HC Deb 09 April 1936 vol 310 cc3040-66

3.36 p.m.

Mr. BOOTHBY

I understand that an hon. Member on the Opposition side of the House intends to raise the question of our policy at Geneva with regard to Abyssinia, and if that be the case, I would like to make one or two observations in that connection which are germane to the topic raised by my hon. Friend who has just resumed his seat, because it is of vital importance to relate our foreign policy to our capacity for translating it into effective action. In other words, our foreign policy must depend upon our general defensive organisation, and for my part I am satisfied that, whatever else may be said, we have not at the present moment defences in any field sufficient to enable us to carry out the foreign policy we are at present attempting to follow.

I would like to say to my Noble Friend who I believe is to reply to this Debate, that I was one of those who very strongly opposed the Hoare-Laval proposals concerning Abyssinia. I did so because I thought we were going back on everything we had been saying for six months and because at that time I thought there was still a chance of achieving unanimity among the members of the Council of the League of Nations and of achieving not unilateral action, but effective combined action against Italy. That chance appears to have gone altogether at the present time, and if it has gone—and I think the House will demand some very definite reassurances from my Noble Friend before they are convinced that it has not gone—I think in the interests of everybody, but perhaps more particularly in the interests of the unfortunate Abyssinians, it would be better to face the fact that we have failed this time. We are not, and never have been, prepared to fight Italy alone on behalf of the Abyssinians.

I address my observations particularly to hon. Members of I he Liberal party and the Labour party, who continue to press for what they call strong action and who say that they are prepared to face the consequences, which may be war. I do not believe the country at the moment is prepared to fight Italy alone on behalf of Abyssinia. I do not believe we can get the country to do that, and if we are not prepared to do it, and if it be true, as I think it appears to be true, that the chance of unanimity and effective action at Geneva has gone, it would only be kind to the Abyssinians if we faced that fact, instead of continuing to lead them—one could hardly call it up the garden path at the present moment—through this hell in the absolutely vain hope that somehow, in some way, at some time effective assistance will be given to them by Geneva. I do not believe that will come.

In the existing circumstances, I cannot understand what was the point in the speech made at Geneva yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I cannot see that his observations at this particular juncture can have any other effect than that of prolonging this ghastly war, and still worse the effect of severing us from France at a moment of very grave international crisis in Europe. We live in a dynamic and even a violent period in the world's history, and it demands swift and decisive action in foreign policy on our part. It may demand violent changes in foreign policy if we are to save the peace of the world and save civilisation. The main objective that remains open to us at present seems to be one and one only—stop the slaughter as quickly as possible and at any cost.

I believe that the mass of British public opinion sees that the attempt at collective security and the attempt to translate that into collective action at Geneva has failed, and if the Government are prepared to face up to that the mass of public opinion would support such action on the part of the British Government. Can we stop the slaughter, can we stop this war in Abyssinia at the present moment by going on trying to "hot up" the Council of the League of Nations to action which in our heart of hearts we know they are not going to take and we know that France is not going to take? They are not going to impose oil sanctions. Is it worth while going on trying, in the present position between France and ourselves? I do not think we have armed forces enough to enable us to do it.

Mr. FOOT

May I ask my hon. Friend, does he not realise that if France were to refuse to back us up in this matter in any proposal we make there will be a far larger rift between France and public opinion in this country than there is at present?

Mr. BOOTHBY

May I ask my hon. Friend whether he thinks that is a desirable thing? I think it would be the most calamitous and the most catastrophic event that could happen. We cannot possibly afford to have a real rift between France and ourselves now or in the future. I believe the peace of the world and the state of civilisation ultimately depends on co-operation between France and ourselves. I fully agree that in seine measure at any rate the French have let us down in this matter. We supported effective action against Italy. We were prepared, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) said, to go the whole way, and France, at the time when action might have been effective, refused to go with us. Let us face up to it, that is all. She did refuse to go with us when effective action could have been taken. Now I believe it is too late to take effective action.

Therefore, I think the kindest thing to everybody, and the kindest thing above all to the Abyssinians, would be to face up to it and say that this time at any rate economic sanctions have failed. The important thing now is to bring the war to a close at any cost because no one is going to fight for Abyssinia. I believe that the best thing is to face up to the realities of the position. My hon. Friend says it is too late. I can only say I do not agree. Nothing is ever too late. There is such a thing as learning by experience, however bitter that experience may be. If the Government are prepared to face up to the position and explain the facts clearly they will find a surprising amount of support even amongst those who are most strongly attached to sanctions. Now may I just say a word or two upon the question raised by my hon. Friend in his most interesting speech.

Mr. SHORT

I submit that the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby) is now taking up the subject which has already, been raised by the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. Donner). Is he entitled to introduce that subject again and thus to supersede my hon. Friend behind me who wishes to raise another matter?

