HC Deb 21 December 1938 vol 342 cc3045-56

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Captain Hope.]

11.1 p.m.

Mr. Noel-Baker

I want to apologise to the Under-Secretary of State for keeping him on duty three nights running at a late hour. I have asked permission to raise on the Adjournment the statement which was made in another place some time ago by the Noble Lord who is Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, together with certain answers to questions regarding that statement which have been put to the Government in this House. The statement and the questions to which I wish to refer relate to the evacuation of foreign troops from Spain, the conditions upon which the Anglo-Italian Agreement was made, and the interpretation of those conditions given to this House by the Government, and especially by the Prime Minister in speeches which he has made. I submit that those issues have a very special importance at the present moment, in view of the forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister to Rome.

I want to remind the House of some of the principal events connected with these questions, and the dates on which the events happened. Negotiations for the Anglo-Italian Agreement may be said, in one sense, to have begun in July, 1937, when the Prime Minister wrote his first famous letter to Signor Mussolini. They were rudely interrupted within a few days by Italian piracy in the Mediterranean, against which the Nyon Agreement was made. It was known by Christmas of last year that the Prime Minister was anxious to renew the negotiations, and we learned on 21st February of this year that the Prime Minister was so anxious to renew them that he was prepared to part with his Foreign Secretary in order to carry them on. It was on that date, 21st February, that he first explained the basic conditions upon which his negotiations, as we understood, were to be conducted. On 7th March—I believe I am correct, if not the Under-Secretary will put me right—the formal conversations between the two Governments began in Rome. On 16th April the Agreement and the Protocol were signed in Rome. On 2nd May, the Prime Minister brought the Agreement and the Protocol before this House, and on 26th July he made a speech in which he further explained the conditions upon which the Agreement was based.

On 2nd November last, that is to say practically six months after the Agreement was first laid before the House, it was again the subject of debate here, when the Government asked for authority to bring it into force. At every stage the most important subject of debate in this House lay in the conditions upon which the negotiations had been begun, and the conditions upon which the Agreement was to come into force. It was because of these conditions—and the Prime Minister himself has stated so on more than one occasion—that the long interval of six months was allowed to elapse between the signing of the Agreement and the date on which it was brought into force. That long interval elapsed, although this was said to be a great act of appeasement, which was to help towards the peace of the world. However, Signor Mussolini made it plain later that he was extremely anxious that the Agreement should be brought into force without delay.

What were the conditions which the Prime Minister laid down? Before I recite them, let me remind the House that it was over this subject of Italian intervention in Spain that the late Foreign Secretary resigned his office. In effect, he said to the House, on 21st February—I am not quoting him textually—" I am ready to negotiate with Signor Mussolini for a general treaty. I have offered to do so and I want to do so, but only when he carries out the four Treaties which I have already made with him, under which he has undertaken not to intervene in Spain." It was on that ground that the Foreign Secretary resigned. Faced by that firm attitude of one of his principal colleagues the Prime Minister on 21st of February was at great pains to explain to the House that he attached as much importance to the Italian question as the Foreign Secretary, and that by his method he was more likely than the Foreign Secretary to secure practical results. Let me remind the House what the Prime Minister actually said: Once the conversations had started we should find good effects of the new atmosphere in many places, and notably in Spain, where the chief difficulty between us had lain for so long."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February, 1938; col. 60, Vol. 332.] He went on to say that he told Count Grandi that a settlement of the Spanish question must be regarded as an essential feature of any agreement arrived at and that when the agreement was brought to Geneva it must not be possible for anyone to assert that Signor Mussolini had materially altered the situation in Spain by sending reinforcements to Franco or by failing to implement the arrangement contemplated by the formula. In order to prove his enthusiasm on this point and Signor Mussolini's good faith, he told the House that Signor Mussolini had accepted that morning the British formula for the evacuation of foreign troops from Spain. He confirmed these statements when he brought the question of the Agreement before the House on 2nd May. He recited the pledge which Signor Mussolini gave in the Agreement—a very good pledge indeed, in my opinion—that he would bring away his foreign troops under the Non-Intervention plan.

