature of a censure upon any hon. Member of this House. That, however, is a matter for the future—

§ Mr. Churchill
That matter is not for the future. This Debate deals specifically with the Report of the Committee of Privileges; that is what we are discussing naw; and certainly I myself, when I heard that it was proposed to insert these words exonerating the military Court, naturally came to the conclusion that it remained open to the House in debate to search further for the person upon whom the breach of privilege censure alighted.

§ Sir J. Simon
I am convinced that my previous statement was right. I do not believe that the House of Commons as a whole would countenance putting forward words in a Committee Report of this sort exonerating the very body against which the complaint was made—[HON. MEMBERS: "No!"]—not exonerating, but saying that no reflection was made upon it—I do not believe that the House of Commons as a whole would willingly accept the interpretation that that was a covert slap at someone else who was not mentioned.
We shall have Debates on the wider aspect of this matter later on, and I feel very certain that all who desire it will have the opportunity of taking part in those Debates; but, so far as to-day is concerned, I am very glad that to this extent we have made more definite and precise one of the ancient privileges of this House, which is none the less ancient 1014 because an instance has not happened before. I agree with the very eloquent words of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) at the end of his speech, when he said that this is a lesson to some other systems in that it shows that in this country we do understand how to preserve Parliamentary liberty.