Mr. BOOTHBY

That is a point of Order. I respectfully submit that the question of the general defence of the country is closely bound up with the question of foreign policy and that on a Motion for the Adjournment it is proper to deal with the two together. I understood that it was the intention to have a general discussion of the whole subject of foreign policy and defence but if any of my hon. Friends above the Gangway feel that I have treated them badly by going on to deal with this subject I apologise. I understand, however, that they are not aggrieved and I would point out that there is plenty of time left for an effective and interesting Debate on this vital subject. I do not think that the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Short) had any justification for intervening. I disagree with his view and I am not prepared to be called to order by him.

On the general question of defence I would emphasise and underline the concluding passage in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke as to the vital necessity of providing adequate cruisers for the defence of the trade routes. I think he made a very good point, that when allowance is made for the number of cruisers working in connection with the battle fleet and those which are refitting, refuelling and so forth, we have only about 20 available for the defence of our trade routes and some of those are over-age. That is a most dangerous aspect of this question of food supplies in time of war. What nearly beat us in the last war was starvation, which was far more dangerous to us than any military effort of the enemy and the necessity of keeping our trade routes open at almost any cost is of paramount importance.

There is one other aspect of this question which is also of great importance, and that is the question of production in this country. We subsidise wheat and sugar beet, but they are more or less artificial products in this country and cannot be produced here nearly as cheaply as they can be produced overseas. There are, however, three classes of produce, namely, oats, potatoes and barley, all of which are indigenous to this country and in regard to which, with a little effort by the Government, we could make ourselves self-supporting. The repercussions of the present policy of subsidising wheat nad sugar beet at the expense of the oats and barley growers is very serious indeed on beef production. The price of oats and barley is so low that it is becoming financially impossible for farmers the North-East of Scotland, who produce some of the best beef in the world, to continue breeding first-grade cattle. Not only the standard but the size of the herds is being reduced, and the grade is being lowered, because the prices which the farmer receives for his arable crops are unremunerative.

I re-echo the wish of the hon. Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Boss) for the attendance on this occasion of a representative of the Department of Agriculture. This question raises large issues of policy, and I hope that my hon. Friend opposite will draw the attention both of the President of the Board of Trade and of the Minister of Agriculture to the fact that some of us have been worried by the lack of machinery for dealing with the whole question of food production in this country. We have put a lot of questions recently to the Prime Minister, and we have received very unsatisfactory replies. He has told us that there is no committee set up, that there is no Minister primarily responsible for the survey of agricultural production in Great Britain as a whole and for the necessary steps to be taken to coordinate agriculture as between Scotland and England, and also to survey the whole field where it comes to apportioning subsidies. There are many of us who feel that this lack of central control over agricultural production in this country as a whole is to some extent the cause of the present confusion in policy, because I do not think that anyone, on a long view, would agree that it is either right or fair or wise, in the interests of the country as a whole, to select almost at random two commodities like wheat and beet, of which there is incidentally a world glut, and subsidise them at the expense of every other farmer in Great Britain who is unable, through no fault of his own, to grow those two particular commodities.

I submit, with all the emphasis that I can, that this question should be studied from the point of view not only of the country as a whole, but also of national defence, from the point of view of the commodities of which, if the worst came to the worst and our shipping were seriously interfered with, we should stand in most need. I am not at all sure it would not be found, if the situation ever became desperate, as I pray that it may never become, that oats and potatoes may ultimately be more valuable than beet sugar and wheat. At any rate, I think it is a subject which the Government ought very carefully to study, and let us know what their long-term agricultural policy is, because we do not know at the present time. We do not know what they are going to do about subsidies, or about oats, or about barley, or about Ottawa, or about the Argentine Agreement. We do not know what their policy is with regard to nutrition. We only know that it has been abundantly proved recently by Sir John Orr and other authorities that, in order to attain a satisfactory level of nutrition in this country, apart altogether from any question of war or defence, we ought almost to double our production of certain classes of agricultural produce.

That we know, but how the Government propose to do it we do not know, and I submit that during the Recess the Government might devote their activities, not to individual details, on which undoubtedly the administration is excellent, but to the continuation of a general long-term agricultural policy for this country, designed not only in the interests of defence, but also in the interests of the health of our own people, because there is an impression prevailing, I think on all sides of the House, that there is not an adequate grip, that there is no long-term theme with regard to agricultural policy at the present time, and I believe that from every point of view, whether of social affairs or of defence, it is one of the most important questions and issues which confront us to-day.

3.53 p.m.

Dr. BURGIN

It is only with the leave of the House that I can intervene again to make an answer to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mr. Donner), who was kind enough to give me notice of the subject he wished to raise. I am afraid that with the aspect of the matter which raises questions of defence it is not within my province to deal, but on the other aspects it is, I agree, a problem of staggering magnitude. The hon. Member has called attention to a number of points. He has reduced the demand, which was at one time current, for 12 months' stocks to be held in this country, to six months' stocks. We are now perhaps rather nearer in our ideas, but in addition to the stocks in public granaries, the stocks of wheat held in millers' private silos, of flour in millers' warehouses, stocks of imported flour and flour in bakers' warehouses should be considered. There are also the stocks of home-grown wheat, which, of course, depend on the time of year. All these, taken together, would amount at the present time, according to the best trade information which I have, to something like three months' supplies under normal conditions. So that when we find the difference between us is the question whether one should guard against temporary interruption by having a sufficiency, whether that be three months or six months, it is a matter that could rightly be discussed.