He said that there had been suspicions frequently expressed that Italy when the time came would refuse to withdraw volunteers in accordance with the Non-Intervention Committee's Agreement. The Prime Minister scorned these fears and suspicions, and took the Italian pledges at their face value. He said that he was perfectly certain they would be carried out, and he said he had no doubt that time would show that he was right. On 26th July he again explained to the House that he still thought that the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Spain must be a condition of bringing the Treaty into force. Let me quote his actual words: We shall do all we possibly can to facilitate the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain in order that the country may cease to offer any threat to the peace of Europe. After a question by the Leader of the Opposition, he made it plain that in his view the withdrawal of volunteers was the minimum which could be carried out before a settlement of the Spanish question could be regarded as complete. Even as late as 2nd November, the Prime Minister used similar language when he told the House about the 10,000 troops which Signor Mussolini had withdrawn, and then he went on to say that he had three assurances from Signor Mussolini. The first was that the remaining forces of all categories would be withdrawn; secondly, that no further Italian troops would be sent, and, thirdly, the pledge about aircraft. He then went on to use these words, to which I attach great importance: These three assurances, taken in conjunction with the actual withdrawal of this large body of men, in my judgment constitutes a substantial earnest of the good intentions of the Italian Government. I submit that this means, even on 2nd November, that the Prime Minister led the House to believe that the withdrawal of the 10,000 men was only the first step, that he still hoped that Italy would end her intervention altogether, that further steps would be taken within the measurable future, and that that was why he spoke of Signor Mussolini's good intentions with regard to Spain. I submit that it was by these pledges that the Prime Minister secured the approval of the House for his two Motions on 2nd May and 2nd November.

Suddenly, on the very next day, after this House had voted that the Treaty should be brought into force, when it had committed the final act which it could not revoke, the Noble Lord the Foreign Secretary made a very different declaration in another place. He said: Signor Mussolini has always made it plain, from the time of the first conversations between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government, that, for reasons of his own, whether we approve of them or not, he was not prepared to see General Franco defeated. That was very different from the language used by the Prime Minister the day before. There was no mention there of Signor Mussolini's good intentions, no sign that he intended to end his intervention. It was a brutal declaration by the Noble Lord that Signor Mussolini was determined to see General Franco through to victory, and that our Government had known it from the time of the first conversations. Now, we had always believed, on these benches, that that was true. My right hon. Friend the Member for Gorton (Mr. Benn) had heard it as long ago as December last, in Rome. We had been forced to the conclusion that the Foreign Secretary resigned his office as a protest against the Aragon offensive which he knew was coming, and that he refused to negotiate whole that offensive was going on. The Prime Minister accepted that resignation. The Prime Minister believed that that offensive would be decisive, that the war would be over, and that Signor Mussolini could fulfil his pledges when General Franco had won. I submit that what the Foreign Secretary really told the House, on 3rd November was that we were right, and that that was, in fact, the case. I submit to the Under-Secretary that the Foreign Secretary's language was in reality perfectly plain. It meant that when the negotiations began between the two Governments, His Majesty's Government knew that Signor Mussolini insisted on General Franco's victory, that they accepted Signor Mussolini's condition, and made their Agreement on that basis.

In consequence of questions about that declaration of the Foreign Secretary, there began a strange process of explanation from the Government Front Bench. We asked precisely what it was that Signor Mussolini had said in the first conversations to bring the Government to this view. The Under-Secretary replied that he had said nothing and that the Government were relying on public declarations. I then asked what were the dates of those declarations. I could find nothing in January, February or March that might fit into the case. We were told that it was not the conversations for the making of the Agreement that the Foreign Secretary means, but the conversations which came much later about bringing the Treaty into force. The original conversations were in March; the later conversations about bringing the Treaty into force were in June.