If the hon. Member will allow me, I should like to look into the suggestions that he has been good enough to put forward in his constructive speech, and perhaps communicate with him. In so far as his speech dealt with matters of defence, of course they must be dealt with by others and on another occasion. I should like him and other hon. Members who think, like him, that the question of the storage of food to guard against emergencies is a matter of importance, to consider the enormous implications of a problem of rendering us self-sufficient with regard to homegrown foodstuffs so as to make us capable of standing a siege. If the hon. Member means temporary interruption, I can understand much of his argument, but standing a siege is something bigger than any of us need contemplate. If he will allow me to deal with his speech in the way I have suggested, it will perhaps be the best method of handling it.

Mr. DONNER

I thank my hon. Friend. Of course, I only envisaged a temporary interruption.

3.57 p.m.

Mr. A. HENDERSON

I do not propose to follow the speech of the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby) except to express my disagreement with his suggestion that we should endeavour to obtain peace between Abyssinia and Italy by stopping the slaughter at any price. I agree with him if the price, as far as it is possible to pay compensation, is to be paid to Abyssinia. I think there are very few Members who would agree that the price should be paid to Italy. Italy has broken every pledge that she has made. She solemnly undertook under the Covenant of the League of Nations to respect and preserve the political independence and territorial integrity of every other country belonging to the League, and there is no reason, because Italy has broken her solemn pledges, that this country and the other Members of the League should break their pledges.

I gave notice to the Noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that I desired to raise one or two aspects of that war. I do not think I am guilty of exaggeration when I say that the methods that are being adopted by Italy in the conduct of the war against Abyssinia are causing the most profound concern to the people of this country. We were told by the Foreign Secretary that he had received a report that aeroplanes had flown over an open town—or a town which is alleged by the Abyssinians to be open—and that 300 bombs fell on the town of Harar. Some of them fell on the Swedish Mission, 50 on the Egyptian Red Cross, 14 on the Catholic Mission, four on the French hospital, four on the Harar Red Cross, and others on various churches in the vicinity.

This question concerns every nation, because every nation has subscribed to The Hague Convention of 1907. Under that Convention the bombing of towns, places of religion, hospitals and other charitable institutions was prohibited. This country as well as other countries, including Italy, signed that Convention. Therefore, it is of concern to this country when Italy acts in such a manner as to outrage the conceptions that most decent people have with regard to the way in which she should carry on war. Moreover, it is another example of a definite breach of an undertaking freely entered into by Italy.

Then there is the question of the use of gas. In 1925 the Geneva Gas Protocol was signed, its main provision being that asphyxiating and poisonous gases should not be used by any country which signed the Protocol. Both Italy and Abyssinia have signed it. Moreover, it is interesting to note that during the Disarmament Conference the question of the use of poisonous gases arose once again, and hon. Members who care to inquire further into the subject will find that Italy raised two points in the discussions which took place at the end of 1932 and in the early part of 1933 on the Draft Convention for the Prohibition of Poisonous Gases in War. They said, first, that the sanctions which were to be enforced under the Convention, if and when it came into force, were not strong enough and ought to be made more effective. Secondly, the Convention provided that there should be regional applications of sanctions. "No," said Italy, "it is no use making the application of sanctions a regional matter, it must be made the responsibility of all the nations associated with the League of Nations." The Government and the Council of the League of Nations should not, therefore, have any great difficulty in making up their minds that Italy, through her delegations at Geneva, has in the past taken a very strong attitude with regard to the application of sanctions.

When I raised this matter in the House two or three weeks ago the Noble Lord the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs suggested that I was in too much of a hurry in referring to Article 16 of the Covenant, which deals with the imposition of sanctions, because in 1921 a series of resolutions had been passed one of which provided that sanctions should be applied, as he called it, progressively. Progressively means stage by stage. I should not object to that interpretation, and I am not differing with the Noble Lord on a question of interpretation, but on the question of application. There has been no application of sanctions stage by stage. That is just the trouble. Hostilities began in the first week of October in last year. In the week commencing 11th October four sanctions were imposed by the Co-ordinating Committee: The withholding of credit; the stoppage of imports from Italy into League countries; the prohibition of the supply of munitions of war to Italy; and placing an embargo on a number of commodities required for war purposes.

Those sanctions were imposed in the second week in October. Six months have elapsed, and no further sanctions have been imposed against Italy. In December a committee was appointed to consider the application of an oil embargo. Reporting in February, the committee said that, in their opinion, Italy had stocks of oil amounting to about 800,000 tons, sufficient to last for two-and-a-half or three months. In January, Italy increased those stocks of oil by an amount exceeding 50,000 tons, and she has no doubt been doing that each month since January, so that I should imagine that at present Italy would have not less than 1,000,000 tons of oil in reserve. The rains are expected to commence in May, and for several months there will be very little in the way of military operations. Italy will be conserving or reducing her consumption of oil, and if an oil embargo were imposed next week it is doubtful whether it would become effective before October or November. All this could have been avoided if the Council of the League had taken their courage in both hands and imposed an embargo at once not only upon oil but upon coal, iron and steel and all the other commodities which are required by Italy for war purposes.

Why have the Council of the League not withdrawn the heads of missions? The Noble Lord has referred to the resolution of 1921, and he knows that the suggestion was included in that resolution that the first thing to do was to withdraw the heads of missions, but not to withdraw the whole personnel of the Embassies. Why have the Ambassadors of the League countries not been withdrawn from Rome?

Mr. BOOTHBY

Might I ask one question, because it is very important? Suppose that France refuses, as she has refused, either to withdraw her Ambassador or to impose an oil embargo, would the hon. Member be prepared to recommend that this country should take unilateral action involving a possible risk of war?

Mr. HENDERSON

If my hon. Friend's postulate were correct, I would be prepared to give my answer, but it is not correct. I can only speak of matters within my own knowledge, and the French Government have never been requested, so far as I know, to withdraw their Ambassador from Rome. The question of the withdrawal of heads of missions has never, as far as I know, been considered by the Co-ordinating Committee, and no decision has been taken by that Committee to prevent intercourse between the nationals of Italy and the nationals of League nations. That is another Sanction contained in Article 16.

So far as the hon. Member's question is concerned, I would reply that in the event of France and other countries refusing to carry out their obligations under the Covenant, my hon. Friend would be entitled to say that the League of Nations had broken down and he and his friends could withdraw into their policy of isolation, if that be their policy. That position has never arisen, because 46 nations have given an undertaking, under Article 16, to come to the assistance of any country against whom special measures might be directed by the aggressor country, Italy. The Noble Lord knows that proposals for mutual support in the application of sanctions have been accepted outright by 46 governments. If that be so, why should this Government or any other Government be afraid of finding themselves having to hold the baby on behalf of the League of Nations?

It is far better to take the straight course, with all its risks. The Noble Lord knows as well as I do that Italy is not in a position to overcome the resistance of 46 nations, unless we are to assume that all these other nations are composed of hypocrites, that they are nations who are prepared to give an undertaking to-day and break it to-morrow, that they are all the same as Italy. If that were the position I could understand it, but to think that it is shows a complete lack of knowledge of the psychology of the smaller nations, and even of nations like Russia, and, with great respect to the hon. Member for East Aberdeen, even of France. There may have been a reluctance on the part of a particular French premier. We do not know the nature of the conversations which took place in January of last year between M. Laval and Signor Mussolini, but I have had letters even from Italy in which I am told that it is commonly said in that country that France gave Italy a free hand as a result of those conversations. Whether that be so or not I do not know, but I agree that there seems to have been a reluctance on the part of the late French Government to accept its responsibilities. There is no reason for saying that that is the position with the present French Government, and I would ask the Noble Lord, as far as he is able to influence the policy of his Government, not to follow the example of Italy.

Whatever we may think about the League of Nations, we are pledged with 50 other nations to respect and preserve—the word used in Article 11 is, as the Noble Lord knows, "preserve" and there can be no dispute between us as to what preserve "means—we are pledged with 50 other nations to preserve the territorial integrity of Abyssinia. As far as oil sanctions are concerned, those who say that sanctions mean war must face up to the alternative. Either Italy is to be allowed to be supplied with all these war materials, which is not going to help the cause of peace, or sanctions are going to be imposed, with all the risks of doing so, which will make it more difficult for Italy to carry on this war. I, for one, believe that a victory for Italy will mean a defeat of the League, and not only a defeat of the League, but a defeat of the conceptions on which the League is based—human co-operation, human decency and human welfare. There is no escaping from the position that, if Italy is able to annex the whole or the greater part of Abyssinia as the result of this war, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Covenants contained in the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact are not worth the paper on which they are printed so far as small countries are concerned. Are we to understand that the League only exists to safeguard the security of the more powerful nations, or is it to exist to safeguard the security of all nations, great or small?

This is the testing time, and at the present moment, as the "Times" said in a leading article the other day, the only person who comes out of the present crisis well is the Emperor of Abyssinia. He may be uncivilised, he may be a wild, untutored savage, but at any rate he is prepared to adhere to the solemn obligations into which his country entered at Geneva. On the other hand, we have Signor Mussolini, a dictator with no one to say him nay, repudiating all his obligations, breaking all his pledges, returning to the law of the jungle, the law that might is right, that force shall prevail against the rule of law. I believe that the world has come to a crisis. It is not a question of being bloodthirsty, but a question of standing or falling by the Covenant of the League of Nations. There is nothing wrong with the Covenant. It is based on a conception of law and justice against which no Member of the House can cavil. If it means anything we must see that Abyssinia is not dismembered and its men, women and children outraged and mutilated by a bullying aggressor. I hope the Noble Lord will give us an assurance that the Government will stand firm to its responsibilities and, if necessary, give a lead at Geneva in the direction of preventing Italy from destroying an independent country.

4.16 p.m.