Now, I submit that that was a very strange explanation. To begin with, the Foreign Secretary's words were quite plain. I have read them to the House. He spoke of the first conversations between the two Governments. He never mentioned anything about bringing the Treaty into force, and the Under-Secretary, in answer to our questions as late as 14th November, also spoke of the first conversations between the Governments without any qualifying phrase. I submit that, on the fact of the plain interpretation of the Foreign Secretary's words, it is the first conversations of March that must have been intended. Secondly, we asked what was the declaration by Signor Mussolini on which the Government relied. We were told that it was the speech he made at Genoa on 14th May. I have here a report from the "Times" of that speech. Signor Mussolini said on that occasion that he did not think that Franco-Italian conversations would succeed, because he said, on one extremely vital matter—the war in Spain: We (that is, Italy and France) stand on opposite sides of the barricades. Their desire is for a victory for Barcelona. We, on the other hand, want Franco to win. I admit that that shows sympathy with General Franco, but it is not an adequate basis on which the Government should make up its mind upon a major matter of policy, affecting the great act of appeasement which they were trying to carry through. I have no desire to accuse the Under-Secretary or anybody else of lack of candour, but I find it extremely difficult to accept the explanations which have been put forward. They do not fit the words used by the Foreign Secretary. They do not fit the Under-Secretary's own answer of 14th Novem- ber. They do not fit the facts and above all, and most important, they do not explain why the Government did not come to the House on 14th May, as soon as they knew this situation, as soon as they knew that Signor Mussolini, far from intending to end his intervention was firmly resolved to win the Spanish war, and tell us frankly that that was so Let us accept every explanation that the Under-Secretary has given, everything the Government has said, that it was only on 14th May that they knew that Signor Mussolini had made this resolution. Still, it does not explain or justify in any way what the Prime Minister has told us in every speech he has made on this subject since. We were led to believe from his speeches that Italian intervention was going to end, that what Signor Mussolini said would make no material change in Spain, that he would send in no reinforcements but would evacuate his troops as soon as the Non-Intervention Committee had a plan and that he would not try to win the war.

On 2nd November we were still adjured to believe in his good intentions with regard to Spain. On 3rd November, the Foreign Secretary told us the brutal truth. If the Prime Minister had told us the truth in those terms on 21st February, on 2nd May, on 26th July or even, I believe, on 2nd November, he would not have got his votes in this House. We say that the Foreign Secretary's revelations destroyed the moral basis of the Prime Minister's policy and the moral basis of the votes which this House had given and I now ask the Under-Secretary to tell us why we are wrong.

11.19 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Butler)

I must thank the hon. Member for his kind references to me, and to the fact that I have been brought here so frequently at this hour of the night. I can assure him that it is a pleasure to me to debate with him on any occasion. But I should have been more happy to do so had he adduced any new information or any new subject for the consideration of the House. Unfortunately, he has reiterated many of the old arguments and covered much of the ground which has already been covered by this House on frequent occasions, and I would point out to hon. Members that it is always this question of Spain that is pursued by hon. Members opposite in these Debates, which are raised on the Adjournment.

Let us examine the hon. Member's speech. He went over the history of the bringing into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. He covered a great period of time and was, as far as I could make out, perfectly accurate in his statement of facts. The one thing which was, I think, inaccurate was the suggestion that if the Government had come to the House on certain dates and made statements of the type which the hon. Member described, then the House would have voted in a different way either on the Agreement when it was first signed or on the bringing of the Agreement into force. I am convinced that there is, has been, and always would have been a big majority for the bringing into force of the Italian Agreement, a Treaty on a new basis founded on the old friendship between our two peoples. I am convinced that that is strongly desired in this House and in the country. The hon. Member asked me several questions on the subject of my Noble Friend's speech. He quoted my Noble Friend as saying: Signor Mussolini had always made it plain from the time of the conversations between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government that for reasons known to us all, whether we approved them or not, he was not prepared to see General Franco defeated. He has questioned the replies given to him from these benches giving an explanation of the conversations to which my Noble Friend referred. These conversations related to the conversations in June about the bringing into force of the Agreement, and the particular statement to which my Noble Friend referred was the Genoa speech which had been made in May previously and which the hon. Member opposite has quoted. Signor Mussolini said on 14th May: They (the French) desire the victory of Barcelona. We, on the other hand, desire and mean to see the victory of General Franco.

Mr. Wedgwood Benn

Would the Under-Secretary tell us plainly whether from our Ambassador in Rome or from other official sources we had not received for months before the Genoa speech a perfectly plain statement of what Signor Mussolini intended, namely, the victory of General Franco?

Mr. Butler

I am bound to apply myself to the question upon which the Adjournment has been allowed, and I cannot go off into the general question, but I am able to say that we are always kept fully informed by His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome on all matters, and it would be quite possible for me, had I the whole evening before me, to read out public statements of Signor Mussolini made chiefly in the latter part of 1937 on the subject of his aims in Spain. In fact, if everyone had read the Italian newspapers with the care and attention which many hon. and right hon. Members opposite do, as seen in the use they make of them in putting questions to me in the House, one would have been able to trace many statements by Signor Mussolini himself on his ultimate aims in Spain. I have answered what the right hon. Gentleman asked me, whether we were informed by our Ambassador, and I have told him that we are kept fully informed by him of all cognate matters of this sort. It is, however, impossible to lay before the House the documents contained in diplomatic correspondence.