Mr. PRICE

This subject is not raised for the purpose of making any difficulties or causing any embarrassment to the Government. Judging by this morning's newspapers, it appears that the Foreign Secretary is doing his best at Geneva to raise some of the points that have been raised in my hon. Friend's speech. It would be a bad service to the right hon. Gentleman, who appears to be raising this question of restraining Italy from carrying on the use of poison gas and, one assumes, raising the question of extending the sphere of sanctions and if he is unable to get satisfaction, to stab him in the back by any speech here which would make it difficult for him. I generally listen with great interest to the speeches of the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby) but to-day he has disappointed us very deeply. His speech will not be of any assistance to the Foreign Secretary. On the contrary, I fear it is a stab in the back for him if he is, as I think, fighting for the right thing at Geneva. Public opinion is now getting ripe for taking action in this matter. The use of poison gas is appealing to the humanitarian side of our people, besides being a breach of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The question is whether we can do anything effective to stop it. The most effective thing, surely, is the application of sanctions, progressive in such a way as now to include articles which will be effective in putting a stop to these atrocities and preventing Italy getting any further oil for the use of her aeroplanes.

It is, of course, reasonable for the Government to consider whether it is possible effectively to apply them, and I am going to prove that it is possible or that, if it is difficult, it is entirely because of the hesitations and everlastng delays and obstructions which have gone on and for which the Government cannot escape some share of blame. Russia and Rumania, which are big oil producers, have declared their readiness to join in oil sanctions if other nations will do the same. I know that the attitude of the United States may be brought up. What are the facts? A few months ago there was before Congress a neutrality Bill to replace the existing law passed by Congress some years ago. That neutrality law did give certain powers to the President, or at least it did not take away from him certain powers which he might use to make it difficult for the oil exporters in the United States to send oil to Italy. It is a well known fact that the United States Government have control, by means of shipping subsidies, over the oil fleet of the United States. That power is not taken away from the President even under the new neutrality law. By this constant delay and uncertainty and the feeling that we were not serious about this matter, and particularly by the situation created by the Hoare-Laval agreement, the opinion of the United States has been seriously undermined. The people in the United States are a sentimental people, although they have old institutions and traditions which have led them in the past to demand the right to trade with belligerent States, and which brought them into the War in 1917. Even in spite of that, it is always possible to appeal to public opinion in the United States. If it had been shown that we were in earnest, we should have had by this time the United States standing side by side with the League of Nations in taking steps to prevent oil going to Italy. It is just that, shall I say, cowardice—for which I do not say that we alone are responsible but we at least have a share of the blame—which has failed to mobilise public opinion in the United States on the side of oil sanctions.

Of course, we have the opinion of France to consider. I understand that she only supplies to Italy just about that amount of oil to keep the taxi-cabs going in Rome for a few days. In any case, her position is not likely to be serious from a technical point of view, serious though it is from the diplomatic and political point of view. But even here, are we to believe that public opinion in France cannot also be influenced and appealed to provided we show that we are in earnest? It is just that kind of speech delivered by the hon. Member for East Aberdeen which makes it possible for there to be opposition in France and a feeling to exist that we are not in earnest. The anti-League interests in this country and the Press campaign which has been carried on for months against the League, headed by Mr. Garvin in the "Observer" and supported by the isolationists, are doing everything they can to undermine the morale and the authority of the League. It is they who assist anti-League interests and Fascist interests in France. I maintain, therefore, that it is possible for us, if we show that we are in earnest, to take steps in this direction.

There is a further point, and that is that even now if we could get a united front and act in this direction all might be well. We are told that sanctions mean war. If that be true, why is it that we have now the Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, round about the Suez Canal? This House not long ago voted over £7,000,000 for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the Navy in connection with those Fleet movements in the Eastern Mediterranean. My hon. Friends and I on these benches did not vote against that. We moved a reasoned Amendment, and voted for it, calling attention to the foreign policy of the Government which has brought about the situation that made this expenditure necessary, meaning thereby that if we had acted earlier and Italy had been properly held at the beginning, this expenditure would not have been necessary. That does not mean that we were not willing to do whatever might be necessary to support oil sanctions if a dictator chose to run mad and attack us.

I have referred to our failures in the past, but let us not say that all is lost and throw up our hands. Let us not say that the dictator who has torn up the Covenant of the League and is attacking another member shall get away with the spoils and the booty. Let us say that we are ready to support the League and the Covenant, even to the necessity of defending it against any possible aggressor. For these reasons, I have the greatest pleasure in supporting my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswinford (Mr. Henderson) in raising the question of restraining Italy in the use of these terrible weapons of war.

4.23 p.m.

Mr. EMMOTT

It is not very long ago since the hon. Member for the Forest of Dean (Mr. Price) made a very interesting speech on the subject of Germany, with almost every word of which I found myself in complete agreement. To-day he has addressed to the House an argument with which I find myself in complete disagreement. It is impossible to go into the general argument on this occasion, but the cases of Germany and Italy are quite distinct from each other. In the case of Germany we are concerned with a breach of the Locarno Treaty, but in the case of Italy we are concerned with a breach of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The two Treaties give rise to very different obligations and general considerations, and it seems to me that when we are dealing with a breach of the Covenant of the League we have to keep our feet planted very firmly on the ground and address ourselves always to the question, what is and what is not possible. It appears to me that the hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson) and the hon. Member for the Forest of Dean have ignored that fundamental and practical question: What is and what is not possible?

Lieut.-Commander FLETCHER

How can you find out how it is possible to assist the Abyssinians if you do not inquire?

Mr. EMMOTT

During the whole course of the discussions at Geneva last year the British Government were engaged in inquiring what was possible in this respect; and when the hon. Member above the Gangway accuses the Government of cowardice, well, that, in the first place, is a matter of opinion and, in the second place, the hurling of this type of epithet across the Floor of the House is not argument, and does not conduce to a clarification of the subject. With much that was said by the hon. Member for Kingswinford the whole House is in agreement. No one can defend some of the practices which have been employed by the Italian forces in the conduct of the Abyssinian war, and no one can but deplore the whole curse of that frightful conflict. But this, after all, is a practical question and has to be considered on practical grounds. The hon. Member for Kingswinford brought it as a charge against the Government that they had been backward in attempting to persuade the League to fufil in the letter the obligations of Article 16 of the Covenant, and he referred specifically to the provision which refers to the prevention of intercourse between the citizens of the Covenant breaking State and citizens of other States. This bears directly upon the point I wish to make. It is, in fact, impossible in the circumstances of to-day for all the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant to be executed. I have not the Covenant before me, but, speaking from memory, I think it is true that if the provisions of Article 16 were to be strictly executed, His Majesty's Government are here and now under the obligation not only to prevent intercourse between the citizens of Italy and our own citizens, and those of other States members of the League, but also to prevent intercourse between Italian citizens and the citizens of the United States of America. Plainly the thing is impossible. Can anyone seriously suggest that such a course is at this moment possible or should seriously be urged on His Majesty's Government as a practical measure?

Mr. HENDERSON

I did not advocate that we should cease intercourse between the citizens of the United States and Italy. What I suggested was that member States of the League of Nations are under an obligation under Article 16 to prevent intercourse between their nationals and Italians. The question of the United States is a separate and additional obligation imposed on member States to prevent intercourse between their nationals and an aggressor State.

Mr. EMMOTT

I an much obliged to the hon. Member for his intervention, but I understood that his general argument constituted a charge against the Government of backwardness, indeed of cowardliness, because of their failure to induce other members of the League of Nations to do everything that is incumbent upon them under the provisions of the Covenant. On the contrary, I join issue with him, and I join issue, too, with the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby), with whose general conclusions I agree, but do not agree with some of the stages by which he reached those conclusions. He appeared to argue that in the earlier stages we might have taken with other members of the League action that would have been effective. I would ask him, what action could we have taken at an earlier stage that would have been effective On the contrary, I submit that from the beginning we have done all that we could, without producing results which would have defeated the very objects of the League of Nations and without producing results which the British people would not have tolerated.

Mr. BOOTHBY

I think that if in the early stages, six months ago, we had instituted an embargo on oil and on all raw materials and withdrawn Ambassadors, it would have been effective.

Mr. EMMOTT

I am obliged to my hon. Friend for his intervention, which makes his argument clear. I will come then immediately to the particular point with which I wish to deal. Much has been said in the Debates which have taken place in this House recently on the matter of an oil embargo. It appears to me astonishing and fantastic that this subject should have been discussed in the manner in which it has been without, with the exception of the speech just made by the hon. Member for the Forest of Dean, an adequate appreciation of the position of the United States of America, though the hon. Member for the Forest of Dean himself has, I believe, wholly misrepresented, no doubt innocently, that position to the House. What is the value of urging His Majesty's Government to insist on the imposition of an embargo on the export of oil to Italy if, in fact, that embargo must be ineffective? It is my contention that in present circumstances an embargo on the export of oil to Italy must be ineffective on account of the situation of the United States. What is that situation? I must deal with it generally, because when I came to the House to-day I did not know this question would be raised and I did not furnish myself with the authority with which I should otherwise have provided myself.

At the beginning of this year a Bill was presented to Congress by the Administration and there was another Bill brought before Congress at the instance, if my memory is correct, of Senators Nye and Clark. I think that both those Bills, and certainly that of the Administration, contained provisions that would have conferred upon the Executive power to limit the export of oil to Italy and Italian dependencies below a certain limit. In passing, I would point out that the report of the Experts' Committee has now made it plain that an embargo on the export of oil to Italy and Italian dependencies must be ineffective unless there is a limitation of the export of oil from America. The Bill presented to the American Congress by the Administration contained the provisions to which I have referred, but what happened? Interests likely to be affected by these provisions got together and offered the most determined resistance to them. First, there was an amendment which limited the conditions within which an embargo upon export could be operated, the amendment confining the power of embargo within limits far narrower than were originally suggested by the Executive. But the matter went much further, and in the end the result of the discussions and lobbying and so on that took place, was that the Bill was not proceeded with. The present position is that the neutrality legislation which was in operation during the last part of last year has been prolonged for a year, and that under that legislation, which now governs the whole position, so far as the United States is concerned, there is no power whatever in the American Executive to limit the export of oil below a certain level.