Lieut.-Commander Fletcher

Is it not the case that very many months ago, in fact, over a year ago, Count Grandi informed the Non-Intervention Committee that Italy would never retire from Spain until General Franco had been victorious?

Mr. Butler

I do not see how all these interruptions alter the case. What has happened is that my Noble Friend made a statement in another place which appears to be borne out by many statements which have been adduced by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. My Noble Friend was making a statement of the aims which have been publicly stated by Signor Mussolini, and there are many cases which could be given of statements by Signor Mussolini of this sort. What we are debating to-night is that the Opposition are attempting to read into these statements, and in particular into the statement of my Noble Friend, something sinister which the Government have not told the House. That is not the case. Let me examine that insinuation. It is that by bringing the Agreement into force we were prepared to connive at the Italian Government ensuring the victory of General Franco. That is not so. Nor is it so that there was any sort of bargain such as that to which the hon. Gentleman opposite referred. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, speaking on Monday last, made it perfectly plain that there has been no secret bargain whatever on this subject between Signor Mussolini and ourselves. When the hon. Member opposite makes out that there was some sort of secret understanding at the time of the Aragon offensive and that we here would have been happy to see the victory of General Franco because it would have brought the Spanish war to an end, I say that there is no truth whatever in this story.

Our policy in the Spanish struggle has been consistent. It has been one of impartiality. We have pursued a policy of non-intervention in an imperfect world at a time of great difficulty. I know we have been attacked, but I would ask the House to appreciate my sincerity in stating that our policy has been one of complete impartiality in the Spanish war.

The hon. Member made another insinuation, that by the statement of my Noble Friend we had in fact connived at breaches of non-intervention. I have stated frequently that we did not approve of the breaches of the Non-Intervention Agreement that had taken place. We have stated that from this Box, and I am ready to state it again. There is nothing in the statement of my Noble Friend that can be taken to mean that the Government are conniving at any breaches that have taken place.

Take another point raised by the hon. Member. Knowing the Italian view, he says, we should not have brought the Italian Agreement into force. He read from the speech made by the Prime Minister on 2nd November, in which my right hon. Friend related the reasons which convinced him that it was wise to bring that agreement into force. He summed it up in the words which were used by the hon. Member, that the three assurances given us by Signor Mussolini, the actual withdrawal of a large body of Italians together with a phenomenon which occurred at that time, namely, the decision of the Spanish Government to withdraw their foreign nationals, all contributed to the elimination of the Spanish question as a menace to peace. The House debated that matter at great length at that time, and decided by a large majority that these were sufficient reasons for bringing the Italian Agreement into force.

Lieut.-Commander Fletcher

Did they constitute a settlement in Spain?

Mr. Butler

If the hon. and gallant Member will refer to my right hon. Friend's speech, he will see that in his view, in the view of the Government, and in the view of the House, they did, in fact, constitute a settlement in Spain such as my right hon. Friend had in view.

Mr. Noel-Baker

The Under-Secretary has left out the vital words They constitute a substantial earnest of the good intentions of the Italian Government. And yet the Foreign Secretary has told us that it is the intention of the Italian Government that Franco should win the war.

Mr. Butler

I have been interrupted five times in a short debate in which I am trying to deal with a point of which I have not had much notice. The hon. Member has given us what has really been a history of the Spanish struggle and read out the words in question, and I did not repeat them owing to the short time I have at my disposal. I have the exact words as stated by the Prime Minister, and they are to be found in column 209 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of that date. He stated that the withdrawal of the foreign nationals formed a considerable contribution to the elimination of the Spanish question as a menace to peace. That was regarded by the Government as a substantial reason for bringing the Italian Agreement into force, and I think it is really otiose at this late hour that the hon. Member should come here and try to make out that we had sinister reasons for not coming to the House in May to explain something about a bargain which had not in fact taken place. He is trying to confuse the issues. We have voted in this House on definite issues. The may be differences of opinion as to whether what has been done constitutes a settlement or not. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister regarded it as constituting a settlement, and we regard the bringing into force of the Italian Agreement as the best in the interests of world peace and best in the interests of the British Empire as a whole, and in view of that I trust that the House will disregard the attempt of the hon. Member to make out that there has been any surreptitious bargain, that there is anything extraordinary in what he has pointed out, and that my Noble Friend was other than perfectly clear in stating facts that were well known to hon. Members and the House in general.

Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-nine minutes after Eleven o'Clock.