Mr. PRICE

May I ask whether it is not the case that the Executive by controlling subsidies to United States shipping can thereby indirectly restrict the import of oil?

Mr. EMMOTT

If there is that power it is an indirect power, and probably would be in fact ineffective. Discussion which has ranged round the matter in the United States has concerned itself with the particular legislative proposals to which I have referred, and the position is as I have stated it, that under the neutrality legislation which has been prolonged for a year the. Executive has no power to impose a limitation upon the export of oil. In those circumstances I suggest that it is nothing short of fantastic to urge upon the Government a course which must in practice be ineffective.

4.42 p.m.

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Viscount Cranborne)

During the last few weeks we have had a considerable number—an unusual number—of debates on foreign affairs and particularly debates dealing with the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. I do not think any of us can complain of that, because we all know with what intense anxiety not only everybody in the House but everybody in the country is looking at that dispute. I think the reason is that everyone in this country at the present time realises that that dispute has a very direct bearing not merely on Abyssinia herself, but upon the whole course of collective security. In the speech which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made in this House on Monday he indicated quite clearly, I think, what must be the immediate procedure with regard to this dispute. He said that His Majesty's Government had pressed that there should be a very early meeting of the Committee of Thirteen and that the purpose of that meeting would be to consider the replies received from Italy and Abyssinia to questions which have been addressed to them by the Chairman of the Committee. He went on to say—I will give his exact words: There must be real conciliation, that is to say conciliation which results in a given period in a cessation of hostilities."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th April, 1936; col. 2514, Vol. 310.] He added that if that did not result, then the Committee of Eighteen would have to be called together again to consider what further measures should be taken. I have been asked this afternoon by various speakers to indicate the further trend of events. As hon. Members know, the Committee of Thirteen met yesterday and they have not yet finished their deliberations. In those circumstances it is quite impossible for me to explain to the House this afternoon what action has been taken, but I can say that my right hon. Friend at Geneva has pressed very strongly the policy he adumbrated in the House on Monday that there should be a short time limit for conciliation, and if no results were obtained it would be a question of calling together the Committee of Eighteen. [Laughter.] It is all very well for the hon. Member in that corner to laugh, but if he considers that the Committee of Eighteen has achieved no results at all, that is not in the least true, as I hope to show later.

Mr. DENVILLE

That is not quite the reason why I laughed. I laughed at the idea of this going from one committee to another and then coming back from that committee to still another committee; and we shall probably be in the some position six months hence as we are in to-day.

Viscount CRANBORNE

In this House we have a good deal to do with corn, mittees, and I do not think hon. Members would agree with the proposition that committees do not produce any results. These committees have already produced results, and will produce more results, and Members of this House should be the first to realise that committees are an essential part of the organisation both of this House and of the League of Nations.

There is, however, another issue which has come before us in the last few weeks with regard to this unhappy dispute. That is an issue which has already been mentioned in this Debate. There are, as hon. Members know, and there have been lately, persistent and we fear well-founded reports that the Italian military authorities have made use of poison gas in their campaigns. Of course, it will be necessary in any examination which is being made to verify that fact carefully, because that is too grave a charge to be made against any nation unless you are absolutely sure. But I see no reason why any such examination should need long inquiry. It should be possible to conclude it in a few days. I believe that is also the view of His Majesty's Government and that, I hope and think, will be the course of action. If it turns out as a result of such inquiry that gas has been used, then I suggest that that is an issue of the very first importance and an issue which affects not merely Abyssinia but indeed the whole future of civilisation. As the hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson) has already said, in 1925 a number of nations negotiated what is known as the Gas Protocol at Geneva and I would like to quote, as the hon. Member did not do so, a few relevant words from that Protocol. It states: Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world…To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations, the signatories declare that the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.

Mr. AMMON

Supposing it is proved that they have used it, what then?

Viscount CRANBORNE

I will come to that point. That is exactly the point which arises at the present moment. I have said that it raises an issue of the first importance. The House knows that that Protocol which I have quoted is unqualified. It is a definite declaration with no qualification whatever. It was signed and ratified by the Italian Government, and if it turns out as a result of examination that they have used this gas, then it is clear that there has been a breach of a solemn undertaking, not only against the Abyssinian Government but against all the other signatories to the Protocol. We have heard a great deal in this war of atrocities of various descriptions. We have heard that the Italians have thrown bombs on unfortified towns and even on the Red Cross. We have heard that the Abyssinians have mutilated numbers of prisoners. All these charges must undoubtedly be investigated in due time, and I would say to the hon. Member opposite, who intervened just now, that the question of the Abyssinian violations has already been referred by the Secretary-General of the League to the International Red Cross for inquiry. I would like him to feel that the League is acting in this matter in an entirely unbiased manner.

But in one respect I think that this question of gas is different from others, because this is a definite breach of a Protocol which was signed, as I understand, by Signor Mussolini's own Government, and it must be a matter of con- cern, not only to the Abyssinians, who are suffering most from it, but to all the signatories of the document. What, after all, would be the use of any treaties, of any protocols, of any international documents of any kind, if they could be violated entirely with impunity at the convenience of any nation?

Mr. BOOTHBY

Do the Government really think it is any use laying down rules for the conduct of war, as if it were a game of football? War is a funny business, and if you start laying down rules for its conduct, surely you may make it more rather than less likely to occur.

Viscount CRANBORNE

I am afraid that I do not at all agree with my hon. Friend. I regard this question of gas as one of the utmost importance. He may be right, and it may be impossible, but if we cannot abolish the use of gas in warfare, it seems to me that we are very nearly at the end of our civilisation. I think we ought to take whatever measures it is possible for us to take to try and avoid that happening. After all, where are you going to stop? Are all nations to be allowed to abuse all the inventions of science and other new discoveries? If that is the case, it seems to me that there is the most terrible Nemesis awaiting our civilisation, and not only so, but at no late date—very soon—if this case is allowed to go by default. If it is condoned, if it is excused, it seems to me that the difficulties of the future will be immensely increased.

The hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby) referred to what the Foreign Secretary said at Geneva. He did not quote his words, but I took him to refer to his remarks on this question. I cannot agree, and I do not believe the great majority of the House will agree, with the hon. Member. Here is an issue of the utmost urgency, and it is really a case where our civilisation is in jeopardy. Was my right hon. Friend to allow this breach of the Treaty to go by without any protest whatever, just because of the temporary inconvenience of making a protest, as I understood my hon. Friend suggested? It is obviously a case of very profound principle, which must be preserved to the full. We may say with pride that in this country such a thing could not happen under a democracy, because a democracy would not permit that type of warfare, and I think that is true, but we have to face the fact that there are countries in Europe where such methods of warfare can be permitted, and we have to see what can be done about it. My hon. Friend, in an intervention just now, said it is not the slightest good making conventions for this purpose, or making rules, and that, when people go to war, they will always break all rules, or so I understood him. That may be true, but to my mind that is no reason for not attempting to do it. We regard ourselves as a civilised world.

Mr. BOOTHBY

indicated dissent.

Viscount CRANBORNE

My hon. Friend may not regard himself as a member of a civilised world, but I think we ought, if we can, to improve the world and make it a better and a more habitable world, especially when the alternative is so tremendous and so grave. So much for the future, but in the meantime, as regards the present action, I suggest to the House that it is essential that the Government should stand by the policy which my right hon. Friend adumbrated on Monday. We must try to obtain a time limit on the conciliation procedure, and a short time limit. If it fails, the question of a meeting of the Committee of Eighteen must be envisaged again. I was asked by an hon. Member whether His Majesty's Government would support the oil embargo. They have already declared that they will support an oil embargo if it was generally supported, and we still hold that opinion.

Mr. EMMOTT

Even though it must be ineffective?

Viscount CRANBORNE

It is also a question of moral and psychological effect. It is not true that, because it may not have any material effect, it will have no effect.

I would like to say one or two words of a general nature. I am sorry that the time alloted to me is not sufficient to answer other points which were raised. Hon. Members have been extra- ordinarily kind and sympathetic to the attitude of the Government—even hon. Members on the other side. It has been an interesting Debate from that point of view, and it has not shown great party bias. There has been a certain suggestion in some of the speeches that the Government have not done all they ought to have done. I sometimes have a feeling that in the minds of hon. Members there is an impression that action under the League has a sort of Jekyll and Hyde character that when it has the character of Jekyll it does all sorts of beneficent things for the world, and that when it is Hyde it is the British Government working behind the scenes. That is not true. It is the same organs that do the good things and what hon. Members think the foolish things. We all recognise that in this case it has not been entirely successful. Nobody views the situation in Abyssinia with any feeling of smug satisfaction, but that is no reason for not going on supporting the principles of the League. It is only by those means that we can get through the period of desolation in which we are struggling and come through into an age in which, in the words I once heard used by the late Lord Balfour, boundaries between the nations are not the lines that divide them but the links that bind them together.

4.58 p.m.

Mr. SANDYS

In the two minutes which are left, I wish to draw the attention of the Government to the fact that a week ago a few hon. Members and I put down a Motion on the Order Paper asking for the revision and modification of the Anglo-Argentine Trade Agreement on the first possible occasion, owing to its detrimental effects upon home agriculture and upon Empire trade. As a result of this treaty the home farmer has been badly hit and Empire trade has been seriously affected. I have not time to elaborate the reasons, but I will only say in a word that Great Britain has not had a square deal. According to a statement made by a prominent member of the Argentine Delegation with reference to the effect of the treaty dealing with meat during the last three years, the Argentine had obtained all the advantages which she could reasonably hope for and he frankly admitted that it was only right that Britain should ask for better terms, and that any reasonable man would admit the fairness of such a request. My time has come to an end, but I do urge upon His Majesty's Government to listen attentively to the appeal of the British farmer.

It being Five of the Clock Mr. DEPUTYSPRAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Resolution of the House of 8th April, till Tuesday, 21st April, pursuant to the Resolution of the House this day.